Spanish and Portuguese South America during the Colonial Period; Vol. 2

(Signed) John Whitelocke,Lieutenant-General.

The Right Hon. W. Windham,

&c. &c. &c.

Copy of Letter from Lieutenant-General Whitelocke, to the Right Honourable William Windham, dated July 10th, 1807.—Private.

Buenos Ayres, July 10th, 1807.

Sir,—I have the honour to inform you, that immediately after my arrival at Monte Video, on the 10th of May, I began to make every possible preparation for the attack of this place, as the first and most essential step towards the reduction of the province. For this purpose sloops of war and other light vessels were sent to reconnoitre the southern bank of the river, in order to fix upon the precise point of debarkation. It was found that the water was too shallow to admit of a landing, under cover of the ships of war, anywhere to the westward of the town of Buenos Ayres, nor nearer to it on the eastward than the Enseñada of Barragon. This bay was, therefore, fixed upon as the point of debarkation, and every arrangement that could previously be made was pressed forward with expedition, whilst I waited anxiously for the arrival of Brigadier-General Craufurd’s corps, and the fleet with which I had sailed from England.

On the 27th of May, Rear-Admiral Murray and Brigadier-General Craufurd arrived at the mouth of the river; but owing to a prevalence of contrary winds, the expedition did not reach Monte Video until the 14th of June. I immediately determined not to wait the arrival of the convoy from England, as by the general voice of the inhabitants, and of those officers who had passed the winter in the province, the months of July and August were represented as most unfavourable to military operations, on account of the heavy and continual rains which prevail at that season. Having fixed upon Colonia as the place of assembly from which the expedition was to proceed, I sent the troops upwards, in small divisions, on account of the intricate navigation, leaving at Monte Video the 47th regiment, the detachments of the 20th and 21st light dragoons, two companies of the 38th regiment, and a corps of militia, formed by the British merchants, in all composing a garrison of about 1300 men, under the command of Colonel Browne, of the 40th regiment; and after much delay, caused by contrary winds, Rear-Admiral Murray and myself arrived opposite the point of debarkation on the 28th ultimo.

In the morning the fleet stood into the bay, and before night the whole army, consisting as per margin,16 was landed, without opposition, on the enemy’s coast. The greater part of the next day was occupied in landing artillery, horses, and stores. Immediately on the landing of Brigadier-General Craufurd’s brigade, and the 38th and 87th regiments, I detached Major-General L. Gower with this force and two 3-pounders, to occupy the heights in my front, about five miles distant; and the next morning I proceeded to join him with the rest of the army, four 6-pounders, and two 3-pounders, the remainder of the artillery not being landed. The same day I directed Major-General L. Gower to precede my march with his advanced corps, substituting the 36th and 88th regiments, under Brigadier-General Lumley, for the 38th and 87th regiments; and I left Colonel Mahon, with four troops of the 17th light dragoons, and the 40th regiment, to protect the guns when they should come up, and cover the rear of the army, being principally induced to break my force into these divisions, for the purpose of more readily procuring cover and fuel. On the 1st of July the advanced corps drove a small party of the enemy from the village of Reduction, and took post about two miles beyond it, whilst I occupied the village with the main body. I was now distant about nine miles from the bridge over the Rio Chuello, on the opposite bank of which I understood the enemy had constructed batteries, and intended to make a stand. I determined, therefore, instead of forcing the bridge, to turn the enemy’s line of defence, by marching from our left, and crossing the river in two columns higher up, where it was represented fordable, and continuing to march until I should have got completely to the westward and northward of the town, appuyed my left on the river La Plata, and opened a communication with the fleet. On the 2nd instant, at nine o’clock, Major-General L. Gower marched with his corps, which should now be considered as the right column, and I marched myself at ten, with the intention of uniting our forces that evening in the suburbs of the town. Major-General L. Gower having crossed the river, his leading brigade fell in with a considerable corps of the enemy, under General Liniers himself, which he attacked with great vivacity, completely overthrew it, taking ten pieces of cannon and some prisoners. The Major-General halted on the ground from which he had driven the enemy, waiting my arrival, and sending, at the same time, a summons to General Liniers (No. 1), which was refused on this occasion, as well as the following day, when I sent to him myself (as per No. 2). Owing to the ignorance of my guide, who conducted me by a considerable detour, I did not reach the Major-General until the next day, when I formed my line by placing one of my brigades under Sir Samuel Achmuty, on the left of Brigadier-General Lumley’s, extending it towards the convent of the Recolleta, distant about two miles; and another under Lieutenant-Colonel Guard, on the right, towards the Residencia, whilst Brigadier-General Craufurd’s brigade occupied the central and principal avenues into the town, being distant about three miles from the great square and the fort of Buenos Ayres. In pursuance of my original design, I intended to march the next morning by my left to the convent of Recolleta, which standing on high ground immediately over the river, I could have communicated with the fleet, and landed heavy guns for a vigorous attack of the town, should General Liniers obstinately refuse to surrender it. Upon consulting, however, with Major-General L. Gower, he submitted to me another plan of attack, which as it promised a more expeditious issue, inasmuch as it obviated the necessity of marching to the left, and the delay which would be occasioned by landing heavy guns and erecting batteries, a delay which I the more dreaded on account of the rains having, to all appearance, set in, and the men being in a great degree exposed to the severity of the weather, from the impossibility of conveying camp equipage. I consented, for these reasons, to change my plan, and adopt what seemed to be generally approved by the general officers under me. Besides, the measure of bombardment, or any other measure which might occasion an indiscriminate loss of life, ruin the town, and irritate the people, appeared to me, upon reflection, contrary both to the letter and spirit of my instructions. I hoped also, by this plan, to be able to dislodge those who opposed the progress of his Majesty’s arms, and by driving them to the bottom of the town, there make a number of prisoners, which might be, in our hands, so many pledges for the return of the 71st regiment and the other troops captured with Brigadier-General Beresford, whilst the peaceable inhabitants, and those best disposed towards us, by remaining quietly in their houses, might escape the danger of the attack. The nature of this attack can be best explained by annexing the General Order (No. 3). The result was successful in the principal points, as I obtained possession of the Plaza de Tauros, a strong post on the enemy’s right flank, 32 pieces of ordnance, and a large depôt of ammunition and provisions, as well as the Residencia, another strong post on the enemy’s left, and four pieces of cannon which defended it. But these conquests were purchased with the loss of 2500 men killed, wounded, and prisoners, and amongst the latter Brigadier-General Craufurd and other officers of rank. The conduct of both officers and men in this action has been gallant in the highest degree, and the severity of the loss occasioned solely by the obstinacy of the defence. The enemy had dug ditches across the principal streets, and placed cannon within them: he occupied the flat roofs of all the houses in commanding situations, and from thence, and the windows, poured a destructive fire of musketry, hand-grenades, fire-pots, &c. upon the columns as they advanced; having likewise had the precaution to barricade the doors in so strong a manner as to render them very difficult to force, though the troops had been provided with instruments for that purpose. Every householder, with his negroes, defended his dwelling; and it is, perhaps, not too much to say, that the whole male population of Buenos Ayres was employed in its defence, which very population in the field would probably not have withstood the attack of two British regiments.

On the morning succeeding the attack I received a letter from General Liniers, offering to give up all prisoners taken in the late affair, as well as those taken with Major-General Beresford, if I condescend to relinquish the attack, and withdraw his Majesty’s forces from the province. A correspondence upon this took place, which ended in the treaty I have the honour to transmit.

My reasons for acceding to this negotiation were briefly these:—I had lost in the preceding attack – men, although I had gained a strong post on the enemy’s right flank, from which I communicated with the fleet, and from which it might be possible to fire heavy cannon on the town, and otherwise annoy it. Yet the enemy’s chief defences were too remote from this point, and too much covered by houses to allow me to hope that I could, in any given time, destroy them by cannon alone, even if the nature of my instructions had not militated against such a measure. General Liniers had likewise acquainted me in his letter, that he could not answer for the lives of his prisoners, if the attack was persisted in; and from everything I have since heard from the officers themselves, I have reason to believe they would all have been sacrificed to the fury of an exasperated rabble. Nothing, therefore, remained to be done offensively, but another attack on the town, conducted in a manner similar to the last; the event of which must have been doubtful, as my force, when collected, did not reach 5000 men; and, if even successful, my loss would probably have rendered that force insufficient to keep the place when taken. If it was deemed fruitless to attempt another attack, there yet remained two modes of retreat, either by treaty, or re-embarking in the face of the enemy. The latter measure would certainly have been attended with additional loss, and the wounded and prisoners of the late affair, as well as the 71st regiment, in all 4000 men, lost for ever to Great Britain. In return for which I should have possessed but a nominal command at Monte Video, a post which can never be considered of any advantage whilst the capital of the province and the great entrepôt of commerce remained in the hands of the enemy.

I determined, therefore, to accede to this treaty, by which I shall be enabled to bring off my own army almost entire, and recover the 71st regiment, a point which my instructions has taught me to consider as of the first importance; and I shall evacuate a province which the force I was authorised to calculate upon could never maintain, and which, from the very hostile disposition of its inhabitants, was in truth not worth maintaining.

I shall dispose of the army in the manner pointed out in my instructions, the particulars of which I shall detail to you from Monte Video, by another man-of-war that will sail from thence with duplicates of these despatches. Trusting that the conduct I have pursued in this difficult situation may meet with the gracious approval of his Majesty,—I have the honour to be, &c.

(Signed) John Whitelocke,Lieutenant-General.

This will be delivered to you by Lieutenant-Colonel Bourke, to whom, as well as Sir Samuel Achmuty, I refer you for further particulars.

(A true copy) E. Cooke.

Right Honourable William Windham,

&c. &c. &c.

TREATY

A Definitive Treaty between the Generals in Chief of his Brittanic Majesty and of his Catholic Majesty, as per the following articles:

1st. There shall be, from this time, a cessation of hostilities on both sides of the river Plate.

2d. The troops of his Brittanic Majesty shall retain, for the period of two months, the fortress and place of Monte Video; and, as a neutral country: there shall be considered a line drawn from San Carlos on the west, to Pando on the east, and there shall not be on any part of that line hostilities committed on any side, the neutrality being understood, only that the individuals of both nations may live freely under their respective laws—the Spanish subjects being judged by theirs, as the English by those of their nation.

3d. There shall be on both sides a mutual restitution of prisoners, including not only those which have been taken since the arrival of the troops under Lieutenant-General Whitelocke, but also all those his Britannic Majesty’s subjects captured in South America since the commencement of the war.

4th. That, for the prompt despatch of the vessels and troops of his Brittanic Majesty, there shall be no impediment thrown in the way of the supplies of provision which may be requested for Monte Video.

5th. A period of ten days, from this time, is given for the re-embarkation of his Britannic Majesty’s troops, to pass to the north side of the river La Plata, with the arms which may actually be in their power, stores and equipage, at the most convenient points which may be selected, and during this time provisions may be sold to them.

6th. That at the time of the delivery of the place and fortress of Monte Video, which shall take place at the end of the two months fixed in the second article, the delivery will be made in the terms it was found, and with the artillery it had when it was taken.

7th. Three officers of rank shall be delivered for and until the fulfilment of the above articles by both parties; being well understood, that his Britannic Majesty’s officers who have been on their parole, cannot serve against South America until their arrival in Europe.

Done at the Fort of Buenos Ayres, the seventh day of July, one thousand eight hundred and seven, signing two of one tenor.

(A True Copy)      E. CookeMajor-General Gower to General Liniers, July 3Coral de Miserala, before Buenos Ayres,July 3, 1807.

Sir,—Captain Roache, of the 17th dragoons, whom I had the honour of sending unto you this morning, having informed me that you wished to communicate with me on the subject of terms, I beg to acquaint you, that his Excellency Lieutenant-General Whitelocke has ordered me (from his sincere wish to spare an unnecessary effusion of human blood) to intimate to you, that in the present situation of affairs, if they do not proceed to further hostilities, he will grant terms to the town of Buenos Ayres: that the following must be the basis on which they are to be granted; but that any trifling alteration which may make them more favourable, without altering their original fundamental stipulations, may possibly be agreed to:

1st. All British subjects detained in South America must be delivered up, and sufficient hostages placed in the power of the British Commander till their arrival at Buenos Ayres.

2d. That all persons holding civil offices dependent on the government of Buenos Ayres, and all military officers and soldiers, become prisoners of war.

3d. That all cannon, stores, arms, and ammunition, be delivered up uninjured.

4th. That all public property, of every description, be delivered up to the British Commanders.

5th. That the free and unrestrained exercise of the Roman Catholic religion be granted to the inhabitants of Buenos Ayres.

6th. That all private property on shore shall be respected, and secured to its owners.

Our force is so considerable that I believe, in candour, you cannot doubt of the ultimate result. I trust you will believe me when I assure you that a wish to avoid so dreadful a scene as that which a town taken by assault always presents is the only thing which has induced his Excellency Lieutenant-General Whitelocke to permit me to address you.

(Signed) J. L. Gower,Major-General.

His Excellency Gen. Liniers,

&c. &c. &c.

(A true Copy) E. Cooke.Major-General Ellio’s Answer to Major-General GowerJuly 3, 1807.

Sir,—By orders of the Spanish General, Don Santiago Liniers, I answer to the letter brought by your flag of truce respecting the surrender of this capital, by saying that nothing relative to laying down our arms will be attended to—that the Spanish General has a sufficient number of brave troops, commanded by brave chiefs, full of desire to die in defence of their country, and that this is the moment to show their patriotism.—I remain, &c.

(Signed) Major-General Call. Ellio.

Major-Gen. Levison Gower.

Plan of Attack.—CircularHeadquarters, Camp before BuenosAyres, July 4, 1807.

Sir,—Herewith I have the honour to enclose instructions for the attack of Buenos Ayres. The refusal of the Spanish General to listen to terms, and the state of the army from fatigue and bad weather, leaves but little choice as to the mode of accomplishing our purpose; otherwise I should assuredly be disposed to adopt one equally calculated17 to secure to us possession of the place without the probable chance of so much blood being spilt.

I therefore have to desire that you will impress upon the minds of all officers acting under your immediate orders, the necessity of preventing, in as great a degree as possible under such circumstances, acts of violence on the persons of those who do not carry arms, as well as women and children.—I have the honour to be, &c.

(Signed) John Whitelocke.

To Brigadiers.

COPY OF GENERAL ORDERS,4th July, 1807

Sir Samuel Achmuty to detach the 38th regiment, to possess itself of the Plaza de Tauros and the adjacent strong grounds, and there post itself.

The 87th, 5th, 36th, and 88th regiments to be divided into wings, and each wing is to penetrate into the street directly in its front, in a column of sections right in front.

The light battalion to penetrate by wings into the second street, on the right of that leading up from Mr. White’s house, and the next to it, followed by the 95th regiment.

The left division of the 95th is to receive its orders from Colonel Park, the right division from General Craufurd; two 3-pounders to follow these columns, one each. The 45th to advance by wings, left in front, up to the two next streets beyond the light battalion. The carabineers to move up with the cover two 6-pounders, which will be advanced up the street from Mr. White’s, and remain with them.

The 9th light dragoons to move to the left, and take the ground of the light battalion, at five o’clock, where they will receive further orders.

Each officer commanding a division of the left wing, which is from the 88th to 87th inclusively, to take care that he does not incline to his right of the right wing, that is, light brigade and 45th regiment to the left.

The cannonade in the centre to be the signal for the whole to rush forward; and each division to go, if possible, straight down the street before it, till it arrives at the last square of houses near to the river Plate, of which they are to possess themselves, and on the tops of which they are to form: if they find that they suffer by any interior defences, to lodge themselves as far in advance as they can. Two corporals, with tools, to be attached to the head of each column. The whole to be unloaded, and no firing to be allowed on any account.

When the business is over, the utmost exertion to be used to keep the men collected and formed.

The regiments may leave their packs in their present cantonments, with a subaltern’s guard, if they wish.

The cannonade will commence at 30 minutes past six o’clock precisely.

(A true copy) E. Cooke.Major-General Gower’s Orders

Major-General Levison Gower, as second in command, will be occupied in making the necessary arrangements relative to the executive duties and localities of the situation, aided by Brigadier-General Sir Samuel Achmuty; whose able assistance will also be brought in aid of what may appertain to the many other points to which the attention of the Commander of the forces must of course be directed, in a command in its nature new and intricate.

The other appointments to the Staff will be communicated to the army on the arrival of the additional force.

The 9th light dragoons to march to the left, and take the ground of the light battalion at five o’clock, where they will remain till further orders.

Lieutenant-General Whitelocke to General LiniersHeadquarters before Buenos Ayres, July 4, 1807.

I beg you will do me the justice to impute to the principles of humanity only, the information I give you of my arrival, having joined the troops under the command of Major-General Levison Gower with the principal column of the army. I dare say it is not unknown to you that another column awaits my orders within little more than a league from your capital.

I beg, therefore, only to be informed, if, after this faithful communication, you still adhere to the answer given to the Major-General in your letter of yesterday, who was authorized to address you on this subject, in the event of his arrival before me.

The bearer, Captain Whittingham, has my orders to deliver this, and to wait half an hour from that time for your answer, yes or no.

J. Whitelocke.

To General Liniers, &c.

General Liniers to Major-General Whitelocke

Sir,—I have just received your Excellency’s letter of this date, to the contents of which I have the honour to reply, that whilst I have ammunition, and whilst the same spirit which now animates this garrison and people shall continue to exist, I shall never think of delivering up the post which has been confided to me: and I am perfectly convinced, that I have more than sufficient means to resist all the efforts which your Excellency can make to conquer me.

The duties of humanity of which your Excellency speaks, will, I conceive, be more wounded by your Excellency, who is the aggressor, than by me. I merely do that duty which is prescribed to me by honour and the just right of retaliation.—I have the honour to be, &c.

(Signed) Santiago Liniers.

July 4, 1807.

(A true Copy) E. Cooke.Coral of Miserala, July 3, 1807.

Sir,—I have the honour to report to you, for the information of the Lieutenant-General Whitelocke, that the advanced corps under my command, consisting of three companies of the 95th light battalion, 36th and 38th regiments, with two 3 and two 6-pounders, advanced from the position I had taken up in front of the village of Reduction; and, after making a considerable detour from the badness of the roads, I crossed the Chuello at the Chico Pass; from thence I continued my route, though very strongly enclosed, and difficult ground, till the head of the column arrived at the junction of two roads, about 500 yards from the Canal of Miserala. At the same moment that we discovered the enemy, they commenced a heavy, though, after the first round, not well-directed fire of shot and shells, my artillery having been left in the rear, under the protection of three companies of Brigadier-General Lumley’s brigade, owing to the inability of the horses to bring it up at the same rate at which the infantry marched. I directed an immediate attack to be made on their left flank with the bayonet, which was executed by Brigadier-General Craufurd in the most perfect manner, with his brigade, and he was so well seconded by the gallantry of Lieutenant-Colonel Pack and Major Travers, the officers and men of the 95th, and light battalion, that in five minutes the enemy’s force, though strongly posted behind hedges and embankments, gave way, leaving about 60 killed and 70 prisoners, with all their artillery, consisting of nine guns, one howitzer, three tumbrels with limbers complete.

I beg to state that the conduct of every officer and soldier engaged was admirable; and that I am also under great obligation to Brigadier-General Lumley, for his exertions to take a share in the action, but which alone the very exhausted state of his regiments, from the severity of the march, prevented. Immediately after I formed, I found that he had taken a good position on the right of the light brigade, to support it in case of re-attack.