The 56th Division

The main attack of the Fourth Army, launched on the same day, succeeded on the right. North of the Ancre as far as Serre our losses were severe, and the initial gains of the assaulting troops could not be maintained. After five days’ fierce fighting, the enemy’s first system of defence farther south had been penetrated to a depth of a mile over a front of six miles. But north of the Ancre, after the first day, operations were confined to maintaining a steady pressure on the enemy.

This battle, with the subsidiary attack on the Gommecourt Salient, is known as the battle of Albert 1916.

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The division was not relieved. It had suffered in casualties 182 officers and 4,567 other ranks. The London Scottish had sent 24 officers and 847 other ranks into battle, and 9 officers and 257 other ranks had come out. The Rangers had sent in 23 officers and 780 other ranks—6 officers and 280 other ranks came out. The Queen Victoria’s Rifles came out with 22 officers and 160 other ranks; the London Rifle Brigade, 18 officers and 300 other ranks; the Queen’s Westminster Rifles, 19 officers and 160 other ranks. The supporting battalions suffered only slightly less.

When the fighting had abated the enemy seems to have initiated a truce to gather in the wounded. His own stretcher-bearers came out, on seeing which ours also went out. This state of affairs lasted for an hour, when our men were warned to get back to their lines.

The state of the line was extraordinary. The front line, over which so much labour had been expended, had ceased to exist, and could only be held by means of patrols and a few small posts. Our main line was now what was known as the R Line, the original line when the 56th Division arrived in the sector. And the front held by the division was gradually increased. From the 3rd July onwards the division took over the line to the left until on the 8th the 169th Brigade was north of Fonquevillers with its left opposite Little Z. Each brigade held its front with two battalions in the line, one in brigade reserve and one in divisional reserve.

During the night of the 13th the artillery made a “demonstration” in order to help the Fourth Army, which was again attacking in the south. On this night a patrol of the Queen’s Westminster Rifles captured a prisoner who proved to be of the 91st Regt.—a normal unit.

On the 17th of the month all three brigades attempted raids, but the enemy were found to be too alert, and no prisoners were obtained.

The division remained on this front, keeping the enemy busy, until the 20th August, when it was relieved by the 17th Division, and marched first to Doullens, then to Fromer-le-Grand, then to St. Riquier, where it proceeded to refit and train under the orders of the X Corps.

CHAPTER II

THE SOMME

THE BATTLE OF GINCHY; THE BATTLE OF FLERS-COURCELETTE; THE BATTLE OF MORVAL

The move to St. Riquier, in the neighbourhood of Abbeville, revealed to some of the officers that their men were not very fit for marching. This knowledge appears to come as a revelation to some people. Those on active service very soon discovered that a long period of trench duty, though it hardened the men to those particular conditions, made them unfit for any strenuous marching. It was probably never understood by people in England. They were, then, weary battalions that arrived at St. Riquier.

When it is said that a battalion or a division was “resting,” that word must not be taken in too literal a sense. One might define it with greater truth as being a change of location, sometimes a mere matter of a mile or so, at others perhaps fifty miles. There were, it is true, no trenches to man, no sentry groups by day and night, but there was always work to be done. And the work, very naturally, had always the one end in view—the defeat of the Germans.

The training was almost exclusively of an aggressive nature. Unless there was some special object in view, when trenches would be dug to represent our own and those occupied by the enemy, the optimistic nature of the Higher Command always leaned to open warfare training. Companies wandered about, as they do in England, attacking villages, strong points, and woods, and indulged in vast schemes of pursuit after phantom armies called Red or North or South Armies. But this short period at St. Riquier gave the 56th Division a surprise in the matter of training.

Battalions had been reinforced since the Gommecourt action, and there was some grumbling about the nature of the reinforcements. Batches of men, from all sorts of units, were drafted to battalions, and General Hull made great efforts to get this system altered. Battalions, however, were of fair strength.

We know that very early in the war the problem of barbed wire had been exercising the minds of the Staff in general. Long after the Press campaign for high explosives, when this form of shell was provided in large quantities, wire-cutting was still ordered with quite a high percentage of shrapnel. But whatever you did, however long the time you gave to cutting the wire, it never disappeared entirely; vile, treacherous strands stuck out of the earth like brambles, stakes remained miraculously upright with waving lengths of wire to grab you by the sleeve or the trousers; and when the cutting was well done, there had been a mere substitution of obstacles—the state of the ground, blasted into holes, pits, mounds, and mud made progress very slow and difficult.

How was wire to be removed?

Mr. Winston Churchill let his mind wander round steam-rollers linked up with chains. Other minds thought of tractors. At the same time, inventors were considering the old question of moving forts. In August 1916 there came from England a weird and fearful-looking machine known as a Tank.

On the 26th August the 7th Middlesex practised an attack in conjunction with five Tanks. One can easily imagine the Middlesex men, and everybody else who had wind of what was afoot, all agog at this new form of field training! What were the criticisms of the London men on this … machine?

The Tanks had only been landed in France on the 25th, and it is not surprising that two of them broke down. But the practice was continued on subsequent days until each brigade had acquired experience. Sir Douglas Haig, Marshal Joffre, and H.R.H. the Prince of Wales were interested spectators of these evolutions.

The orders for this exercise were that the Tanks would cross our front line at zero hour, and would be followed by the first infantry wave one minute later. The second wave would start at zero plus three minutes; the third wave at zero plus five minutes; the fourth wave at zero plus six minutes. The infantry were instructed to advance in short rushes up to, but not beyond, the Tanks—unless a Tank broke down, when they were to proceed as if it was not there.

Everyone seems to have been much impressed by the behaviour of the Tanks.

On the 31st August, General Hull received a warning order that his division would move to Corbie and come under the XIV Corps (Cavan). And on the following day the artillery was ordered forward. The 168th and 169th Infantry Brigades left St. Riquier on the 3rd, and the 167th Brigade on the 4th. Events came tumbling over one another.

On the 4th September the leading troops of the division were at the Citadel and Happy Valley, near Carnoy; on the 5th at Maricourt Siding. And on the 6th September the 56th Division was ordered to relieve the 5th Division that night in the front line.

No one will ever be able to describe in adequate fashion the scene behind the Somme battle front. Piccadilly in the height of the season, with its slow-moving and ever-stopping traffic, may give some idea of the state of the roads—only one must substitute army carts, limbers, lorries, for smart limousine cars and buses, one must substitute a loose stone road covered with six inches of mud, and holes three feet deep filled with water, for the smooth wood paving of that thoroughfare. And there were no pavements, no sidewalks. The infantry threaded its way in single file through this mass of dirty carts, and sweating men and horses, and overheated motor-lorries, halting sometimes for hours; or broke away across-country where, although the traffic was not so congested, obstacles such as cavalry lines, transport lines, camps, and, as the forward area was penetrated, lines of heavy guns and howitzers were met with.

The whole country seemed pulsing with life and effort. Here was no labour-saving device of peaceful civilisation, but a continual strain of muscle and sinew. Difficulties were overcome by straining horses, straining men, for where the greatest difficulty existed the engine was of no use. And through the midst of all this, threading its way in long files, passed the 56th Division.

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We have said that the results of the first five days of fighting, which started on the 1st July, was an advance of one mile on a front of six miles. This was followed by minor engagements to adjust the line.

The two northern Corps of the attacking Army were given to Sir Hubert Gough, with instructions to keep the enemy busy while Sir Henry Rawlinson battered his way through farther south.

On the 14th July the Fourth Army was again launched on a front from Longueval to Bazentin-le-Petit Wood. This battle was continued for several days, and established the Army on a line from Maltz Horn Farm (Montauban), where it joined on to the left of the French, along the eastern edge of Trones Wood to Longueval, then westward past Bazentin-le-Grand to the northern corner of Bazentin-le-Petit (and the wood), and so to the north of Ovillers. Over 2,000 prisoners were taken, which brought the total since the opening of the offensive to more than 10,000, also in this battle we captured 4 heavy guns, 42 field-guns, 30 trench mortars, and 52 machine guns. [Battle of Bazentin Ridge.]

But our line from Pozières to Delville Wood and Longueval, and then south of Maltz Horn Farm, where it was carried still south by the French to the village of Hem, made a most unpleasant salient. The enemy had excellent observation from Guillemont, and could bring a mass of surrounding artillery to bear on a comparatively small area packed with troops, guns, and supplies. To relieve this most uncomfortable position, it was arranged that the right of the British Army should swing forward in conjunction with the French. To do this the French would have to capture the strongly fortified villages of Maurepas, Le Foret, Rancourt, and Frigicourt, while we would have to take all the country up to Sailly-Saillisel and Morval, which included the capture of Flers, Gueudecourt, Ginchy, Guillemont, and Les Bœufs. Before this could be done, the enemy, on the 18th July, launched a strong counter-attack on Delville Wood-Longueval-Waterlot Farm. And this was the prelude to much fierce and very confusing fighting. [The battle of Delville Wood commenced on the 15th July and ended 3rd September.]

On the 30th July we attacked Guillemont and Falfemont Farm in conjunction with our Allies, but without success; and on the 7th August our troops again entered Guillemont and were again driven out. Guillemont was the important point to be gained, but it was evident that it could not be won in a small engagement, and as the only objective, without heavy loss. So we and the French made a series of attacks, advancing foot by foot on Maurepas, Falfemont, Guillemont, Leuze Wood, and Ginchy. But no great progress was made. And so the month of August passed.

On the 3rd September a combined French and British attack was made on a wide front extending on the left to the Ancre, so that both the Fourth and Fifth Armies were engaged. The gain in front of Sir Hubert Gough’s Army was small, but the Fourth Army managed to win the much-disputed Guillemont, and after many assaults Falfemont Farm (which was only completely captured on the 5th) and the greater part of Leuze Wood. Ginchy and High Wood remained in the hands of the Germans, but we had made a step in the right direction, and had advanced our right to a depth of one mile on a front of nearly two miles and captured over a thousand prisoners. [Battle of Guillemont, 3rd-6th September.]

This was, briefly, the situation when the 56th Division marched forward to take over the line from the 5th Division.

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Brig.-Gen. Loch was ordered to take over a portion of the line, and accordingly the 168th Brigade moved from Maricourt Siding in the direction of Falfemont Farm, and came under the orders of the 5th Division. The local situation was always most difficult to grasp. The Somme field of battle was the most hideous place and absolutely bewildering. A guide was a treacherous person to trust, or perhaps we should say he was a broken reed to lean on; for the poor fellow had no treacherous intent in his heart, he was anxious enough to lead troops in the right direction, but nine times out of ten was completely lost a few minutes after he started. And there were, perhaps, more mistakes made in attempting to trace the front line in that great battle than in any other.

Guillemont was held by us; Combles was strongly held by the Germans. Between these two places was Leuze Wood. We held, with more or less certainty, the line of the road between Leuze Wood and Guillemont, and we also held the country between Leuze Wood and Falfemont Farm, and had pushed troops into the wood itself; but the situation in the rest of the square marked 27 was very vague (see map)—the only certain thing was that there were many Germans there. Except for the wood and the line of the road to Guillemont, the Germans held all of squares 20 and 21. We had a nasty, elongated triangle pushed into enemy territory, and it had a wobbly right side to it.

The Kensingtons went into the front line not very far from Falfemont Farm, in the lower left corner of square 27. The London Scottish were supposed to be in support to the Royal Irish Rifles, and got into a two-foot scrape, unworthy of the name of “trench,” about three-quarters of the way through Leuze Wood. The Royal Irish Rifles were imagined to be holding the most southern end of Bouleaux Wood across the road which separated it from Leuze Wood.

The positions were, of course, taken over at night, and the next day the French attacked Combles. In order to help our Allies our guns started a bombardment, but unfortunately most of their shells fell around Leuze Wood. It was one of the unavoidable accidents of war. Close shooting has to be done, and there are many possible causes, from faulty ammunition to wet ground, for guns shooting short. It is none the less annoying to the infantry. Capt. A. H. Macgregor, of “C” Company (London Scottish), made strong remarks in writing, but failed to stop the energetic gunners.

The Irish were having a much worse time than the London Scottish, as they were also being heavily bombarded by the Germans. So they decided to evacuate their trench.

All this led to some confusion, and on top of it the enemy launched a bombing attack, which was probably in support of their counter-attack on the French. The London Scottish reserve companies, which were at Wedge Wood, moved up, and the battalion prepared to defend Leuze Wood, which they imagined would shortly be heavily attacked. But the Irish, although they lost heavily, threw back the German bombers and were relieved by two companies of the London Scottish.

By midnight everything was re-established as it had been before, and, while probing about in the dark, the London Scottish gathered in two enemy officers and fourteen other ranks of the 107th Infantry Regt. as prisoners.

The position they were in was on the south of the road, and it was decided to try and dig a trench on the edge of Bouleaux Wood, that is, on the other side of the road. A platoon was sent forward the following morning to undertake this work. It was successfully carried out, and the covering party managed to inflict a good many casualties on the enemy—Sergt. Smith, of “B” Company, shot eight—and three further prisoners were taken.

This experience of the London Scottish will give some idea of the conditions which ruled what was officially known as “holding the line.” At any moment a post might be wrested from you and have to be fought for again, and all the time you were described as “established” in Leuze Wood.

On the night of the 7th September the Queen Victoria’s Rifles took over this bit of line, and the London Scottish went back to Maltz Horn Farm.

On the night of the 6/7th September, General Hull took over command of the divisional front from the G.O.C. 5th Division. There was a slight readjustment of line the next night, and it was then held by the 169th Brigade on the right and in touch with the 1st French Division, and the 168th Brigade on the left and in touch with the 16th Division on the Combles-Guillemont road.

There was to be a big attack on the 9th, but the position from which the 56th Division had to start was not too satisfactory. A study of the battle of the Somme will show that at some time or other every unit lost direction. It was exceedingly difficult to recognise an objective; even the heaps of ruins which marked the sites of villages were frequently mistaken. It is a rolling, featureless country. But perhaps the chief cause of loss of direction was the shape of the jumping-off line. The German defence was very obstinate and the fighting severe. Troops, having made an advance, had to hang on anywhere, facing the enemy where he opposed them most fiercely. The result was a zigzag line, a crazy front, where troops frequently faced east and west and were told to attack north. On an ordinary practice field-day, a platoon commander can get his men out of a trench and make them wheel in the desired direction, but in action attacking troops will always be drawn towards the nearest firing. Men getting out of a trench and hearing or seeing an enemy in front of them will go towards him, no matter how much orders to the contrary have been dinned into their heads.

Consider the line of the 56th Division. The left along the Guillemont-Leuze Wood road was facing due north; it then curled round the wood and faced south-east; another curl made the extreme right of the line face north-east. The attack on the 9th was to be in a north-easterly direction.

To get a better line and form a strong flank facing Combles, an attempt was made to clear the enemy from the trenches south-east of Leuze Wood.

The London Rifle Brigade had relieved the Kensingtons on the right of the line, and companies were somewhat puzzled by their position, which is described as “most obscure.” On the night of the 8th they made a bombing attack to clear the trenches on the south-east of the wood. At first this met with some success, but in the early morning of the 9th the enemy came at them again in large numbers, and they were driven back to their former position. It was not thought advisable to try to regain the lost ground.

The attack on the 9th September (the battle of Ginchy) was by the whole of the XIV Corps in conjunction with the XV Corps on the left. The XIV Corps held Guillemont; and Delville Wood was held by the XV Corps. The object was to capture Ginchy and bring the line up to point 141·7, and from there down to Leuze Wood. Incidentally it meant clearing the ground to the south-east of the wood, but in following the actions from this date it must be remembered that the Higher Command intended to work round Combles, and so the right of the British Army was always working to form a defensive flank, until the advance reached a point which would enable troops to join hands with the French on the far side of Combles.

The task of the 169th Brigade was the forming of a flank against Combles by capturing the trenches south-east of the wood (the trenches they had failed to take by bombing) and to advance their line a short way through Bouleaux Wood.

The 168th Brigade, who were on the line of the Guillemont-Leuze Wood road, were to pivot on their right (the advance from the northern end of the wood was very slight) and bring their left up to point 141·7. This “right form” was to be done in two stages, the road to Ginchy marking the halfway line.

The artillery were ordered to put up a creeping and stationary barrage. Fifty per cent. of guns were to fire on a known position as a stationary barrage; the other 50 per cent. were to start just ahead of the infantry and creep forward at the rate of fifty yards a minute, until the stationary barrage was reached, when the latter would be jumped forward to the next stationary barrage line.

It will be gathered from the foregoing account of how the 56th Division took over the line that the conditions under which the infantry waited for the resumption of attack were not dissimilar to those at the end, though not the actual termination, of an engagement—when nobody knows within a few hundred yards where any unit really is. And, indeed, that was always the situation during the battle of the Somme. There was perpetual unrest in the line.

The battle on the 9th has always seemed like a wild rush in fast-fading light. It was to open at 4.45 p.m., but on the left of the Corps it seems to have been delayed. Nowhere was it entirely successful in the assault. The situation remained obscure and fighting continued for several days.

The truth of the whole matter was that the enemy defended Combles with desperation. The right of the 56th Division had as hard a task as was ever set for any troops, and on their left was a German strong point bearing the ominous name of “the Quadrilateral,” the strength of which was only learned at bitter cost. We will follow the fortunes of the division from the right of the line.

The 169th Brigade was on the right with the London Rifle Brigade and the Queen Victoria’s Rifles attacking. Leuze Wood, as we know, was always a dangerous spot, and the task of the London Rifle Brigade was to capture those trenches on the south-east of the wood and start the building up of the flank facing Combles. But the moment the men left their jumping-off trenches, their attack was met and destroyed by a hail of rifle and machine-gun fire.

On the left of the London Rifle Brigade the Queen Victoria’s Rifles, whose objective was the enemy trench on the far side of the Combles road, met with more success and gained a precarious footing in a part of that line. But no troops of the 169th Brigade could be said to be established anywhere on their objective.

Part of the 2nd London Regt. was given to the London Rifle Brigade, and a second attack was launched on the trenches south-east of the wood, almost simultaneously with a counter-attack by the enemy from his Bouleaux Wood defences. The Queen Victoria’s Rifles held on to their gains, but the second attack on the trenches south-east of the wood failed. The Queen’s Westminster Rifles, who were in reserve, were sent for.

The 168th Brigade, on the left of the division, attacked with the 4th London Regt. on the right and the Rangers on the left. The 4th Londons, pivoting on the north end of Leuze Wood, gained their first objective under close cover of our barrage and with little loss. But the Rangers came under heavy machine-gun fire from their left. It was ascertained from a prisoner, captured later, that a whole battalion of his regiment, the 161st of the 185th Division, was in the centre of the square marked 20.

The left company of the Rangers, with the troops of the 16th Division on their left, met a strong force of the enemy and were driven back to their point of departure. The right company, however, after hard fighting which lasted until 6 p.m., reached their first objective, the line of the road from Leuze Wood to Ginchy.

Meanwhile the 4th London Regt., sticking close to the artillery barrage, had again advanced at 5.25 p.m. and gained their final objective. But their losses were severe. The machine-gun fire was tremendous, and its effects can be gathered from the fact that a post, which was left to construct a strong point in the first objective, was entirely wiped out.

The right company of the Rangers, having gained their first objective, again advanced, though the opposition they had met with had caused them to be late on the barrage. Again the murderous fire was poured on them from the left, and they swerved so that they came up on the centre of the 4th London troops. These two battalions were now on the line of the trench leading to point 141·7, but exactly how near that point was only determined later. On the right they were in touch with the Queen Victoria’s Rifles.