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Chambers's Edinburgh Journal, No. 427
This work does not profess to deal much with etymologies; the author thinking that any very strict attention to the derivation of words, in connection with synonyms, would only tend to confuse the subject. The history of the origin and growth of words must undoubtedly throw light upon their meanings; but he, nevertheless, holds the two questions to be completely distinct and separable; and thinks that, in an inquiry into the actual and present meaning of a word, the consideration of what it originally meant may frequently lead us into error. A few suggestive remarks are given upon this matter.
'Our question is, not what ought to be, or formerly was, the meaning of a word, but what it now is; nor can we be completely guided by quotations from Shakspeare or Milton, or even from Addison or Johnson. Language has undergone such changes, even within the last sixty or seventy years, that many words, at that time considered pure, are now obsolete; while others—of which the word "mob" is a specimen—formerly slang, are now used by our best writers, and received, like pardoned outlaws, into the body of respectable citizens.' The standard, accordingly, to which the author refers in the work before us, is the sense in which a word is used by the purest writers and most correct speakers of our own days.
The synonyms are arranged or classed according to the parts of speech to which they belong—namely, into particles, nouns, adjectives, and verbs. The uses of all the words are well defined, and sufficiently illustrated by examples; a table of contents and a complete index are also added, rendering reference to any word as easy as looking for it in a dictionary. The table of contents, indeed, will be found to serve most of the purposes of a vocabulary of synonyms: a glance at it will frequently give you all the words of similar signification to the particular one for which you may happen to require an equivalent. From the part of the book relating to verbs, we take the following; the words under notice being, To teach, instruct, inform, educate:—
'Of these words, the first two are often used synonymously, but they have also a distinct meaning. "Teaching," strictly speaking, when distinguished from instruction, is applied to the practice of an art or branch of knowledge: instruction, to the theory. A child is, correctly speaking, instructed in the grammar of a language, and taught to speak the language. Thus, teaching may be merely mechanical; while "instruction" implies a degree of understanding in the pupil, as well as in the master. A child who has been taught to learn lessons by rote, without understanding them, will find difficulty in comprehending instruction in the principles of what he has learned: hence, we speak of teaching a brute, but never of instructing it.
'Information,6 again, is distinguished from instruction, in relation to the truths conveyed by it. Matters of fact, made known to one who could not have known them before, are called information: instruction elicits new truths out of subject-matter already existing in the mind—(see Whately's Logic, book iv. § 1.)
'A traveller gives us information respecting foreign countries; a metaphysician instructs us in the principles of moral science—principles drawn from facts already known to us. The two processes may take place at the same time: a child in learning a lesson receives both information and instruction: he is taught things he never knew before, and also taught to apply and make use of what he does know already. In fact, pure mathematics is the only branch of instruction which includes no information, as the propositions are all based on principles previously assumed. In short, a person who is informed, knows something he did not before; one who is instructed, understands something he did not before; one who is taught, can do something he could not do before.
'Education is more comprehensive than any of the other words before us. It includes the whole course of moral and intellectual teaching. One who gives occasional lessons is not said to educate. To educate (agreeably to its derivation, from "e-duco," not "in-duco"), includes the drawing out of the faculties, so as to teach the pupil how to teach himself; which is one of the most valuable of arts.
'Moral training, considered by itself, is called "teaching;" this constitutes no exception to the rule laid down, as its object is to enable us, not to know, but to do what is right.'—(P. 32-34.)
'Few words, perhaps, are more apt to be misapplied than the string of adjectives treated of in the section next quoted—namely, benevolent, beneficent, charitable, munificent, liberal, bountiful, philanthropic.
'Benevolent and beneficent, together with their conjugates, have curiously diverged from their original meaning. Etymologically, "benevolent" implied merely wishing well to others, and "beneficent" doing well; now, "benevolent" includes both kinds of feelings and actions, and "beneficent" is restricted to acts of kindness on a great scale, and generally performed by some one of exalted station and character: hence, we speak of the "beneficence" rather than the "benevolence" of the Creator. It may perhaps be said to follow from this, that "benevolent" draws our attention more to the character of the agent; "beneficent," to that of the act performed—retaining, so far, a tinge of their etymology.
'"Charitable" (when not used in reference to a mild and candid judgment of others) seems to be restricted to one kind of benevolence—that which consists in alms-giving.
'"Munificent" resembles "beneficent," in referring always to favours on a large scale, and conferred by superiors; but there is this important difference, that "beneficent" always implies some real and essential good done, while "munificent," as its derivation implies, may be applied equally to any gift, whether really useful or not. One who makes a present of jewellery or pictures to a friend, is munificent, but would not be called "beneficent." If he raised a distressed family from starvation, the word "beneficent" would be more appropriate. But one who gives largely to the public, or to some institution, is called munificent. It seems to convey the idea of splendour. No one can be called munificent who does not give on a large scale.
'Any one who is ready to give freely, as the etymology implies, on whatever scale, is "liberal." "Bountiful," again, is stronger than "liberal," and implies giving in abundance; it also differs from "liberal" in being restricted to giving; while "liberal" is applied to an easy style of expenditure in general; to the reverse, in short, of "stingy," or "miserly." Many people live in a liberal style, who are very far from being "bountiful." Bountiful always seems to imply, giving out of an ample store.
'"Philanthropic," as its etymology indicates, implies benevolence solely in reference to the human race, and always to masses, not to individuals. One who devises some plan to benefit numbers, is called "philanthropic;" but we should not talk of "philanthropically giving a loaf to a hungry child."'—(P. 83-85.)
As space is beginning to press, our last extract must be short: it relates to words often enough employed indiscriminately—imagination, conception, fancy. '"Imagination" and "fancy" are frequently confounded together, but are, nevertheless, very distinct in their signification. In the first place, "imagination" implies more of a creative power than "fancy;" it requires a greater combination of various powers, and is therefore a higher exercise of genius. "Fancy," on the other hand, is more an employment of ingenuity and taste, though it also requires inventive power. Secondly, "imagination" implies a longer flight; "fancy," rather a succession of short efforts: the one is a steady blaze; the other, a series of sparkles. An epic poem would require an exercise of the first; a ballad, or other lighter production, of the last: hence, we may see that the difference between the two is, in some measure, one of subject-matter; for the same power which we call "fancy" when employed in a melody of Moore, would be called "imagination" in the works of Dante or Milton. In short, the efforts of "fancy" bear the same relation to those of "imagination" that the carving and polishing of a gem or seal does to sculpture.
'In the third place, wit may come into works of "fancy," and could not be admitted into the province of "imagination." The same with what are called conceits.
'"Conception" has something in common with imagination, but it implies more decidedly a creative power, and is referred to something tangible and real; whereas, in efforts of fancy and imagination, there is always a consciousness of unreality. The province of "conception" is that which has a real existence: hence, the productions of painters, sculptors, and musicians, are called "conceptions." "Conception" also denotes something framed and originated in our own mind; whereas the imagination or fancy may be acted on merely from without. The poet or writer of fiction exercises his own conceptions, but awakens the imagination of his readers.'
These quotations will give as general a notion of the work as can be conveyed by a few extracts. To those among our readers who may be in quest of such a book, we can decidedly recommend it as one that is certain to be useful. It is by far the best of the kind that we have ever happened to meet with; and we think that if it were universally studied and consulted, the result would be a great improvement of expression, both in common speech and literature.
'CHAPTER ON CATS.'
In No. 419 of this Journal, an article with the above heading mentions among the exports from New York to New Granada 100 cats. Wherever our contributor may have picked up his intelligence, the original source is the New York Herald; but, unluckily, a paper of a more practical character—if we may judge from its title—The Dry-Goods Reporter, gives the custom-house entry in full, in which the change of a single vowel makes a prodigious difference. The entry is this: '100 cots—125 dollars—to Granada.'
A MARINER'S WIFE
'Ah me, my dream!' pale Helen cried,With hectic cheeks aglow:'Why wake me? Hide that cruel beam!I'll not win such another dreamOn this side heaven, I know.'I almost feel the leaping waves,The wet spray on my hair,The salt breeze singing in the sail,The kind arms, strong as iron-mail,That held me safely there.'I'll tell thee:—On some shore I stood,Or sea, or inland bay,Or river broad, I know not—saveThere seemed no boundary to the waveThat chafed and moaned alway.'The shore was lone—the wave was lone—The horizon lone; no sailBroke the dim line 'twixt sea and sky,Till slowly, slowly one came by,Half ghostlike, gray and pale.'It was a very little boat,Had neither oars nor crew;But as it shoreward bounded fast,One form seemed leaning by the mast—And Norman's face I knew!'He never looked nor smiled at me,Though I stood there alone;His brow was very grave and high,Lit with a glory from the sky—The wild bark bounded on.'I shrieked: "Oh, take me—take me, love!The night is falling dread."—"My boat may come no nearer shore;And, hark! how mad the billows roar!Art thou afraid?" he said.'"Afraid! with thee?"—"The wind sweeps fierceThe foamy rocks among;A perilous voyage waiteth me."—"Then, then, indeed, I go with thee,"I cried, and forward sprung.'All drenched with brine, all pale with fear—Ah no, not fear; 'twas bliss!—I felt the strong arms draw me in:If after death to heaven I win,'Twill be such joy as this!'No kiss, no smile, but aye that clasp—Tender, and close, and brave;While, like a tortured thing, upleaptThe boat, and o'er her deck there sweptWave thundering after wave.'I looked not to the stormy deep,Nor to the angry sky;Whether for life or death we wrought,My whole world dwindled to one thought—Where he is, there am I!'On—on—through leaping waves, slow calmed,With salt spray on our hair,And breezes singing in the sail,Before a safe and pleasant gale,The boat went bounding fair:'But whether to a shore we came,Or seaward sailed away,Alas! to me is all unknown:O happy dream, too quickly flown!O cruel, cruel day!'Pale Helen lived—or died: dull timeO'er all that history rolls;Sailed they or sunk they on life's waves?—I only know earth holds two graves,And heaven two blessed souls.REMITTANCES TO AND FROM EMIGRANTS
Within the past few years, a system of foreign exchanges has been perfected in this country, by which the smallest sum of money can be remitted either way across the Atlantic, with perfect security and the greatest dispatch. Drafts are drawn as low as 1s. sterling, which are cashed in any part of Great Britain or the United States. This, to emigrants who wish to bring over their money without fear of loss, or to residents here who wish to remit small sums to their relatives or friends in Europe, to enable them to come to this country, is of vast importance, as it guarantees them against loss; that is, when the drafts are good. This is, therefore, the great point at issue. To obtain drafts of undoubted credit and security is the first thing to be considered. There are dozens of drawers on both sides of the Atlantic, all of whom have their friends, who place more or less confidence in the character of the bills drawn. We have no doubt they are all sound and solvent. We know nothing now to the contrary. The drafts can be obtained in any city in the Union, for any amount, from 1s. sterling upwards, drawn upon some place in Europe; and drafts can be obtained in various European cities payable in any city of the United States.—Abridged from the New York Herald.
FOREST-TREES
In contemplating the length of life of one of the reverend and hoary elders of the forest, we are apt to forget that it is not to be measured by the standard of man or of the higher animals; for it is really not the measure of an individual existence, but, as it were, of the duration of an empire or a nation. A tree is a populous community, presided over by an oligarchy, of which the flowers are the aristocracy, and the leaves the working-classes. The life of the individual members of the commonwealth is brief enough, but the state of which they are members, has often a vast duration; and some of those whose ages we have referred to, could they take cognisance of human affairs, would look with contempt upon the instability and irregularity of human governments and states, as compared with the unchanging order and security of their own.—Professor Forbes in Art-Journal.
WHISKY AND MISERY
Whisky and misery, whichever be cause, whichever be effect, always go together. There has been, as is well known, a failure of the potato-crop, and consequently a famine, in the West Highlands and Hebrides. In the island of Mull, about L.3000 of money raised in charity was spent in the year ending October 10, 1848, for the eleemosynary support of the people. In the same space of time, the expenditure of the people on whisky was L.6009! We do not know how much had previously been spent on whisky in that island; but we may judge from the fact ascertained regarding Skye. In the year ending October 10, 1850, the sum paid in the latter island for whisky was L.10,855—considerably more than double the amount expended in relief by the Destitution Fund, and more than double the consumption of the same district in 1845, the year before the distress commenced! 'That is,' says the Quarterly Review, which quotes the facts from excellent authority, 'the increased consumption of whisky exactly tallies with the extraneous aid received; in other words, the whole amount of charitable assistance went in whisky!'
Printed and Published by W. and R. Chambers, High Street, Edinburgh. Also sold by W.S. Orr, Amen Corner, London; D. N. Chambers, 55 West Nile Street, Glasgow; and J. M'Glashan, 50 Upper Sackville Street, Dublin.—Advertisements for Monthly Parts are requested to be sent to Maxwell & Co., 31 Nicholas Lane, Lombard Street, London, to whom all applications respecting their insertion must be made.
1
The reader will find excellent matter on this subject in Mary Carpenter's recent volume on Reformatory Schools, and in a 'Report of the Proceedings of a Conference on the Subject of Preventive and Reformatory Schools, held at Birmingham on the 9th and 10th of December 1851.'
2
Bogue, London: 1852.
3
See Guesses at Truth. First series.
4
A Selection of English Synonyms. Second Edition. Parker, London: 1852.
5
See Whately's Logic, book iv., chap. 3, § 1, in which the above is illustrated by the difference between the road from London to York and the road from York to London.
6
The nouns are used here instead of the verbs for convenience sake, as they precisely correspond.