Thirty Years' View (Vol. I of 2)

"In bringing this great question before the American people, Mr. B. should consider himself as addressing the calm intelligence of an enlightened community. He believed the body of the American people to be the most enlightened community upon earth; and, without the least disparagement to the present Senate, he must be permitted to believe that many such Senates might be drawn from the ranks of the people, and still leave no dearth of intelligence behind. To such a community – in an appeal, on a great question of constitutional law, to the understandings of such a people – declamation, passion, epithets, opprobrious language, would stand for nothing. They would float, harmless and unheeded, through the empty air, and strike in vain upon the ear of a sober and dispassionate tribunal. Indignation, real or affected; wrath, however hot; fury, however enraged; asseverations, however violent; denunciation, however furious; will avail nothing. Facts – inexorable facts – are all that will be attended to; reason, calm and self-possessed, is all that will be listened to. An intelligent tribunal will exact the respect of an address to their understandings; and he that wishes to be heard in this great question, or being heard, would wish to be heeded, will have occasion to be clear and correct in his facts; close and perspicuous in his application of law; fair and candid in his conclusions and inferences; temperate and decorous in his language; and scrupulously free from every taint of vengeance and malice. Solemnly impressed with the truth of all these convictions, it was the intention of himself (Mr. B.), whatever the example or the provocation might be – never to forget his place, his subject, his audience, and his object – never to forget that he was speaking in the American Senate, on a question of violated constitution and outraged individual right, to an audience comprehending the whole body of the American people, and for the purpose of obtaining a righteous decision from the calm and sober judgment of a high-minded, intelligent, and patriotic community.

"The question immediately before the Senate was one of minor consequence; it might be called a question of small import, except for the effect which the decision might have upon the Senate itself. In that point of view, it might be a question of some moment; for, without reference to individuals, it was essential to the cause of free governments, that every department of the government, the Senate inclusive, should so act as to preserve to itself the respect and the confidence of the country. The immediate question was, upon the rejection of the President's message. It was moved to reject it – to reject it, not after it was considered, but before it was considered! and thus to tell the American people that their President shall not be heard – should not be allowed to plead his defence – in the presence of the body that condemned him – neither before the condemnation, nor after it! This is the motion: and certainly no enemy to the Senate could wish it to miscarry. The President, in the conclusion of his message, has respectfully requested that his defence might be entered upon the Journal of the Senate – upon that same Journal which contains the record of his conviction. This is the request of the President. Will the Senate deny it? Will they refuse this act of sheer justice and common decency? Will they go further, and not only refuse to place it on the Journal, but refuse even to suffer it to remain in the Senate? Will they refuse to permit it to remain on file, but send it back, or throw it out of doors, without condescending to reply to it? For that is the exact import of the motion now made! Will senators exhaust their minds, and their bodies also, in loading this very communication with epithets, and then say that it shall not be received? Will they receive memorials, resolutions, essays, from all that choose to abuse the President, and not receive a word of defence from him? Will they continue the spectacle which had been presented here for three months – a daily presentation of attacks upon the President from all that choose to attack him, young and old, boys and men – attacks echoing the very sound of this resolution, and which are not only received and filed here, but printed, which, possibly, the twenty-six could not unite here, nor go to trial upon any where! He remarked, in the third place, upon the effect produced in the character of the resolution, and affirmed that it was nothing. He said that the same charge ran through all three. They all three imputed to the President a violation of the constitution and laws of the country – of that constitution which he was sworn to support, and of those laws which he was not only bound to observe himself, but to cause to be faithfully observed by all others.

"A violation of the constitution and of the laws, Mr. B. said, were not abstractions and metaphysical subtleties. They must relate to persons or things. The violations cannot rest in the air; they must affix themselves to men or to property; they must connect themselves with the transactions of real life. They cannot be ideal and contemplative. In omitting the specifications relative to the dismission of one Secretary of the Treasury, and the appointment of another, what other specifications were adopted or substituted? Certainly none! What others were mentally intended? Surely none! What others were suggested? Certainly none! The general charge then rests upon the same specification; and so completely is this the fact, that no supporter of the resolutions has thought it necessary to make the least alteration in his speeches which supported the original resolution, or to say a single additional word in favor of the altered resolution as finally passed. The omission of the specification is then an omission of form and not of substance; it is a change of words and not of things; and the substitution of a derogation of the laws and constitution, for dangerous to the liberties of the people, is a still more flagrant instance of change of words without change of things. It is tautologous and nonsensical. It adds nothing to the general charge, and takes nothing from it. It neither explains it nor qualifies it. In the technical sense it is absurd; for it is not the case of a statute in derogation of the common law, to wit, repealing a part of it; in the common parlance understanding, it is ridiculous, for the President is not even charged with defaming the constitution and the laws; and, if he was so charged, it would present a curious trial of scandalum magnatum for the American Senate to engage in. No! said Mr. B., this derogation clause is an expletion! It is put in to fill up! The regular impeaching clause of dangerous to the liberties of the people, had to be taken out. There was danger, not in the people certainly, but to the character of the resolution, if it staid in. It identified that resolution as an impeachment, and, therefore, constituted a piece of internal evidence which it was necessary to withdraw; but in withdrawing which, the character of the resolution was not altered. The charge for violating the laws and the constitution still stood; and the substituted clause was nothing but a stopper to a vacuum – additional sound without additional sense, to fill up a blank and round off a sentence.

"After showing the impeaching character of the Senate's resolution, from its own internal evidence, Mr. B. had recourse to another description of evidence, scarcely inferior to the resolutions themselves, in the authentic interpretations of their meaning. He alluded to the speeches made in support of them, and which had resounded in this chamber for three months, and were now circulating all over the country in every variety of newspaper and pamphlet form. These speeches were made by the friends of the resolution to procure its adoption here, and to justify its adoption before the country. Let the country then read, let the people read, what has been sent to them for the purpose of justifying these resolutions which they are now to try! They will find them to be in the character of prosecution pleadings against an accused man, on his trial for the commission of great crimes! Let them look over these speeches, and mark the passages; they will find language ransacked, history rummaged, to find words sufficiently strong, and examples sufficiently odious, to paint and exemplify the enormity of the crime of which the President was alleged to be guilty. After reading these passages, let any one doubt, if he can, as to the character of the resolution which was adopted. Let him doubt, if he can, of the impeachable nature of the offence which was charged upon the President. Let him doubt, if he can, that every Senator who voted for that resolution, voted the President to be guilty of an impeachable offence – an offence, for the trial of which this Senate is the appointed tribunal – an offence which it will be the immediate duty of the House of Representatives to bring before the Senate, in a formal impeachment, unless they disbelieve in the truth and justice of the resolution which has been adopted.

"Mr. B. said there were three characters in which the Senate could act; and every time it acted it necessarily did so in one or the other of these characters. It possessed executive, legislative, and judicial characters. As a part of the executive, it acted on treaties and nominations to office; as a part of the legislative, it assisted in making laws; as a judicial tribunal, it decided impeachments. Now, in which of these characters did the Senate act when it adopted the resolution in question? Not in its executive character, it will be admitted; not in its legislative character, it will be proved: for the resolution was, in its nature, wholly foreign to legislation. It was directed, not to the formation of a law, but to the condemnation of the President. It was to condemn him for dismissing one Secretary, because he would not do a thing, and appointing another that he might do it; and certainly this was not matter for legislation; for Mr. Duane could not be restored by law, nor Mr. Taney be put out by law. It was to convict the President of violating the constitution and the laws; and surely these infractions are not to be amended by laws, but avenged by trial and punishment. The very nature of the resolution proves it to be foreign to all legislation; its form proves the same thing; for it is not joint, to require the action of the House of Representatives, and thus ripen into law; nor is it followed by an instruction to a committee to report a bill in conformity to it. No such instruction could even now be added without committing an absurdity of the most ridiculous character. There was another resolution, with which this must not be confounded, and upon which an instruction to a committee might have been bottomed; it was the resolution which declared the Secretary's reasons for removing the deposits to be insufficient and unsatisfactory; but no such instruction has been bottomed even upon that resolution; so that it is evident that no legislation of any kind was intended to follow either resolution, even that to which legislation might have been appropriate, much less that to which it would have been an absurdity. Four months have elapsed since the resolutions were brought in. In all that time, there has been no attempt to found a legislative act upon either of them; and it is too late now to assume that the one which, in its nature and in its form, is wholly foreign to legislation, is a legislative act, and adopted by the Senate in its legislative character. No! This resolution is judicial; it is a judgment pronounced upon an imputed offence; it is the declared sense of a majority of the Senate, of the guilt of the President of a high crime and misdemeanor. It is, in substance, an impeachment – an impeachment in violation of all the forms prescribed by the constitution – in violation of the privileges of the House of Representatives – in subversion of the rights of the accused, and the record of which ought to be expunged from the Journal of the Senate.

"Mr. B. said the selection of a tribunal for the trial of impeachments was felt, by the convention which framed the constitution, as one of the most delicate and difficult tasks which they had to perform. Those great men were well read in history, both ancient and modern, and knew that the impeaching power – the usual mode for trying political men for political offences – was often an engine for the gratification of factious and ambitious feelings. An impeachment was well known to be the beaten road for running down a hated or successful political rival. After great deliberation – after weighing all the tribunals, even that of the Supreme Court – the Senate of the United States was fixed upon as the body which, from its constitution, would be the most impartial, neutral, and equitable, that could be selected, and, with the check of a previous inquisition, and presentment of charges by the House of Representatives, would be the safest tribunal to which could be confided a power so great in itself, and so susceptible of being abused. The Senate was selected; and to show that he had not overstated the difficulties of the convention in making the selection, he would take leave to read a passage from a work which was canonical on this subject, and from an article in that work which was written by the gentleman whose authority would have most weight on this occasion. He spoke of the Federalist, and of the article written by General Hamilton on the impeaching power:

"'A well-constituted court for the trial of impeachments is an object not more to be desired than difficult to be obtained, in a government wholly elective. The subjects of its jurisdiction are those offences which proceed from the misconduct of public men; or, in other words, from the abuse or violation of some public trust. They are of a nature which may, with peculiar propriety, be denominated political, as they relate chiefly to injuries done immediately to society itself. The prosecution of them, for this reason, will seldom fail to agitate the passions of the whole community, and to divide it into parties more or less friendly or inimical to the accused. In many cases, it will connect itself with the pre-existing factions, and will enlist all their animosities, partialities, influence, and interest, on one side or on the other; and, in such cases, there will always be the greatest danger that the decision will be regulated more by the comparative strength of parties, than by the real demonstrations of innocence or guilt. The delicacy and magnitude of a trust which so deeply concerns the political reputation and existence of every man engaged in the administration of public affairs, speak for themselves. The difficulty of placing it rightly in a government resting entirely on the basis of periodical elections, will as readily be perceived, when it is considered that the most conspicuous characters in it will, from that circumstance, be too often the leaders or the tools of the most cunning or the most numerous faction; and, on this account, can hardly be expected to possess the requisite neutrality towards those whose conduct may be the subject of scrutiny.

"'The division of the powers of impeachment between the two branches of the legislature, assigning to one the right of accusing, to the other the right of trying, avoids the inconvenience of making the same persons both accusers and judges; and guards against the danger of persecution from the prevalency of a factious spirit in either of those branches.'

"Mr. B. said there was much matter for elucidation of the present object of discussion in the extract which he had read. Its definition of an impeachable offence covered the identical charge which was contained in the resolution adopted by the Senate against the President. The offence charged upon him possessed every feature of the impeachment defined by General Hamilton. It imputes misconduct to a public man, for the abuse and violation of a public trust. The discussion of the charge has agitated the passions of the whole community; it has divided the people into parties, some friendly, some inimical, to the accused; it has connected itself with the pre-existing parties, enlisting the whole of the opposition parties under one banner, and calling forth all their animosities – all their partialities – all their influence – all their interest; and, what was not foreseen by General Hamilton, it has called forth the tremendous moneyed power, and the pervading organization of a great moneyed power, wielding a mass of forty millions of money, and sixty millions of debt; wielding the whole in aid and support of this charge upon the President, and working the double battery of seduction, on one hand, and oppression on the other, to put down the man against whom it is directed! This is what General Hamilton did not foresee; but the next feature in the picture he did foresee, and most accurately describe, as it is now seen by us all. He said that the decision of these impeachments would often be regulated more by the comparative strength of parties than by the guilt or innocence of the accused. How prophetic! Look to the memorials, resolutions, and petitions, sent in here to criminate the President, so clearly marked by a party line, that when an exception occurs, it is made the special subject of public remark. Look at the vote in the Senate, upon the adoption of the resolution, also as clearly defined by a party line as any party question can ever be expected to be.

"To guard the most conspicuous characters from being persecuted – Mr. B. said he was using the language of General Hamilton – to guard the most conspicuous characters from being persecuted by the leaders or the tools of the most cunning or the most numerous faction – the convention had placed the power of trying impeachments, not in the Supreme Court, not even in a body of select judges chosen for the occasion, but in the Senate of the United States, and not even in them without an intervening check to the abuse of that power, by associating the House of Representatives, and forbidding the Senate to proceed against any officer until that grand inquest of the nation should demand his trial. How far fortunate, or otherwise, the convention may have been in the selection of its tribunal for the trial of impeachments, it was not for him, Mr. B., to say. It was not for him to say how far the requisite neutrality towards those whose conduct may be under scrutiny, may be found, or has been found, in this body. But he must take leave to say, that if a public man may be virtually impeached – actually condemned by the Senate of an impeachable offence, without the intervention of the House of Representatives, then has the constitution failed at one of its most vital points and a ready means found for doing a thing which had filled other countries with persecution, faction, and violence, and which it was intended should never be done here.

"Mr. B. called upon the Senate to recollect what was the feature in the famous court of the Star Chamber, which rendered that court the most odious that ever sat in England. It was not the mass of its enormities – great as they were – for the regular tribunals which yet existed, exceeded that court, both in the mass and in the atrocity of their crimes and oppressions. The regular courts in the compass of a single reign – that of James the Second; a single judge, in a single riding – Jeffries, on the Western Circuit – surpassed all the enormities of the Star Chamber, in the whole course of its existence. What then rendered that court so intolerably odious to the English people? Sir, said Mr. B., it was because that court had no grand jury – because it proceeded without presentment, without indictment – upon information alone – and thus got at its victims without the intervention, without the restraint, of an accusing body. This is the feature which sunk the Star Chamber in England. It is the feature which no criminal tribunal in this America is allowed to possess. The most inconsiderable offender, in any State of the Union, must be charged by a grand jury before he can be tried by the court. In this Senate, sitting as a high court of impeachment, a charge must first be presented by the House of Representatives, sitting as the grand inquest of the nation. But if the Senate can proceed, without the intervention of this grand inquest, wherein is it to differ from the Star Chamber, except in the mere execution of its decrees? And what other execution is now required for delinquent public men, than the force of public opinion? No! said Mr. B., we live in an age when public opinion over public men, is omnipotent and irreversible! – when public sentiment annihilates a public man more effectually than the scaffold. To this new and omnipotent tribunal, all the public men of Europe and America are now happily subject. The fiat of public opinion has superseded the axe of the executioner. Struck by that opinion, kings and emperors in Europe, and the highest functionaries among ourselves, fall powerless from the political stage, and wander, while their bodies live, as shadows and phantoms over the land. Should he give examples? It might be invidious; yet all would recollect an eminent example of a citizen, once sitting at the head of this Senate, afterwards falling under a judicial prosecution, from which he escaped untouched by the sword of the law, yet that eminent citizen was more utterly annihilated by public opinion, than any execution of a capital sentence could ever have accomplished upon his name.

"What occasion then has the Senate, sitting as a court of impeachment, for the power of execution? The only effect of a regular impeachment now, is to remove from office, and disqualification for office. An irregular impeachment will be tantamount to removal and disqualification, if the justice of the sentence is confided in by the people. If this condemnation of the President had been pronounced in the first term of his administration, and the people had believed in the truth and justice of the sentence, certainly President Jackson would not have been elected a second time; and every object that a political rival, or a political party, could have wished from his removal from office, and disqualification for office, would have been accomplished. Disqualification for office – loss of public favor – political death – is now the object of political rivalship; and all this can be accomplished by an informal, as well as by a formal impeachment, if the sentence is only confided in by the people. If the people believed that the President has violated the constitution and the laws, he ceases to be the object of their respect and their confidence; he loses their favor; he dies a political death; and that this might be the object of the resolution, Mr. B. would leave to the determination of those who should read the speeches which were delivered in support of the measure, and which would constitute a public and lasting monument of the temper in which the resolution was presented, and the object intended to be accomplished by it.

"It was in vain to say there could be no object, at this time, in annihilating the political influence of President Jackson, and killing him off as a public man, with a senatorial conviction for violating the laws and constitution of the country. Such an assertion, if ventured upon by any one, would stand contradicted by facts, of which Europe and America are witnesses. Does he not stand between the country and the bank? Is he not proclaimed the sole obstacle to the recharter of the bank; and in its recharter is there not wrapped up the destinies of a political party, now panting for power? Remove this sole obstacle – annihilate its influence – kill off President Jackson with a sentence of condemnation for a high crime and misdemeanor, and the charter of the bank will be renewed, and in its renewal, a political party, now thundering at the gates of the capitol, will leap into power. Here then is an object for desiring the extinction of the political influence of President Jackson! An object large enough to be seen by all America! and attractive enough to enlist the combined interest of a great moneyed power, and of a great political party."

Thus spoke Mr. Benton; but the debate on the protest went on; and the motion of Mr. Poindexter, digested into four different propositions, after undergoing repeated modifications upon consultations among its friends, and after much acrimony on both sides, was adopted by the fixed majority of twenty-seven. In voting that the protest was a breach of the privileges of the Senate, that body virtually affirmed the impeachment character of the condemnatory resolutions, and involved itself in the predicament of voting an impeachable matter without observing a single rule for the conduct of impeachments. The protest placed it in a dilemma. It averred the Senate's judgment to be without authority – without any warrant in the constitution – any right in the body to pronounce it. To receive that protest, and enter it on the journal, was to record a strong evidence against themselves; to reject it as a breach of privilege was to claim for their proceeding the immunity of a regular and constitutional act; and as the proceeding was on criminal matter, amounting to a high crime and misdemeanor, on which matter the Senate could only act in its judicial capacity; therefore it had to claim the immunity that would belong to it in that capacity; and assume a violation of privilege. Certainly if the Senate had tried an impeachment in due form, the protest, impeaching its justice, might have been a breach of privilege; but the Senate had no privilege to vote an impeachable matter without a regular impeachment; and therefore it was no breach of privilege to impugn the act which they had no privilege to commit.