The 56th Division

The difficulties indicated in this paper were those which faced the actual fighting men. We have already mentioned the zigzag line, and the reader will readily appreciate how the attempt to form a front, moving in a given direction after the men had left the trenches, frequently led to confusion and loss of direction. Col. Bayliffe’s statement that men will edge away from the source of fire does not necessarily contravert our assertion that they are drawn towards the sound of fire, which must be read in conjunction with the admitted uncertainty of the exact position of an objective. During an attack no officer or N.C.O. can control more than half a dozen men, and the more usual number is two. On this basis the proportion of officers and N.C.O.s is totally inadequate, and it follows that success depends largely on the men themselves. The assaulting troops will fall naturally under two heads: leaders and followers. The leaders are the men of greater initiative, and in moments of uncertainty, when doubt of their direction seizes them, when no trench is visible, they turn towards the sound of the enemy—the place where the firing comes from. It is one of the factors to be dealt with in keeping direction. A line which has become thin through casualties will, no doubt, swerve from a strongly-held post.

And what a lot is covered by the paragraph on digging! The physical effort required to go through a battle like the Somme was colossal. Relief meant only relief from the actual front line, not relief from open trenches, from wet, from mud, from cold, or even from severe casualties; it was merely a case of moving a short way back to other trenches. After days of this sort of life an assault was a most exhausting experience and, if successful, was not finished with the written message, “We are on our objective.” Exhausted men were called upon to dig new trenches at once, under fierce fire, and the trenches dug, they waited for the counter-attack which, on the Somme, inevitably followed. Perhaps the counter-attack succeeded and the men were driven back to their original line—and still there was no rest.

Imagine the condition of mind of the surviving officers and men of a company when they were reinforced by troops straight from home, with no experience of modern or indeed any other form of fighting. The reinforcements came almost as an added anxiety to the old men. And how could the new arrivals be expected to appreciate the advantage of following close on our own barrage, in itself a doubt-provoking thing? There was nothing easy for the regimental officer or for his men; they fought the enemy, the earth, and the sky.

We give the gallant colonel’s remarks on Tanks as an interesting light on the early proceedings of the new engines of war. We are well aware that they will provoke a smile from some readers, but they are none the less justifiable. Tanks accomplished very little on this part of the battle front. To the infantry they seemed only to attract the attention of the enemy with the appalling noise they made and the very definite target they afforded, and then they broke down! Col. Bayliffe’s opinion, which does not absolutely condemn the use of Tanks, was shared by two Brigadier-Generals of the 16th Division, and most of the infantry in less exalted positions. That they afterwards accomplished the object of their inventors is beside the point.

Heaven forbid that we should appear to offer excuses for the 56th Division—none are needed. But we find it impossible to give a true picture of the conditions under which men fought, and by placing a few of the difficulties before the reader, hope to enable him to appreciate the truly great fighting qualities of these London men. Success conjures up to the mind a picture of swift movement, and such successes were gained during the war—but not on the Somme. The enemy was strong and determined, and fought to the last. Gen. Falkenhayn, who was the instigator of the Verdun offensive, seems to rather pooh-pooh the battle of the Somme, and give the impression that it had little effect on the Central Powers; but as he was dismissed at the end of August, one might deduce that other people did not share his views. Hindenburg and Ludendorff, on the other hand, wag their heads gravely over the whole business. The Germans were being badly battered, and were fighting most desperately to arrest disaster. And so, in recording the exploits of the 56th Division, we have to repeat somewhat monotonously the account of attacks being continually delivered on the same trench or point.

The trouble in a battle of this sort is to reconcile the two points of view: that of the Higher Command and that of the infantry. For the infantry there was no break in the fighting—if they did not assault “over the top,” they were bombing the enemy out of a trench or being bombed out themselves. And it is not too easy to decide what particular trenches were held at any one moment. The position in Loop Trench, for instance, was continually changing. Combles Trench, the sunken road, and the southern end of Bouleaux Wood were points of continual struggle. The enemy exerted his full pressure on the 56th Division. But for the Higher Command this month of fighting divides itself into five attacks!

The plan on this part of the front was to surround Combles by joining the French on the far side. The junction of two armies of different nationalities might always be considered a point of weakness, and the movement itself was one of which the enemy could take advantage. Lord Cavan explains the position very clearly with a small rough sketch:

“The plan to take Combles was like this:

Therefore during the advance the protection of my flank from a possible counter-stroke down the arrow was most important. This protection from Leuze Wood to Morval was splendidly and gloriously afforded. Further, in the actual attack on Morval and Les Bœufs this protecting flank had to be advanced to keep pace with the attack. The key of this was the capture of a trench about X-X. This was captured and held, and the complete success of the battle was assured. I had every confidence in Hull and his men, tired though they were, and this confidence was more than justified.”

This grim, determined, and desperate struggle reveals qualities in the London troops which, though they existed, would not in a more spectacular success have been so clearly demonstrated. It requires good men to attack again and again until their object is gained, and when these attacks are launched against such splendidly trained soldiers as the Germans, one can only marvel that the thing was ever done, and applaud the steadfast courage, the endurance of body and spirit, which enabled the men to do it.

True, the battles of the Somme ended with both sides being stuck in the mud—an inglorious ending to so much heroism—and the final, and perhaps fatal, stroke was snatched from our grasp by the weather; but those who came through the battle may now consider dispassionately what it was they had accomplished.

The Central Powers (we must always remember that we fought more than the strength of Germany) had decided, as we know, to bleed France white on the field of Verdun. They were also pressing Italy hard and had gained important successes. The Entente Powers replied first with Brussiloff’s attack, and secondly with the Franco-British offensive on the Somme. Falkenhayn declares that the most dangerous moment of the Russian offensive had been passed before the first shot of the battle of the Somme had been fired. He also maintains that the Austrian loss of the right bank of the Isonzo had no connection with the Somme; that the Germans would not in any case have sent troops to help their ally in Italy. As for Verdun, he deals with it in a somewhat unsatisfactory paragraph:

“The only tangible gain, then, of this battle to the enemy remains in its effect on the situation on the Western Front. As a matter of course, an expenditure of strength such as the enemy favoured demanded the use of corresponding forces for the defence. The operations in the Meuse area were not yet, however, immediately affected. On the 11th July we were still able, by a strong thrust, to advance our line on the east bank.... After this it was the tension of the whole situation, and especially the necessity to husband our matériel and ammunition, which necessitated the abandonment of any big German offensive operations on the Meuse. The headquarters of the Crown Prince’s Army Group were instructed to carry on the offensive calmly and according to plan, so as to give the enemy no good reason for concluding that he could hope for its cessation. This, too, was quite successful, for the French were unable to bring up reinforcements from the Meuse to the Somme front until September, when, following on the change of Chief of the General Staff, the ‘Verdun-offensive’ had been completely abandoned.”

The last sentence is, of course, the bitter pill for Falkenhayn. It is perhaps only natural that he would seek to justify his policy, and persist that he was right and would have succeeded had he been left alone. Hindenburg’s memoirs give one a somewhat different impression:

“Very soon after I took over my new post I found myself compelled by the general situation to ask His Majesty the Emperor to order the offensive at Verdun to be broken off. The battles there exhausted our forces like an open wound. Moreover, it was obvious in any case that the enterprise had become hopeless, and that for us to persevere with it would cost us greater losses than those we were able to inflict on the enemy. The battlefield was a regular hell, and was regarded as such by the troops.”

And of the Somme he says:

“The extent of the demands which were being made on the army in the West was brought before my eyes quite vividly for the first time during this visit to France. I will not hesitate to admit that it was only now that I fully realised all that the Western Armies had done hitherto.... I could now understand how everyone, officers and men alike, longed to get away from such an atmosphere.... Many of our best and finest fighting men had to pour out their heart’s blood in destroyed trenches....

It was only when the arrival of the wet season began to make the ground impossible that things became quieter in the battle area of the Somme. The million of shell-holes filled with water became mere cemeteries.... Over everyone hovered the fearful spectre of this battlefield, which for desolation and horror seemed to be even worse than that of Verdun.”

General Ludendorff carries the impression still further3:

“On the Somme the enemy’s powerful artillery, assisted by excellent aeroplane observation and fed with enormous supplies of ammunition, had kept down our fire and destroyed our artillery. The defence of our infantry had become so flabby that the massed attacks of the enemy always succeeded. Not only did our moral suffer, but in addition to fearful wastage in killed and wounded, we lost a large number of prisoners and much material....

The 25th saw the beginning of the heaviest of the many heavy engagements that made up the battle of the Somme. Great were our losses. The enemy took Rancourt, Morval, Gueudecourt, and the hotly-contested Combles. On the 26th the Thiepval salient fell....

The fighting had made the most extraordinary demands both on commanders and troops.... Divisions and other formations had to be thrown in on the Somme front in quicker succession, and had to stay in the line longer. The time for recuperation and training on quiet sectors became shorter and shorter. The troops were getting exhausted. Everything was cut as fine as possible. The strain on our nerves in Pless was terrible....”

We may conclude, then, that the Somme, as the chief counter-stroke of the Entente Powers, defeated the Central Powers; France was not bled white; and although the Russians were driven back, and Roumania, who had entered the war, was speedily defeated by the Central Powers, Italy was relieved and delivered a successful counter-attack on the Austrians. The situation, as a result of the Somme, although the individual British soldier may not have thought it vastly improved, was more than ever serious for the Central Powers, and one could not at that stage hope for more.

The total number of prisoners taken by the British Armies on the Somme, from 1st July to 18th November, was over 38,000. Also 29 heavy guns, 96 field guns, 136 trench mortars, and 514 machine guns.

CHAPTER III

LAVENTIE-RICHBOURG

One might well imagine that the 56th Division was entitled to a rest, but the days when armies retired into winter-quarters had passed—unless a “quiet” bit of the line may be so called. There was a rest for a few days in the neighbourhood of Belloy-sur-Somme, north-west of Amiens. Battalions moved there, after a night at Bernafay Wood, Mansell Camp, or the Citadel, by bus, and all moves were complete by the 12th October. Then they rested and cleaned up.

There was a slight rearrangement on the 20th, which brought Divisional Headquarters to Hallencourt, and some of the units into other villages, but the division was once more on the move almost immediately, and on the 24th October was behind the 61st Division in the country round Lestrem. Three days later brigades commenced the relief of the 61st Division in the Richbourg l’Avoué-Laventie line.

This bit of country was exceedingly flat, and in normal times was drained by innumerable ditches. It was one of those bits of country where trenches are an impossibility—soil and water seem to be combined in equal proportions. Naturally war conditions did not improve the draining, and at times large tracts of the country were flooded. Our defences were breastworks, and the system of holding the line was by a combination of posts. There were certain advantages about this line, matters of space and of easy approach, but they were only apparent when the weather was fine; when it was cold and wet, shelter was very difficult to find.

At first all three brigades were in line, but on the 27th November the 5th Division was put in on the right and the front was shortened, so that two brigades held the line and one was in reserve.

The whole of the division, however, did not arrive in this sector at once. The artillery had been left on the Somme battlefield covering the left of the French. Of this time Brig.-Gen. Elkington writes:

“During the whole of the month of October the heavy and incessant rain had made the going so bad that it was almost impossible to get vehicles up to the positions. Improvised ammunition carriers were made out of the baskets from the ammunition wagons, and for the last part of the operations all ammunition, rations, and water went up on pack animals. It was most difficult to get material for dugouts up to the guns, and in consequence officers and men suffered a great deal of discomfort. The horses also suffered very much from the constant hard, heavy work. The 56th Divisional Artillery were relieved on the 31st October by the 8th Divisional Artillery. Owing to the heavy going, the withdrawal of the guns was a difficult job, and one section of A/280, which got stuck in deep mud, took two days to get out. The 56th Divisional Artillery marched from the Somme on the 1st November, badly in need of a rest and refit in the way of clothes, etc., and on the 5th we arrived on the Neuville-St. Vaast front, and went into the line, covering the 3rd Canadian Division facing the Vimy Ridge, on the 6th. The headquarters of the artillery was established at Aubigny, where the headquarters of the Canadian Division, under Major-Gen. Lipsett, were.

From the 7th November to the 1st December we remained covering the Canadian Division. The sector was a very quiet one, but the batteries were very extended, and it was a matter of very long walks going round them, as cars were not allowed forward. We were very well done by the Canadians, and the men were able to get reclothed, and the horses managed to pick up in the good stabling.... On the 1st December the 56th Divisional Artillery was relieved by the Canadian R.F.A., and we marched to the Neuve Chapelle area to cover our own division.”

Meanwhile the 56th Division was covered by the 6th Divisional Artillery.

Reinforcements for the shattered battalions were prompt, and all monthly strength returns show a good average of a thousand men for battalions. Horses remained steadily about 5,100, although the number fell during the battle of the Somme. In actual numbers the division was of average strength, but the quality had suffered. We find, for instance, a record that a draft of over a thousand men arrived about this period, and that they had not been instructed in musketry! With all the will in the world such men were not of very great use. Provision was made, however, for their instruction.

Almost at once the reputation of this Neuve Chapelle front began to change. It had been considered a quiet bit of line with nothing much happening beyond mining and counter-mining. On the 28th October the enemy opened a trench-mortar bombardment which Australian miners declared to have been the heaviest they had experienced during their stay in that line. The system of holding the line by means of posts, too, gave many opportunities for patrol work, as it was a system adopted by both sides. The advantage of position, as was so often the case, was with the Germans, who were on the Aubers Ridge, with better observation and drier ground.

The month of November was a quiet month, cold and wet. No Man’s Land was flooded and patrols found it very difficult to move about, as they could not avoid splashing and consequent betrayal of their presence.

On the 30th November the enemy raided the 7th Middlesex, who occupied as part of their line a mine-crater. Major Emery was on the spot, and with two men drove them off. They failed to secure identification. The next day, however, we secured identification in the shape of a Lieut. Steinhardt, 19th Bavarian Regt., who was in charge of a patrol which was dispersed by one of our Lewis-gun teams—an experience which the lieutenant found so bewildering that he lost his way and entered our lines, under the impression that they were his own.

Two lance-corporals, Millar and Wodley, of the 2nd London Regt., also secured identification by chasing a German patrol of five men, of whom they killed one and the remaining four put up their hands. These men were of the 7th Bavarian Regt., 5th Bavarian Division, III Bavarian Corps.

The policy of the XI Corps (Gen. Haking) was to annoy the enemy on all occasions and keep him always uneasy. The month of December was therefore devoted to most active patrolling, and the enemy lines were entered again and again only to be found empty. There is only one record of finding the line occupied, when the Queen Victoria’s Rifles captured two prisoners. The reason, of course, was the state of the ground, and it affords an interesting sidelight on the endurance shown by the men of the 56th Division, as the trenches, or rather defences, they occupied were similar to those of the Hun.

The operations of the winter are, in fact, only of interest as showing the endurance, the determination, and the spirit of the 56th Division. There was nothing in the nature of an attack or even a raid of any magnitude—it was a matter of small parties of men resisting the fearful conditions of climate, and penetrating with the greatest boldness into the enemy lines.

Having ascertained that the enemy was not occupying his line, but merely patrolling it, a more aggressive attitude was adopted from the 1st January, 1917. On the first day of the year snipers, from the battalions in line, established themselves in the German front line and remained there all day. They had a few opportunities which they did not miss.

The operations until the 14th January were carried out by battalions of the 167th Brigade; those between the 14th and 29th by the 169th Brigade. Briefly they may be summarised.

On the night of the 3rd/4th January 100 men of a new draft were taken across No Man’s Land, in parties of six, to “visit” the enemy trenches; this was no easy matter on account of the state of the ground. On the same night two officers of the 3rd London Regt. penetrated almost to the enemy support lines, when they were held up by deep water.

On the night 9/10th January four posts were established in the enemy front line, and on the next night two more.

On the 14th a post known as Hampstead Heath was violently attacked by the enemy in very superior numbers. This post was held by the 7th Middlesex, and the men were so cold they could scarcely move; the Queen’s Westminster Rifles were actually halfway across No Man’s Land on the way to relieve them when the attack occurred. This relief was apparently driven back by trench-mortar barrage and machine-gun fire. The 7th Middlesex men put up a fight, but their Lewis gun was jammed and useless, and they were forced out of the post. One man was found to be missing. The record of this regiment is particularly fine, and they felt very acutely the taking of this prisoner by the enemy. The 7th Middlesex is one of the two Imperial Service Battalions of the Territorial Force which existed at the outbreak of war. It was the first battalion to leave the country and was sent to hold Gibraltar. In March 1915 it arrived in France and was attached to the 8th Division at La Gorgue—in this same area. From the taking over of the line immediately after the battle of Neuve Chapelle it went through many engagements before joining the 56th Division, and up to this time, in spite of all the attacks on the Somme, it had only lost six men as prisoners. Its casualties in France, to date, were: 28 officers and 338 other ranks killed, 35 officers and 763 other ranks wounded.

On the morning of the 15th January another post called Bertha was attacked under cover of a dense fog, and after four men out of eleven had been killed, the post (of the 1st London Regt.) was driven out—but two were taken prisoners. Almost immediately, however, a patrol of the same regiment, composed of four men, left our front line and reoccupied the post, and by noon our troops had restored the position. The enemy made another attack, but were driven off. This post evidently caused the Germans great annoyance, as they attacked it on the night of the 16/17th January and were again driven off.

From the 17th to the 20th the posts were bombarded by artillery and trench mortars, and on the 21st, under cover of an intense bombardment, the enemy succeeded in occupying Bertha Post. A counter-attack was at once organised, but it failed, owing to two machine guns which the enemy had brought up with them. In the early morning our patrols discovered the enemy leaving it, and it was again occupied.

During the night 22nd/23rd January the enemy made an organised attempt to recapture all the posts. After repeated attacks the garrison of Bertha Post was once more forced to retire, and again reoccupied the spot in the early morning.

The enemy shelled the posts all day on the 23rd and 24th, on the latter with a large percentage of lachrymatory shells, which shelling was followed by four separate attacks. After hand-to-hand and bombing fights they were driven off.

On the evening of the 27th the enemy concentrated his artillery fire on Irma Post, which until then had only received general attention from him, and succeeded in driving the garrison out. We then drove the enemy out by artillery fire, and the post was reoccupied by us.

On the 28th the Army Commander, Gen. Horne, directed that all the posts should be vacated.

One cannot consider these incidents only as small bickerings. The artillery fire which the men had to face was remarkably accurate and very fierce, and there was also the weather. At first No Man’s Land was a swamp, or a lake, and then a cold snap set in, which was paralysing to all who had to live in the open. The men had no cover either from shell fire or the weather—the “posts” were only a matter of shell-holes on our side of the German breastworks, and improved with the help of a shovel and a pick. In face of these hardships the courage and determination of the troops of the 56th Division never faltered, although at one time Capt. Newnham felt impelled to write that, “although wiring has been much strengthened, actual consolidation is impossible owing to the frozen ground. The garrison feel they are occupying shell traps. Battalions are on the defensive and not offensive, and the moral of the men is suffering. At the same time our existing defences are falling into disrepair.” In spite of this dictum the men succeeded, after it was written, in driving off four severe attacks, but it gives an indication of the desperate conditions under which the 56th Division carried out an aggressive policy.