Thirty Years' View (Vol. I of 2)

"2. That the treaty of amity and commerce, and the treaty of alliance of 1778, as well as the consular convention of 1788, were suspended by the 2d article of the treaty of 1800, and from that time became mere matters for negotiation between the parties at a convenient time; that, therefore, the desire to get rid of these treaties, and of any 'onerous obligations' contained in them, was only the desire to get rid of an obligation to negotiate 'at a convenient time;' and that such a consideration could not have induced the Senate of the United States to expunge that article from the treaty, if thereby that body had supposed it was imposing upon the country a liability to pay to its citizens the sum of five millions of dollars – a sum much larger than France had asked, in money, for a full discharge from the 'onerous obligations' relied upon.

"3. That the treaty of 1800 reserved and provided for certain portions of the claims; that payment, according to such reservations, was made under the treaty of 1803; and that it is at least doubtful whether the payment thus made did not cover all the claims ever admitted, or ever intended to be paid by France; for which reason the expunging of the second article of the treaty of 1800, by the Senate of the United States, in all probability, released nothing which ever had, or which was ever likely to have value.

"Mr. W. said, if he had been successful in establishing either of these positions, there was an end of the claims, and, by consequence, a defeat of the bill.

"The advocates of the bill conceded that two positions must be established, on their part, to sustain it, to wit:

"1. That the claims were valid claims against France, and had never been paid. And

"2. That they were released by the government of the United States for a full and valuable consideration passing to its benefit by means of the release.

"If, then, a state of war had existed, it would not be contended that any claims of this character, not reserved or provided for in the treaty of peace, were valid claims after the ratification of such a treaty. His first proposition, therefore, if sustained, would defeat the bill, by establishing the fact that the claims, if not reserved in the treaty of 1800, were not valid claims.

"The second proposition, if sustained, would establish the fact that, inasmuch as the valuable consideration passing to the United States was alleged to grow out of the 'onerous obligations' in the treaty of amity and commerce, the treaty of alliance, and the consular convention; and inasmuch as these treaties, and all obligations, past, present, or future, 'onerous' or otherwise, growing out of them, were suspended and made inoperative by the second article of the treaty of the 30th of September, 1800, until further negotiation, by the common consent of both powers, should revive them, the Senate of the United States could not have expected, when they expunged this article from the treaty, that, by thus discharging the government from an obligation to negotiate 'at a convenient time,' they were incurring against it a liability of millions; in other words, the discharge of the government from an obligation to negotiate upon any subject 'at a convenient time,' could not have been considered by the Senate of the United States as a good and valuable consideration for the payment of private claims to the amount of five millions of dollars.

"The third proposition, if sustained, would prove that all the claims ever acknowledged, or ever intended to be paid by France, were paid under the treaty of 1803, and that, therefore, as claims never admitted or recognized by France would scarcely be urged as valid claims against her, no valid claims remained; and, consequently, the expunging of the second article of the treaty of the 30th of September, 1800, released nothing which was valid, and nothing remained to be paid by the United States as a liability incurred by that modification of that treaty. Here Mr. W. said he would rest his reasoning as to these three propositions.

"But if the Senate should determine that he had been wrong in them all, and had failed to sustain either, he had still another proposition, which he considered conclusive and unanswerable, as to any valuable consideration for the release of these claims having passed to the United States in consequence of their discharge from the 'onerous obligations' said to have been contained in the former treaties. These 'onerous obligations,' and the only ones of which he had heard any thing in the course of the debate, or of which he had found any thing in the documents, arose under the 17th article of the treaty of amity and commerce, and the 11th article of the treaty of alliance; and, in relation to both, he laid down this broad proposition, which would be fully sustained by the treaties themselves, and by every act and every expression on the part of the American negotiators, and the government of the United States, viz.:

"'The obligations, liabilities, and responsibilities, imposed upon the government of the United States and upon France by the 17th article of the treaty of amity and commerce of 1778, and by the 11th article of the treaty of alliance of 1778, where mutual, reciprocal, and equal: each formed the consideration, and the only consideration, for the other; and, therefore, any release which discharged both powers from those liabilities, responsibilities, and obligations, must have been mutual, reciprocal, and equal; and the release of either must have formed a full and valuable consideration for the release of the other.'

"Mr. W. said he would not trouble the Senate by again reading the articles from the respective treaties. They would be recollected, and no one would controvert the fact that, when the treaties were made, these articles were intended to contain mutual, reciprocal, and equal obligations. By the first we gave to France the liberty of our ports for her armed vessels, privateers, and prizes, and prohibited all other powers from the enjoyment of the same privilege; and France gave to us the liberty of her ports for our armed vessels, privateers, and prizes, and guarded the privilege by the same prohibition to other powers; and by the second we guaranteed to France, for ever, her possessions in America, and France guaranteed to us, for ever, 'our liberty, sovereignty, and independence, absolute and unlimited, as well in matters of government as commerce.' Such were the obligations in their original inception. Will it be contended that they were not mutual, reciprocal, and equal, and that, in each instance, the one did not form the consideration for the other? Surely no one will take this ground.

"If, then, said Mr. W., the obligations imposed upon each government by these articles of the respective treaties were mutual, reciprocal, and equal, when undertaken, they must have remained equal until abrogated by war, or changed by treaty stipulation. No treaty, subsequent to those which contain the obligations, had affected them in any manner whatever. If, as he had attempted to show, war had existed from July, 1778, to 1800, that would not have rendered the obligations unequal, but would have abrogated them altogether. If, as the friends of the bill contend, there had been no war, and the treaties were in full force up to the signing of the convention of the 30th of September, 1800, what was the effect of that treaty, as originally signed by the negotiators, upon these mutual, reciprocal, and equal obligations? The second original article of that treaty will answer. It did not attempt to disturb their mutuality, reciprocity, or equality, but suspended them as they were, past, present, or future, and made all the subject of future negotiation 'at a convenient time.'

"But, Mr. W. said, the Senate of the United States expunged this article of the treaty of 1800, and refused to advise and consent to ratify it as a part of the treaty; and hence it was contended the United States had discharged themselves from the 'onerous obligations' of these articles in the respective treaties, and had, by that act, incurred, to the claimants under this bill, the heavy liability which it recognizes. If the expunging of that article discharged the United States from obligations thus onerous, did it not discharge France from the fellow obligations? Was not the discharge, made in that manner, as mutual, reciprocal, and equal, as the obligations in their inception, and in all their subsequent stages up to that act? How, then, could it be contended that the discharge of the one was not a full and adequate consideration for the discharge of the other? Nothing upon the face of the treaties authorized the introduction of this inequality at this step in the official proceedings. Nothing in the record of the proceedings of the Senate, when acting upon the article, indicates that they intended to pay five millions of dollars to render this mutual release equal between the two powers. The obligations and responsibilities were reserved as subjects of future negotiation, upon terms of equality, and the striking out of that reservation was but a mutual and reciprocal and equal release from the obligation further to negotiate. This much for the reciprocity of these obligations as derived from the action of the sovereign powers themselves.

"What was to be learned from the action of their respective negotiators? He did not doubt but that attempts had been made on the part of France to exhibit an inequality in the obligations under the treaty, and to set up that inequality against the claims of our citizens; but had our negotiators ever admitted the inequality to exist, or ever attempted to compromise the rights of the claimants under this bill for such a consideration? He could not find that they had. He did not hear it contended that they had: and, from the evidence of their acts, remaining upon record, as a part of the diplomatic correspondence of the period, he could not suppose they had ever entertained the idea. He had said that the American negotiators had always treated these obligations as mutual, reciprocal, and equal; and he now proposed to read to the Senate a part of a letter from Messrs. Ellsworth, Davie, and Murray, addressed to the French negotiators, and containing the project of a treaty, to justify his assertion. The letter was dated 20th August, 1800, and it would be recollected that its authors were the negotiators, on the part of the United States, of the treaty of the 30th of September, 1800. The extract is as follows:

"'1. Let it be declared that the former treaties are renewed and confirmed, and shall have the same effect as if no misunderstanding between the two powers had intervened, except so far as they are derogated from by the present treaty.

"'2. It shall be optional with either party to pay to the other, within seven years, three millions of francs, in money or securities which may be issued for indemnities, and thereby to reduce the rights of the other as to privateers and prizes, to those of the most favored nation, And during the said term allowed for option, the right of both parties shall be limited by the line of the most favored nation.

"'3. The mutual guaranty in the treaty of alliance shall be so specified and limited, that its future obligation shall be, on the part of France, when the United States shall be attacked, to furnish and deliver at her own ports military stores to the amount of one million of francs; and, on the part of the United States, when the French possessions in America, in any future war, shall be attacked, to furnish and deliver at their own ports a like amount in provisions. It shall, moreover, be optional for either party to exonerate itself wholly of its obligation, by paying to the other, within seven years, a gross sum of five millions of francs, in money or such securities as may be issued for indemnities.'

"Mr. W. asked if he needed further proofs that not only the American government, but the American negotiators, treated these obligations under the treaty as, in all respects, mutual, reciprocal, and equal; and if the fallacy of the argument that the United States had obtained to itself a valuable consideration for the release of these private claims in the release of itself from these obligations, was not utterly and entirely disproved by these facts? Was not the release of the obligations on the one side the release of them on the other? And was not the one release the necessary consideration for the other? How, then, could it be said, with any justice, that we sought our release at the expense of the claimants? There was no reasonable ground for such an allegation, either from the acts of our government or of our negotiators. When the latter fixed a value upon our obligations as to the privateers and prizes, and as to the guaranty, in the same article they fixed the same price, to a franc, upon the reciprocal obligations of France; and when the former discharged our liability, by expunging the second article of the treaty of 1800, the same act discharged the corresponding liability of the French government.

"Here, then, Mr. W. said, must end all pretence of a valuable consideration for these claims passing to the United States from this source. The onerous obligations were mutual, reciprocal, and equal, and the respective releases were mutual, reciprocal, and equal, and simultaneous, and nothing could be fairly drawn from the act which operated these mutual releases to benefit these claimants.

"Mr. W. said he was, then, necessarily brought back to the proposition with which he started in the commencement of his argument, that, if the United States were liable to pay these claimants, that liability must rest upon the broad ground of a failure by the government, after ordinary, and, in this instance, extraordinary efforts to collect the money. The idea of a release of the claims for a valuable consideration passing to the government had been exploded, and, if a liability was to be claimed on account of a failure to collect the money, upon what ground did it rest? What had the government done to protect the rights of these claimants? It had negotiated from 1793 to 1798, with a vigilance and zeal and talent almost unprecedented in the history of diplomacy. It had sent to France minister after minister, and, upon several occasions, extraordinary missions composed of several individuals. Between 1798 and 1800, it had equipped fleets and armies, expended millions in warlike preparation, and finally sent forth its citizens to battle and death, to force the payment of the claims. Were we now to be told, that our failure in these efforts had created a liability against us to pay the money? That the same citizens who had been taxed to pay the expenses of these long negotiations, and of this war for the claims, were to be further taxed to pay such of the claims as we had failed to collect? He could never consent to such a deduction from such premises.

"But, Mr. President, said Mr. W., there is another view of this subject, placed upon this basis, which renders this bill of trifling importance in the comparison. If the failure to collect these claims has created the liability to pay them, that liability goes to the extent of the claims proved, and the interest upon them, not to a partial, and perhaps trifling, dividend. Who, then, would undertake to say what amount of claims might not be proved during the state of things he had described, from the breaking out of the war between France and England, in 1793, to the execution of the treaty, in 1800? For a great portion of the period, the municipal regulations of France required the captured cargoes to be not confiscated, but paid for at the market value at the port to which the vessel was destined. Still the capture would be proved, the value of the cargo ascertained, before the commission which the bill proposes to establish; and who would adduce the proof that the same cargo was paid for by the French government?

"This principle, however, Mr. W. said, went much further than the whole subject of the old French claims. It extended to all claims for spoliations upon our commerce, since the existence of the government, which we had failed to collect. Who could say where the liability would end? In how many cases had claims of this character been settled by treaty, what had been collected in each case, and what amount remained unpaid, after the release of the foreign government? He had made an unsuccessful effort to answer these inquiries, so far as the files of the state department would furnish the information, as he had found that it could only be collected by an examination of each individual claim; and this would impose a labor upon the department of an unreasonable character, and would occupy more time than remained to furnish the information for his use upon the present occasion. He had, however, been favored by the Secretary of State with the amounts allowed by the commissioners, the amounts paid, and the rate of pay upon the principal, in two recent cases, the Florida treaty, and the treaty with Denmark. In the former instance, the payment was ninety-one and two thirds per centum upon the principal, while in the latter it was but thirty-one and one eighth per centum. Assume that these two cases are the maximum and minimum of all the cases where releases have been given for partial payments; and he begged the Senate to reflect upon the amounts unpaid which might be called from the national treasury, if the principle were once admitted that a failure to collect creates a liability to pay.

"That in his assumption that a liability of this sort must go to the whole amount of the claims, he only took the ground contended for by the friends of this bill, he would trouble the Senate with another extract from the report of Mr. Livingston, from which he had before read. In speaking of the amount which should be appropriated, Mr. Livingston says:

"'The only remaining inquiry is the amount; and on this point the committee have had some difficulty. Two modes of measuring the compensation suggested themselves:

"'1. The actual loss sustained by the petitioners.

"'2. The value of the advantages received, as the consideration, by the United States.

"'The first is the one demanded by strict justice; and is the only one that satisfies the word used by the constitution, which requires just compensation, which cannot be said to have been made when any thing less than the full value is given. But there were difficulties which appeared insurmountable, to the adoption of this rule at the present day, arising from the multiplicity of the claims, the nature of the depredations which occasioned them, the loss of documents, either by the lapse of time, or the wilful destruction of them by the depredators. The committee, therefore, could not undertake to provide a specific relief for each of the petitioners. But they have recommended the institution of a board, to enter into the investigation, and apportion a sum which the committee have recommended to be appropriated, pro rata, among the several claimants.'

"'The committee could not believe that the amount of compensation to the sufferers should be calculated by the advantages secured to the United States, because it was not, according to their ideas, the true measure. If the property of an individual be taken for public use, and the government miscalculate, and find that the object to which they have applied it has been injurious rather than beneficial, the value of the property is still due to the owner, who ought not to suffer for the false speculations which have been made. A turnpike or canal may be very unproductive; but the owner of the land which has been taken for its construction is not the less entitled to its value. On the other hand, he can have no manner of right to more than the value of his property, be the object to which it has been applied ever so beneficial.'

"Here, Mr. W. said, were two proposed grounds of estimating the extent of the liability of the government to the claimants; and that which graduated it by the value received by the government was distinctly rejected, while that making the amount of the claims the measure of liability, was as distinctly asserted to be the true and just standard. He hoped he had shown, to the satisfaction of the Senate, that the former rule of value received by the government would allow the claimants nothing at all, while he was compelled to say that, upon the broad principle that a failure to collect creates a liability to pay, he could not controvert the correctness of the conclusion that the liability must be commensurate with the claim. He could controvert, he thought, successfully, the principle, but he could not the measure of damages when the principle was conceded. He would here conclude his remarks upon the points he had noticed, by the earnest declaration that he believed the passage of this bill would open more widely the doors of the public treasury than any legislation of which he had any knowledge, or to which Congress had ever yielded its assent.

"Mr. W. said he had a few observations to offer relative to the mode of legislation proposed, and to the details of the bill, and he would trouble the Senate no further.

"His first objection, under this head, was to the mode of legislation. If the government be liable to pay these claims, the claimants are citizens of the country, and Congress is as accessible to them as to other claimants who have demands against the treasury. Why were they not permitted, individually, to apply to Congress to establish their respective claims, as other claimants were bound to do, and to receive such relief, in each case, as Congress, in its wisdom, should see fit to grant? Why were these claims, more than others, grouped together, and attempted to be made a matter of national importance? Why was a commission to be established to ascertain their validity, a duty in ordinary cases discharged by Congress itself? Were the Senate sure that much of the importance given to those claims had not proceeded from this association, and from the formidable amount thus presented at one view? Would any gentleman be able to convince himself that, acting upon a single claim in this immense mass, he should have given it his favorable consideration? For his part, he considered the mode of legislation unusual and objectionable. His principal objections to the details were, that the second section of the bill prescribed the rules which should govern the commission in deciding upon the claims, among which 'the former treaties between the United States and France' were enumerated; and that the bill contained no declaration that the payments made under it were in full of the claims, or that the respective claimants should execute a release, as a condition of receiving their dividends.

"The first objection was predicated upon the fact that the bill covered the whole period from the making of the treaties of 1778, to that of the 30th September, 1800, and made the former treaties the rule of adjudication, when Congress on the 7th July, 1798, by a deliberate legislative act, declared those treaties void, and no longer binding upon the United States or their citizens. It is a fact abundantly proved by the documents, that a large portion of the claims now to be paid, arose within the period last alluded to; and that treaties declared to be void should be made the law in determining what were and what were not illegal captures, during the time that they were held to have no force, and when our citizens were authorized by law to go upon the high seas, regardless of their provisions, Mr. W. said, would seem to him to be an absurdity which the Senate would not legalize. He was fully aware that the first section of the bill purported to provide for 'valid claims to indemnity upon the French government, arising out of illegal captures, detentions, forcible seizures, illegal condemnations, and confiscations;' but it could not be overlooked that illegal captures, condemnations, and confiscations, must relate entirely to the law which was to govern the adjudication; and if that law was a void treaty which the claimants were not bound to observe, and did not observe, was it not more than possible that a capture, condemnation, or confiscation, might, by compulsion, be adjudged illegal under the rule fixed by the bill, while that same capture, condemnation, or confiscation, was strictly legal under the laws which governed the commerce of the claimant when the capture was made? He must say that it appeared clear to his mind that the rule of adjudication upon the validity of claims of this description, should, in all cases, be the same rule which governed the commerce out of which the claims have arisen.