Abridgement of the Debates of Congress, from 1789 to 1856 (4 of 16 vol.)

Mr. Macon spoke against the amendment, which, if adopted, would compel him to vote against his own motion. The restrictive system, he said, would not be of long duration, and, when it expired, provisions in plenty might be exported to South America and elsewhere; so that there was very little necessity for suspending the embargo law, which was only adopted preparatory to a different state of things. The clause in the resolution relating to Teneriffe, he said, had been added at the suggestion of another member.

Mr. Calhoun again spoke against the amendment, and in reply to Mr. Randolph's imputation of intolerance to the minority. This course of discussion he deprecated, as not comporting with the sacred cause of distant and oppressed humanity, &c.

Mr. Smiles made some remarks in reply to an observation of Mr. Randolph, that the donation by the British Parliament of a hundred thousand pounds to the sufferers by an earthquake in Portugal, some years ago, was an act almost sufficient to purchase absolution for all the sins of that Government. Mr. S. cited instances of similar conduct in this country, in much smaller communities; and expressed his regret that gentlemen chose to appreciate every act of other Governments, without allowing merit to their own for acts much more praiseworthy.

The question on Mr. Randolph's motion to amend, was negatived – yeas 30, nays 74.

Mr. Blackledge proposed to add "corn and rice" to the flour to be exported.

Mr. Macon thereon modified his resolution so as to authorize the exportation of "provisions," instead of "flour," which would include all descriptions of breadstuff.

The question was taken on the first clause of the resolution, viz: so much as relates to Caraccas, and carried unanimously.

The question was taken on the remainder of the resolution, viz: so much as relates to Teneriffe, and negatived – for its adoption 47, against it 57.

So it was Resolved, That the Committee of Commerce and Manufactures be instructed to report a bill authorizing the President of the United States to cause to be purchased – barrels of provisions, and have the same exported to some port in Caraccas, for the use of the inhabitants who have suffered by the earthquake.

Mr. Randolph adverted to the uncertainty as to the fact, which he supposed had caused the rejection of the clause of the resolution relating to Teneriffe, and offered the following resolution, in a form calculated to produce the proper inquiry:

"Resolved, That the Committee of Commerce and Manufactures be instructed to inquire whether any, and what relief ought to be extended to the inhabitants of the Canary Islands, who are suffering by famine occasioned by locusts."

Mr. Newton said, as this motion only proposed inquiry, and was not, like the other, peremptory, he hoped it would pass.

And the resolution was agreed to.

Monday, May 4

Relief for Venezuela

On motion of Mr. Newton, the House resolved itself into a Committee of the Whole on the bill for the relief of the inhabitants of Venezuela.

[The bill authorizes the President to cause to be exported such quantity of provision as he may think proper, for the relief of the inhabitants of Venezuela, suffering by the effects of an earthquake.]

Mr. Newton proposed to fill the blank for the appropriation with the sum of $30,000.

Mr. Pitkin inquired for the official information, which might have been laid before the committee, on the subject of the distress existing at Caraccas.

Mr. Newton, in reply, said, that there were many private letters in confirmation of the facts, and also a letter from our Consul, &c. Some of which were read.

Mr. Calhoun moved to fill the blank with fifty thousand dollars, which he thought would be little enough to effect the object in view.

The question on the latter motion was decided in the affirmative, 45 to 29.

The committee rose, and reported the bill; which was ordered to be engrossed for a third reading this day, which was subsequently done, and the bill passed.

Wednesday, May 13

Recall of Absentees

Mr. Williams said he rose to make a motion, the object of which was in itself so clear, that he believed there was no necessity for illustrating it. There was but one objection that he was aware of, and that was, that there was no precedent for it; but if that should be urged, he would reply that there never was before a crisis requiring it. The motion was —

Resolved, That the Speaker be directed to address a letter to each member of the House now absent, requesting his attendance prior to the first day of June.

Mr. Grundy, said the object of the motion, no doubt, was a correct one. He should, therefore, vote for the motion as it now stood, but would prefer a modification of it. On what particular day it would be proper to have every member in his place, could not be foreseen with certainty by any one. To fix on a day, however, would be as much as to tell the members we do not want them earlier, and would put it out of our power to act prior to that day. But, on the other hand, should we not be ready to act on that day, is it not pledging ourselves that we will then act, whether we are ready or not? It would be as well to request the attendance of members immediately, and then we shall not stand committed either to act on or before that day. He hoped there would not be an absent man on the occasion of voting the final measure; though he should consider such a vote as a completion of what was already begun, and not a determination of the course to be pursued, which question he considered as decided in the anterior measures already adopted.

Mr. Roberts said the call of the House met his perfect approbation; but, in its present form, he should be constrained to vote against it. He was not afraid that it would be considered a pledge to act on a certain day; but the members near home, after it was passed, would take the opportunity of the interval to visit their homes, and leave the House without a quorum. He, therefore, moved to amend the resolution, so as to request the attendance of the members forthwith.

This motion was agreed to – ayes 47.

After some objections by Mr. Stanford to the phraseology of the resolution, it was passed without a division, there not being more perhaps than five dissenting voices.

Friday, May 22

Judge Toulmin

Mr. Poindexter, from the select committee, made the following report:

The committee to whom was referred the letter of Cowles Mead, Speaker of the House of Representatives of the Mississippi Territory, enclosing a presentment of the Grand Jury of Baldwin county, in said Territory, complaining of the conduct of Harry Toulmin, Judge of the District of Washington, in said Territory, beg leave to submit the following report:

That the charges contained in the presentment aforesaid, have not been supported by evidence; and from the best information your committee have been enabled to obtain on the subject, it appears that the official conduct of Judge Toulmin has been characterized by a vigilant attention to the duties of his station, and an inflexible zeal for the preservation of the public peace and tranquillity of the country over which his judicial authority extends. They therefore recommend the following resolution:

"Resolved, That it is unnecessary to take any further proceeding on the presentment of the Grand Jury of Baldwin county, in the Mississippi Territory, against Judge Toulmin."

The report was read and concurred in.

Wednesday, May 27

Renewal of Whitney's Patent Right to the Cotton Gin Invention

The House resolved itself into a Committee of the Whole on the bill "for the relief of Eli Whitney."

Mr. Bibb avowed his opposition to the principle and details of the bill, and moved to strike out as much as provided for renewing Whitney's patent right to the machine for ginning cotton. Mr. B. said, that, although the bill assumed the character of a private act, it involved considerations of great national concernment. If, sir, said he, the committee will take the trouble to consider it attentively, in all its relations, I am persuaded the motion submitted will not have been made in vain. The object of granting patents is clearly defined by the constitution to be the promotion of science and useful arts. The effect of such promotion is obviously the advancement of public improvement and prosperity. All the authority which Congress possesses over this subject, is derived from the following provision: "Congress shall have power to promote the progress of science and useful arts, by securing, for limited times, to authors and inventors, the exclusive right to their respective writings and discoveries." Here are two distinct propositions: 1. The delegation of power to promote science and useful arts; 2. And a description of the mean authorized to be employed. The benefit proposed to inventors is evidently not the object in view, but the mean whereby the end may be accomplished; it is the incitement offered to genius and talent, for the purpose of general advantage; it is the price paid by the people of the United States for the disclosure of useful inventions. To legislate, therefore, correctly, on the subject, it is indispensable that this distinction between the mean and the object should be kept constantly in view. So long as patents are granted for the promotion of science and useful arts, the intent and meaning of the constitution are fairly pursued; but whenever they are allowed with any other view, there is a manifest departure from the limit of authority to which Congress is confined. Sir, the framers of the constitution were sensible that monopolies were odious every where, and that they would be particularly so to the people of this country. Hence the limitation imposed, which permits monopolies only in an expressly-defined case, and for a limited time. The constitution declares, that "all powers not delegated to the United States, nor prohibited to the States, are reserved to the States or to the people." It is also the rule of construction, universally admitted, that the enumeration of powers excludes all powers not enumerated. I maintain, then, that the constitution having clearly designated the object for which, and the parties to whom, exclusive rights may be granted, for limited times, Congress is restrained within those precise bounds. If there can be a legitimate departure from them in one case, the restraint becomes wholly nugatory. The doctrine which deprives Congress of the power to establish banking monopolies, equally forbids them in every case, and for every purpose, other than those specified in the clause to which I have adverted.

If, therefore, I establish the position that the proposed renewal of Whitney's patent is neither intended nor calculated to promote science or useful arts, I shall have succeeded in showing that this bill ought to be rejected.

Permit me to inquire, in the first place, how the object of the constitution may be attained? By pursuing the principle which has heretofore governed the Legislature. The statute securing patent rights must be general in its application, holding out inducements to the inventive faculties of all, and prospective in its operation. It must grant monopolies for a limited time to future and not past discoveries. The term during which the exclusive rights shall continue, should be sufficiently long to afford the necessary incitement to the exertions of genius, to promise an adequate reward for the labor of invention. Whether fourteen years, as now fixed by law, be the proper term, is a question on which gentlemen may rationally differ in opinion. It is worthy of remark, however, that under the existing statute, the progress of invention in the useful arts has been more rapid in the United States than in any other country on the globe. Still, if necessary, Congress is competent to extend by a general provision exclusive rights to future inventors for a longer time; but the renewal of a patent for a discovery already made and in use, stands on distinct grounds. In the one case, the progress of science and useful arts (the object for which alone patents are constitutional) would probably be promoted; but in the other, the invention being already made and disclosed, public improvement cannot possibly be advanced by taking away its benefit from the community. Is the object of this bill to promote science or the useful arts? The candor of its advocates will answer the question in the negative. It is to promote the interests of Mr. Whitney at the public expense – to convert the mean prescribed by the constitution into the end. If the renewal of a patent in a special case would furnish an adequate stimulus to the exertions of other ingenious men, it might be urged with some appearance of plausibility; but no man will assert that one or two accidental cases of this sort, out of the many thousand patents which are issued, would have any influence on the expectations of others. It follows, therefore, that the passage of the present bill will be a departure from the intent and meaning of that instrument, which is the fountain of our authority.

Sir, there is another view of this subject in relation to policy, to which I beg leave to ask the attention of the committee. In this widely-extended country, the pursuits of the people are various and diversified. In one section cotton is cultivated, in another hemp, and in a third wheat. Suppose patents are obtained for valuable improvements relative to these articles, either in the instruments of cultivation or of preparation for market. The patentees are entitled by law to exclusive rights for fourteen years. For the improvement concerning the article of cotton only, the patent is extended to twenty-one or twenty-eight years, as now proposed, while exclusive rights to the other inventions are permitted to expire. What is the consequence? The people of one section of the Union are subjected in their pursuits to the privations incident to monopolies, for that term; while those of another section similarly situated are exempted from all restraint at the expiration of the first patent. I appeal to the candor and magnanimity of this assembly to determine whether such a course of proceeding be not manifestly unjust, and utterly incompatible with that equality of rights guarantied to the respective States. The constitution imposes uniformity of taxation for the purpose of avoiding the injustice and oppression towards particular States, which the extension of patent rights, in special cases, is calculated to produce. The fact cannot be disguised, that the operation of this bill will be to levy a tax on the people of Georgia, the Mississippi and Louisiana Territories alone; and if it passes, it will be owing to that circumstance. I know enough of human nature, and have seen much in the course of my acquaintance with legislative proceedings, to satisfy my mind, that if cotton were cultivated in a few large States, this bill would certainly be rejected. Does any man believe that if the large States of Virginia, Pennsylvania, New York, and Massachusetts, were concerned in this thing, as are those portions of the Southern country I have mentioned, the application of Mr. Whitney for a renewal of his monopoly would be successful? No, sir; and I urge this consideration for the purpose of showing the impolicy of extending patents in special cases, inasmuch as it puts it in the power of Congress by such a regulation to give a preference to one section of the Union over another, and because the power will never be exercised in cases affecting a particular and comparatively small portion of the community. Enact a general law on the subject of patents – make what provision you please in relation to future discoveries, and none can complain. Whether improvements shall be made interesting to this, that, or the other section of the nation, will be left to chance; when made, the monopolies will be equal in their duration, and all will be equally exempt from partiality or oppression.

There is another aspect, Mr. Chairman, in which the provisions of the bill now before the committee are manifestly unjust. The Legislatures of Tennessee and the two Carolinas purchased, during the term of Whitney's late patent, the right of using in those States his invention for ginning cotton. The fact will not be denied, that the price paid was proportionate to the extent of time for which the patentee held the exclusive right. Now it is proposed to re-grant to Whitney the monopoly for an additional term of years, so far as relates to my constituents, while the three States I have mentioned are expressly exempted from its operations. It is true, the Legislature of Georgia did not enter into any arrangements with the patentee on the subject, but it will be perceived that all persons who erected machines without permission, during the fourteen years, are left by the bill subject to prosecution. The effect, therefore, will be to impose a restraint relative to the same object on one State for twenty-one or twenty-eight years, while other States are exempted at the expiration of half that term. I know, sir, that unfavorable impressions exist on the minds of many gentlemen concerning the conduct of Georgia in this affair; and I fear they may have much influence on the decision of the question. Whether the Legislature ought or ought not to have followed the example of the legislatures of other States, is a question which belongs exclusively to that body to determine. Your patent law imposed no obligation on the subject, and they had the right to do so or not, as they pleased. Having done nothing which they had not a right to do, and omitted nothing which they had not the right to omit, I cannot consent to any unauthorized control of this House over their proceedings. That Mr. Whitney's invention has been highly important to the Southern country I freely admit, and that he deserves much for his useful labors, none can deny; but, if the conduct of Georgia has not been so liberal towards him as some gentlemen think it ought to have been, an apology may be found in the resentment which his conduct was calculated to excite. When his machine was first erected in Georgia, as I have understood, he refused to sell his patent right upon any terms or for any price. It was determined to monopolize every pound of cotton at an enormous premium, and arrangements were made for that purpose. To that circumstance, and the opinion which prevailed, that the invention was not new, is to be attributed the course of proceeding, now made the subject of complaint. The imprudence of Mr. Whitney, or, perhaps, of his partner, could not fail to have produced feelings of resentment rather than of liberality towards them. I repeat, however, that the conduct of Georgia has no connection with the present question. The United States never guarantied to any patentee the receipt of any given sum for his invention, nor gave any pledge that his exclusive right should in no instance be violated. They have enacted laws for the security of patentees, provided a remedy for violations of their rights in all cases, and a tribunal before which that remedy may be sought. To that tribunal – the courts of the United States – Mr. Whitney should be referred for redress. This is not a time for exciting State jealousies and individual resentments among ourselves. Policy, and that conciliatory spirit which ought to guide our deliberations, unite in prescribing a different course, and I do trust that prescription will not be disregarded on the present occasion.

But, sir, there is still another and more important view of this subject, on which alone I probably might have relied. The patent of Mr. Whitney expired about four years ago, and an unqualified right to the invention was thereby vested (as I shall show) in the people of the United States. Under such circumstances, it is my purpose to prove the proposed renewal manifestly unconstitutional. I presume it will be admitted, that, without the provision of the constitution on the subject, and the law pursuant thereto, no exclusive rights would belong to inventors. It is true the inventor would be entitled to his particular machinery, but other persons would not be prohibited from imitating it, and consequently his right to his discovery would not be exclusive. In a state of nature, occupancy gives a right to soil, upon the ground of supposed labor on the part of the occupant in taking possession. The right and the occupancy, however, are inseparable. If the latter be abandoned, the former ceases to exist – the soil becomes common to all, and may be appropriated to another's use. The natural law in regard to inventions is the same. So long as the inventor is alone in the possession of a knowledge of his discovery, he is the occupant, and has an exclusive right. But the moment he discloses that knowledge to the public he abandons his occupancy, and the invention becomes subject to the use of others. This principle is recognized by the constitution itself, and fully established also in other countries. The express delegation of power to secure to inventors the exclusive right to their discoveries, admits that without it no such right would exist after disclosure. In Great Britain the doctrine is perfectly settled. If gentlemen will turn to the famous case of literary property, Millar vs. Taylor, which was argued with great ability, and decided with unusual deliberation, they will be satisfied of the fact.

The court were divided on the particular question pending before them, and gave their opinions separately and very much at large. On that occasion it was determined that the publication of a literary work did not of itself divest the author of the exclusive right, nor authorize others to republish it for their advantage without his consent. But it was admitted, as a point fully and entirely settled, that the principle did not apply to mechanical inventions; that the disclosure of a mechanical invention did divest the inventor of his exclusive right to such inventions, and that the public became entitled to all the benefits which could be derived from it. A later decision of the highest courts of the Kingdom on another case, has placed the question of literary property on the same footing with the mechanical inventions. The principle of these decisions is, that the disclosure of an invention amounts to a relinquishment of exclusive use, it is an implied right to the public. And if such be the doctrine in Great Britain, under a Government the foundation of which is monopoly and exclusive privileges, it cannot be otherwise among this people, the fundamental principle of whose Government is, equality of right and exclusion of monopolies. I contend, then, sir, that if the disclosure of an invention vests in the public a right to use it without restraint, much more strongly is that right vested after the expiration of a patent. In the one case the public are invested with a common or equal right by an implied gift, and in the other by contract. The very condition on which patents are granted is, that, at the expiration of the term authorized by law, the people shall be entitled to the free use of the invention; and, to secure this right to the people, such a specification of the machinery employed is required at the time of issuing the patent, as will enable others to understand and imitate it with success. Need I undertake to prove that, from the moment Whitney's patent expired, his exclusive right ceased to exist? None will deny the fact. Is it necessary to show that the right which was exclusive during the patent, is now the common right of all? It will be admitted that every man in the United States has at this moment as perfect a right to erect gins on Whitney's plan, as to build a house or make any implement of agriculture. The question then presents itself, has Congress the power to divest the people of that right? I say no, sir; to renew a patent after it has expired, is to establish a new principle unauthorized by the constitution. To secure a pre-existent right is one thing, but to divest the people of the United States of their right, and vest it in an individual, is quite a different affair. "Congress shall have power to promote the progress of science and useful arts, by securing, for limited times, to authors and inventors, the exclusive right to their respective writings and discoveries." What is the import of this provision? An inventor while in the sole possession of the knowledge of his invention has the exclusive right to it, without the intervention of law; but when that knowledge is disclosed to the public, the exclusive right would cease to exist. Therefore, for the purpose of affording a stimulus to ingenuity, and of obtaining disclosures of useful discoveries, Congress is authorized to provide by law for securing that exclusive right for a limited time after disclosure, which previously existed in the inventor, and which enabled him forever to withhold his invention from the public. The disclosure is the great object to be attained; the security of the exclusive right before existing, but which would be lost without such security, by the act of disclosure, is the mean authorized to be employed. Is there no difference between protecting an existing right, and taking away a right from one party for the purpose of vesting it in another party? The States composing the Union are now entitled to the benefit of Whitney's invention, and may make whatever regulations concerning it, within their territorial limits, they please. Will it be said that because the power is delegated to Congress to promote useful inventions and to obtain their disclosure to the public, by holding out the inducement resulting from the security of a monopoly for a limited time, therefore the States may be constitutionally deprived of their unquestionable rights? Surely not. Hence, I conclude that the power of Congress over this subject has terminated by their own act, and that to resume it would be an unconstitutional encroachment on the rights of the respective States. Sir, the power given to Congress on the question of patents is similar in extent and in every other view to that which in England is vested in the King. He is empowered to grant patents for new and useful inventions for a limited time, but it is held that when that time expires, such inventions belong to the public. "If a patent be granted in case of a new invention, the King cannot grant a second patent, for the charter is granted as an encouragement to invention and industry, and to secure the patentee in the profits for a reasonable time; but when that is expired, the public is to have the benefit of the discovery." —10 Mad. Rep. 110. It is also laid down in Bull N. P. 76, that among the general questions of patents, the first is – "Whether the invention were known and in use before the patent." Such is the English law, and the statutes of the United States heretofore passed are founded on the same principle. The existing statutes make it an indispensable condition to securing an exclusive right, that the invention shall not have been "known or used before the application;" for a patent itself reads thus: "Whereas A. B., a citizen, &c., hath alleged that he has invented a new and useful improvement, being [here insert a description of the invention] which improvement has not been known or used before his application," &c. It is then perfectly clear, that our predecessors who have legislated on this subject considered a public disclosure of an invention an abandonment of all claim to the exclusive use; that they understood the object of the constitution to be the advancement of national improvement; and that when the public are in possession of any important discovery they could not be divested of it. Suppose the inventor of that useful instrument the screw-auger, who was an inhabitant of New England, and who never solicited a patent for it, should now make application. Your law excludes him because his invention is known and in use. And I call on gentlemen to show how the progress of science or useful arts, or individual justice, would be less promoted by granting a patent in that case, than in the present application. Certainly a man is not less entitled to the bounty of Congress who has given to the public the results of his labors, than he who has enjoyed the benefit of a monopoly for fourteen years; nor will it be asserted that the right of the community to an invention is less complete from the expiration of a patent, than from the bare act of disclosing it.