On the Philosophy of Discovery, Chapters Historical and Critical

Quoted by Jebb, Pref. to Op. Maj.

83

Mosheim, Hist. iii. 161.

84

Op. Maj. p. 57.

85

Mosheim, iii. 161.

86

Gratian published the Decretals in the twelfth century; and the Canon and Civil Law became a regular study in the universities soon afterwards.

87

Tenneman, ix. 4.

88

Tenneman, ix. 25.

89

"Jam nobis manifestum est terram istam in veritate moveri," &c.—De Doctâ Ignorantiâ, lib. ii. c. xii.

90

De Doct. Ignor. lib. i. c. i.

91

De Conjecturis, lib. i. c. iii. iv.

92

Born in 1433.

93

Born 1529, died 1597.

94

Aristoteles Exotericus, p. 50.

95

Tiraboschi, t. vii. pt. ii. p. 411.

96

"Franciscus Patricius, novam veram integram de universis conditurus philosophiam, sequentia uti verissima prænuntiare est ausus. Prænunciata ordine persecutus, divinis oraculis, geometricis rationibus, clarissimisque experimentis comprobavit.

Ante primum nihil,Post primum omnia,A principio omnia," &c.

His other works are Panaugia, Pancosmia, Dissertations Peripateticæ.

97

Tiraboschi, t. vii. pt. ii. p. 411.

98

Dissert. Perip. t. ii. lib. v. sub fin.

99

Tenneman, ix. 148.

100

Tenneman, ix. 167.

101

Ibid. 158.

102

Agrippa, De Occult. Phil. lib. i. c. l.

103

Written in 1526.

104

Philip Aurelius Theophrastus Bombastus von Hohenheim, also called Paracelsus Eremita, born at Einsiedlen in Switzerland, in 1493.

105

Hist. Sc. Id. b. ix. c. 2. sect. 1. The Mystical School of Biology.

106

Tenneman, ix. 221.

107

Tenneman, ix. 265.

108

Bernardini Telesii Consentini De Rerum Natura juxta propria Principia.

109

I take this account from Tenneman: this Proem was omitted in subsequent editions of Telesius, and is not in the one which I have consulted. Tenneman, Gesch. d. Phil. ix. 280.

110

Proem.

111

"De Principiis atque Originibus secundum fabulas Cupidinis et Cœli: sive Parmenidis et Telesii et præcipuè Democriti Philosophia tractata in Fabula de Cupidine."

112

"Talia sunt qualia possunt esse ea quæ ab intellectu sibi permisso, nec ab experimentis continenter et gradatim sublevato, profecta videntur."

113

Thom. Campanella de Libris propriis, as quoted in Tenneman, ix. 291.

114

Economisti Italiani, t. i. p. xxxiii.

115

Tenneman, ix. 305.

116

Hist. Ind. Sc. b. xvi. c. iii. sect. 2.

117

Ibid. b. xvii. c. ii. sect. 1.

118

Quæst. Peripat. i. 1.

119

Tenneman, ix. 108.

120

Hist. Ind. Sc. b. v. c. iii. sect. 2.

121

Tenneman, ix. 420. "Quæcunque ab Aristotele dicta essent commenticia esse." Freigius, Vita Petri Rami, p. 10.

122

Rami, Animadv. Aristot. i. iv.

123

See Hist. Ind. Sc. b. iv. c. iv. sect. 4.

124

Tenneman, ix. 230.

125

Ibid. 108.

126

Tenneman, ix. 246.

127

Melancthon, De Anima, p. 207, quoted in Tenneman, ix. 121.

128

His works have never been published, and exist in manuscript in the library of the Institute at Paris. Some extracts were published by Venturi, Essai sur les Ouvrages de Leonard da Vinci. Paris, 1797.

129

Leonardo died in 1520, at the age of 78.

130

Paul III. in 1543.

131

Hist. Ind. Sc. b. v. c. ii.

132

Born 1537, died 1619.

133

Hist. Ind. Sc. b. xvii. c. ii. sect. 1.

134

Fabricius, De Motu Locali, p. 182.

135

p. 199.

136

Speculationum Liber, p. 195.

137

Ibid. p. 169.

138

Gulielmi Gilberti, Colcestriensis, Medici Londinensis, De Magnete, Magneticisque Corporibus, et de Magno Magnete Tellure, Physiologia Nova, plurimis et Argumentis et Experimentis demonstrata.

139

Hist. Ind. Sc. b. xii. c. i.

140

Pref.

141

De Magnete, lib. vi. c. 3, 4.

142

Nov. Org. b. i.

143

B. i. Aph. 64.

144

Vol. ix. 185.

145

De Magnete, p. 60.

146

B. iii. c. 4.

147

Nov. Org. b. ii. Aph. 48.

148

Drinkwater's Life of Galileo, p. 18.

149

Life of Galileo, p. 9.

150

Hist. Ind. Sc. b. vi. c. ii. sect. 5.

151

Life of Galileo, p. 29.

152

Ibid. p. 33.

153

Il Saggiatore, ii. 247.

154

Il Saggiatore, ii. 200.

155

Ibid. i. 501.

156

Hist. Ind. Sc. b. vi. c. ii. sect. 2.

157

Hist. Ind. Sc. b. vi. c. ii. sect. 4.

158

Ibid. b. v. c. iv. sect. 1.

159

De Stell. Mart. p. iv. c. 51 (1609); Drinkwater's Kepler, p. 33.

160

Published 1604. Hist. Ind. Sc. b. ix. c. ii.

161

Hist. Ind. Sc. b. v. c. iv. sect. i.

162

Hist. Ind. Sc. b. vii. c. vi. sect 1.

163

De Stell. Mart. p. 11. c. 19.

164

Hist. Ind. Sc. b. ii. c. iv. sect. 6.

165

Ibid. sect. 8.

166

Montucla, i. 566.

167

De Augm. lib. iv. c. 1.

168

And in other passages: thus, "Ego enim buccinator tantum pugnam non ineo." Nov. Org. lib. iv. c. i.

169

Lib. 1. Aphor. 78 et seq.

170

Aug. Sc. Lib. iii. c. 4. p. 194. So in other places, as Nov. Org. i. Aph. 104. "De scientiis tum demum bene sperandum est quando per scalam veram et per gradus continuos, et non intermissos aut hiulcos a particularibus ascendetur ad axiomata minora, et deinde ad media, alia aliis superiora, et postremo demum ad generalissima."

171

Nov. Org. 1. Aph. 22.

172

Ib. Aph. 20.

173

1 Ax. 15.

174

Nov. Org. lib. ii. Aph. 19.

175

Inst. Mag. par. iii. (vol. viii. p. 244).

176

Hist. Ind. Sc. b. x. c. i.

177

Ib. c. iv.

178

Nov. Org. lib. i. Aph. 61.

179

Nov. Org. lib. ii. Aph. 10.

180

Aph. 11.

181

Aph. 15, p. 105.

182

Page 110.

183

Herschel, On the Study of Nat. Phil. Art. 192.

184

Nov. Org. lib. i. Aph. 40.

185

Nov. Org. lib. i. Ax. 103.

186

Edinb. Rev. No. cxxxii. p. 65.

187

Ib.

188

Pref. to the Nat. Hist. i. 243.

189

Nov. Org. lib. i. Aph. 19.

190

Ibid. lib. i. Aph. 20.

191

Aph. 27.

192

Ib. 28.

193

Aph. 104. So Aph. 105. "In constituendo axiomate forma inductionis alia quam adhuc in usu fuit excogitanda est," &c.

194

Ep. ad P. Fulgentium. Op. x. 330.

195

Nov. Org. i. Aph. 113.

196

See the motto to Kant's Kritik der Reinen Vernunft.

197

Œuvres Philosophiques de Bacon, &c. par M. N. Bouillet, 3 Tomes.

Examen de la Philosophie de Bacon (Œuvres Posthumes du Comte J. de Maistre).

Bacon, sa Vie, son Temps, sa Philosophie, par Charles de Remusat.

Histoire de la Vie et des Ouvrages de François Bacon, par J. B. de Vaugelles.

Franz Baco von Verulam, von Kuno Fischer.

The Works of Francis Bacon, collected and edited by James Spedding, Robert Leslie Ellis, and Douglas Denon Heath.

198

Note to Aph. xviii.

199

Pref. to the Parasceue, Vol. i. p. 382.

200

Anatomical Exercitations concerning the Generation of Living Creatures, 1653. Preface.

201

He used similar expressions in conversation. George Ent, who edited his Generation of Animals, visited him, "at that time residing not far from the city; and found him very intent upon the perscrutation of nature's works, and with a countenance as cheerful, as mind unperturbed; Democritus-like, chiefly searching into the cause of natural things." In the course of conversation the writer said, "It hath always been your choice about the secrets of Nature, to consult Nature herself." "'Tis true," replied he; "and I have constantly been of opinion that from thence we might acquire not only the knowledge of those less considerable secrets of Nature, but even a certain admiration of that Supreme Essence, the Creator. And though I have ever been ready to acknowledge, that many things have been discovered by learned men of former times; yet do I still believe that the number of those which remain yet concealed in the darkness of impervestigable Nature is much greater. Nay, I cannot forbear to wonder, and sometimes smile at those, who persuade themselves, that all things were so consummately and absolutely delivered by Aristotle, Galen, or some other great name, as that nothing was left to the superaddition of any that succeeded."

202

Lib. i. c. 2, 3.

203

Anal. Post. ii.

204

Pars iii. p. 45.

205

See Hist. Ind. Sc. b. vi. c. ii.

206

Cap. i. ii.

207

Hist. Ind. Sc. b. ix. c. ii.

208

Meteorum, c. viii. p. 187.

209

Mackintosh, Dissertation on Ethical Science.

210

Hist. Ind. Sc. b. vii. c. i.

211

Castelli, Torricelli, Viviani, Baliani, Gassendi, Mersenne, Borelli, Cavalleri.

212

De Plenitudine Mundi, in qua defenditur Cartesiana Philosophia contra sententias Francisci Baconi, Th. Hobbii et Sethi Wardi.

213

Bacon's Works, vol. ii. 111.

214

Hist. Ind. Sc. b. vii. c. i.

215

Nov. Org. lib. ii. Aph. 2.

216

Ib. lib. ii. Aph. 45.

217

Optics, qu. 31, near the end.

218

Qu. 28.

219

Hist. Ind. Sc. b. v. and b. vii.

220

Optics, qu. 31.

221

History of Ideas, b. iii. c. x.

222

Ibid. b. iii. c. ix. x. xi.

223

Opticks, qu. 31.

224

Nov. Org. l. ii. Aph. 2. "Licet enim in natura nihil existet præter corpora individua, edentia actus puros individuos ex lege; in doctrinis tamen illa ipsa lex, ejusque inquisitio, et inventio, et explicatio, pro fundamento est tam ad sciendum quam ad operandum. Eam autem legem, ejusque paragraphos, formarum nomine intelligimus; præsertim cum hoc vocabulum invaluerit, et familiariter occurrat."

Aph. 17. "Eadem res est forma calidi vel forma luminis, et lex calidi aut lex luminis."

225

Essay, b. xi. c. iv. sect. 3.

226

Ibid. c. xiii. sect. 22.

227

History of Ideas, b. iii. c. iii. Modern Opinions respecting the Idea of Cause.

228

Ibid. b. i. c. iv.

229

Langue des Calculs, p. 1.

230

Grammaire, p. xxxvi.

231

Since the selection and construction of terms is thus a matter of so much consequence in the formation of science, it is proper that systematic rules, founded upon sound principles, should be laid down for the performance of this operation. Some such rules are accordingly suggested in b. iv. of the Nov. Org. Ren.

232

Disc. Prélim. p. viii.

233

Helvetius Sur l'Homme, c. xxiii.

234

P. xiii.

235

See Mr.Sharpe's Essays.

236

Price's Essays, p. 16.

237

P. 18.

238

Reid, Essays on the Powers of the Human Mind, iii. 31.

239

Stewart, Outlines of Moral Phil. p. 138.

240

Whately, Polit. Econ. p. 76.

241

Cousin, Fragmens Philosophiques, i. 53.

242

Ibid. i. 67.

243

See also the vigorous critique of Locke's Essay, by Lemaistre, Soirées de St. Petersbourg.

244

Ampère, Essai, p. 210.

245

Kritik der Reinen Vernunft, Pref. p. xv.

246

The sensational system never acquired in Germany the ascendancy which it obtained in England and France; but I am compelled here to pass over the history of philosophy in Germany, except so far as it affects ourselves.

247

i. p. 14.

248

i. p. 7.

249

Hist. Ind. Sc. b. xi. c. vii.

250

P. 15.

251

P. 16.

252

M. Comte's statement is so entirely at variance with the fact that I must quote it here. (Phil. Pos. vol. i. p. 705.)

"Le second théorème général de dynamique consiste dans le célèbre et important principe des aires, dont le première idée est due à Kepler, qui découvrit et démontra forte simplement cette propriété pour le cas du mouvement d'une molecule unique, ou en d'autres terms, d'un corps dont tous les points se meuvent identiquement. Kepler établit, par les considérations les plus élémentaires, qui si la force accélératrice totale dont une molecule est animée tend constamment vers un point fixé, le rayon vecteur du mobile décrit autour de ce point des aires égales en temps egaux, de telle sorte que l'aire décrite au bout d'un temps quelconque croît proportionellement à ce temps. Il fit voir en outre que réciproquement, si une semblable relation a été vérifiée dans le mouvement d'un corps par rapport à un certain point, c'est une preuve suffisante de l'action sur le corps d'un force dirigée sans cesse vers ce point."

There is not a trace of the above propositions in the work De Stellâ Martis, which contains Kepler's discovery of his law, nor, I am convinced, in any other of Kepler's works. He is everywhere constant to his conceptions of the magnetic virtue residing in the sun, by means of which the sun, revolving on his axis, carries the planets round with him. M. Comte's statement so exactly expresses Newton's propositions, that one is led to suspect some extraordinary mistake, by which what should have been said of the one was transferred to the other.

253

Vol. ii. p. 433.

254

Vol. ii. 640.

255

I venture to offer this problem;—to express the laws of the phenomena of diffraction without the hypothesis of undulations;—as a challenge to any one who holds such hypothesis to be unphilosophical.

256

ii. p. 641.

257

ii. p. 673.

258

Hist. Ind. Sc. ii. 489, b. x. c. i.

259

ii. p. 561.

260

i. 50.

261

i. 41.

262

ii. 433.

263

Phil. Pos. ii. 392-398.

264

[A System of Logic, Ratiocinative and Inductive, being a connected view of the Principles of Evidence, and of the Methods of Scientific Investigation. By John Stuart Mill.]

265

These Remarks were published in 1849, under the title Of Induction, with especial reference to Mr. J. S. Mill's System of Logic.

266

My references are throughout (except when otherwise expressed) to the volume and the page of Mr. Mill's first edition of his Logic.

267

On this subject see an Essay On the Transformation of Hypotheses, given in the Appendix.

268

B. vii. c. iii. sect. 3.

269

B. iii. c. ix. art. 7.

270

B. i. c. iii.

271

B. iii. c. viii.

272

Discourse, Art. 192.

273

B. xi. c. xi.

274

Phil. b. xiii. c. ix. art. 7.

275

B. xiii. c. viii.

276

Given also in the Phil. Ind. Sc. b. xiii. c. vii. sect. 17.

277

Ibid. b. vi. c. iv.

278

See Hist. Ind. Sc. b. xii. note D, in the second edition.

279

There are some points in my doctrines on the subject of the Classificatory Sciences to which Mr. Mill objects, (ii. 314, &c.), but there is nothing which I think it necessary to remark here, except one point. After speaking of Classification of organized beings in general, Mr. Mill notices (ii. 321) as an additional subject, the arrangement of natural groups into a Natural Series; and he says, that "all who have attempted a theory of natural arrangement, including among the rest Mr. Whewell, have stopped short of this: all except M. Comte." On this I have to observe, that I stopped short of, or rather passed by, the doctrine of a Series of organized beings, because I thought it bad and narrow philosophy: and that I sufficiently indicated that I did this. In the History (b. xvi. c. vi.) I have spoken of the doctrine of Circular Progression propounded by Mr. Macleay, and have said, "so far as this view negatives a mere linear progression in nature, which would place each genus in contact with the preceding and succeeding ones, and so far as it requires us to attend to the more varied and ramified resemblances, there can be no doubt that it is supported by the result of all the attempts to form natural systems." And with regard to the difference between Cuvier and M. de Blainville, to which Mr. Mill refers (ii. 321), I certainly cannot think that M. Comte's suffrage can add any weight to the opinion of either of those great naturalists.

280

Hist. Ind. Sc. b. x. note (VA) in the second edition.

281

B. xi. c. v. art. 11.

282

I have given elsewhere (see last chapter) reasons why I cannot assign to M. Comte's Philosophie Positive any great value as a contribution to the philosophy of science. In this judgment I conceive that I am supported by the best philosophers of our time. M. Comte owes, I think, much of the notice which has been given to him to his including, as Mr. Mill does, the science of society and of human nature in his scheme, and to his boldness in dealing with these. He appears to have been received with deference as a mathematician: but Sir John Herschel has shown that a supposed astronomical discovery of his is a mere assumption. I conceive that I have shown that his representation of the history of science is erroneous, both in its details and in its generalities. His distinction of the three stages of sciences, the theological, metaphysical, and positive, is not at all supported by the facts of scientific history. Real discoveries always involve what he calls metaphysics; and the doctrine of final causes in physiology, the main element of science which can properly be called theological, is retained at the end, as well as the beginning of the science, by all except a peculiar school.

283

I have also, in the same place, given the Inductive Pyramid for the science of Optics. These Pyramids are necessarily inverted in their form, in order that, in reading in the ordinary way, we may proceed to the vertex. Phil. Ind. Sc. b. xi. c. vi.

284

Cosmos, vol. ii. note 35.

285

The reader will probably recollect that as Induction means the inference of general propositions from particular cases, Deduction means the inference by the application of general propositions to particular cases, and by combining such applications; as when from the most general principles of Geometry or of Mechanics, we prove some less general theorem; for instance, the number of the possible regular solids, or the principle of vis viva.

286

B. vi. c. v.

287

c. vi.

288

Hist. b. vi. c. vi. sect. 13.

289

Hist. Ind. Sc. b. viii.

290

Reprinted in the Appendix to this volume.

291

Phil. Pos. t. iv. p. 264.

292

Logic, b. vi. c. 3.

293

Jones, On Rent, 1833.

294

Literary Remains, 1859.

295

The substance of this and the next chapter was printed as a communication to the Cambridge Phil. Soc. in 1840.

296

Or in the earlier editions, in the Philosophy of the Inductive Sciences.