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Thirty Years' View (Vol. I of 2)
Thirty Years' View (Vol. I of 2)полная версия

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Thirty Years' View (Vol. I of 2)

Язык: Английский
Год издания: 2017
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2. The hostility of the President to the bank. This assertion, said Mr. B., so incontinently reiterated by the president of the bank, is taken up and repeated by our Finance Committee, to whose report he was now paying an instalment of those respects which he had promised them. This assertion, so far as the bank and the committee are concerned in making it is an assertion without evidence, and, so far as the facts are concerned, is an assertion against evidence. If there is any evidence of the bank or the committee to support this assertion, in the forty pages of the report, or the three hundred pages of the appendix, the four members of the Finance Committee can produce it when they come to reply. That there was evidence to contradict it, he was now ready to show. This evidence consisted in four or five public and prominent facts, which he would now mention, and in other circumstances, which he would show hereafter. The first was the fact which he mentioned when this report was first read on the 18th of December last, namely, that President Jackson had nominated Mr. Biddle at the head of the government directors, and thereby indicated him for the presidency of the bank, for three successive years after this hostility was supposed to have commenced. The second was, that the President had never ordered a scire facias to issue against the bank to vacate its charter, which he has the right, under the twenty-third section of the charter, to do, whenever he believed the charter to be violated. The third, that during many years, he has never required his Secretaries of the Treasury to stop the governmental receipt of the branch bank drafts, although his own mind upon their illegality had been made up for several years past. The fourth, that after all the clamor – all the invocations upon heaven and earth against the tyranny of removing the deposits – those deposits have never happened to be quite entirely removed! An average of near four millions of dollars of public money has remained in the hands of the bank for each month, from the 1st of October, 1833, to the 1st of January, 1835, inclusively! embracing the entire period from the time the order was to take effect against depositing in the Bank of the United States down to the commencement of the present year! So far are the deposits from being quite entirely removed, as the public are led to believe, that, at the distance of fifteen months from the time the order for the removal began to take effect, there remained in the hands of the bank the large sum of three millions eight hundred and seventy-eight thousand nine hundred and fifty-one dollars and ninety-seven cents, according to her own showing in her monthly statements. That President Jackson is, and always has been, opposed to the existence of the bank, is a fact as true as it is honorable to him; that he is hostile to it, in the vindictive and revengeful sense of the phrase, is an assertion, Mr. B. would take the liberty to repeat, without evidence, so far as he could see into the proofs of the committee, and against evidence, to the full extent of all the testimony within his view. Far from indulging in revengeful resentment against the bank, he has been patient, indulgent, and forebearing towards it, to a degree hardly compatible with his duty to his country, and with his constitutional supervision over the faithful execution of the laws; to a degree which has drawn upon him, as a deduction from his own conduct, an argument in favor of the legality of this very branch bank currency, on the part of this very committee, as may be seen in their report. Again, the very circumstance on which this charge of hostility rests in the two-and-twenty letters of Mr. Biddle, proves it to be untrue: for the stoppage of the drafts, understood to be in contemplation, was not in contemplation, and did not take place until the pecuniary concerns of the country were tranquil and prosperous; and when it did thus take place, the president of the bank declared it to have been always the exclusive right of the government to do it, in which the bank had no interest, and for which it cared nothing. No, said Mr. B., the President has opposed the recharter of the bank; he has not attacked its present charter; he has opposed its future, not its present existence; and those who characterize this opposition to a future charter as attacking the bank, and destroying the bank, must admit that they advocate the hereditary right of the bank to a new charter after the old one is out; and that they deny to a public man the right of opposing that hereditary claim.

3. That there was no necessity for this third curtailment ordered in January. Mr. B. said, to have a full conception of the truth of this position, it was proper to recollect that the bank made its first curtailment in August, when the appointment of an agent to arrange with the deposit banks announced the fact that the Bank of the United States was soon to cease to be the depository of public moneys. The reduction under that first curtailment was $4,066,000. The second was in October, and under that order for curtailment the reduction was $5,825,000. The whole reduction, then, consequent upon the expected and actual removal of deposits, was $9,891,000. At the same time the whole amount of deposits on the first day of October, the day for the removal, or rather for the cessation to deposit in the United States Bank to take effect, was $9,868,435; and on the first day of February, 1834, when the third curtailment was ordered, there were still $3,066,561 of these deposits on hand, and have remained on hand to near that amount ever since; so that the bank in the two first curtailments, accomplished between August and January, had actually curtailed to the whole amount, and to the exact amount, upon precise calculation, of the amount of deposits on hand on the first of October; and still had, on the first of January, a fraction over three millions of the deposits in its possession. This simple statement of sums and dates shows that there was no necessity for ordering a further reduction of $3,320,000 in January, as the bank had already curtailed to the whole amount of the deposits, and $22,500 over. Nor did the bank put the third curtailment upon that ground, but upon the new measures in contemplation; thus leaving her advocates every where still to attribute the pressure created by the third curtailment to the old cause of the removal of the deposits. This simple statement of facts is sufficient to show that this third curtailment was unnecessary. What confirms that view, is that the bank remitted to Europe, as fast as it was collected, the whole amount of the curtailment, and $105,000 over; there to lie idle until she could raise the foreign exchange to eight per cent. above par; which she had sunk to five per cent. below par, and thus make two sets of profits out of one operation in distressing and pressing the country.

4. No excuse for doubling the rates of exchange, breaking up the exchange business in the West, forbidding the branch at New Orleans to purchase a single bill on the West, and concentrating the collection of exchange on the four great commercial cities. For this, Mr. B. said, no apology, no excuse, no justification, was offered by the bank. The act stood unjustified and unjustifiable. The bank itself has shrunk from the attempt to justify it; our committee, in that report of which the bank proclaims itself to be proud, gives no opinion in its brief notice of a few lines upon this transaction; but leaves it to the Senate to pronounce upon its wisdom and necessity! The committee, Mr. B. said, had failed in their duty to their country by the manner in which they had veiled this affair of the exchanges in a few lines; and then blinked the question of its enormity, by referring it to the judgment of the Senate. He made the same remark upon the contemporaneous measure of the third curtailment; and called on the author of the report [Mr. Tyler] to defend his report, and to defend the conduct of the bank now, if he could; and requested him to receive all this part of his speech as a further instalment paid of what was due to that report on the bank.

5. That the curtailment and exchange regulations of January were political and revolutionary, and connect themselves with the contemporaneous proceedings of the Senate for the condemnation of the President. That this curtailment, and these regulations were wanton and wicked, was a proposition, Mr. B. said, which resulted as a logical conclusion from what had been already shown, namely, that they were causeless and unnecessary, and done upon pretexts which have been demonstrated to be false. That they were political and revolutionary, and connected with the proceedings in the Senate for the condemnation of the President, he would now prove. In the exhibition of this proof, the first thing to be looked to is the chronology of the events – the time at which the bank made this third curtailment, and sent forth these exchange regulations – and the time at which the Senate carried on the proceeding against the President. Viewed under this aspect, the two movements are not only connected, but identical and inseparable. The time for the condemnation of the President covers the period from the 25th of December, 1833, to the 28th of March, 1834; the bank movement is included in the same period; the orders for the pressure were issued from the 21st of January to the 1st of February, and were to accomplish their effect in the month of March, and by the first of April; except in one place, where, for a reason which will be shown at a proper time, the accomplishment of the effect was protracted till the 10th day of April. These, Mr. B. said, were the dates of issuing the orders and accomplishing their effect; the date of the adoption of the resolution in the bank for this movement is not given in the report, but must have been, in the nature of things, anterior to the issue of the orders; it must have been some days before the issue of the orders; and was, in all probability, a few days after the commencement of the movement in the Senate against the President. The next point of connection, Mr. B. said, was in the subject matter; and here it was necessary to recur to the original form, and to the second form, of the resolution for the condemnation of the President. In the first, or primordial form, the resolution was expressly connected with the cause of the bank. It was, for dismissing Mr. Duane because he would not remove the deposits, and appointing Mr. Taney because he would remove them. In the second form of the resolution – that form which naturalists would call its aurelia, or chrysalis state – the phraseology of the connection was varied, but still the connection was retained and expressed. The names of Mr. Duane and Mr. Taney were dropped; and the removal of the deposits upon his own responsibility, was the alleged offence of the President. In its third and ultimate transformation, all allusion to the bank was dropped, and the vague term "revenue" was substituted; but it was a substitution of phrase only, without any alteration of sense or meaning. The resolution is the same under all its phases. It is still the bank, and Mr. Taney, and Mr. Duane, and the removal of the deposits, which are the things to be understood, though no longer prudent to express. All these substantial objects are veiled, and substituted by the empty phrase "revenue;" which might signify the force bill in South Carolina, and the bank question in Philadelphia! The vagueness of the expression left every gentleman to fight upon his own hook, and to hang his vote upon any mental reservation which could be found in his own mind! and Mr. B. would go before the intelligence of any rational man with the declaration that the connection between the condemnation of the President and the cause of the bank was doubly proved; first by the words of the resolution, and next by the omission of those words. The next point of connection, Mr. B. said, was detected in the times, varied to suit each State, at which the pressure under the curtailment was to reach its maximum; and the manner in which the restrictions upon the sale and purchase of bills of exchange was made to fall exclusively and heavily upon the principal commercial cities, at the moment when most deeply engaged in the purchase and shipment of produce. Thus, in New-York, where the great charter elections were to take place during the first week in April, the curtailment was to reach its maximum pressure on the first day of that month. In Virginia, where the elections are continued throughout the whole month of April, the pressure was not to reach its climax until the tenth day of that month. In Connecticut, where the elections occurred about the first of April, the pressure was to have its last turn of the screw in the month of March. And in these three instances, the only ones in which the elections were depending, the political bearing of the pressure was clear and undeniable. The sympathy in the Senate in the results of those political calculations, was displayed in the exultation which broke out on receiving the news of the elections in Virginia, New-York, and Connecticut – an exultation which broke out into the most extravagant rejoicings over the supposed downfall of the administration. The careful calculation to make the pressure and the exchange regulations fall upon the commercial cities at the moment to injure commerce most, was also visible in the times fixed for each. Thus, in all the western cities, Cincinnati, Louisville, Lexington, Nashville, Pittsburg, Saint Louis, the pressure was to reach its maximum by the first day of March; the shipments of western produce to New Orleans being mostly over by that time; but in New Orleans the pressure was to be continued till the first of April, because the shipping season is protracted there till that month, and thus the produce which left the upper States under the depression of the pressure, was to meet the same pressure upon its arrival in New Orleans; and thus enable the friends of the bank to read their ruined prices of western produce on the floor of this Senate. In Baltimore, the first of March was fixed, which would cover the active business season there. So much, said Mr. B., for the pressure by curtailment; now for the pressure by bills of exchange, and he would take the case of New Orleans first. All the branches in the West, and every where else in the Union, were authorized to purchase bills of exchange at short dates, not exceeding ninety days, on that emporium of the West; so as to increase the demand for money there; at the same time the branch in New Orleans was forbid to purchase a single bill in any part of the valley of the Mississippi. This prohibition was for two purposes; first, to break up exchange; and next, to make money scarce in New Orleans; as, in default of bills of exchange, silver would be shipped, and the shipping of silver would make a pressure upon all the local banks. To help out this operation, Mr. B. said, it must be well and continually remembered that the Bank of the United States itself abducted about one million and a quarter of hard dollars from New Orleans during the period of the pressure there; thus proving that all her affected necessity for curtailment was a false and wicked pretext for the cover of her own political and revolutionary views.

The case of the western branches was next adverted to by Mr. B. Among these, he said, the business of exchange was broken up in toto. The five western branches were forbid to purchase exchange at all; and this tyrannical order was not even veiled with the pretext of an excuse. Upon the North Atlantic cities, Mr. B. said, unlimited authority to all the branches was given to purchase bills, all at short dates, under ninety days; and all intended to become due during the shipping season, and to increase the demand for money while the curtailment was going on, and the screw turning from day to day to lessen the capacity of getting money, and make it more scarce as the demand for it became urgent. Thus were the great commercial cities, New Orleans, New-York, Baltimore, and Philadelphia, subject to a double process of oppression; and that at the precise season of purchasing and shipping crops, so as to make their distress recoil upon the planters and farmers; and all this upon the pretext of new measures understood to be in contemplation. Time again becomes material, said Mr. B. The bank pressure was arranged in January, to reach its climax in March and the first of April; the debate in the Senate for the condemnation of President Jackson, which commenced in the last days of December, was protracted over the whole period of the bank pressure, and reached its consummation at the same time; namely, the 28th day of March. The two movements covered the same period of time, reached their conclusions together, and co-operated in the effect to be produced; and during the three months of this double movement, the Senate chamber resounded daily with the cry that the tyranny and vengeance of the President, and his violation of laws and constitution, had created the whole distress, and struck the nation from a state of Arcadian felicity – from a condition of unparalleled prosperity – to the lowest depth of misery and ruin. And here Mr. B. obtested and besought the Senate to consider the indifference with which the bank treated its friends in the Senate, and the sorrowful contradiction in which they were left to be caught. In the Senate, and all over the country, the friends of the bank were allowed to go on with the old tune, and run upon the wrong scent, of removal of the deposits creating all the distress; while, in the two-and-twenty circular letters dispatched to create this distress, it was not the old measure alone, but the new measures contemplated, which constituted the pretext for this very same distress. Thus, the bank stood upon one pretext, and its friends stood upon another; and for this mortifying contradiction, in which all its friends have become exposed to see their mournful speeches exploded by the bank itself, a just indignation ought now to be felt by all the friends of the bank, who were laying the distress to the removal of the deposits, and daily crying out that nothing could relieve the country but the restoration of the deposits, or the recharter of the bank; while the bank itself was writing to its branches that it was the new measures understood to be in contemplation that was occasioning all the mischief. Mr. B. would close this head with a remark which ought to excite reflections which should never die away; which should be remembered as long as national banks existed, or asked for existence. It was this: That here was a proved case of a national bank availing itself of its organization, and of its power, to send secret orders, upon a false pretext, to every part of the Union, to create distress and panic for the purpose of accomplishing an object of its own; and then publicly and calumniously charging all this mischief on the act of the President for the removal of the deposits. This recollection should warn the country against ever permitting another national bank to repeat a crime of such frightful immorality, and such enormous injury to the business and property of the people. Mr. B. expressed his profound regret that the report of the bank committee was silent upon these dreadful enormities, while so elaborate upon trifles in favor of the bank. He was indignant at the mischief done to private property; the fall in the price of staples, of stocks, and of all real and personal estate; at the ruin of many merchants, and the injury of many citizens, which took place during this hideous season of panic and pressure. He was indignant at the bank for creating it, and still more for its criminal audacity in charging its own conduct upon the President; and he was mortified, profoundly mortified, that all this should have escaped the attention of the Finance Committee, and enabled them to make a report of which the bank, in its official organ, declares itself to be justly proud; which it now has undergoing the usual process of diffusion through the publication of supplemental gazettes; which it openly avers would have insured the recharter if it had come out in time; and to which it now looks for such recharter as soon as President Jackson retires, and the country can be thrown into confusion by the distractions of a presidential election.

Mr. B. now took up another head of evidence to prove the fact that the curtailment and exchange regulations of January were political and revolutionary, and connected with the proceedings of the Senate for the condemnation of the President; and here he would proceed upon evidence drawn from the bank itself. Mr. B. then read extracts from Mr. Biddle's letters of instructions (January 30, 1834) to Joseph Johnson, Esquire, president of the branch bank at Charleston, South Carolina. They were as follows: "With a view to meet the coming crisis in the banking concerns of the country, and especially to provide against new measures of hostility understood to be in contemplation by the executive officers at Washington, a general reduction has been ordered at the several offices, and I have now to ask your particular attention to accomplish it." * * * * "It is as disagreeable to us as it can be to yourselves to impose any restrictions upon the business of the office. But you are perfectly aware of the effort which has been making for some time to prostrate the bank, to which this new measure to which I have alluded will soon be added, unless the projectors become alarmed at it. On the defeat of these attempts to destroy the bank depends, in our deliberate judgment, not merely the pecuniary interests, but the whole free institutions of our country; and our determination is, by even a temporary sacrifice of profit, to place the bank entirety beyond the reach of those who meditate its destruction."

Mr. B. would invoke the deepest attention to this letter. The passages which he had read were not in the circulars addressed at the same time to the other branches. It was confined to this letter, with something similar in one more which he would presently read. The coming crisis in the banking concerns of the country is here shadowed forth, and secretly foretold, three months before it happened; and with good reason, for the prophet of the evil was to assist in fulfilling his prophecy. With this secret prediction, made in January, is to be connected the public predictions contemporaneously made on this floor, and continued till April, when the explosion of some banks in this district was proclaimed as the commencement of the general ruin which was to involve all local banks, and especially the whole safety-fund list of banks, in one universal catastrophe. The Senate would remember all this, and spare him repetitions which must now be heard with pain, though uttered with satisfaction a few months ago. The whole free institutions of our country was the next phrase in the letter to which Mr. B. called attention. He said that in this phrase the political designs of the bank stood revealed; and he averred that this language was identical with that used upon this floor. Here, then, is the secret order of the bank, avowing that the whole free institutions of the country are taken into its holy keeping; and that it was determined to submit to a temporary sacrifice of profit in sustaining the bank, which itself sustains the whole free institutions of the country! What insolence! What audacity! But, said Mr. B., what is here meant by free institutions, was the elections! and the true meaning of Mr. Biddle's letter is, that the bank meant to submit to temporary sacrifices of money to carry the elections, and put down the Jackson administration. No other meaning can be put upon the words; and if there could, there is further proof in reserve to nail the infamous and wicked design upon the bank. Another passage in this letter, Mr. B. would point out, and then proceed to a new piece of evidence. It was the passage which said this new measure will soon be added, unless the projectors become alarmed at it. Now, said Mr. B., take this as you please; either that the projectors did, or did not, become alarmed at their new measure; the fact is clear that no new measure was put in force, and that the bank, in proceeding to act upon that assumption, was inventing and fabricating a pretext to justify the scourge which it was meditating against the country. Dates are here material, said Mr. B. The first letters, founded on these new measures, were dated the 21st of January; and spoke of them as being understood to be in contemplation. This letter to Mr. Johnson, which speaks hypothetically, is dated the 30th of January, being eight days later; in which time the bank had doubtless heard that its understanding about what was in contemplation was all false; and to cover its retreat from having sent a falsehood to two-and-twenty branches, it gives notice that the new measures which were the alleged pretext of panic and pressure upon the country were not to take place, because the projectors had got alarmed. The beautiful idea of the projectors – that is to say, General Jackson, for he is the person intended – becoming alarmed at interdicting the reception of illegal drafts at the treasury, is conjured up as a salvo for the honor of the bank, in making two-and-twenty instances of false assertion. But the panic and pressure orders are not countermanded. They are to go on, although the projectors do become alarmed, and although the new measure be dropped.

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