The Works of Samuel Johnson, LL.D. Volume 11

I am, therefore, afraid, that in a short time the Hanoverians may consider Britain as a tributary province, upon which they have a right to impose the maintenance of sixteen thousand men, who are to be employed only for the defence of their own country, though supported at the expense of this. I am afraid that we shall be taught to imagine, that the appearance of the Hanoverians is necessary in our own country, perhaps to check the insolence of the sons of freedom, who, without fear, border upon treason. I am afraid, that his majesty or his successour may be advised by sycophants and slaves to trust the guard of his person to the trusty Hanoverians, and advised to place no confidence in the natives of Britain.

For my part, I think it a very wise precept by which we are directed to obviate evils in the beginning; and therefore, since, in my opinion, the influence of Hanover must be destructive to the royal family, and detrimental to those kingdoms, I shall endeavour to obviate it by voting against any provision for these useless mercenaries, and declaring that I shall more willingly grant the publick money to any troops than those of Hanover.

Lord PERCIVAL spoke next as follows:—Sir, I look upon the question now under your consideration, to vary very little in reality from that which was debated here the first day of this session. The principal point in the debate of that day, was the same with that which is more regularly the debate of this, whether the Hanoverian forces should be taken into British pay?

Sir, I should then have offered my sentiments upon this question, if so many other gentlemen had not delivered my sense in so much a better manner than I thought myself able to do, that it would have appeared a great presumption in me, and would have given the house an unnecessary trouble. The same reason had induced me to have been silent also upon this occasion, if the temper of the times, the little indulgence shown by gentlemen to one another, when they happen to differ in political opinions, and the popular circumstance in which I stand, did not in some sort oblige me to protect the vote I then gave, and that which I now intend to give, by the reasons that induce me to give it.

Sir, there are three principal considerations in this question; first, whether we are to assist the house of Austria and balance of power at all, aye or no? then, whether we ought to do it with our whole force? and lastly, whether the Hanoverian troops should be made a part of that force?

As to the first consideration, a new doctrine has been taught and inculcated for some months past, that it is of no importance to this nation what may happen on the continent; that this country being an island intrenched within its own natural boundaries, it may stand secure and unconcerned in all the storms of the rest of the world. This doctrine, inconsistent as it is with all sense and reason, contrary as it is to the universal principles of policy by which this nation hath been governed from the conquest to this hour, is yet openly professed and avowed by many without these walls; and though no man has yet ventured to own this opinion publickly and directly in this house, yet some gentlemen even here, in effect maintain it, when they argue, that in no case this nation ought to assist or support the balance of power without the concurrence of the Dutch. This tends inevitably to produce the same fatal effect; it reduces this country to depend upon Holland, to be a province to Holland; and France would then have no more to do to become mistress of all Europe, than to gain over one single town of the United Provinces, or to corrupt a few members of the States; it is, therefore, a doctrine of the greatest danger. The only solid maxim is, that whoever becomes master of the continent, must in the end obtain the dominion of the sea. To confirm this, I may venture to cite an old example, nor can I be accused of pedantry in doing of it, since it is an instance drawn from the last universal monarchy to which the world submitted. The Romans had no sooner divided, broken and subdued those powers upon the continent of Europe, who had given a diversion in the great attempt they had long intended, than they attacked the Carthaginians, a maritime power, potent in arms, immensely opulent, possessed of the trade of the whole world, and unrivalled mistress of the sea. Yet these people, who enjoyed no wealth, pursued no commerce, and at the commencement of their quarrel were not masters of a single ship, at length prevailed against this enemy upon their proper element, beat and destroyed their fleets, invaded their dominions, and subdued their empire. From whence, sir, I must conclude, that we cannot wholly rely upon our situation, or depend solely on our naval power; and I may venture to reason upon this axiom, that this nation must contribute to support the house of Austria and the balance of power in some degree.

The next question that occurs, is, in what degree we ought to do it, and whether we should do it with our whole force? Taking, therefore, our footing here upon this axiom, that we must contribute to it in some degree, and taking farther to our aid the reasoning of those gentlemen, who think it a work of such extreme danger, and almost desperate, the natural and evident conclusion can be only this, that as we must do it, so we must do it with the utmost vigour, and with our whole force.

We come now to consider, whether the Hanoverian troops should be made part of that force? There are several considerations previous to the decision of this question. First, whether they are as cheap as any other forces we can hire? Then, whether they are as good? Next, whether they are as properly situated? And whether they are as much to be depended upon? If, as to every one of these particulars, the answer must be made in the affirmative, I think it will go very far to determine the question now before you.

As to the first, that they are as cheap, nay, upon the whole, much cheaper, the estimates now upon your table, notwithstanding any cavil, do sufficiently demonstrate.

That they are as good, what man can doubt, who knows the character of the German nation? What man can doubt, who knows the attention of his majesty to military discipline? Those gentlemen can least pretend to doubt it, who sometimes do not spare reflections upon that attention which they insinuate to be too great.

That these troops are not properly situated, will be hardly asserted at this time, when they are actually now in Flanders, and now acting in conjunction with our troops. Let any man consider the map of Europe, let him observe the seat of the war, and he must evidently see, that whether their service may be required in Flanders, whether upon the Rhine, or in the heart of Germany, in every one of these cases, the Hanoverian forces are as properly circumstanced and situated as any troops in Europe.

It remains in the last place to examine, whether any other troops can be better depended upon; and sure nothing can be more obvious than that we may rely with more security on these than any other. They are subjects of the same prince, and of a prince indulgent to all his subjects, and accused by those who differ in other points from me, of being partial against the interest of his German dominions. Unless, therefore, we arraign the first principle upon which a free government can be supported, and without which every exercise of arbitrary power would be warranted, we must allow that such a people will be faithful to such a prince, will defend him with a strict fidelity, and support his quarrel with the utmost zeal; with a zeal which can never be expected from the mercenary troops of any other foreign power.

This naturally leads us to inquire what other troops we can depend upon; the answer to this inquiry is short and positive; that as affairs now stand abroad, we can depend upon none but these; let us carry this consideration with us in a survey of all Europe; shall we take into our pay sixteen thousand of the Dutch? Would this be the means of bringing Holland into alliance with us? Would they act at their own expense, would they exert their own proper force? Would they pay their own troops in aid of the common cause, when they found this nation ready to do it for them? They would act like madmen if they did. Shall we hire Danes? Is there a gentleman in this house, who is not convinced that this power has been warped, for some time past, towards the interest of France? When we hired these troops in the last instance, did they not deceive us? Did they not even refuse to march? nay, farther, are they not in all appearance now upon the point of being employed in a quarrel of their own? a quarrel in which they will have need of all their force. Shall we then hire Saxons? An honourable gentleman seemed to think that there may be some possibility of this, and perhaps there may hereafter, when the king of Prussia's views are known, and the part he shall resolve to act; but Saxony is certainly now too much exposed to, and cannot fail to be alarmed at his growing power; at the great augmentation of his armies, and the secret and vast designs which he seems to meditate. This measure, therefore, is not practicable in the present conjuncture; that electorate cannot hazard its own security in these precarious circumstances, by lending out so great a body of its troops. Would gentlemen advise the hire of Prussian troops to serve us in this conjuncture? They who do advise it, must forget strangely the part so lately acted by that prince, and the variety of his conduct with regard to his different allies within the space of the two last years. I shall guard myself in my expressions, and maintain a proper respect in discoursing of so great a character; but I must say thus much, that the ministry would act with great imprudence, to put the safety of the British troops, and to risk the fate of this army, upon the event of such a measure. I need not say more; for it is not yet proved to us, that this prince would (I wish there was no reason to believe he would not) lend us this body of his men, though we should be disposed to take them into pay. The Swiss cantons, therefore, now alone remain; and indeed from them we probably might procure a greater number; but I leave it to the judgment of any man of sense and candour, whether any minister of this nation could warrant the employment of sixteen thousand Swiss in this service? For when we reflect upon the situation of these provinces, and compare it with that of our British troops who are now in Flanders, it is visible that they must pass four hundred miles upon the borders of the Rhine, flanked by the strong places of France, during their whole march, exposed to the garrisons and armies upon that frontier, by whom it can never be supposed that they would be suffered to pass unmolested, when France must so well know the intention of their march to be for no other end, but to make a conjunction with other troops in the British pay, in order afterwards to invade, or at least to interrupt the views of that kingdom with their united force.

These reasons, sir, prove invincibly to me, that if we are to assist the house of Austria by an army, we must, of prudence, nay, of necessity, in part, compose that army of the Hanoverian troops.

But yet there is another state of this question, an alternative of which some gentlemen seem very fond, whether it would not be better to assist the queen of Hungary with money only?

This opinion at first sight is extremely plausible; if the queen of Hungary has been able to do so much with an aid of 500,000 l. what might she not be able to do with a million more? Sir, a million more would by no means answer in the same proportion. When a sum is given her, which with the best economy can suffice barely to put her troops in motion, when the enemy is at her very gates, her all at an immediate stake, there can be no room for a misapplication of it. But a sum so immense as that of a million and a half, would dazzle the eyes of a court so little used to see such sums; and as an honourable gentleman, [Mr. Horace WALPOLE,] long versed in foreign affairs, and well acquainted with these matters, told you in a former debate, would be much of it squandered among the Austrian ministers and favourites. I make no scruple to add to this, that some small part might fall to the share of ministers elsewhere. But there is another danger which gentlemen who contend for this measure do not consider: can they who profess a distrust of all ministers, and particularly those who are now employed at home; they who have ever argued against all votes of credit, upon this principle, that it affords an opportunity to ministers of defrauding the service, and of putting large sums into the purse of the crown, or into their private pockets; can they now argue for this measure, which I may be bold to say, would be in effect the most enormous vote of credit that was ever given in the world? Gentlemen insinuate, that the taking the Hanoverian forces into British pay, is a criminal complaisance, calculated only to confirm an infant and a tottering administration. But how much greater means for such a purpose, would an alternative like this afford? Suppose a minister, unfirm in his new-acquired power, to ingratiate himself with his prince, should propose a scheme to replenish the coffers of an exhausted civil list, squandered in such vile purposes, that no man could have the hardiness to come to parliament, or dare to hope a supply for it by any regular application to this house? What method could be devised by such a minister himself, to do the job more excellent than this? For who can doubt that (guard it how you will) the queen of Hungary might be induced, in the condition in which she now stands, to accept a million, and to give a receipt in full for the whole sum? How could you prevent an understanding of this kind between two courts? and how easy, therefore, might it be to sink 500,000 l. out of so vast a grant? Sir, I will suspect no minister, but I will trust none in this degree; and I wonder other gentlemen do not suspect, if I do not. From hence, therefore, I consider this as a proposition both fallacious and unsafe; for though it be a fact, that the same sum of money might maintain in Austria double the number of troops; yet, if no more than half that money should be applied (as I have shown great reason to believe that it would not) to the uses of the war, it is evident that you would deceive yourselves, and would have but an equal number of raw, irregular, undisciplined, and much worse troops for it.

But, sir, there is yet a stronger argument against the supply in money only. What are our views in supporting the queen of Hungary? Our views are general and particular; general, to save the house of Austria, and to preserve a balance of power; particular, to prevent the French from making any farther acquisitions on this side of Flanders. The first might possibly be answered in a good degree, by giving that princess an equivalent in money; but the second cannot be securely provided against, without an army on this side of Europe in the British pay. Sir, is it not natural for every one of us to guard our vital parts, rather than our more remote members? Would not the queen of Hungary (stipulate and condition with her as you please) apply the greatest part of these subsidies in defence of her dominions in the heart of Germany? Might it not even induce her to enlarge her views, and to think of conquests and equivalents for what she has already lost, which it might be vain and ruinous for us to support her in? Would she not leave Flanders to shift for itself, or still to be taken care of by the Dutch and Britain? In such a case, if France should find it no longer possible to make any impression on her territories on the German side, what must we expect to be the consequence? I think it very visible she would on a sudden quit her expensive and destructive projects on that quarter, and there only carry on a defensive war, while she fell with the greater part of her force at once upon the Low Countries, which would by this measure be wholly unprovided; and she might there acquire in one campaign, before any possibility of making head against her, (which the Dutch would hardly attempt, and could certainly not alone be able to effect,) all that she has been endeavouring for the last century to obtain, and what no union of powers could be ever capable of regaining from her. All this will be effectually prevented by an army paid by us on this side of Europe; an army ready to march to the borders of her country, and to intercept her succours and supplies for the German war; an army, ready to protect the petty states, whose interest and inclination it apparently must be to declare for us, and to join their forces with us, when they no longer fear the power of France; an army, which may possibly give courage and spirit to greater powers, who may still doubt, without these vigorous measures, (after what they have formerly experienced,) whether they could even yet depend upon us; an army, (if the posture of affairs should make it necessary,) able to cause a powerful diversion to the French forces, by an attack upon Lorrain and Champagne, and still within distance to return upon its stops in time, to prevent the French from carrying any point of consequence in Flanders, should they then attempt it.

One argument more, I beg leave to mention, and it is of great weight. Admit that the sums raised upon the subject might be greater in the one case than the other, the sums remitted out of the kingdom would be infinitely less. Whatever is remitted to the queen of Hungary, is buried in the remotest parts of Germany, and can never return to us; whereas in a war carried on by troops in our own pay on this side, by much the greater part of the expense returns to us again, in part by the pay of officers, by the supply of provisions and necessaries in a country exhausted by armies, ammunition, ordnance, horses, clothing, accoutrements, and a multitude of other articles, which I need not enumerate, because experience, which is the soundest reasoner, fully proved it in the example of the last war, at the conclusion of which, notwithstanding the prodigious sums expended in it, this nation felt no sensible effect, from a diminution of its current specie.

Sir, I was prepared to have spoken much more largely to this subject, but my discourse has already been drawn to a greater length than I imagined, in treating upon the argument thus far. I shall, therefore, avoid troubling you any farther upon it at this time; I shall only observe, that in my humble opinion, it is sufficiently proved, first, that we must assist the house of Austria, and that we must do it with all our force; next, that we cannot do it with money only, but in part with a land army, and that this land army cannot be conveniently (I may say possibly) composed, at this time, without the Hanoverian troops. This question, therefore, can, I think, be no longer debated, but upon the foot of popular prejudices and insinuations of an improper connexion of Hanoverian and British interests; but as I could not enter into this subject without concern and indignation, and as it is a very delicate point for me in particular to debate upon, I shall leave this part of the question to other gentlemen, who can engage in it both with less inconvenience, and with more ability, than it is possible for me to do.

To which Mr. George GRENVILLE replied in substance:—Sir, though I am far from thinking myself able to produce, without study or premeditation, a complete answer to the elaborate and artful harangue which you have now heard, yet as I cannot be convinced of the reasonableness of the measures which have been defended with so much subtilty, I shall at least endeavour to show, that my disapprobation is not merely the effect of obstinacy, and that I have at least considered the proposals of the ministry, before I have ventured to condemn them.

Whether we ought to think ourselves indispensably obliged to maintain, at all events, the balance of power on the continent, to maintain it without allies, to maintain it against a combination of almost all Europe, I shall not now inquire; I will suppose it, for once, our duty to struggle with impossibility, and not only to support the house of Austria when it is attacked, but to raise it when it is fallen; fallen by our own negligence, and oppressed with the weight of all the surrounding powers; and shall, therefore, at present, only inquire by what means we may afford that assistance with most benefit to our allies, and least danger to ourselves.

With regard to our ally, that assistance will be apparently most advantageous to her, by which her strength will be most increased, and therefore it may, perhaps, be more useful to her to find her money than troops; but if we must supply her with troops, I doubt not but it will readily appear, that we may easily find troops which may be of more use and less expense than those of Hanover.

It has been observed, with regard to the convenient situation of those troops, that it cannot now be denied, since they are acting in Flanders in conjunction with the British forces. This is an assertion to which, though it was uttered with an air of victorious confidence, though it was produced as an insuperable argument, by which all those who intended opposition were to be reduced to silence and despair, many objections may be made, which it will require another harangue equally elaborate to remove.

That the troops of Hanover are now acting in conjunction with the Britons, I know not how any man can affirm, unless he has received intelligence by some airy messengers, or has some sympathetick communication with them, not indulged to the rest of mankind. None of the accounts which have been brought hither of the affairs of the continent have yet informed us of any action, or tendency to action; the Hanoverians have, indeed, been reviewed in conjunction with our forces, but have, hitherto, not acted; nor have the armies yet cemented the alliance by any common danger, or shown yet that they are friends otherwise than by sleeping and eating together, by eating at the expense of the same nation.

Nor am I at present inclined to grant, that either army is situated where it may be of most use to the queen of Hungary; for they now loiter in a country which no enemy threatens, and in which nothing, therefore, can be feared; a country very remote from the seat of war, and which will probably be last attacked. If the assistance of the queen of Hungary had been designed, there appears no reason why the Hanoverians should have marched thither, or why this important conjunction should have been formed, since they might, in much less time, and with less expense, have joined the Austrians, and, perhaps, have enabled them to defeat the designs of the French, and cut off the retreat of the army which was sent to the relief of Prague. But this march, though it would have been less tedious, would have been more dangerous, and would not have been very consistent with the designs of those who are more desirous of receiving wages than of deserving them; nor is it likely, that those who required levy-money for troops already levied, and who demanded that they should be paid a long time before they began to march, would hurry them to action, or endeavour to put a period to so gainful a trade as that of hiring troops which are not to be exposed.

This conduct, however visibly absurd, I am very far from imputing either to cowardice or ignorance; for there is reason to suspect, that they marched into Flanders only because they could not appear in any other place as the allies of the queen of Hungary, without exposing their sovereign to the imperial interdict.

It is, therefore, not only certain, that these troops, these boasted and important troops, have not yet been of any use; but probable, that no use is intended for them, and that the sole view of those who have introduced them into our service, is to pay their court by enriching Hanover with the spoils of Britain.

That this is in reality their intention, appears from the estimates to which an appeal has been so confidently made, but which, if they are compared with a contract made for the troops of the same nation in the last war, will show how much their price has risen since their sovereign was exalted to this throne; though I cannot find any proof that their reputation has increased, nor can discover, from their actions in Flanders, any reason to believe that their services will be greater.