The Works of Samuel Johnson, LL.D. Volume 10

But, my lords, if this is done by him without necessity, if the general preference of his friends is only the consequence of mistaken judgment, or corrupt gratitude, this address is equally necessary, because the effects are equally pernicious.

When a minister, suspected of ill intentions, is continued in employment, discontent must naturally spread over the nation; and if the end of government be the happiness of the people; if suspicion and jealousy be contrary to a state of happiness; and if this suspicion which generally prevails, this discontent which fills the whole nation, can only be appeased by the removal of the minister; prudence, justice, and the examples of our ancestors, ought to influence us to endeavour that the affairs of the nation may be transferred to such whose greater integrity or wisdom has recommended them to the affection of the people.

In this motion, therefore, we need not be supposed to imply that the minister is either ignorant or corrupt, but that he is disliked by the people, disliked to such a degree, my lords, that it is not safe for his majesty to employ him.

It is, doubtless, our duty, my lords, to guard both the rights of the people, and the prerogatives of the throne, and with equal ardour to remonstrate to his majesty the distresses of his subjects, and his own danger. We are to hold the balance of the constitution, and neither to suffer the regal power to be overborne by a torrent of popular fury, nor the people to be oppressed by an illegal exertion of authority, or the more insupportable hardships of unreasonable laws.

By this motion, my lords, the happiness of the people, and the security of his majesty, are at once consulted, nor can we suppress so general a clamour without failing equally in our duty to both.

To what, my lords, is the untimely end of so many kings and emperours to be imputed, but to the cowardice or treachery of their counsellors, of those to whom they trusted that intercourse, which is always to be preserved between a monarch and his people? Were kings honestly informed of the opinions and dispositions of their subjects, they would never, or, at least rarely, persist in such measures, as, by exasperating the people, tend necessarily to endanger themselves.

It is the happiness of a British monarch, that he has a standing and hereditary council, composed of men who do not owe their advancement to the smiles of caprice, or the intrigues of a court; who are, therefore, neither under the influence of a false gratitude, nor of a servile dependence, and who may convey to the throne the sentiments of the people, without danger, and without fear. But, my lords, if we are either too negligent, or too timorous to do our duty, how is the condition of our sovereign more safe, or more happy than that of an emperour of Turkey, who is often ignorant of any complaints made against the administration, till he hears the people thundering at the gates of his palace.

Let us, therefore, my lords, whatever may be our opinion of the conduct of the minister, inform his majesty of the discontent of his subjects, since, whether it is just or not, the danger is the same, and whenever any danger threatens the king, we ought either to enable him to oppose, or caution him to avoid it.

Lord CHOLMONDELEY spoke next, to the following effect:—My lords, I cannot but observe in this debate an ambition of popularity, in my opinion not very consistent with the freedom of debate, and the dignity of this assembly, which ought to be influenced by no other motive than the force of reason and truth.

It has been a common method of eluding the efficacy of arguments, to charge the opponent with blind adherence to interest, or corrupt compliance with the directions of a court; nor has it been less frequent to prevent inquiries into publick measures, by representing them as the clamours of faction, the murmurs of disobedience, and the prelude to rebellion.

So necessary, my lords, has it been always thought to be uninfluenced in our examinations by dependence or interest, that the most irrefragable reasons have lost the power of conviction, by the condition and characters of those by whom they were produced; and so much is it expected from innocence and justice to despise all foreign assistance, and to stand the test of inquiry without asking the support of power, that every man has been concluded guilty that has fled for shelter to the throne.

And surely, my lords, if that man's suffrage is of little weight, who appears determined to subscribe to the dictates of a minister, no greater credit can be assigned to another, who professes himself only the echo of the clamours of the populace. If it be a proof of a weak cause, and consciousness of misconduct, to apply to the crown for security and protection, it may be accounted an acknowledgment of the insufficiency of arguments, when the people is called in to second them, and they are only to expect success from the violence of multitudes.

That all government is instituted for the happiness of the people, that their interest ought to be the chief care of the legislature, that their complaints ought patiently to be heard, and their grievances speedily redressed, are truths well known, generally acknowledged, and, I hope, always predominant in the mind of every lord in this assembly. But, that the people cannot err, that the voice of fame is to be regarded as an oracle, and every murmur of discontent to be pacified by a change of measures, I have never before heard, or heard it only to disregard it.

True tenderness for the people, my lords, is to consult their advantage, to protect their liberty, and to preserve their virtue; and perhaps examples may be found sufficient to inform us that all these effects are often to be produced by means not generally agreeable to the publick.

It is possible, my lords, for a very small part of the people to form just ideas of the motives of transactions and the tendency of laws. All negotiations with foreign powers are necessarily complicated with many different interests, and varied by innumerable circumstances, influenced by sudden exigencies, and defeated by unavoidable accidents. Laws have respect to remote consequences, and involve a multitude of relations which it requires long study to discover. And how difficult it is to judge of political conduct, or legislative proceedings, may be easily discovered by observing how often the most skilful statesmen are mistaken, and how frequently the laws require to be amended.

If then, my lords, the people judge for themselves on these subjects, they must necessarily determine without knowledge of the questions, and their decisions are then of small authority. If they receive, implicitly, the dictates of others, and blindly adopt the opinions of those who have gained their favour and esteem, their applauses and complaints are, with respect to themselves, empty sounds, which they utter as the organs of their leaders. Nor are the desires of the people gratified when their petitions are granted; nor their grievances overlooked when their murmurs are neglected.

As it is no reproach to the people that they cannot be the proper judges of the conduct of the government, so neither are they to be censured when they complain of injuries not real, and tremble at the apprehension of severities unintended. Unjust complaints, my lords, and unreasonable apprehensions, are to be imputed to those who court their regard only to deceive them, and exalt themselves to reputation by rescuing them from grievances that were never felt, and averting dangers that were never near.

He only who makes the happiness of the people his endeavour, loves them with a true affection and a rational tenderness, and he certainly consults their happiness who contributes to still all groundless clamours, and appease all useless apprehensions, who employs his care, not only to preserve their quiet and their liberty, but to secure them from the fear of losing it, who not only promotes the means of happiness, but enables them to enjoy it.

Thus, it appears, my lords, that it is possible to be a friend, at the same time, to the people and the administration, and that no man can more deserve their confidence and applause, than he that dissipates their unreasonable terrours, and contributes to reconcile them to a good government.

That most of the clamours against the present government arise from calumnies and misrepresentations, is apparent from the sanction of the senate, which has been given to all the measures that are charged as crimes upon the administration.

That the army is supported by the consent of the senate, that the senate has approved the convention, and that our taxes are all imposed and continued by the senate, cannot be denied. What then is demanded by those that censure the conduct of publick affairs, but that their opinion should be considered as an overbalance to the wisdom of the senate, that no man should be allowed to speak but as they dictate, nor to vote but as they shall influence them by their rhetorick or example?

To repeat the particular topicks of accusation, and recapitulate the arguments which have been produced to confute it, would be a tedious and unnecessary labour; unnecessary, because it is well known that they once had the power of convincing this house, and that nothing has since happened to lessen their force, and because many of them now have been already repeated by the noble lords that have opposed the motion.

To search far backward for past errors, and to take advantage of later discoveries in censuring the conduct of any minister, is in a high degree disingenuous and cruel; it is an art which may be easily practised, of perplexing any question, by connecting distant facts, and entangling one period of time with another.

The only candid method of inquiry is to recur back to the state of affairs, as it then appeared, to consider what was openly declared, and what was kept impenetrably secret, what was discoverable by human sagacity, and what was beyond the reach of the most piercing politician.

With regard to the Hanover treaty, it is not, my lords, requisite that we should engage ourselves in a very minute examination; for it was not only not transacted by the right honourable gentleman whose behaviour is the subject of this debate, but cannot be proved to have been known by him till it was formally ratified. If he afterwards approved it either in the council or the senate, he cannot justly, how destructive or ridiculous soever that treaty may be thought, be charged with more than his share of the guilt, the bare guilt of a single vote.

But there is one accusation yet more malicious, an accusation not only of crimes which this gentleman did not commit, but which have not yet been committed, an accusation formed by prying into futurity, and exaggerating misfortunes which are yet to come, and which may probably be prevented. Well may any man, my lords, think himself in danger, when he hears himself charged not with high crimes and misdemeanours, not with accumulative treason, but with misconduct of publick affairs, past, present, and future.

The only charge against this gentleman, which seems to relate more to him than to any other man engaged in the administration, is the continuance of the harbour of Dunkirk, which, says the noble duke, he must be acquainted with as commissioner of the treasury; but if the title of first commissioner be denied, if his authority be but the same with that of his associates, whence comes it, my lords, that he is more particularly accused than they? Why is his guilt supposed greater if his power is only equal?

But, my lords, I believe it will appear, that no guilt has been contracted on this account, and that Dunkirk was always intended, even by those that demanded the demolition of it, to continue a harbour for small trading vessels, and that if larger ever arrived from thence, they lay at a distance from the shore, and were loaded by small vessels from the town.

With regard to other affairs, my lords, they were all transacted by the council, not by his direction, but with his concurrence; and how it is consistent with justice to single him out for censure, I must desire the noble lords to show who approve the motion.

If the people, my lords, have been, by misrepresentations industriously propagated, exasperated against him, if the general voice of the nation condemns him, we ought more cautiously to examine his conduct, lest we should add strength to prejudice too powerful already, and instead of reforming the errours, and regulating the heat of the people, inflame their discontent and propagate sedition.

The utmost claim of the people is to be admitted as accusers, and sometimes as evidence, but they have no right to sit as judges, and to make us the executioners of their sentence; and as this gentleman has yet been only condemned by those who have not the opportunities of examining his conduct, nor the right of judging him, I cannot agree to give him up to punishment.

Lord HALIFAX spoke next, in substance as follows:—My lords, though I do not conceive the people infallible, yet I believe that in questions like this they are seldom in the wrong, for this is a question not of argument but of fact; of fact discoverable, not by long deductions and accurate ratiocinations, but by the common powers of seeing and feeling.

That it is difficult to know the motives of negotiations, and the effects of laws, and that it requires long study and intense meditation to discover remote consequences, is indubitably true. And, with regard to the people in general, it cannot be denied, that neither their education qualifies them, nor their employments allow them to be much versed in such inquiries.

But, my lords, to refer effects to their proper causes, and to observe, when consequences break forth, from whence they proceed, is no such arduous task. The people of the lowest class may easily feel that they are more miserable this year than the last, and may inquire and discover the reason of the aggravation of their misery; they may know that the army is increased, or our trade diminished; that the taxes are heavier, and penal laws become more grievous.

Nor is it less easy for them to discover that these calamities are not brought upon them by the immediate hand of heaven, or the irresistible force of natural causes; that their towns are not ruined by an invasion, nor their trade confined by a pestilence; they may then easily collect, that they are only unhappy by the misconduct of their governours; they may assign their infelicity to that cause, as the only remaining cause that is adequate to the effect.

If it be granted, my lords, that they may be mistaken in their reasoning, it must be owned, that they are not mistaken without probabilities on their side: it is probable that the ministry must injure the publick interest when it decays without any other visible cause; it is still more probable, when it appears that among those whose station enables them to enter into national inquiries, every man imputes his calamities to the minister, who is not visibly dependent on his favour. It becomes more probable, yet, when it appears that it is the great business of the minister to multiply dependencies, to list accomplices, and to corrupt his judges.

At least, my lords, if it be granted, which, surely, cannot be denied, that the people may be sensible of their own miseries, it is their part to declare their sufferings, and to apply to this house for relief, and it is our business to discover the authors of them, and bring them to punishment.

That the people are very loud and importunate in their complaints, is daily evident; nor is it less apparent, that their complaints are just; if, therefore, their miseries must have an author, let the defenders of this gentleman point out the man whom they may more properly accuse.

But, my lords, nothing is more evident, than that the crimes and the criminal are equally known, that there is one man predominant in his majesty's councils, and that it has long been the practice of that man at once to oppress and ridicule the people, to plunder them, and set them at defiance.

Nothing is more known than that this man pretends to a superiour knowledge, and exerts a superiour power in the management of the publick revenues, and that they have been so ill managed for many years, that the expenses of peace have been almost equal to those of a most vigorous and extensive war.

Nothing is more probable, than that most of the foreign negotiations are conducted by his direction, nor more certain, than that they have generally tended only to make us contemptible.

That the excise was projected in his own head, that it was recommended by him upon his own conviction, and pressed upon the legislature by his influence, cannot be questioned; and if this were his only crime, if this were the only scheme of oppression that ever he planned out, it is such a declaration of war upon the publick liberty, such an attack of our natural and constitutional rights, as was never, perhaps, pardoned by any nation.

Nor is it less notorious, that the late infamous convention was transacted by one of his own dependents, that he palliated or concealed the losses of our merchants, that he opposed the declaration of war, and has since obstructed its operations.

On this occasion, my lords, it may be useful to remark the apparent partiality of this gentleman's vindicators, who declare, that measures are not to be censured as imprudent, only because they are unsuccessful, and yet when other instances of his conduct fall under our examination, think it a sufficient defence to exclaim against the unreasonableness of judging before the event.

To deny that, in the conduct both of civil and military affairs, he has obtained, I know not by what means, an authority superiour to that of any other man, an authority irresistible, uncontroulable, and regal, is to oppose not only common fame, but daily experience. If as commissioner of the treasury he has no more power than any of his associates, whence is it, that to oppose or censure him, to doubt of his infallibility, to suspect his integrity, or to obstruct his influence, is a crime punished with no lighter penalty than forfeiture of employment, as appears, my lords, from the late dismission of a gentleman, against whom nothing can be alleged but an obstinate independence and open disregard of this arbitrary minister.

But happy would it be, my lords, for this nation, if he endeavoured not to extend his authority beyond the treasury or the court; if he would content himself with tyrannising over those whose acceptance of salaries and preferments has already subjected them to his command, without attempting to influence elections, or to direct the members of the other house.

How much the influence of the crown has operated upon all publick councils since the advancement of this gentleman, how zealously it has been supported, and how industriously extended, is unnecessary to explain, since what is seen or felt by almost every man in the kingdom cannot reasonably be supposed unknown to your lordships.

Nothing can be more contrary to the true notion of the British constitution, than to imagine, that by such measures his majesty's real interest is advanced. The true interest, my lords, of every monarch, is to please the people, and the only way of pleasing Britons, is to preserve their liberties, their reputation, and their commerce. Every attempt to extend the power of the crown beyond the limits prescribed by our laws, must in effect make it weaker, by diverting the only source of its strength, the affection of his subjects.

It is, therefore, my opinion, my lords, that we ought to agree to this motion, as a standing memorial not only of our regard for the nation, but of our adherence to our sovereign; that his councils may be no longer influenced by that man whose pernicious advice, and unjustifiable conduct, has added new hopes and new strength to his enemies, impoverished and exasperated his subjects, inflamed the discontent of the seditious, and almost alienated the affection of the loyal.

The bishop of SALISBURY spoke next, to the following purport:—My lords, after all the exaggerations of the errours, and all the representations of the malconduct of the right honourable gentleman; after the most affecting rhetorick, and the most acute inquiries, nothing has appeared of weight sufficient to prevail with me to agree to the present motion; a motion, if not of an unprecedented, yet of a very extraordinary kind, which may extend in its consequences to futurity, and be, perhaps, more dangerous to innocence than guilt.

I cannot yet discover any proof sufficient to convict him of having usurped the authority of first minister, or any other power than that accidental influence which every man has, whose address or services have procured him the favour of his sovereign.

The usurpation, my lords, of regal power must be made evident by somewhat more than general assertions, must appear from some publick act like that of one of the prelates left regent of the kingdom by Richard the first, who, as soon as the king was gone too far to return, in the first elevations of his heart, began his new authority by imprisoning his colleague.

To charge this gentleman with the dismission of any of his colleagues, can, after the strongest aggravations, rise no higher than to an accusation of having advised his majesty to dismiss him, and even that, my lords, stands, at present, unsupported by evidence; nor could it, however uncontestably proved, discover either wickedness or weakness, or show any other authority than every man would exercise, if he were able to attain it.

If he had discharged this gentleman by his own authority, if he had transacted singly any great affair to the disadvantage of the publick, if he had imposed either upon the king or the senate by false representations, if he had set the laws at defiance, and openly trampled on our constitution, and if by these practices he had exalted himself above the reach of a legal prosecution, it had been worthy of the dignity of this house, to have overleaped the common boundaries of custom, to have neglected the standing rules of procedure, and to have brought so contemptuous and powerful an offender to a level with the rest of his fellow-subjects by expeditious and vigorous methods, to have repressed his arrogance, broken his power, and overwhelmed him at once by the resistless weight of an unanimous censure.

But, my lords, we have in the present case no provocations from crimes either openly avowed, or evidently proved; and certainly no incitement from necessity to exert the power of the house in any extraordinary method of prosecution. We may punish whenever we can convict, and convict whenever we can obtain evidence; let us not, therefore, condemn any man unheard, nor punish any man uncondemned.

The duke of BEDFORD spoke next, in substance as follows:—My lords, it is easy to charge the most blameless and gentle procedure with injustice and severity, but it is not easy to support such an accusation without confounding measures widely different, and disguising the nature of things with fallacious misrepresentations.

Nothing is more evident than that neither condemnation nor punishment is intended by the motion before us, which is only to remove from power a man who has no other claim to it than the will of his master, and who, as he had not been injured by never obtaining it, cannot justly complain that it is taken from him.

The motion, my lords, is so far from inflicting punishment, that it confers rewards, it leaves him in the possession of immense wealth, however accumulated, and enables him to leave that office in security, from which most of his predecessors have been precipitated by national resentment, or senatorial prosecution.

There is no censure, my lords, made of his conduct, no charge of weakness, or suspicion of dishonesty, nor can any thing be equitably inferred from it, than that in the opinion of this house his majesty may probably be served by some other person, more to the satisfaction of the British nation.

Though it is not just to punish any man without examination, or to censure his conduct merely because it has been unpleasing or unsuccessful; though it is not reasonable that any man should forfeit what he possesses in his own right, without a crime, yet it is just to withdraw favours only to confer them on another more deserving; it is just in any man to withhold his own, only to preserve his right, or obviate an injurious prescription, and it is, therefore, just to advise such a conduct whenever it appears necessary to those who have the right of offering advice.