Abridgement of the Debates of Congress, from 1789 to 1856 (4 of 16 vol.)

The natural course of inquiry now is, into the idea which is asserted to be conveyed, and the expressions which are said to convey it. Concerning the first there is no difficulty. The idea asserted to be conveyed is, "that the arrangement made between Mr. Erskine and Mr. Smith was entered into by the American Government, with a knowledge that the powers of Mr. Erskine were incompetent for that purpose." It would save a world of trouble if the expressions in which this idea is said to be conveyed were equally easy of ascertainment. But on this point, those gentlemen who maintain this result are far from being agreed. Some being of opinion that it is to be found in one place, some in another, and others again assert that it is to be found in the whole correspondence taken together. Never was an argument of this nature before so strangely conducted. Gentlemen seem wholly to lay out of sight that this resolution pledges this House to the assertion of a particular fact, and expresses no general sentiment concerning the conduct of Jackson, or the conduct of his Government. Yet, as if the whole subject of British relations was under discussion, they have deemed themselves at liberty to course through these documents, collect every thing which seems to them indecorous, insolent or unsuitable in Mr. Jackson's language, and add to the heap thus made the whole list of injuries received from Great Britain – impressments, affair of the Chesapeake, murder of Pierce – and all this, for what purpose? Why, truly, to justify this House in making a solemn asseveration of a particular fact! As if any injury in the world could be even an apology for the deliberate utterance of a falsehood. Let the conduct of Mr. Jackson, or of Great Britain, be as atrocious as it will, if the fact which we assert do not exist, we and this nation are disgraced. It is evident, then, that irksome as such a task is, it is necessary that we should submit to a precise inquiry into the truth of that to which we are about to pledge our reputation and that of this people.

In our investigation, let us follow the natural course that is pointed out in the resolution. This alleges that the obnoxious expressions are contained in a letter of the 23d of October, and to this limits our assertion. In this letter, therefore, either directly, or by way of reference to some other, this obnoxious idea or insinuation must be found. For if it be not in this, even if it should be contained in other parts of the correspondence, which is not, however, pretended, still our assertion would be false. Concerning this letter of the 23d of October, I confidently assert, without fear of contradiction, that the obnoxious idea, if contained in that letter, is conveyed in the paragraph I am now about to quote. No man has pretended to cite any part of this letter, as evidence of the asserted insult, except the ensuing, and although there is not a perfect coincidence in opinion as to the particular part in which it resides, yet all agree that it lurks somewhere in this paragraph, if it have any dwelling-place in this letter.

[The paragraph.]

I have quoted the whole paragraph because, in that obscure and general mode of argument in which gentlemen have indulged, it has been read as that entire portion in which the insult is conveyed. It is difficult to conceive how some parts of this paragraph can be thought to convey any insult. However, in prosecution of my plan, I shall first exclude all those parts in which the obnoxious idea cannot be pretended to exist, and then limit my investigation to that part in which it must exist, if, in the letter of the 23d of October, it be conveyed at all.

With respect to the first sentence in this paragraph, I say confidently that the insult is not contained there. It is simply a declaration of the causes of the disavowal, so far from including the obnoxious idea of a knowledge in our Government of the incompetency of Erskine's powers, that in a manner it excludes that idea, by enumerating violation of instructions and want of authority as the only causes of the disavowal. In the first sentence, then, the insult is not. I pass by the second, as it will be the subject of a distinct examination hereafter. The third and fourth sentences it will not even be pretended convey this obnoxious idea. They simply acknowledge the frequency of graduated instructions, and assert the fact that Mr. Erskine's were not of that character. In this there is no insult. As little can it be pretended to exist in the fifth sentence. It merely asserts that Mr. Smith "already," that is, at or before the time Mr. Jackson was then writing, is acquainted with the instructions, (a fact not denied, and not suggested to be an insult,) and that the fact of these instructions being the only ones, Mr. Smith knows from the information of Mr. Jackson– an assertion, which so far from intimating the obnoxious idea of a knowledge in Mr. Smith at the time of the arrangement with Mr. Erskine, that it conveys a contrary idea, by declaring that he was indebted for it to his (Mr. Jackson's) information. Here, then, the insult is not. With respect to the last sentence in this paragraph, the only assertions it contains, are the fact that the terms accepted were not contained in the instructions, and the evidence of this fact derived from the statement of Erskine that those acceded to were substituted by Mr. Smith in lieu of those originally proposed. In all this, the knowledge of Mr. Smith of the incompetency of Mr. Erskine's powers is not so much as intimated. Indeed, no one has pretended directly to assert that they have found it in the parts of this paragraph, from which I have thus excluded the obnoxious idea. Yet, as the whole has been cited, and made the basis of desultory declamation, I thought it not time lost to clear out of the way all irrelevant matter, and to leave for distinct examination the only sentence of this paragraph in which the insult lurks, if it has any existence in this letter. This point we have now attained. And as little inclined as gentlemen may be to precise investigation, they must yield to it. I say, therefore, confidently, and without fear of contradiction, that if the assertion contained in this resolution be capable of justification by any part of the letter of the 23d of October, it is by the following, the only remaining sentence of the cited paragraph which I have not yet examined: "These instructions I now understand by your letter, as well as from the obvious deduction which I took the liberty of making in mine of the 11th instant, were, at the time, in substance made known to you; no stronger illustration, therefore, can be given of the deviation from them which occurred than by a reference to the terms of your agreement." The latter part of this sentence being merely a conclusion from the preceding part, and having no relation to the knowledge of our Government at the time of the arrangement, will be laid out of consideration as being obviously wholly without the possibility of any agency in conveying the obnoxious idea. There remains only the preceding part of this sentence for the residence of the insult. Here, if anywhere, it must exist. Accordingly this is usually shown as the spot where the ghost of insinuation first appeared before the eyes of our astonished Administration. Here we shall again find it; unless, indeed, it were in fact a mere delusion of the fancy, formed of "such stuff as dreams are made." Let us examine by way of analysis.

[Here Mr. Quincy analyzed the paragraph.]

I have thus far proceeded by way of a strict analysis of every part of the correspondence, in which the insulting idea, asserted in this resolution, has been said to be conveyed. I have omitted no part which has been cited in support of this first resolution, and think that I have shown that it exists nowhere in the letter of the 23d of October, either in direct assertion, or by way of reference. And it is concerning what is contained in that letter alone, that the resolution under consideration makes assertion. The House will observe that, according to all rules of fair reasoning, it would have been sufficient for me to have limited myself to show the fallacy of the arguments of the advocates of this insult; it being always incumbent on those who assert the existence of any thing to prove it. I have not, however, thought my duty on so important an occasion fulfilled, unless I undertook to prove what the lawyers call "a negative," and to show, with as much strength of reasoning as I had, the non-existence of the idea asserted in this resolution; with what success, I cheerfully leave to the decision of such thoughtful men in the nation who will take the trouble to understand the argument. There is, however, a corroborative view of this subject, which ought not to be omitted.

The insulting idea said to be conveyed is, that Mr. Smith had a knowledge, at the time of the arrangement, of the incompetency of Erskine's powers, and this because such a knowledge was one of the essential circumstances which could only lead to a disavowal. Now, it does happen that neither Mr. Erskine nor his Government enumerate this knowledge of our Government as one of those essential circumstances. On the contrary, they constantly omit it, when formally enumerating those circumstances. Mr. Canning places the disavowal, solely, on the footing of Mr. Erskine's having "acted not only not in conformity, but in direct contradiction to his instructions." Mr. Jackson, also, in his letter of the 23d, when formally enumerating the causes of the disavowal, says expressly, that the disavowal was "because the agreement was concluded in violation of that gentleman's instructions, and altogether without authority to subscribe to the terms of it." Now, is it not most extraordinary, that after such formal statements, not including the knowledge of our Government among the essential circumstances, that it is on this knowledge the British Government intend to rely for the justification of their disavowal? I simply ask this question, if the British did intend thus to rely on the previous knowledge of our Government, why do they always omit it in their formal enumerations? And if they do not intend thus to rely, in what possible way could it serve that Government thus darkly to insinuate it? But as if it were intended to leave this House wholly without excuse in passing this resolution, Mr. Jackson expressly asserts, in this very letter of the 23d of October, that the information of that fact was derived from him, the knowledge of which, this resolution asserts, he intended to intimate was known at the time of the arrangement with Erskine. For he specifically says: "I have had the honor of informing you that it (Mr. Erskine's instruction) was the only one by which the conditions on which he was to conclude were prescribed." Now, if Mr. Jackson had remotely intended to intimate that Mr. Smith had a previous knowledge of that fact, would he have asserted that he was indebted to him (Mr. Jackson) for the information? Conclusive as this argument is, there is yet another in reserve, which is a clincher. And that is, that this very knowledge which we propose solemnly to affirm Mr. Jackson intimated our Government possessed at the time of the arrangement, it is, from the nature of things, impossible they should have possessed. The idea asserted to be intended to be conveyed is, a knowledge in our Government that the arrangement was entered into without competent powers on the part of Mr. Erskine. Now, the fact that Mr. Erskine's powers were incompetent, it was impossible for our Government to know, except from the confession of Mr. Erskine. But Mr. Erskine before, at the time, and ever since, has uniformly asserted the reverse. So that, besides all the other absurdities growing out of this resolution, there is this additional, that it accuses Mr. Jackson of the senseless stupidity of insinuating as a fact, a knowledge in our Government, which from the undeniable state of things it is not possible they should have possessed. Mr. Speaker, can any argument be more conclusive? 1. The idea is not conveyed by the form of expression. 2. Mr. Jackson, though expressly enumerating the only causes which led to a disavowal, does not suggest this. 3. Mr. Jackson expressly asserts the knowledge that these were the only instructions derived from him; of course it could not have been known previous to the arrangement. 4. Had he been absurd enough to attempt to convey such an idea, the very nature of things shows that it could not exist. I confess I am ignorant by what reasoning the non-existence of an insinuation can be demonstrated, if it be not by this concurrence of arguments.

Before I conclude this part of the subject, it will be necessary to make a single observation or two, on the following passage in Mr. Jackson's letter of the 4th of November, for although our assertion has relation, in the part of the resolution under consideration, only to the letter of the 23d of October, yet this subsequent passage has been adduced as a sort of accessory after the fact. "You will find that, in my correspondence with you, I have carefully avoided drawing conclusions that did not necessarily follow from the premises advanced by me, and least of all should I think of uttering an insinuation, where I was unable to substantiate a fact. To facts, as I have become acquainted with them, I have scrupulously adhered." This the subsequent part of the resolution under debate denominates, "the repetition of the same intimation." But if the argument I have offered be correct, there was no such "intimation" in the preceding letters, and of course no repetition of it here. For if he had, as I think I have proved, in his former letters uttered no such insinuation as is asserted, then all the allegations in this paragraph are wholly harmless and decorous, neither disrespectful nor improper. "But this," says the gentleman from Pennsylvania, (Mr. Milnor) "is conclusive to my mind, that Mr. Jackson did intend to insult, for if he had not would he have refrained from giving an explanation when it was asked?" That gentleman will recollect that the assertion of this House is as to the idea which Mr. Jackson has conveyed in the letter of the 23d, not as to the idea which he intended to convey. Suppose he intended it, and has not done it, our assertion is still false. But will that gentleman seriously conclude, contrary to so obvious a course of argument, that he has asserted, or even intended to assert, this particular idea, merely because he does not choose to explain it? Are there not a thousand reasons which might have induced Mr. Jackson not to explain, consistent with being perfectly innocent of the intention originally to convey it? Perhaps he thought that he had already been explicit enough. Perhaps he thought the explanation was asked in terms which did not entitle Mr. Smith to receive it. Perhaps he did not choose to give this satisfaction. Well that now is "very ungentlemanly," says the gentleman from Pennsylvania, (Mr. Milnor.) I agree, if he pleases, so it was. But does that justify this resolution? Because he is not a gentleman, shall we assert a falsehood?

I briefly recapitulate the leading points of my argument. When Mr. Jackson asserts "that the substance of the instructions was known to our Government," the expression cannot convey the obnoxious idea, because it is not pretended that, in those instructions, the existence of other powers was excluded. When he says, "you must have thought it unreasonable to complain of disavowal," the time of knowledge implied is confined by the structure of the sentence to the time of a disavowal known, and cannot be limited backwards to the time of arrangement made. It is also absurd to suppose that Mr. Jackson would intimate by implication the knowledge of our Government of Erskine's incompetency of powers at the time of arrangement, as an essential circumstance on which the King's right of disavowal was founded, and yet omit that circumstance in a formal enumeration; and lastly, it is still more absurd to suppose that he would undertake to insinuate a knowledge, which, from the nature of things, could not possibly exist.

I have thus, Mr. Speaker, submitted to a strict and minute scrutiny all the parts of this correspondence which have been adduced by any one in support of the fact asserted in this resolution. This course, however irksome, I thought it my duty to adopt, to the end that no exertion of mine might be wanting to prevent this House from passing a resolution, which, in my apprehension, is pregnant with national disgrace, and other innumerable evils.

Friday, December 29

Another member, to wit, from North Carolina, James Holland, appeared and took his seat.

COL. ISAAC A. COLESBreach of Privilege

Mr. Taylor, from the committee appointed to inquire into the circumstances alluded to in the letter of I. A. Coles to the Speaker of the House, made the following report:

That, according to that order, they have taken into consideration the subject referred to them; that in making the proposed inquiry they have taken the depositions of the honorable James Turner, a Senator of the United States, and of Mr. Samuel Sprigg, which depositions they beg leave to report to the House.

From these depositions it was established, to the satisfactory belief of your committee, that Mr. I. A. Coles, without any immediate previous altercation or provocation, did assault and strike a member of this House, within the walls of the north wing of the Capitol; that this act was done on Monday, the 27th ult., about one o'clock P. M., and after this House had adjourned over to the following day.

That, from the assertions of Mr. Coles, and from the actual admission of the member assaulted, your committee were satisfied that the provocation or supposed provocation which occasioned the attack did not arise from any thing said or any act done by the member of this House, in the fulfilment of his duties as a Representative in the Congress of the United States.

Your committee are of opinion that this latter circumstance may be received in extenuation, but cannot be admitted in justification of the act done by Mr. Coles; and, from all the circumstances of the case, they are of opinion that said assault and violence offered to the member was a breach of the privileges of this House.

Your committee further report, that they have considered the letter of Mr. Coles to the Speaker of this House, together with another letter from Mr. Coles addressed to the Chairman of your Committee, (which they also beg leave to report to the House,) that these two letters, in the opinion of your committee, do contain acknowledgments and apologies on the occasion, which ought to be admitted as satisfactory to the House. They therefore recommend the following resolution:

Resolved, That any further proceeding in the above case is unnecessary.

To the Hon. John Taylor, Chairman, &c

Sir: Understanding that the declaration which I had the honor this morning to make before the committee, will be more acceptable if put in the written form, I hasten to comply with what I believe to be their wish, in tendering through them, to the House of Representatives, the renewed assurance "that if I could have supposed that the circumstance alluded to in my letter to the Speaker, would have been construed into a breach of the privilege of the House, it would not have occurred at the time and in the place where it unfortunately happened."

With sentiments of great respect, I am your obedient humble servant,

I. A. COLES.

December 28, 1808.

Ordered to lie on the table.

Conduct of the British Minister

The House resumed the consideration of this subject. At four o'clock Mr. Livermore commenced a speech, but gave way for a motion to adjourn which was carried, 53 to 51.

Saturday, December 30

A motion was made by Mr. Dawson, that the report made yesterday, on the occurrence between I. A. Coles and a member of this House, and the documents accompanying the same, be printed for the use of the members: and the question being taken thereon, it was resolved in the affirmative – yeas 76, nays 25. The report and documents were referred to a Committee of the Whole on Thursday next.

Conduct of the British Minister

Mr. Rhea, of Tennessee – Mr. Speaker, it is not deemed necessary in the observations I will make on the resolution under consideration, to take into view any relations of the United States with Great Britain or France, because it does not clearly appear that any exist, except in this, that the United States are suffering loss and damage. If there be any relations with Great Britain, as they respect the United States, they are negative and suffering; as they respect Great Britain, positive and active. Be they what they may, they are not properly within the range of a discussion on this resolution, which merely respects the conduct of an Ambassador Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary of His Britannic Majesty near the United States. How the relations, if there be any, between the United States and France are connected with the subject of this resolution, will require the greatest civilian, the most wise master of public law, to discover; the consideration of these subjects, except so far as mentioning only circumstances which have existed, will be omitted. Neither does it appear very necessary to recur, in examining this question, in the view I intend to take of it, to writers or authorities, as they are called, on public law or laws of nations, because, if any time heretofore, there was a public law acknowledged and practised by all civilized nations, that law is, in these times, become obsolete and disused; and the great nations of the old world have severally adopted particular systems of law respecting other nations, adapted to their own several existing circumstances, and bottomed on principles different from those which heretofore were denominated principles of public law. When, therefore, in the course of these observations, said Mr. R., I may use the words "public law," my intention is to express thereby an idea of some system named public law, not the law of nature, which, gradually becoming obsolete, has been very little, if any, in use since the commencement of the American Revolution – a system which, notwithstanding it is often appealed to, if ever it did exist, is now only to be found in books, and not in practice. Neither is it intended in this case to draw into notice any diplomatic proceedings many years heretofore transacted, by way of argument, in support of what I may say on the subject of this resolution; inasmuch as the truth and merits of it do rest and depend on the Message of the President of the United States, and the documents accompanying the same, and the other documents relative thereto, which have been received from him since the commencement of this session of Congress, together with some other documents relative to the arrangement of April last, made between the American Government and the honorable David Montague Erskine, late Ambassador Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary from His Britannic Majesty, near the United States.

This resolution is not an answer to a Message from the President of the United States; there are not in it any words of relation between it and a message evidencing an expression or intended direction of that nature; neither are there in it any words manifesting an intention to transmit it to him as an address; for these and other reasons, which, if necessary, might be mentioned, it does not appear that this joint resolution can, with any propriety, be named an answer or response to a Message from the President, or an address to him. It may, therefore, be reasonably expected, that any objection raised against it, on the opinion of its being an answer to a Message from the President, or an address to him, will not prevail.

This resolution is not a declaration of war; it is predicated on a specified conduct of an Ambassador Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary of His Britannic Majesty, near the Government of the United States, and on the denial of the Executive Government of the United States to receive any further communications from him in consequence of that conduct. And it may be observed that, how ancient soever among nations the custom or usage of sending or receiving Ambassadors, Plenipotentiaries, and public Ministers of that kind may be, the custom or usage, it is reasonable to believe, is bottomed only on the great principle of humanity, and does not impose a perfect obligation either to send such minister, or to receive him, or to continue him after being received; therefore, not to send an Ambassador, Plenipotentiary, or public Minister – not to receive such Minister – to recall such Minister – or to refuse to receive any further communications from such Minister, is not a just cause of war; and it follows that the acting or not acting, in either of the cases, is not a declaration of war. True it is, that the resolution states, that "the Congress of the United States do solemnly pledge themselves to the American people, and to the world, to stand by and support the Executive Government in its refusal to receive any further communications from the said Francis James Jackson, and to call into action the whole force of the nation, if it should become necessary, in consequence of the conduct of the Executive Government in this respect, to repel such insult, and to assert and maintain the rights, the honor, and the interests of the United States;" but, it is to be observed, that that pledge goes only to the doing of certain things which may become necessary in consequence of the conduct of the Executive Government in respect to that thing which is alluded to. But if any gentleman is disposed to continue to this resolution the name of an answer to a Message from the President, or address to him, or to call it a declaration of war, he certainly may give it any name he pleases; and I hope, said Mr. R., that I may also have the liberty to give it a name that appears appropriate to it.