The Camp-fires of Napoleon

The two emperors parted with reiterated demonstrations of cordiality. Napoleon handed into his carriage that monarch whom he had just called his brother, and remounted his horse to return to Austerlitz.

General Savary was sent to suspend the march of Davoust’s corps. He first proceeded to Holitsch, with the suite of the Emperor Francis, to learn whether the Emperor Alexander acceded to the proposed conditions. He saw the latter, around whom every thing was much changed since the mission on which he was sent to him a few days before. “Your master,” said Alexander to him, “has shown himself very great. I acknowledge all the power of his genius, and, as for myself, I shall retire, since my ally is satisfied.” General Savary conversed for some time with the young czar on the late battle, explained to him how the French army, inferior in number to the Russian army, had nevertheless appeared superior on all points, owing to the art of manœuvring which Napoleon possessed in so eminent a degree. He courteously added that with experience Alexander, in his turn, would become a warrior, but that so difficult an art was not to be learned in a day. After these flatteries to the vanquished monarch, he set out for Goding to stop Marshal Davoust, who had rejected all the proposals for a suspension of arms, and was ready to attack the relics of the Russian army. To no purpose he had been assured in the name of the Emperor of Russia himself that an armistice was negotiating between Napoleon and the Emperor of Austria. He would not on any account abandon his prey. But General Savary stopped him with a formal order from Napoleon. These were the last musket-shots fired during that unexampled campaign. The troops of the several nations separated to go into winter-quarters, awaiting what should be decided by the negotiators of the belligerent powers.

THE CAMP-FIRE AT JENA

Jena was one of Napoleon’s most decisive fields. There, in the conflict of a day, Prussia, who had dared to defy a power which had brought Austria and Russia to the dust, was completely annihilated. There the descendants of the great Frederick reaped the bitter consequences of his weak presumption. At Jena, the valley of the Saale begins to widen. The right bank is low, damp and covered with meadows. The left bank presents steep heights, whose peaked tops overlook the town of Jena, and are ascended by narrow, winding ravines, overhung with wood. On the left of Jena, a gorge more open, less abrupt, called the Muhlthal, has become the passage through which the high road from Jena to Weimar has been carried. This road first keeps along the bottom of the Muhlthal, then rises in form of a spiral staircase, and opens upon the plateaux in rear. It would have required a fierce assault to force this pass.

The principal of the heights that overlook the town of Jena is called Landgrafenberg, and, since the memorable events of which it has been the theatre, it has received from the inhabitants the name of Napoleonsberg. It is the highest in these parts. Napoleon and Lannes, surveying from that height the surrounding country, with their backs turned to Jena, beheld on their right the Saale running in a deep, winding, wooded gorge, to Naumburg, which is six or seven leagues from Jena. Before them they saw undulated plateaux, extending to a distance, and subsiding by a gentle slope to the little valley of the Ilm, at the extremity of which is situated the town of Weimar. They perceived on their left the high road from Jena to Weimar, rising by a series of slopes from the gorge of the Muhlthal to these plateaux, and running in a straight line to Weimar. These slopes, somewhat resembling a sort of snail’s shell, have thence received in German the appellation of the Schneeke (snail.)

It was in September, 1806, that Napoleon, having set all his divisions in motion, left Paris and put himself at the head of his grand army. The Prussians were superior in numbers, well disciplined, and full of spirit. They numbered between one hundred and thirty thousand and one hundred and forty thousand men. The cavalry especially, bore a high reputation, which, however, as we shall see, it could not sustain. The French Emperor had an army of one hundred and seventy thousand men in the field, with a power of concentrating one hundred thousand of them within a few hours.

On learning that the Prussian army was changing its position and advancing from Erfurt upon Weimar, with a view to approach the banks of the Saale, Napoleon manœuvred to meet the changes of the enemy.

They might be coming thither with one of the two following intentions: either to occupy the bridge over the Saale at Naumburg, over which passes the great central road of Germany, in order to retire upon the Elbe, while covering Leipzig and Dresden; or to approach the course of the Saale, for the purpose of defending its banks against the French. To meet this double contingency, Napoleon took a first precaution, which was to dispatch Marshal Davoust immediately to Naumburg, with orders to bar the passage of the bridge there with the twenty-six thousand men of the third corps. He sent Murat, with the cavalry, along the banks of the Saale, to watch its course, and to push reconnoisances as far as Leipzig. He directed Marshal Bernadette upon Naumburg, with instructions to support Marshal Davoust in case of need. He sent Marshals Lannes and Augereau to Jena itself. His object was to make himself master immediately of the two principal passages of the Saale, those at Naumburg and Jena, either to stop the Prussian army there, if it should design to cross and to retire to the Elbe, or to go and seek it on the heights bordering that river, if it purposed to remain there on the defensive. As for himself, he continued with Marshals Ney and Soult, within reach of Naumburg and Jena, ready to march for either point according to circumstances.

On the morning of the 13th, he learned by more circumstantial accounts that the enemy was definitively approaching the Saale, with the yet uncertain resolution of fighting a defensive battle on its banks, or of crossing and pushing on to the Elbe. It was in the direction from Weimar to Jena that the largest assemblage appeared. Without losing a moment, Napoleon mounted his horse to proceed to Jena. He gave himself his instructions to Marshals Soult and Ney, and enjoined them to be at Jena in the evening, or at latest in the night. He directed Murat to bring his cavalry towards Jena, and Marshal Bernadotte to take at Dornburg an intermediate position between Jena and Naumburg. He set out immediately, sending officers to stop all troops on march to Gera, and to make them turn back for Jena.

In the evening of the preceding day, Marshal Davoust had entered Naumburg, occupied the bridge of the Saale, and taken considerable magazines, with a fine bridge equipage. Marshal Bernadotte had joined him. Murat had sent his light cavalry as far as Leipzig, and surprised the gates of that great commercial city. Lannes had proceeded towards Jena, a small university town, seated on the very banks of the Saale, and had driven back pell-mell the enemy’s troops left beyond the river, as well as the baggage, which encumbered the road. He had taken possession of Jena, and immediately pushed his advanced posts upon the heights which command it. From these heights he had perceived the army of the Prince of Hohenlohe, which, after recrossing the Saale, encamped between Jena and Weimar, and he had reason to suspect that a great assemblage was collecting in that place.

Napoleon had arrived at Jena on the afternoon of the 13th of October. Marshal Lannes, who had outstripped him, was waiting for him with impatience, like that of a war-horse, snuffing the battle. Both mounted their horses to reconnoitre the localities. We have described the ground upon which the battle was fought. The Prussians were posted on the heights which overlook the town of Jena. The French were coming up on the low ground on the opposite side of the river. The chief difficulty was to reach the Prussians. There was but one method that appeared practicable. The bold tirailleurs of Lannes, entering the ravines which are met with on going out of Jena, had succeeded in ascending the principal eminence, and all at once perceived the Prussian army encamped on the plateaux of the left bank. Followed presently by some detachments of Suchet’s division, they had made room for themselves by driving in General Tauenzien’s advanced posts. Thus by force of daring, the heights which commanded the left bank of the Saale were gained; but by a route which was scarcely practicable to artillery. Thither, Lannes conducted the emperor, amidst an incessant fire of tirailleurs which rendered reconnoisance extremely dangerous.

Napoleon, having before him a mass of troops, the force of which could scarcely be estimated, supposed that the Prussian army had chosen this ground for a field of battle, and immediately made his dispositions, so as to debouch with his army on the Landgrafenberg, before the enemy should hasten up, en masse, to hurl him into the precipices of the Saale. He was obliged to make the best use of his time, and to take advantage of the space gained by the tirailleurs to establish himself on the height. He had, it is true, no more of it than the summit, for, only a few paces off, there was the corps of General Tauenzien, separated from the French only by a slight ridge of ground. This corps was stationed near two villages, one on the right, that of Closewitz, surrounded by a small wood, the other on the left, that of Cospoda, likewise surrounded by a wood of some extent. Napoleon purposed to leave the Prussians quiet in this position till the next day, and meanwhile to lead part of his army up the Landgrafenberg. The space which it occupied was capable of containing the corps of Lannes and the guard. He ordered them to be led up immediately through the steep ravines which serve to ascend from Jena to the Landgrafenberg. On the left, he placed Gazan’s division. On the right, Suchet’s division; in the centre, and a little in rear, the foot-guard. He made the latter encamp in a square of four thousand men, and in the centre of this square he established his own bivouac.

But it was not enough to bring infantry upon the Landgrafenberg—it was necessary to mount artillery too upon it. Napoleon, riding about in all directions, discovered a passage less steep than the others, and by which the artillery might be dragged up with great exertion. Unluckily, the way was too narrow. Napoleon sent forthwith for a detachment of the engineers, and had it widened by cutting the rock; he himself, in his impatience, directed the works, torch in hand. He did not retire till the night was far advanced, when he had seen the first pieces of cannon rolled up. It required twelve horses to drag each gun-carriage to the top of the Landgrafenberg. Napoleon purposed to attack General Tauenzien at day-break, and, by pushing him briskly, to conquer the space necessary for deploying his army. Fearful, however, of debouching by a single outlet, wishing also to divide the attention of the enemy, he directed Augereau towards the left, to enter the gorge of the Muhlthal, to march one of his two divisions upon the Weimar road, and to gain with the other the back of the Landgrafenberg, in order to fall upon the rear of General Tauenzien. On the right, he ordered Marshal Soult, whose corps, breaking up from Gera, was to arrive in the night, to ascend the other ravines, which, running from Lobstedt and Dornburg, debouch upon Closewitz, likewise for the purpose of falling upon the rear of General Tauenzien. With this double diversion, on the right and on the left, Napoleon had no doubt of forcing the Prussians in their position, and gaining for himself the space needed by his army for deploying. Marshals Ney and Murat were to ascend the Landgrafenberg by the route Lannes and the guard had followed.

The day of the 13th had closed; profound darkness enveloped the field of battle. Napoleon had placed his tent in the centre of the square formed by his guard, and had suffered only a few fires to be lighted; but all those of the Prussian army were kindled. The fires of the Prince of Hohenlohe were to be seen over the whole extent of the plateaux, and at the horizon on the right, topped by the old castle of Eckartsberg, those of the army of the Duke of Brunswick, which had all at once become visible for Napoleon. He conceived that, so far from retiring, the whole of the Prussian forces had come to take part in the battle. He sent immediately fresh orders to Marshals Davoust and Bernadotte. He enjoined Marshal Davoust to guard strictly the bridge of Naumburg, even to cross it, if possible, and to fall upon the rear of the Prussians, while they were engaged in front. He ordered Marshal Bernadotte, placed immediately, to concur in the projected movement, either by joining Marshal Davoust, if he was near the latter, or by throwing himself directly on the flank of the Prussians, if he had already taken at Dornburg a position nearer to Jena. Lastly, he desired Murat to arrive as speedily as possible with his cavalry.

While Napoleon was making these dispositions, the Prince of Hohenlohe was in complete ignorance of the lot which awaited him. Still persuaded that the bulk of the French army, instead of halting before Jena, was hurrying to Leipzig and Dresden, he supposed that he should at most have to deal with the corps of Marshals Lannes and Augereau, which, having passed the Saale, would, he imagined, make their appearance between Jena and Weimar, as if they had descended from the heights of the forest of Thuringia. Under this idea, not thinking of making front towards Jena, he had on that side opposed only the corps of General Tauenzien, and ranged his army along the road from Jena to Weimar. His left, composed of Saxons, guarded the summit of the Schnecke; his right extended to Weimar, and connected itself with General Ruchel’s corps. However, a fire of tirailleurs, which was heard on the Landgrafenberg, having excited a sort of alarm, and General Tauenzien applying for succor, the Prince of Hohenlohe ordered the Saxon brigade of Cerini, the Prussian brigade of Sanitz, and several squadrons of cavalry, to get under arms, and dispatched these forces to the Landgrafenberg, to dislodge from it the French, whom he conceived to be scarcely established on that point. At the moment when he was about to execute this resolution, Colonel de Massenbach brought him from the Duke of Brunswick a reiterated order not to involve himself in any serious action, to guard well the passages of the Saale, and particularly that of Dornburg, which excited uneasiness because some light troops had been perceived there. The Prince of Hohenlohe, who had become one of the most obedient of lieutenants when he ought not to have been so, desisted at once, in compliance with these injunctions from the head-quarters. It was singular, nevertheless, that in obeying the order not to fight, he should abandon the debouche by which, on the morrow, a disastrous battle was to be forced upon him. Be this as it may, relinquishing the idea of retaking the Landgrafenberg, he contented himself with sending the Saxon brigade of Cerini to General Tauenzien, and with placing at Nerkwitz, facing Dornburg, the Prussian brigade of Schemmelpfennig, lastly several detachments of cavalry and artillery, under the command of General Holzendorf. He sent some light horse to Dornburg itself, to learn what was passing there. The Prince of Hohenlohe confined himself to these dispositions: he returned to his head-quarters at Capellendorf.

Napoleon, stirring before daylight, gave his last instructions to his lieutenants, and orders for his soldiers to get under arms. The night was cold, the country covered to a distance with a thick fog, like that which for some hours enveloped the field of Austerlitz. Escorted by men carrying torches, Napoleon went along the front of the troops, talking to the officers and soldiers. He explained the position of the two armies, demonstrated to them that the Prussians were as deeply compromised as the Austrians in the preceding year; that, if vanquished in that engagement, they would be cut off from the Elbe and the Oder, separated from the Russians, and forced to abandon to the French the whole Prussian monarchy; that, in such a situation, the French corps which should suffer itself to be beaten would frustrate the grandest designs, and disgrace itself for ever. He exhorted them to keep on their guard against the Prussian cavalry, and to receive it in square with their usual firmness. His words everywhere drew forth shouts of “Forward! vive l’Empereur!” Though the fog was thick, yet through its veil the enemy’s advanced posts perceived the glare of the torches, heard the acclamations of the French, and went to give the alarm to General Tauenzien. At that moment, the corps of Lannes set itself in motion, on a signal from Napoleon. Suchet’s division, formed into three brigades, advanced first. Claparede’s brigade, composed of the 17th light infantry, and a battalion of elite, marched at the head, deployed in a single line. On the wings of this line, and to preserve it from attacks of cavalry, the 34th and 40th regiments, forming the second brigade, were disposed in close column, Vedel’s brigade, deployed, closed this sort of square. On the left of Suchet’s division, but a little in rear, came Gazan’s division, ranged in two lines and preceded by its artillery. Thus they advanced, groping their way through the fog. Suchet’s division directed its course towards the village of Closewitz, which was on the right, Gazan’s division towards the village of Cospoda, which was on the left. The Saxon battalions of Frederick Augustus and Rechten, and the Prussian battalion of Zweifel, perceiving through the fog a mass in motion, fired all together. The 17th light infantry sustained that fire, and immediately returned it. This fire of musketry was kept up for a few minutes, the parties seeing the flash and hearing the report, but not discerning one another. The French, on approaching, at length discovered the little wood which surrounded the village of Closewitz. General Claparede briskly threw himself into it, and, after a fight hand to hand, had soon carried it, as well as the village of Closewitz itself. Having deprived General Tauenzien’s line of this support, the French continued their march amidst the balls that issued from that thick fog. Gazan’s division, on its part, took the village of Cospoda, and established itself there. Between these two villages, but a little farther off, was a small hamlet, that of Lutzenrode, occupied by Erichsen’s fusiliers. Gazan’s division carried that also, and was then able to deploy more at its ease.

At this moment the two divisions of Lannes were assailed by fresh discharges of artillery and musketry. These were from the Saxon grenadiers of the Cerini brigade, who, after taking up the advanced posts of General Tauenzien, continued to move forward, firing battalion volleys with as much precision as if they had been at a review. The 17th light infantry, which formed the head of Suchet’s division, having exhausted its cartridges, was sent to the rear. The 34th took its place, kept up the fire for some time, then encountered the Saxon grenadiers with the bayonet, and broke them. The route having soon extended to the whole corps of General Tauenzien. Gazan’s and Suchet’s divisions picked up about twenty pieces of cannon and many fugitives. From the Landgrafenberg, the undulated plateaux, on which the French had just deployed, gradually subsided to the little valley of the Ilm. Hence they marched rapidly upon sloping ground, to the heels of a fleeing enemy. In this quick movement they encountered two battalions of Cerini, and also Pelet’s fusiliers, which had been left in the environs of Closewitz. These troops were flung back for the rest of the day towards General Holzendorf, commissioned on the preceding day to guard the debouche of Dornburg.

This action had not lasted two hours. It was nine o’clock, and Napoleon had thus early realized the first part of his plan, which consisted in gaining the space necessary for deploying his army. At the same moment his instructions were executed at all points with remarkable punctuality. Towards the left, Marshal Augereau, having sent off Heudelet’s division, and likewise his artillery and cavalry, to the extremity of the Muhlthal, on the high road from Weimar, was climbing with Desjardin’s divisions, the back of the Landgrafenberg, and coming to form on the plateaux to the left of Gazan’s division. Marshal Soult, only one of whose divisions, that of General St. Hilaire, had arrived, was ascending from Lobstedt, in the rear of Closewitz, facing the positions of Nerkwitz and Alten-Krone, occupied by the relics of Tauenzien’s corps and by the detachment of General Holzendorf. Marshal Ney, impatient to share in the battle, had detached from his corps a battalion of voltigeurs, a battalion of grenadiers, the 25th light infantry, two regiments of cavalry, and had gone on before with this body of elite. He entered Jena at the very hour when the first act of the engagement was over. Lastly, Murat, returning at a gallop, with the dragoons and cuirassiers, from reconnoisances executed on the Lower Saale, was mounting in breathless haste towards Jena. Napoleon resolved, therefore, to halt for a few moments on the conquered ground, to afford his troops time to get into line.

Meanwhile, the fugitives belonging to General Tauenzien’s force had given the alarm to the whole camp of the Prussians. At the sound of the cannon, the Prince of Hohenlohe had hastened to the Weimar road, where the Prussian infantry was encamped, not yet believing the action to be general, and complaining that the troops were harassed by being obliged needlessly to get under arms. Being soon undeceived, he took his measures for giving battle. Knowing that the French had passed the Saale at Saalfeld, he had expected to see them make their appearance between Jena and Weimar, and had drawn up his army along the road running from one to the other of these towns. As this conjuncture was not realized, he was obliged to change his dispositions, and he did it with promptness and resolution. He sent the bulk of the Prussian infantry, under the command of General Grawert, to occupy the positions abandoned by General Tauenzien. Towards the Schnecke, which was to form his right, he left the Niesemuchel division, composed of the two Saxon brigades of Burgsdorf and Nehroff, of the Prussian Boguslawski battalion, and of a numerous artillery, with orders to defend to the last extremity the winding slopes by which the Weimar road rises to the plateaux. To aid them, he gave them the Cerini brigade, rallied and reinforced by four Saxon battalions. In rear of his centre, he placed a reserve of five battalions under General Dyherrn, to support General Grawert. He had the wrecks of Tauenzien’s corps rallied at some distance from the field of battle, and supplied with ammunition. As for his left, he directed General Holzendorf to push forward, if he could, and to fall upon the right of the French, while he would himself endeavor to stop them in front. He sent General Ruchel information of what was passing, and begged him to hasten his march. Lastly, he hurried off himself with the Prussian cavalry and the artillery horses, to meet the French, for the purpose of keeping them in check and covering the formation of General Grawert’s infantry.

It was about ten o’clock, and the action of the morning, interrupted for an hour, was about to begin again with greater violence, while, on the right, Marshal Soult, debouching from Lobstedt, was climbing the heights with St. Hilaire’s division; while in the centre Marshal Lannes, with Suchet’s and Gazan’s divisions, was deploying on the plateaux won in the morning; and while, on the left, Marshal Augereau, ascending from the bottom of the Muhlthal, had reached the village of Iserstedt, Marshal Ney, in his ardour for fighting, had advanced with his three thousand men of the elite, concealed by the fog, and had placed himself between Lannes and Augereau, facing the village of Vierzehn-Heiligen, which occupied the centre of the field of battle. He arrived at the very moment when the Prince of Hohenlohe was hastening up at the head of the Prussian cavalry. Finding himself all at once facing the enemy, he engaged before the Emperor had given orders for renewing the action. The horse artillery of the Prince of Hohenlohe having already placed itself in battery, Ney pushed the 10th chasseurs upon this artillery. This regiment, taking advantage of a clump of trees to form, dashed forward on the gallop, ascended by its right upon the flank of the Russian artillery, cut down the gunners, and took seven pieces of cannon, under the fire of the whole line of the enemy. But a mass of Prussian cuirassiers rushed upon it, and he was obliged to retire with precipitation. Ney then dispatched the 3d hussars. This regiment, manœuvring as the 10th chasseurs had done, took advantage of the clump of trees to form, ascended upon the flank of the cuirassiers, then fell upon them suddenly, threw them into disorder, and forced them to retire. Two regiments of light cavalry, however, were not enough to make head against thirty squadrons of dragoons and cuirassiers. The chasseurs and hussars were soon obliged to seek shelter behind the infantry. Marshal Ney then sent forward the battalion of grenadiers and the battalion of voltigeurs which he had brought, formed two squares, then placing himself in one of them, opposed the charges of the Prussian cavalry. He allowed the enemy’s cuirassiers to approach within twenty paces of his bayonets, and terrified them by the aspect of a motionless infantry which had reserved its fire. At his signal, a discharge within point-blank range strewed the ground with dead and wounded. Though several times assailed, these two squares remained unbroken.