Ancient States and Empires

Renewed preparations of Darius. His death.

The wrath of Darius—a man of great force of character, but haughty and self-sufficient, was tremendous when he learned the defeat of Datis, and his retreat into Asia. He resolved to bring the whole force of the Persian empire together to subdue the Athenians, from whom he had suffered so great a disgrace. Three years were spent in active preparations for a new expedition which should be overwhelming. All the allies of Persia were called upon for men and supplies. Nor was he deterred by a revolt of Egypt, which broke out about this time, and he was on the point of carrying two gigantic enterprises—one for the reconquest of Egypt, and the other for the conquest of Greece—when he died, after a reign of thirty-six years, B.C. 485.

Xerxes. His enormous preparations. His bridges over the Hellespont.

He was succeeded by his son Xerxes, who was animated by the animosities, but not the genius of his father. Though beautiful and tall, he was faint-hearted, vain, blinded by a sense of power, and enslaved by women. Yet he continued the preparations which Darius projected. Egypt was first subdued by his generals, and he then turned his undivided attention to Greece. He convoked the dignitaries of his empire—the princes and governors of provinces, and announced his resolution to bridge over the Hellespont and march to the conquest of Europe. Artabanus, his uncle, dissuaded him from the enterprise, setting forth especially the probability that the Greeks, if victorious at sea, would destroy the bridge, and thus prevent his safe return. Mardonius advised differently, urging ambition and revenge, motives not lost on the Persian monarch. For four years the preparations went forward from all parts of the empire, including even the islands in the Ægean. In the autumn of 481 B.C., the largest army this world has ever seen assembled at Sardis. Besides this, a powerful fleet of one thousand two hundred and seven ships of war, besides transports, was collected at the Hellespont. Large magazines of provisions were formed along the coast of Asia Minor. A double bridge of boats, extending from Abydos to Sestos—a mile in length across the Hellespont, was constructed by Phœnicians and Egyptians; but this was destroyed by a storm. Xerxes, in a transport of fury, caused the heads of the engineers to be cut off, and the sea itself scourged with three hundred lashes. This insane wrath being expended, the monarch caused the work to be at once reconstructed, this time by the aid of Greek engineers. Two bridges were built side by side upon more than six hundred large ships, moored with strong anchors, with their heads toward the Ægean. Over each bridge were sketched six vast cables, which held the ships together, and over these were laid planks of wood, upon which a causeway was formed of wood and earth, with a high palisade on each side. To facilitate his march, Xerxes also constructed a canal across the isthmus which connects Mount Athos with the main land, on which were employed Phœnician engineers. The men employed in digging the canal worked under the whip. Bridges were also thrown across the river Strymon.

His advance. He crosses the Hellespont. His review of his army.

These works were completed while Xerxes wintered at Sardis. From that city he dispatched heralds to all the cities of Greece, except Sparta and Athens, to demand the usual tokens of submission—earth and water. He also sent orders to the maritime cities of Thrace and Macedonia to prepare dinner for himself and hosts, as they passed through. Greece was struck with consternation as the news reached the various cities of the vast forces which were on the march to subdue them. The army proceeded from Sardis, in the spring, in two grand columns, between which was the king and guards and select troops—all native Persians, ten thousand foot and ten thousand horse. From Sardis the hosts of Xerxes proceeded to Abydos, through Ilium, where his two bridges across the Hellespont awaited him. From a marble throne the proud and vainglorious monarch saw his vast army defile over the bridges, perfumed with frankincense and strewed with myrtle boughs. One bridge was devoted to the troops, the other to the beasts and baggage. The first to cross were the ten thousand household troops, called Immortals, wearing garlands on their heads; then followed Xerxes himself in his gilded chariot, and then the rest of the army. It occupied seven days for the vast hosts to cross the bridge. Xerxes then directed his march to Doriscus, in Thrace, near the mouth of the Hebrus, where he joined his fleet. There he took a general review, and never, probably, was so great an army marshaled before or since, and composed of so many various nations. There were assembled nations from the Indus, from the Persian Gulf, the Red Sea, the Levant, the Ægean and the Euxine—Egyptian, Ethiopian, and Lybian. Forty-six nations were represented—all that were tributary to Persia. From the estimates made by Herodotus, there were one million seven hundred thousand foot, eighty thousand horse, besides a large number of chariots. With the men who manned the fleet and those he pressed into his service on the march, the aggregate of his forces was two million six hundred and forty thousand. Scarcely an inferior number attended the soldiers as slaves, sutlers, and other persons, swelling the amount of the males to five million two hundred and eighty-three thousand two hundred and twenty—the whole available force of the Eastern world—Asia against Europe: as in mediæval times it was Europe against Asia. It is, however, impossible for us to believe in so large a force, since it could not have been supplied with provisions. But with every deduction, it was still the largest army the world ever saw.

The magnitude of his forces.

After the grand enumeration of forces, Xerxes passed in his chariot to survey separately each body of contingents, to which he put questions. He then embarked in a gilded galley, and sailed past the prows of the twelve hundred ships moored four hundred feet from the shore. That such a vast force could be resisted was not even supposed to be conceivable by the blinded monarch. But Demaratus, the exiled king of Sparta, told him he would be resisted unto death, a statement which was received with derision.

Progress of the Persians.

After the review, the grand army pursued its course westward in three divisions and roads along Thrace, levying enormous contributions on all the Grecian towns, which submitted as the Persian monarch marched along, for how could they resist? The mere provisioning this great host for a single day impoverished the country. But there was no help, for to mortal eyes the success of Xerxes was certain. At Acanthus, Xerxes separated from his fleet, which was directed to sail round Mount Athos, while he pursued his march through Pæonia and Crestonia, and rejoin him at Therma, on the Thermaic Gulf, in Macedonia, within sight of Mount Olympus.

Preparations of the Athenians. Sparta commands the land forces and Athens the naval.

Meanwhile, the Athenians, fully alive to their danger, strained every nerve to make preparations to resist the enemy; fortunately, there was in the treasury a large sum derived from the Lamian mines, and this they applied, on the urgent representations of Themistocles, to building ships and refitting their navy. A Panhellenic congress, under the presidency of Athens and Sparta, assembled at the Isthmus of Corinth.—the first great league since the Trojan war. The representatives of the various States buried their dissensions, the most prominent of which were between Athens and Ægina. In reconciling these feuds, Themistocles took a pre-eminent part. Indeed, there was need, for the political existence of Hellas was threatened, and despair was seen in most every city. Even the Delphic oracle gave out replies discouraging and terrible; intimating, however, that the safety of Athens lay in the wooden wall, which, with extraordinary tact, was interpreted by Themistocles to mean that the true defense lay in the navy. Salamis was the place designated by the oracle for the retreat, which was now imperative, and thither the Athenians fled, with their wives and children, guarded by their fleet. It was decided by the congress that Sparta should command the land forces, and Athens the united navy of the Greeks; but many States, in deadly fear of the Persians, persisted in neutrality, among which were Argos, Cretes, Corcyra. The chief glory of the defense lay with Sparta and Athens. The united army was sent into Thessaly to defend the defile of Tempe, but discovering that they were unable to do this, since another pass over Mount Olympus was open in the summer, they retreated to the isthmus of Corinth, and left all Greece north of Mount Citheron and the Megarid territory without defense. Had the Greeks been able to maintain the passes of Olympus and Ossa, all the northern States would probably have joined in the confederation against Persia; but, as they were left defenseless, we can not wonder that they submitted, including even the Achæans, Borotians, and Dorians.

The pass of Thermopylæ.

The Pass of Thermopylæ was now fixed upon as the most convenient place of resistance, next to the vale of Tempe. Here the main land was separated from the island of Eubœa by a narrow strait two miles wide. On the northern part of the island, near the town of Histiæa, the coast was called Artemisium, and here the fleet was mustered, to co-operate with the land forces, and oppose, in a narrow strait, the progress of the Persian fleet. The defile of Thermopylæ itself, at the south of Thessaly, was between Mount Œta and an impassable morass on the Maliac Gulf. Nature had thus provided a double position of defense—a narrow defile on the land, and a narrow strait on the water, through which the army and the fleet must need pass if they would co-operate.

Interruption of military preparations by the Olympic games.

While the congress resolved to avail themselves of the double position, by sea and land, the Olympic games, and the great Dorian, of the Carneia, were at hand. These could not be dispensed with, even in the most extraordinary crisis to which the nation could be exposed. While, therefore, the Greeks assembled to keep the national festivals, probably from religious and superstitious motives, auguring no good if they were disregarded, Leonidas, king of Sparta, with three hundred Spartans, two thousand one hundred and twenty Arcadians, four hundred Corinthians, two hundred men from Philius, and eighty from Mycenæ—in all three thousand one hundred hoplites, besides Helots and light troops, was sent to defend the pass against the Persian hosts. On the march through Bœotia one thousand men from Thebes and Thespiæ joined them, though on the point of submission to Xerxes. The Athenians sent their whole force on board their ships, joined by the Platæans.

Leonidas defends the pass of Thermopylæ.

It was in the summer of 480 B.C. when Xerxes reached Therma, about which time the Greeks arrived at their allotted posts. Leonidas took his position in the middle of the Pass—a mile in length, with two narrow openings. He then repaired the old wall built across the Pass by the Phocians, and awaited the coming of the enemy, for it was supposed his force was sufficient to hold it till the games were over. It was also thought that this narrow pass was the only means of access possible to the invading army; but it was soon discovered that there was also a narrow mountain path from the Phocian territory to Thermopylæ. The Phocians agreed to guard this path, and leave the defense of the main pass to the Peloponnesian troops. But Leonidas painfully felt that his men were insufficient in number, and found it necessary to send envoys to the different States for immediate re-enforcements.

The Greek fleet. Disaster to the Persian fleet.

The Greek fleet, assembled at Artemisium, was composed of two hundred and seventy-one triremes and nine penteconters, commanded by Themistocles, but furnished by the different States. A disaster happened to the Greeks very early; three triremes were captured by the Persians, which caused great discouragement, and in a panic the Greeks abandoned their strong naval position, and sailed up the Eubœan Strait to Chalcis. This was a great misfortune, since the rear of the army of Leonidas was no longer protected by the fleet. But a destructive storm dispersed the fleet of the Persians at this imminent crisis, so that it was impossible to lend aid to their army now arrived at Thermopylæ. Four hundred ships of war, together with a vast number of transports, were thus destroyed. The storm lasted three days. After this disaster to the Persians, the Greek fleet returned to Artemisium. Xerxes encamped within sight of Thermopylæ four days, without making an attack, on account of the dangers to which his fleet were exposed. On the fifth day he became wroth at the impudence and boldness of the petty force which quietly remained to dispute his passage, for the Spartans amused themselves with athletic sports and combing their hair. Nor was it altogether presumption on the part of the Greeks, for there were four or five thousand heavily-armed men, the bravest in the land, to defend a passage scarcely wider than a carriage-road—with a wall and other defenses in front.

Attack on the Greeks by the Persians.

The first attack on the Greeks was made by the Medea—the bravest of the Persian army, but their arrows and short spears were of little avail against the phalanx which opposed, armed with long spears, and protected by shields. For two days the attack continued, and was constantly repulsed, for only a small detachment of Greeks fought at a time. Even the “Immortals”—the chosen band of Xerxes—were repulsed with a great loss, to the agony and shame of Xerxes.

Leonidas defends the pass, but is slain. Heroic death of the three hundred Spartans.

On the third day, a Malian revealed to the Persian king the fact that a narrow path, leading over the mountains, was defended only by Phocians, and that this path led to the rear of the Spartans. A strong detachment of Persians was sent in the night to secure this path, and the Phocian guardians fled. The Persians descended the path, and attacked the Greeks in their rear. Leonidas soon became apprised of his danger, but in time to send away his army. It was now clear that Thermopylæ could no longer be defended, but the heroic and self-sacrificing general resolved to remain, and sell his life as dearly as possible, and retard, if he could not resist, the march of the enemy. Three hundred Spartans, with seven hundred Thespians and four hundred Thebans joined him, while the rest retired to fight another day. It required all the efforts of the Persian generals, assisted by the whip, to force the men to attack this devoted band. The Greeks fought with the most desperate bravery, till their spears were broken, and no weapons remained but their swords and daggers. At last, exhausted, they died, surrounded by vast forces, after having made the most heroic defence in the history of the war. Only one man, Aristodemus, returned to his home of all the three hundred Spartans, but only to receive scorn and infamy. The Theban band alone yielded to the Persians, but only at the last hour.

The dismay and indignation of Xerxes.

Nothing could exceed the blended anger and admiration of Xerxes as he beheld this memorable resistance. He now saw, for the first time, the difficulty of subduing such a people as the Greeks, resolved to resist unto death. His mind was perplexed, and he did not know what course to adopt. Had he accepted the advice of Demaratus, to make war on the southern coast of Laconia, and thus distract the Spartans and prevent their co-operation with Athens, he would have probably succeeded.

Naval battle of Artemisium.

But he followed other councils. Meanwhile, the Persian fleet rallied after the storm, and was still formidable, in spite of losses. The Greeks were disposed to retire and leave the strait open to the enemy. The Eubœans, seeing the evil which would happen to them if their island was unprotected, sent to Themistocles a present of thirty talents, if he would keep his position. This money he spent in bribing the different commanders who wished to retire, and it was resolved to remain. The Persians, confident of an easy victory, sent round the island of Eubœa a detachment of two hundred ships, to cut off all hopes of escape to the ships which they expected to capture. A deserter revealed the intelligence to Themistocles, and it was resolved to fight the Persians, thus weakened, at once, but at the close of the day, so that the battle would not be decisive. The battle of Artemisium was a sort of skirmish, to accustom the Greeks to the Phœnician mode of fighting. It was, however, successful, and thirty ships of the Persians were taken or disabled.

Themistocles sails for Salamis.

But the Greeks derived a greater succor than ships and men. Another storm overtook the Persians, damaged their fleet, and destroyed the squadron sent round the island of Eubœa. Another sea-fight was the result, since the Greeks were not only aided by the storm, but new re-enforcements; but this second fight was indecisive. Themistocles now felt he could not hold the strait against superior numbers, and the disaster of Thermopylæ being also now known, he resolved to retreat farther into Greece, and sailed for Salamis.

Despair of the Greeks. Themistocles revives courage by his “wooden wall.”

At this period the Greeks generally were filled with consternation and disappointment. Neither the Pass of Thermopylæ, nor the strait which connected the Malicas Gulf with the Ægean, had been successfully defended. The army of Xerxes was advancing through Phocis and Bœotia to the Isthmus of Corinth, while the navy sailed unobstructed through the Eubœan Sea. On the part of the Greeks there had been no preparations commensurate with the greatness of the crisis, while, had they rallied to Thermopylæ, instead of wasting time at the festivals, they would have saved the pass, and the army of Xerxes, strained for provisions, would have been compelled to retreat. The, Lacedæmonians, aroused by the death of their king, at last made vigorous efforts to fortify the Isthmus of Corinth, too late, however, to defend Bœotia and Attica. The situation of Athens was now hopeless, and it was seen what a fatal mistake had been made not to defend, with the whole force of Greece, the Pass of Thermopylæ. There was no help from the Spartans, for they had all flocked to the Isthmus of Corinth, as the last chance of protecting the Peloponnesus. In despair, the Athenians resolved to abandon Athens, with their families, and take shelter at Salamis. Themistocles alone was undismayed, and sought to encourage his countrymen that the “wooden wall” would still be their salvation. The Athenians, if dismayed, did not lose their energies. The recall of the exiles was decreed by Themistocles' suggestion. With incredible efforts the whole population of Attica was removed to Salamis, and the hopes of all were centered in the ships. Xerxes took possession of the deserted city, but found but five hundred captives. He ravaged the country, and a detachment of Persians even penetrated to Delphi, to rob the shrine, but were defeated. Athens was, however, sacked.

The hostile fleets at Salamis.

The combined fleet of the Greeks now numbered three hundred and sixty-six ships, more than half of which were Athenian. Many wished to retreat to the Isthmus of Corinth, and co-operate with the Spartans. Dissensions came near wrecking the last hopes of Greece, and Themistocles only prevailed by threatening to withdraw the Athenian ships unless a battle were at once fought. He resorted to stratagem to compel the fleet to remain together, with no outlet of escape if conquered. Aristides came in the night from Ægina, and informed the Greeks that their whole fleet was surrounded by the Persians—just what Themistocles desired. There was nothing then left but to fight with desperation, for on the issue of the battle depended the fortunes of Greece. Both fleets were stationed in the strait between the bay of Eleusis and the Saronic Gulf, on the west of the island of Salamis.

Self-confidence of Xerxes. Battle of Salamis and retreat of Xerxes.

Xerxes, seated upon a throne upon one of the declivities of Mount Ægaleos, surveyed the armaments and the coming battle. Both parties fought with bravery; but the space was too narrow for the Persians to engage their whole fleet, and they had not the discipline of the Greeks, schooled by severe experience. The Persian fleet became unmanageable, and the victory was gained by the Greeks. Two hundred ships fell into the hands of the victors. But a sufficient number remained to the Persians to renew the battle with better hopes. Xerxes, however, was intimidated, and in a transport of rage, disappointment, and fear, gave the order to retreat. He distrusted the fidelity of the allies, and feared for his own personal safety; he feared that the victors would sail to the Hellespont, and destroy the bridges. Themistocles, on the retreat of the Persians, employed his fleet in levying fines and contributions upon the islands which had supported the Persians, while Xerxes made his way back to the Hellespont, and crossed to Asia, leaving Mardonius in Thessaly, with a large army, to pursue the conquest on land.

The important results.

Thus Greece was saved by the battle of Salamis, and the distinguished services of Themistocles, which can not be too highly estimated. The terrific cloud was dispersed, the Greeks abandoned themselves to joy. Unparalleled honors were bestowed upon the victor, especially in Sparta, and his influence, like that of Alcibiades, after the battle of Marathon, was unbounded. No man ever merited greater reward.

Mardonius left in command of the Persians. He ravishes Attica and Bœotia.

Though the Persians now abandoned all hopes of any farther maritime attack, yet still great success was anticipated from the immense army which Mardonius commanded. The Greeks in the northern parts still adhered to him, and Thessaly was prostrate at his feet. He sent Alexander, of Macedon, to Athens to offer honorable terms of peace, which were nobly rejected, and he was sent back with this message: “Tell Mardonius that as long as the sun shall continue in his present path we will never contract alliance with a foe who has shown no reverence to our gods and heroes, and who has burned their statues and houses.” The league was renewed with Sparta for mutual defense and offense, in spite of seductive offers from Mardonius; but the Spartans displayed both indifference and selfishness to any interests outside the Peloponnesus. They fortified the Isthmus of Corinth, but left Attica undefended. Mardonius accordingly marched to Athens, and again the city was the spoil of the Persians. The Athenians again retreated to Salamis, with bitter feelings against Sparta for her selfishness and ingratitude. Again Mardonius sought to conciliate the Athenians, and again his overtures were rejected with wrath and defiance. The Athenians, distressed, sent envoys to Sparta to remonstrate against her slackness and selfishness, not without effect, for, at last, a large Spartan force was collected under Pausanias. Meanwhile Mardonius ravaged Attica and Bœotia, and then fortified his camp near Platæa, ten furlongs square. Platæa was a plain favorable to the action of the cavalry, not far from Thebes; but his army was discouraged after so many disasters—in modern military language, demoralized—while Artabazus, the second in command, was filled with jealousy. Nor could much be hoped from the Grecian allies, who secretly were hostile to the invaders. The Thebans and Bœotians appeared to be zealous, but were governed by fear merely of a superior power, and hence were unreliable. It can not be supposed that the Thebans, who sided with the Persians, by compulsion, preferred their cause to that of their countrymen, great as may have been national jealousy and rivalries.

The Greeks assemble against the Persians at Platæa. Preparations for battle.

The total number of Lacedæmonians, Corinthians, Athenians, and other Greeks, assembled to meet the Persian army, B.C. 479, was thirty-eight thousand seven hundred men, heavily armed, and seventy-one thousand three hundred light armed, without defensive armor; but most of these were simply in attendance on the hoplites. The Persians, about three hundred thousand in number, occupied the line of the river Asopus, on a plain; the Greeks stationed themselves on the mountain declivity near Erythæ. The Persian cavalry charged, to dislodge the Greeks, unwilling to contend on the plain; but the ground was unfavorable for cavalry operations, and after a brief success, was driven back, while the general, Masistias, who commanded it, was slain. His death, and the repulse of the cavalry, so much encouraged Pausanias, the Spartan general, that he quitted his ground on the mountain declivity, and took position on the plain beneath. The Lacedæmonians composed the right wing; the Athenians, the left; and various other allies, the centre. Mardonius then slightly changed his position, crossing the Asopus, nearer his own camp, and took post on the left wing, opposite the right wing of the Greeks, commanded by Pausanias. Both armies then offered sacrifices to the gods, but Mardonius was able to give constant annoyance to the Greeks by his cavalry, and the Thebans gave great assistance. Ten days were thus spent by the two armies, without coming into general action, until Mardonius, on becoming impatient, against the advice of Artabazus, second in command, resolved to commence the attack. The Greeks were forewarned of his intention, by Alexander of Macedon, who came secretly to the Greek camp at night—a proof that he, as well as others, were impatient of the Persian yoke. The Lacedæmonians, posted in the right wing, against the Persians, changed places with the Athenians, who were more accustomed to Persian warfare; but this manœuvre being detected, Mardonius made a corresponding change in his own army—upon which Pausanias led back again his troops to the right wing, and a second movement of Mardonius placed the armies in the original position.