A Treatise of Human Nature

Titel: A Treatise of Human Nature

von Oliver Goldsmith, Samuel Pepys, William Dean Howells, John Burroughs, William Harmon Norton, L. Mühlbach, Franklin Knight Lane, Walter Pater, Jonathan Swift, Augusta J. Evans, Trumbull White, Kathleen Thompson Norris, Matthew Arnold, Charles W. Colby, Shakespeare, James Fenimore Cooper, D. H. Lawrence, James Joyce, Ada Cambridge, Philip E. Muskett, Catherine Helen Spence, Rolf Boldrewood, Ernest Scott, Fergus Hume, H. G. Wells, Victor [pseud.] Appleton, Roald Amundsen, Max Simon Nordau, Henry David Thoreau, E. Phillips Oppenheim, Richard Wagner, Franz Liszt, Charlotte Mary Yonge, Charles Henry Eden, Charles Babbage, T. R. Malthus, Unknown, Joseph Ernest Morris, Robert Southey, Isabella L. Bird, Charles James Fox, Thomas Hariot, Cyrus Thomas, Bart Haley, Christopher Morley, Edgar Saltus, Marie Corelli, Edmund Lester Pearson, Robert Browning, John Aubrey, Benjamin Nathaniel Bogue, John McElroy, John Galsworthy, Henry James, Hamilton Wright Mabie, Mina Benson Hubbard, Elizabeth Cleghorn Gaskell, John Keble, Henry Lindlahr, Richard Henry Dana, Annie Wood Besant, Immanuel Kant, John Habberton, Baron Edward John Moreton Drax Plunkett Dunsany, T. B. Ray, Isabel Ecclestone Mackay, Frank C. Haddock, William John Locke, baron Arthur Léon Imbert de Saint-Amand, Ralph Centennius, United States, Library of Congress. Copyright Office, James Otis, George Hartmann, Sir Arthur Conan Doyle, George Gissing, John Henry Tilden, Thomas Wright, Frederick Samuel Dellenbaugh, Anonymous, J. Clontz, David Hume, Margot Asquith, Elmer Ulysses Hoenshel, Byron J. Rees, Lida B. McMurry, Georges Duhamel, Ramsay Muir, Edith Wharton, Charles Sturt, Lola Ridge, J. M. Stone, Annie Payson Call, Grant Allen, kniaz Petr Alekseevich Kropotkin, Steve Solomon, Isabel Moser, Aleksandr Sergeevich Pushkin, Horace W. C. Newte, Charles Darwin, Maurice Maeterlinck, Walter Bagehot, Henri Bergson, George Randolph Chester, John S. C. Abbott, L. Frank Baum, William T. Sherman, Philip Henry Sheridan, Friedrich Wilhelm Nietzsche, Ambrose Bierce, Ulysses S. Grant, F. Scott Fitzgerald, Alfred Lichtenstein, Abbot of Nogent-sous-Coucy Guibert, Nellie L. McClung, Alice Caldwell Hegan Rice, E. Nesbit, Henri Barbusse, J. M. Synge, Frank Norris, Louis Hémon, Henry Van Dyke, Thomas Guthrie Marquis, Susanna Moodie, Frank Bigelow Tarbell, René Descartes, Kirk Munroe, Francis Hopkinson Smith, Edna St. Vincent Millay, Talbot Mundy, George Meredith, Clemens Brentano, James De Mille, James Allen, Norman Douglas, Bolton Hall, Arthur Christopher Benson, James Oliver Curwood, Frank Jardine, Bertram Lenox Simpson, Freiherr von Justus Liebig, Cyril G. Hopkins, Mary Eleanor Wilkins Freeman, Evelyn Scott, Charles Monroe Sheldon, George Berkeley, Steven Sills, Sara Jeannette Duncan, Jules Verne, Irvin S. Cobb, Zane Grey, August von Kotzebue, John Addington Symonds, Marjorie Allen Seiffert, J. B. Bury, William Makepeace Thackeray, Jules Renard, Susan Coolidge, Huguette Bertrand, Mrs. C. F. Fraser, Ottilie A. Liljencrantz, William Morton Payne, Henry Adams, T. S. Arthur, Orison Swett Marden, T. S. Ackland, Anthony Trollope, graf Leo Tolstoy, Robert Smythe Hichens, Émile Gaboriau, Wilkie Collins, Charles Reade, Horace Walpole, Jennette Lee, Thomas Dykes Beasley, Inez Haynes Gillmore, L. H. Woolley, John Francis Davis, James B. Stetson, William Day Simonds, James O'Meara, Almira Bailey, Cuthbert Bede, Voltaire, Percy Bysshe Shelley, William Bennett Munro, Sir Richard Francis Burton, Horatio Alger, Paul Verlaine, Samuel Vaknin, William Ralph Inge, Madame de Staël, J. Hector St. John de Crèvecoeur, L. A. Abbott, F. Colburn Adams, John S. Adams, Thornton W. Burgess, Glenn D. Bradley, Eugen Neuhaus, Arthur E. Knights, Bret Harte, Maturin Murray Ballou, Jane G. Austin, Samuel Johnson, Frederick Niecks, Stephen Leacock, Suelette Dreyfus, Stéphane Mallarmé, Lyndon Orr, William Le Queux, Mary Wollstonecraft Shelley, Jeannie Gunn, Jean François Regnard, John Ruskin

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A TREATISE OF HUMAN NATURE

By David Hume

Contents

ADVERTISEMENT. INTRODUCTION. BOOK I. OF THE UNDERSTANDING PART I. OF IDEAS, THEIR ORIGIN, COMPOSITION, CONNEXION, ABSTRACTION, ETC. SECT. I. OF THE ORIGIN OF OUR IDEAS. SECT. II. DIVISION OF THE SUBJECT. SECT. III. OF THE IDEAS OF THE MEMORY AND IMAGINATION. SECT. IV. OF THE CONNEXION OR ASSOCIATION OF IDEAS. SECT. V. OF RELATIONS. SECT. VI. OF MODES AND SUBSTANCES SECT. VII. OF ABSTRACT IDEAS. PART II. OF THE IDEAS OF SPACE AND TIME. SECT. I. OF THE INFINITE DIVISIBILITY OF OUR IDEAS OF SPACE AND TIME. SECT. II. OF THE INFINITE DIVISIBILITY OF SPACE AND TIME. SECT. III. OF THE OTHER QUALITIES OF OUR IDEA OF SPACE AND TIME. SECT. IV. OBJECTIONS ANSWERED. SECT. V. THE SAME SUBJECT CONTINUED. SECT. VI. OF THE IDEA OF EXISTENCE, AND OF EXTERNAL EXISTENCE. PART III. OF KNOWLEDGE AND PROBABILITY. SECT. I. OF KNOWLEDGE. SECT. II. OF PROBABILITY, AND OF THE IDEA OF CAUSE AND EFFECT. SECT. III. WHY A CAUSE IS ALWAYS NECESSARY. SECT. IV. OF THE COMPONENT PARTS OF OUR REASONINGS CONCERNING CAUSE AND EFFECT. SECT. V. OF THE IMPRESSIONS OF THE SENSES AND MEMORY. SECT. VI. OF THE INFERENCE FROM THE IMPRESSION TO THE IDEA. SECT. VII. OF THE NATURE OF THE IDEA OR BELIEF. SECT. VIII. OF THE CAUSES OF BELIEF. SECT. IX. OF THE EFFECTS OF OTHER RELATIONS AND OTHER HABITS. SECT. X. OF THE INFLUENCE OF BELIEF. SECT. XI. OF THE PROBABILITY OF CHANCES. SECT. XII. OF THE PROBABILITY OF CAUSES. SECT. XIII. OF UNPHILOSOPHICAL PROBABILITY. SECT. XIV. OF THE IDEA OF NECESSARY CONNEXION. SECT. XV. RULES BY WHICH TO JUDGE OF CAUSES AND EFFECTS. SECT. XVI OF THE REASON OF ANIMALS PART IV. OF THE SCEPTICAL AND OTHER SYSTEMS OF PHILOSOPHY. SECT. I. OF SCEPTICISM WITH REGARD TO REASON. SECT. II. OF SCEPTICISM WITH REGARD TO THE SENSES. SECT. III. OF THE ANTIENT PHILOSOPHY. SECT. IV. OF THE MODERN PHILOSOPHY. SECT. V. OF THE IMMATERIALITY OF THE SOUL. SECT. VI. OF PERSONAL IDENTITY SECT. VII. CONCLUSION OF THIS BOOK. BOOK II OF THE PASSIONS PART I OF PRIDE AND HUMILITY SECT. I DIVISION OF THE SUBJECT SECT. II OF PRIDE AND HUMILITY, THEIR OBJECTS AND CAUSES SECT. III WHENCE THESE OBJECTS AND CAUSES ARE DERIVED SECT. IV OF THE RELATIONS OF IMPRESSIONS AND IDEAS SECT. V OF THE INFLUENCE OF THESE RELATIONS ON PRIDE AND HUMILITY SECT. VI LIMITATIONS OF THIS SYSTEM SECT. VII OF VICE AND VIRTUE SECT. VIII OF BEAUTY AND DEFORMITY SECT. IX OF EXTERNAL ADVANTAGES AND DISADVANTAGES SECT. X OF PROPERTY AND RICHES SECT. XI OF THE LOVE OF FAME SECT. XII OF THE PRIDE AND HUMILITY OF ANIMALS PART II OF LOVE AND HATRED SECT. I OF THE OBJECT AND CAUSES OF LOVE AND HATRED SECT. II EXPERIMENTS TO CONFIRM THIS SYSTEM SECT. III DIFFICULTIES SOLVED SECT. IV OF THE LOVE OF RELATIONS SECT. V OF OUR ESTEEM FOR THE RICH AND POWERFUL SECT. VI OF BENEVOLENCE AND ANGER SECT. VII OF COMPASSION SECT. VIII OF MALICE AND ENVY SECT. IX OF THE MIXTURE OF BENEVOLENCE AND ANGER WITH COMPASSION AND MALICE SECT. X OF RESPECT AND CONTEMPT SECT. XI OF THE AMOROUS PASSION, OR LOVE BETWIXT THE SEXES SECT. XII OF THE LOVE AND HATRED OF ANIMALS PART III OF THE WILL AND DIRECT PASSIONS SECT. I OF LIBERTY AND NECESSITY SECT. II THE SAME SUBJECT CONTINUed SECT. III OF THE INFLUENCING MOTIVES OF THE WILL SECT. IV OF THE CAUSES OF THE VIOLENT PASSIONS SECT. V OF THE EFFECTS OF CUSTOM SECT. VI OF THE INFLUENCE OF THE IMAGINATION ON THE PASSIONS SECT. VII OF CONTIGUITY AND DISTANCE IN SPACE AND TIME SECT. VIII THE SAME SUBJECT CONTINUed SECT. IX OF THE DIRECT PASSIONS SECT. X OF CURIOSITY, OR THE LOVE OF TRUTH BOOK III OF MORALS PART I OF VIRTUE AND VICE IN GENERAL SECT. I MORAL DISTINCTIONS NOT DERIVed FROM REASON SECT. II MORAL DISTINCTIONS DERIVed FROM A MORAL SENSE PART II OF JUSTICE AND INJUSTICE SECT. I JUSTICE, WHETHER A NATURAL OR ARTIFICIAL VIRTUE? SECT. II OF THE ORIGIN OF JUSTICE AND PROPERTY SECT. III OF THE RULES WHICH DETERMINE PROPERTY SECT. IV OF THE TRANSFERENCE OF PROPERTY BY CONSENT SECT. V OF THE OBLIGATION OF PROMISES SECT. VI SOME FARTHER REFLECTIONS CONCERNING JUSTICE AND INJUSTICE SECT. VII OF THE ORIGIN OF GOVERNMENT SECT. VIII OF THE SOURCE OF ALLEGIANCE SECT. IX OF THE MEASURES OF ALLEGIANCE SECT. X OF THE OBJECTS OF ALLEGIANCE SECT. XI OF THE LAWS OF NATIONS SECT. XII OF CHASTITY AND MODESTY PART III OF THE OTHER VIRTUES AND VICES SECT. I OF THE ORIGIN OF THE NATURAL VIRTUES AND VICES SECT. II OF GREATNESS OF MIND SECT. III OF GOODNESS AND BENEVOLENCE SECT. IV OF NATURAL ABILITIES SECT. V SOME FARTHER REFLECTIONS CONCERNING THE NATURAL VIRTUES SECT. VI CONCLUSION OF THIS BOOK APPENDIX

ADVERTISEMENT.

My design in the present work is sufficiently explained in the Introduction. The reader must only observe, that all the subjects I have there planned out to myself, are not treated of in these two volumes. The subjects of the Understanding and Passions make a compleat chain of reasoning by themselves; and I was willing to take advantage of this natural division, in order to try the taste of the public. If I have the good fortune to meet with success, I shall proceed to the examination of Morals, Politics, and Criticism; which will compleat this Treatise of Human Nature. The approbation of the public I consider as the greatest reward of my labours; but am determined to regard its judgment, whatever it be, as my best instruction.

INTRODUCTION.

Nothing is more usual and more natural for those, who pretend to discover anything new to the world in philosophy and the sciences, than to insinuate the praises of their own systems, by decrying all those, which have been advanced before them. And indeed were they content with lamenting that ignorance, which we still lie under in the most important questions, that can come before the tribunal of human reason, there are few, who have an acquaintance with the sciences, that would not readily agree with them. It is easy for one of judgment and learning, to perceive the weak foundation even of those systems, which have obtained the greatest credit, and have carried their pretensions highest to accurate and profound reasoning. Principles taken upon trust, consequences lamely deduced from them, want of coherence in the parts, and of evidence in the whole, these are every where to be met with in the systems of the most eminent philosophers, and seem to have drawn disgrace upon philosophy itself.

Nor is there required such profound knowledge to discover the present imperfect condition of the sciences, but even the rabble without doors may, judge from the noise and clamour, which they hear, that all goes not well within. There is nothing which is not the subject of debate, and in which men of learning are not of contrary opinions. The most trivial question escapes not our controversy, and in the most momentous we are not able to give any certain decision. Disputes are multiplied, as if every thing was uncertain; and these disputes are managed with the greatest warmth, as if every thing was certain. Amidst all this bustle it is not reason, which carries the prize, but eloquence; and no man needs ever despair of gaining proselytes to the most extravagant hypothesis, who has art enough to represent it in any favourable colours. The victory is not gained by the men at arms, who manage the pike and the sword; but by the trumpeters, drummers, and musicians of the army.

From hence in my opinion arises that common prejudice against metaphysical reasonings of all kinds, even amongst those, who profess themselves scholars, and have a just value for every other part of literature. By metaphysical reasonings, they do not understand those on any particular branch of science, but every kind of argument, which is any way abstruse, and requires some attention to be comprehended. We have so often lost our labour in such researches, that we commonly reject them without hesitation, and resolve, if we must for ever be a prey to errors and delusions, that they shall at least be natural and entertaining. And indeed nothing but the most determined scepticism, along with a great degree of indolence, can justify this aversion to metaphysics. For if truth be at all within the reach of human capacity, it is certain it must lie very deep and abstruse: and to hope we shall arrive at it without pains, while the greatest geniuses have failed with the utmost pains, must certainly be esteemed sufficiently vain and presumptuous. I pretend to no such advantage in the philosophy I am going to unfold, and would esteem it a strong presumption against it, were it so very easy and obvious.

It is evident, that all the sciences have a relation, greater or less, to human nature: and that however wide any of them may seem to run from it, they still return back by one passage or another. Even. Mathematics, Natural Philosophy, and Natural Religion, are in some measure dependent on the science of MAN; since the lie under the cognizance of men, and are judged of by their powers and faculties. It is impossible to tell what changes and improvements we might make in these sciences were we thoroughly acquainted with the extent and force of human understanding, and could explain the nature of the ideas we employ, and of the operations we perform in our reasonings. And these improvements are the more to be hoped for in natural religion, as it is not content with instructing us in the nature of superior powers, but carries its views farther, to their disposition towards us, and our duties towards them; and consequently we ourselves are not only the beings, that reason, but also one of the objects, concerning which we reason.

If therefore the sciences of Mathematics, Natural Philosophy, and Natural Religion, have such a dependence on the knowledge of man, what may be expected in the other sciences, whose connexion with human nature is more close and intimate? The sole end of logic is to explain the principles and operations of our reasoning faculty, and the nature of our ideas: morals and criticism regard our tastes and sentiments: and politics consider men as united in society, and dependent on each other. In these four sciences of Logic, Morals, Criticism, and Politics, is comprehended almost everything, which it can any way import us to be acquainted with, or which can tend either to the improvement or ornament of the human mind.

Here then is the only expedient, from which we can hope for success in our philosophical researches, to leave the tedious lingering method, which we have hitherto followed, and instead of taking now and then a castle or village on the frontier, to march up directly to the capital or center of these sciences, to human nature itself; which being once masters of, we may every where else hope for an easy victory. From this station we may extend our conquests over all those sciences, which more intimately concern human life, and may afterwards proceed at leisure to discover more fully those, which are the objects of pore curiosity. There is no question of importance, whose decision is not comprised in the science of man; and there is none, which can be decided with any certainty, before we become acquainted with that science. In pretending, therefore, to explain the principles of human nature, we in effect propose a compleat system of the sciences, built on a foundation almost entirely new, and the only one upon which they can stand with any security.

And as the science of man is the-only solid foundation for the other sciences, so the only solid foundation we can give to this science itself must be laid on experience and observation. It is no astonishing reflection to consider, that the application of experimental philosophy to moral subjects should come after that to natural at the distance of above a whole century; since we find in fact, that there was about the same interval betwixt the origins of these sciences; and that reckoning from THALES to SOCRATES, the space of time is nearly equal to that betwixt, my Lord Bacon and some late philosophers [Mr. Locke, my Lord Shaftesbury, Dr. Mandeville, Mr. Hutchinson, Dr. Butler, etc.] in England, who have begun to put the science of man on a new footing, and have engaged the attention, and excited the curiosity of the public. So true it is, that however other nations may rival us in poetry, and excel us in some other agreeable arts, the improvements in reason and philosophy can only be owing to a land of toleration and of liberty.

Nor ought we to think, that this latter improvement in the science of man will do less honour to our native country than the former in natural philosophy, but ought rather to esteem it a greater glory, upon account of the greater importance of that science, as well as the necessity it lay under of such a reformation. For to me it seems evident, that the essence of the mind being equally unknown to us with that of external bodies, it must be equally impossible to form any notion of its powers and qualities otherwise than from careful and exact experiments, and the observation of those particular effects, which result from its different circumstances and situations. And though we must endeavour to render all our principles as universal as possible, by tracing up our experiments to the utmost, and explaining all effects from the simplest and fewest causes, it is still certain we cannot go beyond experience; and any hypothesis, that pretends to discover the ultimate original qualities of human nature, ought at first to be rejected as presumptuous and chimerical.

I do not think a philosopher, who would apply himself so earnestly to the explaining the ultimate principles of the soul, would show himself a great master in that very science of human nature, which he pretends to explain, or very knowing in what is naturally satisfactory to the mind of man. For nothing is more certain, than that despair has almost the same effect upon us with enjoyment, and that we are no sooner acquainted with the impossibility of satisfying any desire, than the desire itself vanishes. When we see, that we have arrived at the utmost extent of human reason, we sit down contented, though we be perfectly satisfied in the main of our ignorance, and perceive that we can give no reason for our most general and most refined principles, beside our experience of their reality; which is the reason of the mere vulgar, and what it required no study at first to have discovered for the most particular and most extraordinary phaenomenon. And as this impossibility of making any farther progress is enough to satisfy the reader, so the writer may derive a more delicate satisfaction from the free confession of his ignorance, and from his prudence in avoiding that error, into which so many have fallen, of imposing their conjectures and hypotheses on the world for the most certain principles. When this mutual contentment and satisfaction can be obtained betwixt the master and scholar, I know not what more we can require of our philosophy.

But if this impossibility of explaining ultimate principles should be esteemed a defect in the science of man, I will venture to affirm, that it is a defect common to it with all the sciences, and all the arts, in which we can employ ourselves, whether they be such as are cultivated in the schools of the philosophers, or practised in the shops of the meanest artizans. None of them can go beyond experience, or establish any principles which are not founded on that authority. Moral philosophy has, indeed, this peculiar disadvantage, which is not found in natural, that in collecting its experiments, it cannot make them purposely, with premeditation, and after such a manner as to satisfy itself concerning every particular difficulty which may be. When I am at a loss to know the effects of one body upon another in any situation, I need only put them in that situation, and observe what results from it. But should I endeavour to clear up after the same manner any doubt in moral philosophy, by placing myself in the same case with that which I consider, it is evident this reflection and premeditation would so disturb the operation of my natural principles, as must render it impossible to form any just conclusion from the phenomenon. We must therefore glean up our experiments in this science from a cautious observation of human life, and take them as they appear in the common course of the world, by men's behaviour in company, in affairs, and in their pleasures. Where experiments of this kind are judiciously collected and compared, we may hope to establish on them a science which will not be inferior in certainty, and will be much superior in utility to any other of human comprehension.