The Tribes and Castes of the Central Provinces of India, Volume 1

55. Primitive language

It has been seen that primitive man considered the life and qualities to be distributed equally over the body in a physical sense, so that they formed part of the substance and flesh. The same view extended even to instrumental qualities or functions, since his mental powers and vision were necessarily limited by his language. Language must apparently have begun by pointing at animals or plants and making some sound, probably at first an imitation of the cry or other characteristic of the animal, which came to connote it. We have to suppose that language was at the commencement a help in the struggle for life, because otherwise men, as yet barely emerged from the animal stage, would never have made the painful mental efforts necessary to devise and remember the words. Words which would be distinctly advantageous in the struggle would be names for the animals and plants which they ate, and for the animals which ate them. By saying the name and pointing in any direction, the presence of such animals or plants in the vicinity would be intimated more quickly and more accurately than by signs or actions. Such names were then, it may be supposed, the first words. Animals or plants of which they made no use nor from which they apprehended any danger, would for long be simply disregarded, as nothing was to be gained by inventing names for them. The first words were all nouns and the names of visible objects, and this state of things probably continued for a long period and was the cause of many erroneous primitive conceptions and ideas. Some traces of the earliest form of language can still be discerned. Thus of Santāli Sir G. Grierson states: “Every word can perform the function of a verb, and every verbal form can, according to circumstances, be considered as a noun, an adjective or a verb. It is often simply a matter of convenience which word is considered as a noun and which as an adjective … Strictly speaking, in Santāli there is no real verb as distinct from the other classes of words. Every independent word can perform the function of a verb, and every verbal form can in its turn be used as a noun or adjective.”107 And of the Dravidian languages he says: “The genitive of ordinary nouns is in reality an adjective, and the difference between nouns and adjectives is of no great importance … Many cases are both nouns and verbs. Nouns of agency are very commonly used as verbs.”108 Thus if it be admitted that nouns preceded verbs as parts of speech, which will hardly be disputed, these passages show how the semi-abstract adjectives and verbs were gradually formed from the names of concrete nouns. Of the language of the now extinct Tasmanian aborigines it is stated: “Their speech was so imperfectly constituted that there was no settled order or arrangement of words in the sentence, the sense being eked out by face, manner and gesture, so that they could scarcely converse in the dark, and all intercourse had to cease with nightfall. Abstract forms scarcely existed, and while every gum-tree or wattle-tree had its name, there was no word for ‘tree’ in general, nor for qualities such as hard, soft, hot, cold, etc. Anything hard was ‘like a stone,’ anything round ‘like the moon,’ and so on, the speaker suiting the action to the word, and supplementing the meaning to be understood by some gesture.”109 Here the original concrete form of language can be clearly discerned. They had a sufficiency of names for all the objects which were of use to them, and apparently verbal ideas were largely conveyed by gesture. Captain Forsyth states110 that though the Korkus very seldom wash themselves, there exist in their language eight words for washing, one for washing the face, another for the hands and others for different parts of the body. Thus we see that the verbal idea of washing was originally conceived not generally, but separately with reference to each concrete object or noun, for which a name existed and to which water was applied.

56. Concrete nature of primitive ideas

The primitive languages consisted only of nouns or the names of visible objects, possibly with the subsequent addition of a few names for such conceptions as the wind and the voice, which could be heard, but not seen. There were no abstract nor semi-abstract terms nor parts of speech. The resulting inability to realise any abstract conception and the tendency to make everything concrete is a principal and salient characteristic of ethnology and primitive religion.111 All actions are judged by their concrete aspect or effects and not by the motives which prompted them, nor the results which they produce. For a Hindu to let a cow die with a rope round its neck is a grave caste offence, apparently because an indignity is thus offered to the sacred animal, but it is no offence to let a cow starve to death. A girl may be married to inanimate objects as already seen, or to an old man or a relative without any intention that she shall live with him as a wife, but simply so that she may be married before reaching puberty. If she goes through the ceremony of marriage she is held to be married. Yet the motive for infant-marriage is held to be that a girl should begin to bear children as soon as she is physically capable of doing so, and such a marriage is useless from this point of view. Some castes who cannot afford to burn a corpse hold a lighted brand to it or kindle a little fire on the grave and consider this equivalent to cremation. Promises are considered as concrete; among some Hindus promises are tied up in knots of cloth, and when they are discharged the knots are untied. Mr. S.C. Roy says of the Oraons: “Contracts are even to this day generally not written but acted. Thus a lease of land is made by the lessor handing over a clod of earth (which symbolises land) to the lessee; a contract of sale of cattle is entered into by handing over to the buyer a few blades of grass (which symbolise so many heads of cattle); a contract of payment of bride-price is made by the bridegroom’s father or other relative handing over a number of baris or small cakes of pulse (which symbolise so many rupees) to the bride’s father or other relative; and a contract of service is made by the mistress of the house anointing the head of the intended servant with oil, and making a present of a few pice, and entertaining him to a feast, thus signifying that he would receive food, lodging and some pay.”112 Thus an abstract agreement is not considered sufficient for a contract; in each case it must be ratified by a concrete act.

Gāyatri or sacred verse personified as a goddess

The divisions of time are considered in a concrete sense. The fortnight or Nakshatra is presided over by its constellation, and this is held to be a nymph or goddess, who controls events during its course. Similarly, as shown in The Golden Bough,113 many kinds of new enterprises should be begun in the fortnight of the waxing moon, not in that of the waning moon. Days are also thought to be concrete and governed by their planets, and from this idea come all the superstitions about lucky and unlucky days. If a day had been from the beginning realised as a simple division of time no such superstitions could exist. Events, so far as they are conceived of, are also considered in a concrete sense. The reason why omens were so often drawn from birds114 is perhaps that birds fly from a distance and hence are able to see coming events on their way; and the hare and donkey were important animals of augury, perhaps because, on account of their long ears, they were credited with abnormally acute hearing, which would enable them to hear the sound of coming events before ordinary people. The proverb ‘Coming events cast their shadows before,’ appears to be a survival of this mode of belief, as it is obvious that that which has no substance cannot cast a shadow.

The whole category of superstitions about the evil eye arises from the belief that the glance of the eye is a concrete thing which strikes the person or object towards which it is directed like a dart. The theory that the injury is caused through the malice or envy of the person casting the evil eye seems to be derivative and explanatory. If a stranger’s glance falls on the food of a Rāmānuji Brāhman while it is being cooked, the food becomes polluted and must be buried in the ground. Here it is clear that the glance of the eye is equivalent to real contact of some part of the stranger’s body, which would pollute the food. In asking for leave in order to nurse his brother who was seriously ill but could obtain no advantage from medical treatment, a Hindu clerk explained that the sick man had been pierced by the evil glance of some woman.

57. Words and names concrete

Similarly words were considered to have a concrete force, so that the mere repetition of words produced an effect analogous to their sense. The purely mechanical repetition of prayers was held to be a virtuous act, and this idea was carried to the most absurd length in the Buddhist’s praying-wheel, where merit was acquired by causing the wheel with prayers inscribed on its surface to revolve in a waterfall. The wearing of strips of paper, containing sacred texts, as amulets on the body is based on this belief, and some Muhammadans will wash off the ink from paper containing a verse of the Korān and drink the mixture under the impression that it will do them good. Here the belief in the concrete virtue and substance of the written word is very clear. The Hindus think that the continued repetition of the Gayatri or sacred prayer to the sun is a means of acquiring virtue, and the prayer is personified as a goddess. The enunciation of the sacred syllable Aum or Om is supposed to have the most powerful results. Homer’s phrase ‘winged words’ perhaps recalls the period when the words were considered as physical entities which actually travelled through the air from the speaker to the hearer and were called winged because they went so fast. A Korku clan has the name lobo which means a piece of cloth. But the word lobo also signifies ‘to leak.’ If a person says a sentence containing the word lobo in either signification before a member of the clan while he is eating, he will throw away the food before him as if it were contaminated and prepare a meal afresh. Here it is clear that the Korku pays no regard to the sense but solely to the word or sound. This belief in the concrete force of words has had the most important effects both in law and religion. The earliest codes of law were held to be commands of the god and claimed obedience on this ground. The binding force of the law rested in the words and not in the sense because the words were held to be those of the god and to partake of his divine nature. In ancient Rome the citizen had to take care to know the words of the law and to state them exactly. If he used one wrong word the law gave him no assistance. “Gaius tells a story of a man whose neighbour had cut his vines; the facts were clear; he stated the law applying to his case, but he said vines, whereas the law said trees; he lost his suit.”115 The divine virtue attached to the sacred books of different religions rests on the same belief. Frequently the books themselves are worshipped, and it was held that they could not be translated because the sanctity resided in the actual words and would be lost if other words were used. The efficacy of spells and invocations seems to depend mainly on this belief in the concrete power of words. If one knows an efficacious form of words connoting a state of physical facts and repeats it with the proper accessory conditions, then that state of facts is actually caused to exist; and if one knows a man’s name and calls on him with a form of words efficacious to compel attendance, he has to come and his spirit can similarly be summoned from the dead. When a Malay wishes to kill an enemy he makes an image of the man, transfixes or otherwise injures it, and buries it on the path over which the enemy will tread. As he buries it with the impression that he will thereby cause the enemy to die and likewise be buried, he says:

It is not I who am burying him,It is Gabriel who is burying him,

and thinks that the repetition of these words produces the state of facts which they denote so that the guilt of the murder is removed from his own shoulders to those of the archangel Gabriel. Similarly when he has killed a deer and wishes to be free from the guilt of his action, or as he calls it to cast out the mischief from the deer, he says:

It is not I who cast out these mischiefs,It is Michael who casts them out.It is not I who cast out these mischiefs,It is Israfel who casts them out,

and so on, freeing himself in the same manner from responsibility for the death of the deer.116 Names also are regarded as concrete. Primitive man could not regard a name as an abstract appellation, but thought of it as part of the person or thing to which it was applied and as containing part of his life, like his hair, spittle and the rest of his body. He would have used names for a long period before he had any word for a name, and his first idea of the name as a part of the substantive body to which it is applied has survived a more correct appreciation. Thus if one knew a person’s name one could injure him by working evil on it and the part of his life contained in it, just as one could injure him through the clippings of his hair, his spittle, clothes or the earth pressed by his foot. This is the reason for the common custom of having two names, one of which, the true name, is kept secret and only used on ceremonial occasions when it is essential, as at a wedding, while the other is employed for everyday life. The latter, not being the man’s true name, does not contain part of his life, and hence there is no harm in letting an enemy know it. Similarly the Hindus think that a child’s name should not be repeated at night, lest an owl might hear it, when this bird could injure the child through its name, just as if it got hold of a piece of cloth worn or soiled by the child. The practice of euphemism rests on this belief, as it was thought that if a person’s name was said and a part of him was thus caused to be present the rest would probably follow. Hence the rule of avoiding the use of the names of persons or things of which one does not desire the presence. Thus Sir E.B. Tylor says: “The Dayak will not speak of the smallpox by name, but will call it ‘The Chief,’ or ‘Jungle leaves,’ or say, ‘Has He left you?’ The euphemism of calling the Furies the Eumenides, or ‘Gracious Ones,’ is the stock illustration of this feeling, and the euphemisms for fairies and for the devil are too familiar to quote.”117 Similarly the name of a god was considered as part of him and hence partaking of his divine nature. It was thus so potent that it could not be mentioned on ordinary occasions or by common persons. Allah is only an epithet for the name of God among the Muhammadans and his True or Great Name is secret. Those who know it have power over all created things. Clearly then the divine power is held to reside in the name itself. The concealment of the name of the tutelary deity of Rome, for divulging which Valerius Soranus is said to have paid the penalty of death, is a case in point.118 Sir E.B. Tylor gives many other interesting examples of the above ideas and points out the connection clearly existing in the savage mind between the name and the object to which it is applied. The Muhammadans think that Solomon’s name is very efficacious for casting out devils and evil spirits. The practice of naming children after gods or by the epithets or titles applied to the divine being, or after the names of saints, appears to be due to the belief that such names, by reason of their association with the god or saint, acquire a part of his divine life and virtue, which when given to children the names will in turn convey to them.119 On the other hand, when a Hindu mother is afraid lest her child may die, she sometimes gives it an opprobrious name as dirt, rubbish, sweepings, or sold for one or two cowries, so that the evil spirits who take the lives of children may be deceived by the name and think that such a valueless child is not worth having. The voice was also held to be concrete. The position of the Roman tribune was peculiar, as he was not a magistrate chosen by divine authority and hence could not summon people to his court; but the tribune had been dedicated to the city gods, and his person was sacrosanct. He could therefore lay hands on a man, and once the tribune touched him, the man was held to be in the magistrate’s power, and bound to obey him. This rule extended even to those who were within hearing of his voice; any one, even a patrician or consul, who heard the tribune’s voice was compelled to obey him. In this case it is clear that the voice and spoken words were held to be concrete, and to share in the sanctity attaching to the body.120

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1

Indian Caste, p. 12.

2

Dr. Wilson’s Indian Caste (Times Press and Messrs. Blackwood), 1875, p. 88, quoting from Rig-Veda.

3

Dr. Wilson’s Indian Caste (Times Press and Messrs. Blackwood), 1875, p. 88, quoting from Rig-Veda.

4

Rig-Veda, i. 11. Wilson, ibidem, p. 94.

5

Wilson, ibidem, p. 99.

6

Manu, ii. 17, 24.

7

Barbarians or foreigners.

8

See Burnett and Hopkins, Ordinances of Manu, s.v.

9

Wilson, Indian Caste, p. 170, quoting Weber, Indische Studien, i. 170.

10

A collection of rules for sacrifices and other rites, coming between the Vedas and the law-books, and dated by Max Müller between 600–200 B.C.

11

Wilson, Indian Caste, p. 182.

12

Wilson, p. 184, quoting from Shrauta-sūtra of Kātyayana, 1. 1. 6.

13

Manu, iv. 99; iii. 178.

14

Wilson, pp. 421, 422.

15

Wilson, p. 187, quoting from Hiranyakeshi Sūtra.

16

See article Mehtar in text.

17

Wilson, p. 363, quoting from Smriti of Angira.

18

Wilson, Indian Caste, p. 195, from Hiranyakeshi Sūtra.

19

Manu, viii. 417.

20

Wilson, p. 260, quoting Mahābhārata, viii. 1367 et seq.

21

Wilson, p. 403, quoting from Vyavahāra Mayūkha.

22

Wilson, p. 400, from Parāshara Smriti.

23

Wilson, p. 140, quoting from Atharva Veda, iv. 32. 1.

24

Wilson, p. 211.

25

Wilson, Indian Caste, referring to Ptolemy, vii. 1. 61 and vi. 120. 3.

26

Wilson, pp. 113, 114.

27

See for the impure castes para. 40 post.

28

The word “aboriginal” is used here for convenience and not as conveying any assertion as to the origin of the pre-Aryan population.

29

Bombay Gazetteer, Pārsis of Gujarāt, p. 213.

30

Rig-Veda, 6. 3. 16, quoted by Wilson, Indian Caste, p. 110.

31

Wilson, p. 109.

32

Monier-Williams, Sanskrit Dictionary, pointed out by Mr. Crooke.

33

Quoted by Wilson, p. 209. It would seem probable, however, that the Vaishyas must themselves have formed the rank and file of the fighting force, at least in the early period.

34

Manu, i. 90.

35

Wilson, Indian Caste, p. 193, quoting from Hiranyakeshi Sūtra.

36

Wilson, p. 260, quoting Mahābhārata, viii. 1367 et seq.

37

Mahābhārata, xii. 2749 et seq.

38

List of classes of Indian society given in the Purusha-Medha of the White Yajur-Veda, Wilson, pp. 126–135.

39

Manu, viii. 113.

40

Hopkin’s and Burnett’s Code of Manu, x. 64, 65, and footnotes.

41

Mahābhārata, xiii. 2510 et. seq., quoted by Wilson, p. 272.

42

Manu, ix. 149, 157.

43

Manu indeed declares that such children could not be initiated (x. 68), but it is clear that they must, as a matter of fact, have been capable of initiation or they could not possibly have been married in the father’s caste.

44

See article on Brāhman for some further details.

45

Wilson, Indian Caste, i. 440, quoting Brahma Vaivarrta Purāna.

46

See article Bhāt for further discussion of this point.

47

Dolichos uniflorus.

48

See article Jāt for a more detailed discussion of their status.

49

Tribes and Castes of Bengal, art. Khandait.

50

Proprietors of large landed estates.

51

See article on Kunbi, para. 1.

52

Village Communities, p. 127.

53

History of the Marāthas, vol. i. p. 25.

54

Village Communities, pp. 226, 227.

55

The Aryan Household, ed. 1891, p. 190.

56

Ibidem, p. 228. Professor Hearn followed Sir Henry Maine in thinking that the clan was an expansion of the patriarchal joint family; but the reasons against this view are given subsequently.

57

Memoir of Central India, vol. ii. p. 22.

58

La Cité antique, 21st ed. pp. 66, 68.

59

La Cité antique, 21 st ed. pp. 66, 68.

60

Nigeria, quoted in Saturday Review, 6th April 1912.

61

Religion of the Semites, p. 96.

62

See article Sunār for a discussion of the sanctity of gold and silver, and the ornaments made from them.

63

Michelia champaka, a variety of the jack or bread-fruit tree.

64

See article Darzi for further discussion of the use of sewn clothes in India.

65

See articles on Bhulia, Panka, Kori and Julāha.

66

Traill’s Account of Kumaon, Asiatic Researches, vol. xvi. (1828) p. 213.

67

Tribes and Castes of Bengal, art. Bāri.

68

Pointed out by Mr. Crooke.

69

The Marāthi name for the god Hanumān.

70

Linguistic Survey, vol. iv., Munda and Dravidian Languages, p. 7.

71

Acacia catechu.

72

See article on Gond.

73

Linguistic Survey, p. 15.

74

Introduction to The Mundas and their Country, p. 9.

75

Linguistic Survey, p. 277.

76

See for this the article on Kol, from which the above passage is abridged.

77

Bombay Gazetteer, vol. xii. p. 175.

78

Cochin Census Report, 1901, quoted in Sir H. Risley’s Peoples of India, 2nd ed. p. 115.