Abridgement of the Debates of Congress, from 1789 to 1856 (4 of 16 vol.)

The question was then taken on Mr. Clay's motion, and negatived.

Mr. Macon moved to strike out one, and insert five years as the term of enlistment. He regretted as much as any one the disasters which had befallen the country; and there was but one way to obviate their effects, and that was by rising superior to them, as a part of the nation had already done – he meant the Western country, where a patriotism had been exhibited equal to that which might have distinguished Rome in its best days. Their zeal was equal to their bravery – and the only drawback on their enterprise was the difficulty of finding something to eat in the wilderness. We must rise after reverses. What, sir, said Mr. M., would have become of Rome, had she desponded when Hannibal defeated her armies? She rose upon it and became the mistress of the world. What would have been the situation of our cause in the Revolution, if, after the British successes in Jersey, we had desponded? But the men of Pennsylvania and New Jersey rose on it, and victory and triumph followed. Our object now ought to be to recover the ground we have lost, and meet the enemy with troops that will insure success. We are told, sir, this war has united England to a man. Sir, I never expected aid from our enemies. Let us follow so good an example, and unite to a man; let us remember the old Continental maxim – "United we stand, divided we fall." If we were as united in defence of our rights, as England is in her usurpations, this war would not last a single campaign – and I hope in this respect we shall, at least, learn wisdom from an enemy. The calculations about one or two campaigns, however, in present circumstances, are visionary. We have engaged an enemy not in the habit of yielding very soon. But, if we were to unite, the question would soon be settled. The cause and object of this war has been more concisely stated by one of those actively engaged in it, than by any other person – I mean Captain Porter's motto – "Free trade and sailors' rights;" no man could have given a better definition of it. It appears to me that one part of this continent ought to be zealous for the rights of seamen – another part for a free export trade; and, if we were, as we ought to be, united, the war would be carried on with energy and with success. I agree with the gentleman from New Jersey, that this thing is not to be done by paper men. My opinion is, that the best thing we can do, is to raise men for five years. Let the Legislature of the country do its duty. If the thirty-five thousand men, now authorized, be not enough, let us get as many as will be adequate to the end we propose. Gentlemen have thought proper to review former transactions. I would be willing to pass them over. I believe almost every measure adopted by the General Government would have had its destined effect if adhered to. You have always got the better of the argument; you have better proclamations; but what avails all this? Britain has impressed your seamen, and given you blows for good words. You have been heretofore told your paper measures were worth nothing: now that it is proposed to give blow for blow, what is said? That you are departing from the pacific system, which the same persons before reprobated, and to which they have become friendly only after every attempt at pacification has failed. Sir, we are now engaged in war, and we must succeed or we must yield the rights of sailors and free trade. Does any man doubt that the war is justly undertaken? Is there a man in the nation – I care not of what political sect, many as there are – who believes that the war is not undertaken on just grounds – that we had not borne with their indignities till we could have borne them no longer? After plundering your property and impressing your seamen on the ocean, their agents have been sent into this nation to sow divisions among us, who ought to be but one family. What crime has been left undone? what injury have we not suffered? Could one be added to the catalogue? It seems to me not. No man loves peace more than I do, and if it had not been for Great Britain sending her agents to our firesides, I do not know but I should have voted against the war. It seemed to me like an attempt on a man's daughter. Not content with vexing and harassing you whenever you went from home, they came here to put strife into your family. You have been told that the Prince Regent and his Ministers are firm. Sir, we never calculated on their receding, but on the energies and force of the nation to obtain redress, and if we had been united, we should have equalled our most sanguine expectations. Let us follow their example, and determine to maintain our national rights, as they do to maintain their usurpations on them.

Mr. M. Clay seconded the motion of Mr. Macon to strike out "one year" and insert "five," as the term of enlistment. He said an army ought to be seasoned before it was carried into the field. We have heard much said, observed he, about sickness in your army; much of the sickness, some time ago, at New Orleans, and much lately of the sickness at Plattsburg. Have you ever heard of an army on earth that was carried into the field before it had been seasoned in the camp? It must, to be good for any thing, be first disciplined in camp, and become inured to the mode of living and the fare of soldiers. It will take some time to season men to the change in their mode of living which must take place on going into camp. It will take a year to prepare them for the field. Without discipline they will be useless. Your seamen are brave and successful because they know what they go to sea for. Take a landsman on board a ship, and what sort of a sailor will he make? Such as the French have on board their vessels. We take no man into the Navy but who understands his business and the purpose for which he goes there, and we see the effects of it. I do not wish it understood, sir, if I vote against the bill, that I am opposed to the war. No, sir. It is a righteous war, into which I go with hand and heart. We may differ about the mode, but that is all. I speak from experience more than from any thing else. Let us raise a sufficient army to serve during the war, be it long or short. It is absurd to suppose that we shall not succeed in our enterprise against the enemy's provinces. We have the Canadas as much under our command as she has the ocean; and the way to conquer her on the ocean is to drive her from the land. I am not for stopping at Quebec or anywhere else; but I would take the whole continent from them, and ask them no favors. Her fleets cannot then rendezvous at Halifax as now, and having no place of resort in the North, cannot infest our coast as they have lately done. It is as easy to conquer them on the land as their whole navy could conquer ours on the ocean. As to coping with them at sea, we cannot do it. We can annoy them, but not meet them on the open sea. I would meet them and hurt them, however, where we can. We must take the continent from them. I wish never to see a peace till we do. God has given us the power and the means; we are to blame if we do not use them. If we get the continent, she must allow us the freedom of the sea. I hope, sir, the amendment of my friend from North Carolina, going to make this army more efficient, may be adopted.

Mr. Pleasants said, before the question was taken, he wished to submit a few of the reasons why he was opposed to the amendment. The question before the House, if he correctly understood it, was not, what were the best materials of which to make an army; whether men for the war, for five years, or for twelve months; but the question was, what is the kind of force, and for what length of time can you raise an army to take the field at the earliest period? I hesitate not a moment, Mr. P. said, to declare, that if it were within the compass of our ability to raise an army for five years by voting it, I would authorize it. Not a moment should I doubt on the subject. The history of the world is strongly in favor of such an army. But we perfectly know, from the progress of the recruiting service, that we have already authorized as many men of that description as we shall probably be able to raise. This force is wanted to render the next campaign efficient. I consider the bill merely as a substitute for the volunteer system heretofore pursued. Of what materials will this army be composed? Of young men ready to volunteer their services for one year in the form of regulars; and in ninety-nine cases out of a hundred, men will enlist in this corps who would not enlist for five years, or for the war. I am sanguine in the opinion, that this measure, if now adopted, will do away the defects of the present volunteer system, and I am fully of opinion, that under it, a force may be drawn into the field ready to act efficiently in the next campaign. I am not one of those, sir, notwithstanding the accounts we have heard of our disasters, who despair of the Republic. If we turn to history we shall find that we have never engaged in any war in which we have come out better in the first campaign than we have in this. Look at the war undertaken under the auspices of Gen. Washington against the Indians. What was the history of it? We all recollect the campaign under Harmar, and its bloody scenes. The campaign under St. Clair cannot be forgotten. We then suffered defeat upon defeat, disaster upon disaster, in the course of the war, which was not terminated till the treaty of Greenville, in 1795, though it may be said to have virtually terminated by the defeat of the Indians by General Wayne, which occurred previous to the treaty. If this country be willing to go into the contest heart and hand, we shall in a very short time demonstrate to the enemy all we want to convince her of, that it is in reality her interest to be at peace with this country. I hope, sir, the motion to amend the bill will not prevail. I am perfectly convinced that the bill as it is will enable us to call a valuable force into service, and I am sanguine in the hope, that, with its aid, together with the other force we shall have, we may clear the continent of the enemy's dominion in one campaign, though I do not undertake to predict that we shall.

The question was then taken on Mr. Macon's proposed amendment, and lost.

The question recurred on the passage of the bill to a third reading.

Mr. Pearson said, not unfrequently it happens, Mr. Speaker, both in private and political life, that men of the clearest perceptions and most correct motives, experience much difficulty and embarrassment in determining on the course best to be pursued, or the application of means best calculated to produce a given object. The object most devoutly wished for by myself, and, no doubt, equally desired by every honest and honorable man in this community, is, that my country should once more be restored to the enjoyment of peace. Under the pressure of existing circumstances, involved in a war with a powerful nation – a war now prosecuted for a doubtful, or, at least, strongly controverted question of national right – a war, the prosecution of which, so far as relates to our military operations, has everywhere, and on all occasions, been attended with disgrace, defeat, or disaster; under such circumstances, I confess, sir, I am not free from embarrassment in determining on the course demanded by genuine patriotism, or best calculated to restore the blessings of peace to the country. I rejoiced to hear the honorable Chairman of the Military Committee (Mr. D. R. Williams) declare, the other day, that his object was also peace. It must be a source of gratification to the country to learn that some of the strongest advocates for the declaration of war begin now to think and talk of peace.

The honorable gentleman, however, urges the passage of the bill under consideration, (which authorizes the enlistment of twenty thousand additional regular troops for one year; and provides for the appointment of proportionally an unusual number of officers, with all the accompanying paraphernalia of an army,) as the means best calculated to produce the end in view. Did I believe, sir, that the passage of this bill, or (what is more difficult and less likely to happen) the actual enlistment of the proposed additional force would secure to us our object, I would not only consent to give this force, but ten times the number, if it were by force alone to be obtained; but when I reflect on the special and sole cause for which it is avowed the war is now prosecuted; when I consider the relative strength, situation, and disposable force, by sea and land, of the two nations, and especially when my recollection is assailed (for we cannot, nor ought we to close our senses against such damning facts) with the heretofore scanty enlistments; the confusion and insubordination which has pervaded many parts of your army; the extraordinary expense already incurred, and the uniform disasters which have marked all your military operations, I cannot bring my mind to the belief that the force now proposed can produce any desirable effect.

Mr. Speaker: As much as I was opposed to the declaration of war, and as much as subsequent events have convinced me of the correctness of the vote I gave on that momentous question, it is not my purpose on this occasion to question the policy of that unfortunate act. My mind is bent on peace; to that object my efforts are directed. The impression is strongly fixed on my understanding, that this war can be terminated with honor and advantage to this nation, without the further effusion of human blood. If so, surely no Christian will deny but justice, humanity, and sound policy demand that nothing should remain undone, on our part, to stop this career of carnage and bloodshed. I have said, sir, that it is my impression that this war can be terminated with honor and advantage to this nation, without a further appeal to arms. In stating this opinion, I do not mean to be understood as identifying the honor of the nation with the honor of those by whom the war was declared; or, in other words, I do not admit that the national honor rests solely in the hands of those who may happen to be in the Administration, or who may happen to constitute a majority in Congress. No, sir, this is an elective Government – the power and ultimate responsibility rest with the people; they cannot be dishonored unless they pertinaciously approve of unwise or wicked measures, and continue to support the authors of such measures. It is, therefore, not with me a primary consideration, in the suggestions I am about to make, how far the honor or reputation, for political wisdom, of any individuals may be affected by the adoption of the plan for peace which has occurred to my mind. I do not know that any honorable gentleman will be affected by it, should it be adopted. I hope he will not; to me it is perfectly indifferent who are in power, so that the affairs of the nation are well conducted.

Mr. Speaker: Whatever may have been the original causes for the declaration of this war, we are now taught to believe that the question in contest is reduced to a single point. The British Orders in Council were repealed on the 21st of June, three days after our declaration of war; and, of course, without a knowledge of that event, the blockade of May, 1806, had long ceased to exist. The sole avowed cause, therefore, remaining, and for which the war is now carried on, is the practice of impressment from on board our merchant vessels. This subject has for many years engaged the attention of both nations; it has been a fruitful theme of execration and declamation for almost every editor and orator of the age. Great as our cause of complaint may have been, (and I am not disposed to palliate it,) it must be admitted by all who understand the nature and true bearing of the question, that it had been subjected to much exaggeration. Permit me, sir, to remark, that notwithstanding the importance, the difficulty, and delicacy which have been justly attributed to this subject, and the unwillingness at all times manifested on the part of the British Government to abandon or derogate from the abstract right of impressing her own seamen from on board neutral merchant vessels, it is very far from being certain that she has not been willing to enter into such arrangement with this Government, as would place the question of impressment on a basis both safe and honorable to this nation. By a reference to the correspondence of Messrs. Monroe and Pinkney with the British Commissioners, which preceded the treaty concluded by those gentlemen in the year 1806, but which was unfortunately rejected by the then President, it is evident that the interest of impressment was, in the opinion of those gentlemen, placed on a footing well calculated to secure our own seamen from the abuse against which we had complained, and against which it was our duty to protect them. This opinion was not only expressed in forcible and decisive language at the time of entering into the arrangement, but repeated by Mr. Monroe more than a year after, in a formal letter to the Secretary of State. The language of that gentleman, now your Secretary of State, is peculiarly emphatic, and must be within the recollection of every gentleman in this House. Without troubling the House with the reading of the documents referred to, it is sufficient for me to state, that your present Secretary of State did, in a letter addressed to Mr. Madison, dated February 28, 1808, declare "that he always believed, and did still believe, that the ground on which the interest of impressment was placed by the paper of the British Commissioners of the 8th of November, 1806, and the explanations which accompanied it, was both honorable and advantageous to the United States."

Thus, sir, as we have conclusive evidence of a disposition on the part of the British Government, at one period at least, to advance considerable length towards an adjustment of this long-contested question; and as we have no evidence that different principles and claims are now asserted from those then advanced; I think it fair to conclude, that it is still in our power to put an end to this controversy with safety to our seamen, and advantage to the nation. Instead, then, of passing this bill, and spending the blood and treasure of our countrymen in the prosecution of this war, I conceive it our duty to make an effort for the sanction of our just rights, and the restoration of peace, without a further appeal to force. It is my decided opinion that such an effort, if fairly and liberally made by this House, and the Executive branch of the Government, would not fail in producing the desired effect.

The peculiar nature of the question, which now constitutes the sole object for continuing the war; the intimation given by the Executive in the correspondence with the British Government, since the declaration of war, together with the opinions stated by Mr. Monroe and Mr. Pinkney, in their letter to the Secretary of State of January 3, 1807, all tend to confirm me in the belief, that it is the duty of Congress to pass a law which would not only check desertions from the British service, by excluding persons of that description from employ in our service, but also deprive the British Government of the apology alleged for impressing American seamen, by excluding British subjects from the commercial and public service of the United States. Having alluded to the letter of Mr. Monroe and Mr. Pinkney of the 3d of January, 1807, I will take the liberty of reading from it a short extract. After stating the opinion they had formerly expressed, that although the British Government did not feel itself at liberty to relinquish formally, by treaty, its claim to search our merchant vessels for British seamen, its practice would nevertheless be essentially, if not completely, abandoned, they observe: "That opinion has since been confirmed by frequent conferences on the subject with the British Commissioners, who have repeatedly assured us that, in their judgment, we were made as secure against the exercise of their pretension by the policy which their Government had adopted, in regard to that very delicate and important question, as we could have been made by treaty. It is proper to observe, however, that the good effect of this disposition, and its continuance, may depend, in a great measure, on the means which may be taken hereafter by the Congress to check desertions from the British service. If the treaty is ratified, and a perfect good understanding is produced by it between the two countries, it will be easy for their Governments, by friendly communications, to state to each other what they respectively desire, and in that mode to arrange the business as satisfactorily as it could be done by treaty."

Thus, sir, had the treaty of 1806 been ratified and a good understanding been produced between the two countries, Congress were warned, even in that event, that it was their duty to lend their aid in rendering effectual and perpetual any arrangement which might be made on this subject of impressment. As to the late communications from the Executive department, made to the British Government, since the declaration of war, it is not my intention at this time to enter into a particular examination of their merit or demerit. I will barely remark, that to me they present a novelty in the history of war and diplomacy. Propositions, alleged to be of a pacific nature, made in six days after the declaration of war! Such a procedure (much as I desire peace and much as I was opposed to the war) is to my mind, to say the least, extremely extraordinary, and its policy incomprehensible. It is the more so from the circumstance of a British Minister being on the spot at the moment of declaring the war and keeping up a continued correspondence with the Secretary of State to the last moment of the existence of peace. Under such circumstances I should conceive each nation ought to have known the ultimatum of the other and not waited for the form of a declaration of war, to resume the negotiation and give a new shape to their proposition. I confess that I am not surprised at the result of this war negotiation – every thing was demanded to be yielded by our enemy, for which the war was declared, even as a preliminary in the first instance to an armistice, and in the second instance as preliminary to a negotiation. The equivalent offered on our part was of a nature which it was not within the province of the Executive to confirm, and, of course, depended on what Congress might or might not do on the subject. In addition to this, our agent in London, through whom those propositions were made, did not possess regular and competent powers, and was considered by the British Government as incompetent to act with them on such a subject on equal terms of obligation and responsibility. Whatever, therefore, may be my opinion in relation to those late propositions, and however illy calculated they may have been to produce any desirable result, I am far from considering them unworthy the particular attention of this House. I allude particularly to the equivalent proposed as an inducement for the discontinuance of the practice of impressment. Here, for the first time in the whole history of the long-protracted discussion on this subject, it is intimated that something effectual will be done on our part to prevent the cause of the abuse of which we complain – a promise is given, in the event of obtaining the concessions demanded, that a law would be passed by Congress to prohibit the employment of British seamen in the public or commercial service of the United States. This, then, is what I ask you now to do – pass a law effectually to exclude all British subjects from the public and private maritime service of the United States; let the law be well guarded against the possibility of violation or evasion; and let us be determined rigidly to enforce it; place this law in the hands of your Executive; let him immediately appoint one or more honest, able, independent commissioners; men who neither have nor expect an office; men in whom the nation, without regard to party, would be willing to confide; give them ample powers to form a treaty or arrange the sole question which is now the pivot on which this war depends. Do all this; do it faithfully, and I venture to predict you will obtain a peace, and secure your just rights more speedily, more effectually, and more satisfactorily to the people of this country, than by all the military operations in the compass of your power.

Monday, January 4

Edward Hempstead, returned to serve as the Delegate in this House from the Territory of Missouri, appeared, produced his credentials, was qualified, and took his seat.