Abridgement of the Debates of Congress, from 1789 to 1856 (4 of 16 vol.)

Mr. Archer said, so great was the respect which he felt for the House, so deep was the consciousness which he entertained of his inability to do justice to a cause, especially one of so much magnitude and importance, of which he might be the advocate, that he would be doing injustice to his feelings were he not to express the weight of the embarrassments which oppressed him. But the wide range which the present discussion had taken, involving considerations of great national interest, and calling forth the cruel asperities of political intolerance, seemed to leave him no alternative in the discharge of his duty, but to repel the unfounded insinuations which had flown in so copious a stream from the other side of the House. Were gentlemen to confine themselves to a temperate investigation of the propriety of adopting measures either recommended by the Executive, or proposed by the majority, who is there that would not listen with pleasure and satisfaction? But when the liberty of debate was prostituted in disseminating the most unfounded charges, in the indiscriminate abuse of the constituted authorities of the nation, he confessed he could not "always be a hearer, and never reply." The few observations he had to make would be without either system or arrangement, having bestowed no previous consideration on the subject, and should be confined not so much to the bill for raising an additional army, as the remarks and arguments of those gentlemen who had preceded him on the other side of the House.

And here, he said, he hoped to be permitted first to notice the charge which had been confidently made by a gentleman from New York (Mr. Gold) against the majority of the House. He had asserted (and he seemed to dwell upon the assertion with peculiar satisfaction) that war had been declared by Congress prematurely and without due preparation; that to embark in a war with a powerful nation, without a large standing army, was impolitic in the extreme. This principle, said Mr. A., in the general might be true, but it had certainly no application to this country. Our Government was founded on the broad basis of popular opinion, liable to fluctuation upon the first appearance of any system which might be calculated to destroy the liberties of the people. A laudable jealousy of their rulers throbbed in the heart of every man in the country, who would seize the first opportunity to change an Administration that would raise a standing army in time of peace, whatever might be the professed objects of such an Administration. From this jealousy the natural result would be, that the men who raised the army would never declare the war which it was intended to wage. He would refer to the Administration of Mr. Adams. An army had been then raised, or attempted to be raised, to defend the country against an anticipated French invasion. The professed object was disbelieved, and the people, apprehending an invasion of their rights, removed from power the men who had voted for the army. All our institutions were repugnant to a standing army in time of peace. Anticipated invasion would seldom justify it, because it might be made a pretext for the purpose at all times, and with the most dangerous views. What had been said by the gentleman from Massachusetts (Mr. Quincy) seemed to confirm this position, for he had expressed his fears of the army, even in a state of declared war, when that army was to be employed out of the limits of the country; and if jealousy existed at such time, the conclusion would naturally follow that it would exist to a greater degree in a time of peace. The argument then of the gentleman, if it proved any thing, proved too much, because its effect would always be to frustrate the views of the Government, and prevent it from going to war to avenge even the grossest insult, or to assert even its most indisputable rights. But an appeal had been made with much confidence to the history of all Europe, to bear him out in the charge he had made, and it had been said that no instance of a nation's engaging in a war without having a well-regulated and disciplined army could be adduced. This, said Mr. A., will be admitted, but he presumed it was incumbent upon the gentleman to show that some analogy existed between the Governments of Europe and that of the United States, before his argument could have any application to the subject. There the people had no voice in the selection of their rulers. There the arbitrary will of the monarch was the law of the land, and his decrees, however oppressive or obnoxious, were enforced by the hand of power, without a murmur or complaint. There each Government is surrounded by kingdoms powerful and strong, the ambition of whose rulers prompts them to seize upon every occasion to enlarge the boundaries of their dominions. For one of these powers, even in the most peaceful condition of the world, to be destitute of a powerful and permanent military force, would evince an inattention to its own security and independence, which would demonstrate the incapacity of its monarch to govern his subjects, or to preserve the integrity of his possessions. But the dissimilarity of the Government and situation of the United States would show the inapplicability of the gentleman's maxim to this country. Here we have no powerful neighbor whose incursions we dread. Here we are happily removed, by a wide-extended ocean, from those nations who, upon a declaration of war by us, could overrun the country with a military force, or endanger its civil institutions. Here we have a people proudly jealous of their liberties, who will put down constitutionally every attempt in a state of peace to raise a Military Establishment. To have delayed, then, the declaration of war against England, until the ranks of the army authorized to be raised had been completely filled, would have been a most certain course to have defeated the object which Congress had in view. The jealousies and fears which would have been the necessary consequence of such delay, would have brought into power men of far different views; men who, if the natural conclusion to be drawn from the arguments of some of them could be admitted, would sooner submit to all the indignities we had received from Great Britain, than resist her. The war was therefore not declared prematurely, but was delayed to as late a period as the nature of our institutions would permit. And, if what he had said would not be sufficient to satisfy the gentleman from New York of his error, the army that was so shamefully surrendered at Detroit, if it had been commanded by a man of spirit and fidelity, would long before this, by the possession which it would have given us of an important province of the enemy, have convinced him that war was not declared without preparation. But, for having said so much upon this point, some apology seemed to be necessary upon his part, and he could only say that he had been induced to do so, because, having been one of the majority who voted for war against England, the charge seemed to be an imputation against his character, which the duty every man owed to himself bound him to repel.

It had been said by a gentleman from Connecticut (Mr. Pitkin) that the nature of the war had been changed; the principal cause had been removed by the British Order in Council of June 23d, 1812, by which her previous orders were repealed; that it was a well-ascertained fact that war would not have taken place if this intelligence had reached the United States before its declaration; and that the Executive ought to have acceded to the terms proposed through Admiral Warren, and have terminated the contest. These were grounds which demanded some consideration, and he trusted that he would be able to show, from authentic documents, that his premises were erroneous, and that of course his conclusions did not follow. But he would now admit, for the sake of argument, (what he should hereafter prove incorrect,) that the Orders in Council were the principal cause of the war; he could not, for himself, see how, even then, the war ought in justice to have terminated. Did it follow that minor considerations should be placed out of view or yielded up entirely? Would it have been proper for the Government to have entered into no stipulations for the security of American seamen? Would it have been proper in them to have claimed on behalf of our citizens no indemnity for the vast amount of spoliations which have been made on the property of American merchants? Unquestionably not. Until these considerations, admitting them to be of minor importance, should have been satisfactorily adjusted, to have made a peace, in his opinion, would have been the height of impolicy. Sir, said he, it is not sufficient that the injury should cease, but that ample compensation should be made for the commission of the wrong. This was the case every day between individuals in civil society, and why ought not the rule to apply with equal force to States, in their relation to each other? Justice was its foundation, and that would operate upon the one as well as the other. These considerations alone, perhaps, ought to be deemed sufficient to show that the course the gentlemen would have taken would have been unwise. But, supposing them to have no weight, he thought it might be satisfactorily shown that, to have acceded to the terms proposed by the British Government, would have been an actual abandonment of the principal cause which had induced hostilities. To have negotiated without entering into an arrangement in relation to the important interest of impressment, would unquestionably have been a relinquishment of the right which we claimed, to be exempted from its exercise. But it was said that was a secondary consideration. From whence was this conclusion drawn? Were we more regardful of the property than the personal liberty of the citizen? Was it taken from an impression which had gone abroad in the country? or from the unofficial conversation of the members of the House? These opinions (if the expression were allowed) he would call extra judicial, and entitled to no consideration. But to show that impressment was the principal cause, he would resort to the best evidence of which the case was susceptible. He would appeal to the archives and records of the country, which, in his opinion, would be conclusive, to show what the opinions of Congress were upon that subject. And, in the first place, would call the attention of the House to the report of the committee to whom our foreign affairs were intrusted, which was made on the 29th of November, 1811. After commenting on the operation of the Orders in Council, they say:

"That they are not of that sect whose worship is at the shrine of a calculating avarice, and while they are laying before the House the just complaints of our merchants against the plunder of their ships and cargoes, they cannot refrain from presenting to the justice and humanity of their country the unhappy case of our impressed seamen. Although the groans of these victims of barbarity for the loss of (what would be dearer to Americans than life) their liberty; although the cries of their wives and children in the privation of protectors and parents have of late been drowned in the louder clamors at the loss of property; yet is the practice of forcing our mariners into the British navy, in violation of the rights of our flag, carried on with unabated rigor and severity. If it be our duty to encourage the fair and legitimate commerce of the country by protecting the property of the merchant, then, indeed, by as much as life and liberty are more estimable than ships and goods, so much more impressive is the duty to shield the persons of our seamen, whose hard and honest services are employed equally with those of the merchants, in advancing, under the mantle of its laws, the interests of their country."

Again, the same committee, in the report which they made to the House, detailing the causes which should induce the House to declare war, say, (after speaking of the evils flowing from the Orders in Council:)

"That they will proceed to the consideration of another wrong, which has been still more severely felt. This is the impressment of our seamen, a practice which has been unceasingly maintained by Great Britain in the wars to which she has been a party since our Revolution. That they cannot convey, in adequate terms, the deep sense which they entertain of the injustice and oppression of this proceeding. Under the pretext of impressing British seamen, Americans were seized in British ports, on the high seas, and in every other quarter to which the British power extends, were taken on board British men of war, and compelled to serve there as British subjects. In this mode our citizens were wantonly snatched from their own country and their families; deprived of their liberty, and doomed to an ignominious and slavish bondage; compelled to fight the battles of a foreign country, and often to perish in them. Our flag has given them no protection; it has been unceasingly violated, and our vessels exposed to danger by the loss of the men taken from them. That while this practice is continued, it is impossible for the United States to consider themselves an independent nation, for every case produces a new proof of their degradation."

These reports, by the adoption of the measures they recommended, were sanctioned by the Congress of the United States, and may be considered as furnishing strong, if not full and complete evidence, that the Legislative department of the Government considered the impressment of our seamen as the principal cause which impelled them to have recourse to the last resort of injured nations. The opinion of the Executive had been manifested in clear and explicit terms upon the subject, in the Message of the Chief Magistrate of the 1st of June, 1812. Thus we have these concurrent proofs against the assertions of the gentleman from Connecticut, (Mr. Pitkin.) If, then, as it appears clearly to have been, from the documents before alluded to, that impressment was the principal cause of the war, that it was an injury which no independent nation could submit to without surrendering a portion of its sovereignty, would it not be admitted, even on the ground which had been taken, that, to have terminated the war by acceding to the propositions alluded to, would have been degrading to the nation, and have manifested the incompetency of the Executive to have conducted with firmness the helm of State which had been submitted to his guidance and direction? And no doubt could be entertained had such an event taken place, but we should have heard denunciations against the Administration proceeding from the very quarter whence they now flow. Then they would have been made with infinitely more justice, because they would have been supported by reason and by truth. We should have then found the opposition appealing to the sympathies of the people, and proclaiming that their most inestimable rights had been surrendered by Government in the pacification; that although they were originally opposed to a war, when it had once been declared they would have prosecuted it until the claim had been abandoned by the British Government. For, it cannot be concealed that unless, in the present contest, Great Britain can be compelled to relinquish her claim to the right of impressment, unless it be made the sine qua non by the American Government, to any arrangement of the existing differences between the two nations, our claim to exemption from the practice must be forever given up, and Great Britain will feel herself at liberty to continue to exercise it with ten-fold rigor and severity.

Mr. A. declared that, notwithstanding the clamor of French influence and French alliance, he felt no apprehensions upon that subject, as he was well convinced it was not the intention or wish of our Government to engulf us in the unfathomable vortex of European warfare. One word to the gentleman from New York (Mr. Gold) and he had done. It had been considered by him as a most unfortunate circumstance that we should be engaged in a war with Great Britain when Russia was struggling for her independence. The most amicable relations existed, it was true, between Russia and the United States; but would the gentleman have us on that account to submit to every species of indignity from the ally of that power? He beheld with as much detestation and abhorrence the conduct of the French Emperor as any man could possibly do. His ambitious progress was everywhere marked with blood. The vengeance of Heaven, he trusted, would arrest him in his career to universal conquest and dominion. The present condition of Russia, although her people groaned under a despotism of the most unrelenting nature, must excite the sympathy of every man in this country, because she was contending for her independence, and he would wish her complete success in the war in which she was now engaged, but that her triumph would protract the restoration of peace to his own country.

Mr. Grundy. – Mr. Speaker, had this debate been confined to the bill before you, I should certainly not have troubled the House with any remarks of mine; but as the gentlemen opposed to the war in which we are engaged have selected this as a fit occasion to bring before this House and the nation a full view of all the relations which exist between this and other countries, an apology at least is furnished for a member of that committee, to whose examination these subjects have been confided, to give his ideas upon the various points suggested. This I shall endeavor to do with temper and moderation.

I will now proceed to state, as accurately and as concisely as I am able, the manner in which the points in difference between the two nations ought to be considered.

Upon some of the subjects in controversy, for instance, that of impressment, negotiation had been tried unsuccessfully for twenty years, as I will show before I sit down, from the public records of the country; on others it had been tried for a shorter period. At the last session of Congress, when every hope of obtaining justice in any other way was lost, the United States declared war, not to procure a repeal of the Orders in Council only, but to obtain redress for the unjust spoliations which had been committed on the property of American citizens, and to cause Great Britain to cease the practice of impressment. Other causes of irritation existed, but these were the prominent causes of the war. It may be taken as granted, in this discussion, that those orders are revoked, notwithstanding the objectionable manner of the revocation. You are now asked to lay down the sword before you have obtained any of the objects of the war, except the abolition of these obnoxious orders. I request gentlemen to reflect, whether this is not, in point of fact, an abandonment of the other points in dispute? Do you not, by ceasing to prosecute the war which is already commenced, declare, in the strongest possible terms, that you will not make war for the injuries which remain unredressed? Can any man persuade himself that you will obtain that by negotiation for which you have determined you will not fight! and that, too, from a nation at all times disposed to depress this growing country? That politician must have a very imperfect knowledge of the considerations which influence all Cabinets, who does not know that the strongest inducement which can be brought to operate in favor of an injured nation, is the apprehension of retaliation, or fear of war, entertained by the other party. I cannot, perhaps, establish this more clearly in any other way than by recurring to the history of a transaction which took place between the United States and Great Britain. Immediately after the attack on the Chesapeake, this Government demanded reparation. The terms proposed were reasonable, and such as a nation, inclined to act justly, would promptly have acceded to. For five years, or more, did the British Government refuse, or rather fail, to make that arrangement, which, at the last session, produced a satisfactory adjustment on that subject. Why, sir, was justice so long delayed, and why was it at last obtained? The British Minister discovered a determination in Congress to submit no longer. He saw that, unless something was done, friendly relations between the two countries must immediately cease. He saw that public sentiment called so loudly for an opportunity of obtaining that justice by force which had been refused to fair argument, that he granted us that reasonable satisfaction which had been so long withheld. Sir, had he not seen the approaching storm, no atonement for that wanton outrage on our national sovereignty had yet been made. If you now say that you will not prosecute the war, the enemy must view it as a decision pronounced by this Government, that war shall not be waged by the American nation for the impressment of her citizens, or for depredations committed on commerce. It might as well be said, in plain, intelligible language, that the ocean is to be abandoned by the people of the United States, except so far as depends on the will of Great Britain. If both the property and liberty of American citizens on the ocean are subject to her disposal, you cease to possess the rights of a sovereign and independent nation. For my own part, if we have the right to claim security for the liberty and property of our citizens against that nation, of which no man dare express a doubt, I am for asserting it until the object is attained, or the ability of this nation fails; of the latter I have no fear.

It is pretended that this Government is not desirous of peace, and that this is a war of conquest and ambition. I beg gentlemen to refrain from making statements which they themselves do not believe. After the declaration of war, what has been the conduct of the Executive? Through Mr. Russell, our Chargé des Affaires at London, they have offered to conclude an armistice on terms which would remove every pretext for complaint on the part of Great Britain. He proposed that this country should exclude from her service British seamen. It is true that Lord Castlereagh urged Mr. Russell's want of powers, and stated that the American Congress alone could make the necessary provisions on that subject. If, however, sincerity had existed with the British Ministry, a temporary arrangement could have been made, by which hostilities would have been suspended until the legitimate authorities of this country could have expressed an opinion. If Mr. R. had not adequate powers to conclude an armistice, the proposition made by Mr. Monroe to Admiral Warren was not liable to the same objection. In substance, both propositions were the same; to the latter, no offer of compliance has been tendered. If I have any objections to the late overtures made by the Executive, it is that too great an anxiety for peace is manifested; but when the nature of our institutions is consulted, a strong propensity for domestic quiet is discovered; and, therefore, the Administration should be indulged in any measure calculated to restore harmony between the two countries, provided the honor and interests of the nation are not compromitted.

I ask gentlemen in opposition to lay aside party feelings, and reflect whether, if we now recede, points are not conceded to the enemy, which they would not yield if in power. They affect to be the followers of Washington. I will show them what his opinions were on the subject of impressment. From them the pretended Washingtonians of the present day will discover their degeneracy. Yes, sir, the Father of his Country too well understood the value of liberty ever to consent that the most obscure individual of his country should be deprived of it by a foreign despot. So early as the year 1792, the British nation commenced the practice of impressment, as now exercised by it. On the 11th day of June, in that year, the then Secretary of State addressed a letter to Mr. Pinkney, the American Minister at London, in which the practice of impressment is strongly reprobated; and let it be remembered, that although this letter was written by the Secretary, it contained the sentiments of the President of the United States. In order that the House may more fully comprehend what were the sentiments of that man, whose memory we all venerate, I will read so much of the letter referred to, as relates to this subject:

"The peculiar custom in England of impressing seamen on every appearance of war will occasionally expose our seamen to peculiar oppressions and vexations. It will be expedient that you take proper opportunities in the mean time of conferring with the Minister on this subject, in order to form some arrangement for the protection of our seamen on those occasions. We entirely reject the mode which was the subject of a conversation between Mr. Morris and him; which was, that our seamen should always carry about them certificates of their citizenship. This is a condition never yet submitted to by any nation – one with which seamen would never have the precaution to comply. The casualties of their calling would expose them to the constant destruction or loss of this paper evidence; and thus the British Government would be armed with legal authority to impress the whole of our seamen. The simplest rule will be, that the vessel being American, shall be evidence that the seamen on board her are such."