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Примечания
1
Demetri Sevastopulo, James Fontanella-Khan and Eric Platt, «Alibaba, Tencent and Baidu spared from US investor blacklist», Financial Times, January 31, 2021, https://www.ft.com/content/46505ee0-fb3d-4cf0-a3df-64e9661e839f.
2
U.S-China Economic and Security Review Commission, «Chinese Companies Listed on Major U. S. Stock Exchanges». March 31, 2022, https://www.uscc.gov/research/chinese-companies-listed-major-us-stock-exchanges.
3
Lai Lin Thomala, «Market share of search engines in China as of December 2021, based on pageview», Statista, January 14, 2022, https://www.statista.com/statistics/253340/market-share-of-search-engines-in-china-pageviews/.
4
Min Tang, Tencent: The Political Economy of China’s Surging Internet Giant (New York: Routledge, 2019), 9–30.
5
Ellen Meiksins Wood, «Unhappy family», Monthly Review, June 1, 1999, https://monthlyreview.org/1999/07/01/unhappy-families/.
6
Ibid.
7
David Harvey, «The coercive laws of competition», Anti-Capitalist Chronicles, November 18, 2021, https://anticapitalistchronicles.libsyn.com/the-coercive-laws-of-competition.
8
Margaret MacMillan, Nixon and Mao: The Week That Changed the World (New York: Random House, 2008).
9
Vijay Prashad and Jie Xiong, «Why Xinjiang is central to US cold war on China», Asia Times, April 17, 2021, https://asiatimes.com/2021/04/why-xinjiang-is-central-to-us-cold-war-on-china/.
10
Anu Bradford and Raluca Csernatoni, «Toward a strengthened transatlantic technology alliance», Carnegie Endowment for International Peace,* January 26, 2021, https://carnegieendowment.org/2021/01/26/toward-strengthened-transatlantic-technology-alliance-pub-83565.
* Carnegie Endowment for International Peace («Фонд Карнеги за международный мир») включен в Перечень иностранных и международных организаций, деятельность которых признана нежелательной на территории Российской Федерации.
11
Steven Erlanger, «The sharp U. S. Pivot to Asia is throwing Europe off balance», New York Times, September 17, 2021, https://www.nytimes.com/2021/09/17/world/europe/biden-china-europe-submarine-deal.html.
12
Final Report National Security Commission on Artificial Intelligence (March 19, 2021), https://www.nscai.gov/wp-content/uploads/2021/03/Full-Report-Digital-1.pdf.
13
Joseph Biden, Executive Order on America’s Supply Chains (E.O. 14017), February 24, 2021, https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2021/03/01/2021–04 280/americas-supply-chains.
14
Этот закон объединил в себе два законопроекта: America COMPETES Act от палаты представителей и «Закон об инновациях и конкуренции» от сената. В итоге они были сведены в единый документ H.R. 4346, который формально назывался «Закон о финансировании безопасности Верховного суда 2022 года». См.: U. S. Congress, House, Supreme Court Security Funding Act of 2022, H.R. 4346, 117th Cong., 1st sess. Introduced in House July 1, 2021, https://www.congress.gov/bill/117th-congress/house-bill/4346/text.
15
White House, FACT SHEET: CHIPS and Science Act Will Lower Costs Create Jobs Strengthen Supply Chains and Counter China, August 9, 2022, https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2022/08/09/fact-sheet-chips-and-science-act-will-lower-costs-create-jobs-strengthen-supply-chains-and-counter-china/.
16
Vijay Prashad and Jie Xiong, «Why Xinjiang is central to US cold war on China», Asia Times, April 17, 2021, https://asiatimes.com/2021/04/why-xinjiang-is-central-to-us-cold-war-on-china/.
17
Keikichi Takahashi, «How unique is Trump’s China policy?» The Diplomat, June 17, 2020, https://thediplomat.com/2020/06/how-unique-is-trumps-china-policy/.
18
Brett Wilkins, «Noam Chomsky warns of „very dangerous“ US antagonism of China», Canadian Dimension, December 1, 2021, https://canadiandimension.com/articles/view/noam-chomsky-warns-of-very-dangerous-us-antagonism-of-china.
19
Wayne M. Morrison, «China and the global financial crisis: Implications for the United States», Congressional Research Service, June 3, 2009, https://sgp.fas.org/crs/row/RS22984.pdf.
20
James Andrew Lewis, «China’s pursuit of semiconductor independence», Center for Strategic & International Studies, February 27, 2019, https://www.csis.org/analysis/chinas-pursuit-semiconductor-independence.
21
Central Committee of the Communist Party of China, Outline of the National Innovation-Driven Development Strategy, trans. Etcetera Language Group, Inc. (Center for Security and Emerging Technology, 2019), https://cset.georgetown.edu/publication/outline-of-the-national-innovation-driven-development-strategy/.
22
Katherine Koleski, The 13th Five-Year Plan, U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, February 14, 2017, https://www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/Research/The%2013th%20Five-Year%20Plan_Final_2.14.17_Updated%20(002). pdf.
23
Dennis Normile, «China again boosts R&D spending by more than 10 %», Science, August 28, 2020, https://www.science.org/content/article/china-again-boosts-rd-spending-more-10.
24
Ibid.
25
Outline of the People’s Republic of China 14th Five-Year Plan for National Economic and Social Development and Long-Range Objectives for 2035, trans, Xinhua News Agency, March 12, 2021, https://cset.georgetown.edu/wp-content/uploads/t0284_14th_Five_Year_Plan_EN.pdf.
26
Phillip Inman, «Chinese president vows to „adjust excessive incomes“ of super rich», Guardian, August 18, 2021, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2021/aug/18/chinese-president-xi-jinping-vows-to-adjust-excessive-incomes-of-super-rich.
27
C. Textor, «Growth rate of real gross domestic product (GDP) in China from 2011 to 2021 with forecasts until 2026», Statista, February 16, 2022, https://www.statista.com/statistics/263616/gross-domestic-product-gdp-growth-rate-in-china/.
28
Stella Qiu and Kevin Yao, «China sets „low bar“ for GDP growth, pledges more jobs», Reuters, March 4, 2021, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-china-parliament-gdp/china-sets-low-bar-for-gdp-growth-pledges-more-jobs-idUSKBN2AX03L.
29
Sharon Chen, «China has a huge wealth-gap problem – and it’s getting worse», Bloomberg, December 24, 2020, https://www.bloomberg.com/news/storythreads/2020–12-24/china-has-a-huge-wealth-gap-problem-and-it-s-getting-worse.
30
Shin Watanabe, «China’s income inequality grows despite village modernization», Nikkei Asia, June 13, 2021, https://asia.nikkei.com/Economy/China-s-income-inequality-grows-despite-village-modernization.
31
Ryan Hass, «Assessing China’s ‘common prosperity’ campaign», Brookings, September 9, 2021, https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2021/09/09/assessing-chinas-common-prosperity-campaign/.
32
James Kynge «Xi Jinping takes aim at the gross inequalities of China’s „gilded age“» Financial Times August 20, 2021, https://www.ft.com/content/8761f611–5619-4c2d-8627–577ba9359cd4.
33
Ibid.
34
U.S. Library of Congress, Congressional Research Service, China’s 14th Five-Year Plan: A First Look, by Karen M. Sutter, Specialist and Michael D. Sutherlan, IF11684 (2021), https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/IF/IF11684.
35
Matt Sheehan, «China Technology 2025: Fragile Tech Superpower», Marco Polo, October 26, 2020, https://macropolo.org/analysis/china-technology-forecast-2025-fragile-tech-superpower/.
36
Angela Huyue Zhang, Chinese Antitrust Exceptionalism (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2021).
37
Kai von Carnap and Valarie Tan, «Tech regulation in China brings in sweeping changes», Merics, Novem- ber 3, 2021, https://merics.org/en/short-analysis/tech-regulation-china-brings-sweeping-changes.
38
«Xi Eyes Innovation, Oversight to Grow China’s Digital Economy», Bloomberg News, October 19, 2021, https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2021–10-19/china-s-xi-vows-tighter-oversight-of-tech-firms-digital-economy.
39
Orange Wang, «China’s Xi Jinping, Liu He move to reassure private sector as Beijing’s Big Tech crackdown rattles entrepreneurs», South Morning China, September 6, 2021, https://www.scmp.com/economy/china-economy/article/3147764/chinas-xi-jinping-liu-he-move-reassure-private-sector.
40
«China’s Liu He assures business of support, amid regulatory crackdown», Reuters, September 6, 2021, https://www.reuters.com/world/china/chinas-liu-he-says-support-private-business-has-not-changed-2021–09-06/.
41
Daniel Slotta, «Announced donations to combat coronavirus from tech giants in China 2020», Statista, February 21, 2022, https://www.statista.com/statistics/1106335/china-covid-19-tech-companies/; Daniel Tam-Claiborne, «Chinese tech philanthropy in the age of „common prosperity“», SupChina, November 23, 2021, https://supchina.com/2021/11/23/chinese-tech-philanthropy-in-the-age-of-common-prosperity/.
42
Yuezhi Zhao, Communication in China: Political Economy, Power, and Conflict (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2008), 138–148.
43
Yu Hong, Networking China: The Digital Transformation of the Chinese Economy (Champaign: University of Illinois Press, 2017).
44
Min Tang, «From „bring-in“ to „going out“: Transnationalizing China’s Internet Capital’ through State Policies», Chinese Journal of Communication, 13, no. 1 (2019): 27–47.
45
Min Tang, Tencent: The Political Economy of China’s Surging Internet Giant (London: Routledge, 2019).
46
Min Tang, «Not Yet the End of Transnational Digital Capitalism: A Communication Perspective of the U.S. – China Decoupling Rhetoric», International Journal of Communication, 16 (2021): 1506–1531.
47
Lianrui Jia, «Going Public and Going Global: Chinese Internet Companies and Global Finance Networks», Westminster Paper in Communication and Culture, 13, no. 1 (2018): 17–36.
48
Shen Hong, Across the Great (Fire) Wall: China and the Global Internet (Ph D. Diss., University of Illinois Urbana Champaign, 2017).