Abridgement of the Debates of Congress, from 1789 to 1856 (4 of 16 vol.)

When Mr. Randolph concluded, the House adjourned.

Thursday, January 14

Additional Military Force

The House then resumed the consideration of the bill to raise twenty additional regiments of infantry for one year. – The question being on the passage of the bill.

Mr. Stow, said: Mr. Speaker, I am aware of the delicacy and novelty of my situation, as well from the indulgence of the House, as from the neutral course which I mean to pursue. He must have been indeed an inattentive observer of mankind who proposes to himself such a course without being exposed to difficulties and dangers from every side. Our country has experienced them too long from the great belligerents of Europe, and an individual will quickly find them here. For even this House is not exempt from its great party belligerents who issue their conflicting decrees and Orders in Council; and, in imitation of the hostile Europeans, it is sometimes a sufficient cause of condemnation to have been spoken with by the adverse side. Yet, notwithstanding all these dangers, I mean to launch my neutral bark on this tempestuous ocean, conscious of the rectitude of my intentions, and humbly hoping for the approbation of my country and my God.

The proper extent of the discussion growing out of this bill seemed to be confined to these inquiries: Can the force contemplated be obtained? If obtained, will it accomplish the end proposed? And lastly, will the force be an economical one? If the discussion had been confined to these limits I would have listened, and not have spoken; but, sir, it has taken a wider range, and assumed a more important aspect. It has embraced the present, and past, and the future. The causes of the war, and the mode of conducting it, have been investigated, and even confident predictions have been made as to its end. The history and the state of our negotiations have been carefully examined – and the Presidential order of succession has been scrutinized by the light of experience as well as that of prophecy. We have sometimes been forced into the scenes of private life; and, at other times, we have been chained to the car of Napoleon. In short, sir, the discussion has ranged as wide as existence, and, not content with that, the speakers "have exhausted worlds, and then imagined new." I do not pretend to censure this – it may be well for the people to have their political concerns thus splendidly dressed and passed in review before them. But still I will attempt to call the attention of the House from the regions of fiction, of fancy, and of poetry, to the humble, but I trust no less profitable, sphere of reality and prose. Passing by many of those things which have amused by their ingenuity, or surprised by their novelty, but which do not deserve a serious answer, I will endeavor to state distinctly the grounds taken by the opponents of this bill, or rather the opponents of furnishing the means of prosecuting the war: Firstly. It is alleged "that the war was originally unjust." Secondly. "That if the war was originally just, it has become unjust to continue it in consequence of the revocation of the British Orders in Council." Thirdly. "That it is inexpedient to prosecute the war, because we have no means of coercing our enemy or enforcing our claims." Fourthly. "That we are unable to support the war." And fifthly. "That, in consideration of all these circumstances, the House ought to withhold the means of further prosecuting the war."

First, then, it was alleged that the war was originally unjust. Here let me call on the House to distinguish between unjust and inexpedient. Nothing can be more important than to have clear and distinct ideas about those words which lie at the bottom of a science, or inquiry. This is happily illustrated in mathematics – there every word, by the help of diagrams, is carefully defined; and the consequence is, that there are no disputes among mathematicians, while their labors have done honor to mankind. A thing may be just and yet inexpedient: the justice of an act relates to the conduct of another, the expediency of our own situation. It may be just for me to sue the man who withholds from me the smallest sum; and yet so inexpedient as to be even ridiculous. Thus a war may be perfectly just, and at the same time highly inexpedient. This, if I mistake not, was the ground generally taken the last year by the opponents of the war, particularly by the gentleman from Virginia before me, (Mr. Sheffey,) which pointed out the distinction which I have endeavored to do, though with more ability and success. I hope the House will bear this distinction in mind; because it is of the greatest importance in the investigation which I intend to make. Before I enter further on the argument, I ask the House to indulge me for a moment while I explain my views relative to the commencement of the war. I never saw any want of provocation on the part of Great Britain. I never for an instant doubted the justice of the war, while I urged its inexpediency with all my might. I considered man placed here by a beneficent Providence, on a fertile soil, and in a happy climate, enlightened by science, and protected by the wisest of laws. By our Revolution cut adrift, as I may say, from the old world, before the storm which was about to desolate Europe arose, I fondly hoped that this new world would furnish one fair experiment of what science, liberty and peace, might achieve, free from those corruptions which have eternally attended on war. I hoped to see the country improved, and bound together by roads and canals, to see it adorned by literary institutions, and by every establishment which reflects honor upon man. Nor do I yet believe that this was an Utopian vision, or an idle dream. I still believe it might all have been realized by a different course – but the nation has determined on war, and, though it was not my choice, I still maintain that it is not unjust.

I shall now examine the second proposition, "that if the war was originally just, its further prosecution is unjust." On what ground does this rest? It is this, that the Orders in Council were the cause of the war; those orders having ceased, the prosecution of the war becomes unjust. Here again justice and expediency are confounded. It was never maintained, that the Orders in Council rendered war more just than many other outrages, though they went farther to prove its expediency, and even necessity. It therefore follows, that their repeal does not affect the justice of the war; unless accompanied with compensation for the spoliations committed under them, and atonement made for other wrongs. Neither of these, is it pretended, has been done; except so far as relates to the affair of the Chesapeake, and which I purposely left out of the catalogue of grievances. An injury which was a just cause of war, remains a just cause for its continuance, till atonement is offered, or till it is settled by negotiation. But, sir, an ample justification of war remains in the impressment of our seamen. The claim on our part is not, as has been alleged, a claim to protect British seamen – it is a claim to protect American citizens. Nay, more, as respects the justice of the continuance of the war, it is a claim only, that they will cease from the practice during the truce, that it may be seen whether it is possible to arrange it by negotiation. Is it unjust to continue the war, till this demand is complied with? or does any American wish to see his country prostrated still lower?

Having thus far explained my ideas relative to the justice of the commencement and continuance of the war, I will now proceed to answer the third objection, namely: That it is inexpedient to carry it on, because we have no means of coercing our enemy – of compelling him – to what? barely to a just and honorable peace; for that is all we demand. And have we no means of doing this? Better, then, to surrender the charter of our independence, confess we are incapable of self-protection, and beg his most gracious Majesty to again take us under his paternal care. Such a doctrine, sir, is as unfounded, as it is degrading to the American character. We have ample means of compelling Great Britain to do us justice; they are to be found in the value of our commerce; in the enterprise of our privateers; in the gallantry of our ships of war, and the conquest of her provinces. Our custom (considering her in the light of a mechanic or merchant who supplies) is of vital importance to Great Britain. It is not to be measured by its amount, in pounds, shillings, and pence, but by the strength and support she derives from the intercourse. For, while I admit that Great Britain does not send half her exports to the United States, I do maintain, that the custom of this country is of more importance to her, than that of the whole world besides. It is with a nation as with an individual, if he exchange luxuries for luxuries, or superfluities, such as ribands for ribands, which he consumes, he adds nothing to his wealth; but if he exchange his luxuries, or his ribands, for bread, or for such materials as give scope to his industry, he is then benefited, and enriched by the interchange. Such is the situation of Great Britain with regard to America. She, and her dependencies, receive more of provision, and raw materials, from America, than from all other parts of the world together. Our trade exactly gives effect to her industry, her machinery, and her capital. And it is this which has, in a great degree, enabled her to make such gigantic efforts in the awful contest in which she is engaged. Our privateers; will they have no effect on Great Britain? Will she learn nothing from the loss of three or four hundred ships? And will she be insensible to the efforts of our little Navy? Can they touch no nerve in which Britons feel? Far different are my conclusions, from what I have seen in British papers – they show that she is tremblingly alive to that subject.

Sir, I will now consider her provinces, about which so much has been said. I, too, will speak of that wonderful country, called Canada, which unites in itself all contrarieties! Which is so cold and sterile, as to be not worth possessing; and so fertile, that if, by any calamity it should become ours, it would seduce away our population; which is so unhappy under the British Government as not to lure our inhabitants; yet so happy, that it is criminal to disturb their felicity; – whose inhabitants, if united with ours, would destroy us, because they have none of the habits of freemen; and who, well knowing the privileges of their free Government, will defend them to the last. A country which is of no importance to Great Britain, and whose loss would not make her feel; a country which is so valuable to Great Britain that she will never give it up. A country so weak that it is inglorious to attack it; and a country so strong that we can never take it. But, sir, leaving these, and a thousand other contradictions, the work of fancy or of spleen, I will present to the House what I believe to be a true view of the subject, drawn from a near residence and much careful examination. Canada is of great importance both to Great Britain and the United States. It is important to Great Britain in the amount and kind of its exports. In the last year preceding war, its exports amounted to between seven and nine millions of dollars, an amount almost as great as the exports of the United States preceding the Revolutionary war. And had the most discerning statesman made out an order, he could not have selected articles better adapted to the essential wants of Great Britain. It has been said that Canada is of less value than one of the sugar islands of the West Indies. Sir, in the present state of the world, Canada is of more importance to Great Britain, in my opinion, than the whole West India Islands taken together. In danger, as she is, of being shut out from the Baltic, and fighting for her existence, she wants not the luxuries, the sugars, and the sweetmeats of the West Indies – she wants the provisions, the timber, the masts, and the spars of the North.

Canada is also of the greatest importance to the United States, in a commercial and political point of view. I have in a great measure explained its commercial importance, by stating its exports; a large portion of which were the products of the United States. Let an attentive observer cast his eye for one moment on the map of North America; let him bear in mind, that from the forty-fifth degree of latitude the waters of Canada bound for a vast extent one of the most fertile, and which will become, one of the most populous parts of the United States; and he will readily perceive that the river St. Lawrence must soon be the outlet for one-third of all the products of American labor. The same circumstances will enable it to lay an impost on one-third of our imported articles. Nor will the evil to our revenue end here. Great Britain will be enabled to smuggle her goods through this channel into all parts of the Union. It will be in vain that you attempt to counteract her by laws; from the great length and contiguity of her possessions, she will forever evade them, unless by your laws you can change the nature of man. But its greatest importance is in a political point of view: for, although not as happy in its government as the United States, it is sufficiently so to draw off multitudes of our new settlers, when the intermediate lands of the State of New York, which separate it from New England, shall be fully occupied. From this circumstance it will divide the American family, and, by the commercial relations which I have pointed out, it will exert a dangerous influence over a part of our country; for the transition from commercial dependence, to political allegiance, is too obvious to be insisted on. Having endeavored to show the importance of Canada to both of the contending nations, I I will only add that it is within our power.

The fourth objection is, that we cannot support the war – that we have not the ability to carry it on. Before I proceed to answer this objection, permit me, sir, to notice a single inconsistency of the gentlemen by whom it has been urged. It is this: in one part of their argument, they represent the people as too happy to enlist, and in another part as too poor to pay! Both of these propositions, I presume, cannot be true. Not to dwell longer, however, upon this contradiction, I do maintain, sir, that the nation is fully able to prosecute the war. On what does the ability of a nation depend? A person who will give himself the trouble of examining things rather than words, will find that it is proportioned to the number of laborers and the productiveness of their labor. Wherever, from soil, climate, or improvement, the labor of a country will produce more than a supply of the necessaries of life, it is evident that the surplus time may be devoted to idleness, to the production and consumption of luxuries, or to the carrying on of war. To illustrate this farther – suppose the labor of a person for five days will support him six, then it is clear, that the labor of five men will support the sixth man in idleness or in war. Now, sir, there is nowhere that the labor of seven millions of people will produce so much as in this country; consequently, nowhere have seven millions of people so great an ability to carry on a war. The quantity of circulating medium, whether made of paper or of silver dollars, has very little to do with the subject. If it is made of paper, and to a great extent, it only shows that the people are in their habits commercial; and that the faith of contracts is well supported. The real ability of a nation lies in what I have stated; and he must be a weak politician who cannot call it forth.

Mr. Speaker, I will now consider the last, and by far the most important objection of all; and one, without which, I certainly would not have spoken. It is, that in consideration of all the circumstances in which we are placed, it is the duty of this House to withhold the means of further prosecuting the war. It will not be denied, I trust, that this is a fair statement of the scope and object of most of the reasonings which have been employed; and that without this construction, they would be irreconcilable with common sense. This doctrine, in my opinion, goes not only to the overthrow of our constitution, but to the destruction of liberty itself. The principle of our Government is, not only that the majority shall rule, but that they shall rule in the manner prescribed by the constitution. So that if it could be proved that a majority of the people were in favor of certain measures, it would not be sufficient till they had pronounced that decision through the constitutional organs. In short, it must have been a principal object with the framers of our constitution to suspend, at least for a limited time, the effects of popular opinion. The constitution has committed the legislative power to three co-equal branches; and to the same hands has it entrusted the power of declaring war; while it has expressly confided the treaty-making power (and which alone can make peace) to two only of those branches. The claim now set up, goes to invest that branch which has no authority in the matter, not only with the treaty-making power, but also with a complete control over the other two branches. Thus one branch of the Government forcing the nation to desist from doing what three, including itself, had thought best to perform. Let us test the correctness of this principle by applying it to another co-equal branch of the Government. Let us suppose the President has made a treaty of peace, which is disapproved of by the Senate – and suppose upon this he should say, the war ought not to be further prosecuted, and refuse to employ the public force, would you not impeach him? Most unquestionably you would. I expressly admit that cases may be imagined, where such a course would be proper – where it would be not only the duty of this House to withhold supplies, but where it would be the duty of an individual to resist the laws; but such are extreme cases, not provided for by any organization of Government. What, sir, has been the practice of the British House of Commons? Have they ever refused supplies because a war was unpopular, since their revolution? Did not the same Parliament, which resolved that they would consider any man as an enemy to his country, who would advise his Majesty to the further prosecution of offensive war in America, still vote the means for carrying on the war? A similar case occurred when Mr. Fox came last into power – he disapproved of the commencement and conduct of the war, and yet he called for and received the necessary supplies.

Mr. Calhoun observed, that he could offer nothing more acceptable, he presumed, to the House, than a promise not to discuss the Orders in Council, French decrees, blockades, or embargoes. He was induced to avoid these topics for several reasons. In the first place, they were too stale to furnish any interest to this House or country. Gentlemen who had attempted it, with whatever abilities, had failed to command attention; and it would argue very little sagacity on his part not to be admonished by their want of success. Indeed, whatever interest had been at one time attached to these subjects, they had now lost. They have passed away; and will not soon, he hoped, return into the circle of politics. Yes, sir, as reviled as has been our country's efforts to curb belligerent injustice, as weak and contemptible as she has been represented to be in the grade of nations, she has triumphed in breaking down the most dangerous monopoly ever attempted by one nation against the commerce of another. He would not stop to inquire whether it was the non-importation act, or the menace of war, or, what was the most probable, the last operating on the pressure produced by the former. The fact is certain, that the Orders in Council of 1807 and 1809, which our opponents have often said that England would not yield, as they made a part of her commercial system, are now no more. The same firmness, if persevered in, which has carried us thus far with success, will, as our cause is just and moderate, end in final victory. A further reason which he had, not to follow our opponents into the region of documents and records, was, that he was afraid of a decoy; as he was induced to believe from appearances that their object was to draw our attention from the merits of the question. Gentlemen had literally buried their arguments under a huge pile of quotations; and had wandered so far into this realm of paper, that neither the vision of this House has been, nor that of the country will be, able to follow them. There the best and worst reasons share an equal fate. The truth of the one and error of the other, are covered with like obscurity.

Mr. C. said he would not multiply proof on a course of conduct the bad effect of which was too sensibly felt to be easily forgot, and the continuation of which was but too apparent in the present discussion. For what was the object of the opposition in this debate? To defeat the passage of this bill? It has been scarcely mentioned; and contains nothing to raise that storm which has been excited against it. The bill proposes to raise twenty thousand men only, and that for one year; and surely there is nothing in that calculated to lay such strong hold of the jealousy or fear of the community. What then is the object of the opposition? Gentlemen certainly do not act without an intention; and wide as has been the range of debate, it cannot be so lawless as to be without an object. It was not, he repeated, to defeat the passage of this bill; no, but what was much more to be dreaded, to thwart that, which the bill proposes to contribute to, the final success of the war; and for this purpose he must do the opposition the credit to say, they have resorted to means the best calculated to produce the effect. In a free Government, in the government of laws, two things are necessary for the effectual prosecution of any great measure; the law by which the executive officer is charged with the execution and vested with suitable powers; and the co-operating zeal and union of the people, who are always indispensable agents. Opposition to be successful must direct its efforts against the passage of the law; or, what was more common and generally more effectual, to destroy the union and the zeal of the people. Either, if successful, is effectual. The former would in most cases be seen and reprobated; the latter, much the most dangerous, has, to the great misfortunes of Republics, presented at all times a ready means of defeating the most salutary measures. To this point the whole arguments of opposition have converged. This gives a meaning to every reason and assertion, which have been advanced, however wild and inconsistent. No topic has been left untouched, no passion unessayed. The war has been represented as unjust in its origin, disastrous in its progress, and desperate in its farther prosecution. As if to prevent the possibility of doubt, a determination has been boldly asserted not to support it. Such is the opposition to the war, which was admitted on all sides to be just; and which in a manner received the votes even of those who now appear to be willing to ruin the country in order to defeat its success.

But, say our opponents, as they were opposed to the war, they are not bound to support it; and so far has this opposition been carried, that we have been accused almost of violating the right of conscience, in denying the right set up by gentlemen. The right to oppose the efforts of our country, while in war, ought to be established beyond the possibility of doubt, before it can be justly adopted as the basis of conduct. How conscience can be claimed in this case cannot be very easily imagined. We oppose not by laws or penalties; we only assert that the opposition experienced cannot be dictated by love of country, and is inconsistent with the duty which every citizen is under to promote the prosperity of the Republic. Its necessary tendency is to prostrate the country at the feet of the enemy, and to elevate a party on the ruins of the public. Till our opponents can prove that they have a right which is paramount to the public interest, we must persist in denying the right to thwart the success of the war. War has been declared by a law of the land; and what would be thought of similar attempts to defeat any other law, however inconsiderable its object? Who would dare to avow an intention to defeat its operation? Can that, then, be true in relation to war which would be reprobated in every other case? Can that be true which, when the whole physical force of the country is needed, withdraws half of that force? Can that be true which gives the greatest violence to party animosity? What would have been thought of such conduct in the war of the Revolution? Many good citizens friendly to the liberty of our country were opposed to the declaration at the time; could they have been justified in such opposition as we now experience? To terminate the war through discord and weakness is a hazardous experiment. But, in the most unjust and inexpedient war, it can scarcely be possible, that disunion and defeats can have a salutary operation. In the numerous examples which history furnishes, let an instance be pointed out, in any war, where the public interest has been promoted by divisions, or injured by concord. Hundreds of instances may be cited of the reverse. Why, then, will gentlemen persist in that course where danger is almost unavoidable, and shun that where safety is almost certain?