History of Julius Caesar Vol. 2 of 2

Cæsar, as he had announced, started early on the morrow of the day on which he had thus addressed his officers, and, determined on conducting his army through an open country, he turned the mountainous and difficult region just described, thus making a circuit of more than fifty miles (seventy-five kilomètres),218 which is represented by a semi-circumference, the diameter of which would be the line drawn from Besançon to Arcey. It follows the present road from Besançon to Vesoul as far as Pennesières, and continues by Vallerois-le-Bois and Villersexel to Arcey. He could perform this distance in four days; then he resumed, on leaving Arcey, the direct road from Besançon to the Rhine by Belfort and Cernay.

On the seventh day of a march uninterrupted since leaving Besançon, he learnt by his scouts that the troops of Ariovistus were at a distance of not more than twenty-four miles (36 kilomètres).

Supposing 20 kilomètres for the day’s march, the Roman army would have travelled over 140 kilomètres in seven days, and would have arrived on the Thur, near Cernay. (By the road indicated, the distance from Besançon to the Thur is about 140 kilomètres.) At this moment, Ariovistus would have been encamped at 36 kilomètres from the Romans, to the north, near Colmar.

Informed of the arrival of Cæsar, Ariovistus sent him word “that he consented to an interview, now that the Roman general had come near, and that there was no longer any danger for him in going to him.” Cæsar did not reject this overture, supposing that Ariovistus had returned to more reasonable sentiments.

The interview was fixed for the fifth day following.219 In the interval, while there was a frequent exchange of messages, Ariovistus, who feared some ambuscade, stipulated, as an express condition, that Cæsar should bring with him no foot soldiers, but that, on both sides, they should confine themselves to an escort of cavalry. The latter, unwilling to furnish any pretext for a rupture, consented; but, not daring to entrust his personal safety to the Gaulish cavalry, he mounted on their horses men of the 10th legion, which gave rise to this jocular saying of one of the soldiers: “Cæsar goes beyond his promise; he was to make us prætorians, and he makes us knights.”220

Interview between Cæsar and Ariovistus.

VI. Between the two armies extended a vast plain, that which is crossed by the Ill and the Thur. A tolerably large knoll rose in it at a nearly equal distance from either camp.221 This was the place of meeting of the two chieftains. Cæsar posted his mounted legion at 200 paces from the knoll, and the cavalry of Ariovistus stood at the same distance. The latter demanded that the interview should take place on horseback, and that each of the two chiefs should be accompanied only by ten horsemen. When they met, Cæsar reminded Ariovistus of his favours, of those of the Senate, of the interest which the Republic felt in the Ædui, of that constant policy of the Roman people which, far from suffering the abasement of its allies, sought incessantly their elevation. He repeated his first conditions.

Ariovistus, instead of accepting them, put forward his own claims: “He had only crossed the Rhine at the prayer of the Gauls; the lands which he was accused of having seized, had been ceded to him; he had subsequently been attacked, and had scattered his enemies; if he has sought the friendship of the Roman people, it is in the hope of benefiting by it; if it becomes prejudicial to him, he renounces it; if he has carried so many Germans into Gaul, it is for his personal safety; the part he occupies belongs to him, as that occupied by the Romans belongs to them; his rights of conquest are older than those of the Roman army, which had never passed the limits of the province. Cæsar is only in Gaul to ruin it. If he does not withdraw from it, he will regard him as an enemy, and he is certain that by his death he shall gain the gratitude of a great number of the first and most illustrious personages in Rome. They have informed him by their messengers that, at this price, he would gain their good-will and friendship. But if he be left in free possession of Gaul, he will assist in all the wars that Cæsar may undertake.”

Cæsar insisted on the arguments he had already advanced: “It was not one of the principles of the Republic to abandon its allies; he did not consider that Gaul belonged to Ariovistus any more than to the Roman people. When formerly Q. Fabius Maximus vanquished the Arverni and the Ruteni, Rome pardoned them, and neither reduced them to provinces nor imposed tribute upon them. If, then, priority of conquest be invoked, the claims of the Romans to the empire of Gaul are the most just; and if it be thought preferable to refer to the Senate, Gaul ought to be free, since, after victory, the Senate had willed that she should preserve her own laws.”

During this conversation, information was brought to Cæsar that the cavalry of Ariovistus were approaching the knoll, and were throwing stones and darts at the Romans. Cæsar immediately broke up the conference, withdrew to his escort, and forbade them to return the attack, not from fear of an engagement with his favourite legion, but in order to avoid, in case he should defeat his enemies, the suspicion that he might have taken advantage of their good faith to surprise them in an interview. Nevertheless, the arrogance of Ariovistus, the disloyal attack of his cavalry, and the rupture of the conference, were soon known, and excited the ardour and impatience of the Roman troops.

Two days afterwards, Ariovistus made a proposal for a renewal of the conference, or for the sending to him of one of Cæsar’s lieutenants. Cæsar refused, the more so because, the day before, the Germans had again advanced and thrown their missiles at the Romans, and that thus his lieutenant would not have been safe from the attacks of the barbarians. He thought it more prudent to send as his deputy Valerius Procillus, the son of a Gaul who had become a Roman citizen, who spoke the Celtic language, and who was on familiar terms with Ariovistus, and M. Mettius, with whom the German king was bound by the rights of hospitality. They had hardly entered the camp of Ariovistus, when he ordered them to be thrown into fetters, under pretence that they were spies.222

Movements of the two Armies.

VII. The same day, the German king broke up his camp and took another position at the foot of the Vosges (sub monte), at a distance of 6,000 paces from that of Cæsar, between Soultz and Feldkirch, not far from the Lauch. (See Plate 6.) Next day he crossed the Thur, near its confluence with the Ill, ascended the left banks of the Ill and the Doller, and only halted at Reiningen, after having gone two miles (three kilomètres) beyond the Roman camp. By this manœuvre, Ariovistus cut off Cæsar’s communication with Sequania and the Æduan country, but he left open the communications with the country of the Leuci and the Lingones.223 (See the Map of Gaul, 2.) The two armies thus encamped at a short distance from each other. During the five following days, Cæsar drew out his troops each day, and formed them in order of battle at the head of his camp (pro castris suas copias produxit), but was not able to provoke the Germans to fight; all hostility was limited to cavalry skirmishes, in which the latter were much practised. To 6,000 horsemen was joined an equal number of picked men on foot, among whom each horseman had chosen one to watch over him in combat. According to circumstances, the horsemen fell back upon the footmen, or the latter advanced to their assistance. Such was their agility, that they kept up with the horses, running and holding by the mane.224

Cæsar, seeing that Ariovistus persisted in shutting himself up in his camp and intercepting his communications, sought to re-establish them, chose an advantageous position about 600 paces (900 mètres) beyond that occupied by the Germans, and led thither his army drawn up in three lines. He kept the first and second under arms, and employed the third on the retrenchments. The spot on which he established himself is perhaps the eminence situated on the Little Doller, to the north of Schweighausen. Ariovistus sent thither about 16,000 of his light troops and all his cavalry, to intimidate the Romans and impede the works. Nevertheless, the third line continued them, and the two others repelled the attack. The camp once fortified, Cæsar left in it two legions and a part of the auxiliaries, and took back the four others to the principal camp. The two Roman camps were 3,600 mètres distant from each other.

Hitherto Cæsar had been satisfied with drawing out his troops and backing them upon his retrenchments; the next day, persisting in his tactics (instituto suo) of trying to provoke Ariovistus to fight, he drew them up at a certain distance in advance of the principal camp, and placed them in order of battle (paulum a majoribus castris progressus, aciem instruxit). In spite of this advanced position (ne tum quidem), Ariovistus persisted in not coming out. The Roman army re-entered the camp towards midday, and a part of the German troops immediately attacked the small camp. Both armies fought resolutely till evening, and there were many wounded on both sides. Astonished at seeing that, in spite of this engagement, Ariovistus still avoided a general battle, Cæsar interrogated the prisoners, and learnt that the matrons charged with consulting destiny had declared that the Germans could not be conquerors if they fought before the new moon.225

Battle against the Germans.

VIII. Next day, leaving a sufficient guard in the two camps, Cæsar placed all his auxiliaries in view of the enemy, in advance of the smaller camp; the number of the legionaries being less than that of the Germans, he sought to conceal his inferiority from the enemy by displaying other troops. While the Germans took these auxiliaries for the two legions which occupied the lesser camp, the latter left it by the Decuman gate, and, unperceived, went to rejoin the other four. Then Cæsar drew up his six legions in three lines, and, marching forward, he led them up to the enemy’s camp (usque ad castra hostium accessit). This offensive movement allowed the Germans no longer the choice of avoiding battle: they quitted their camp, descended into the plain,226 drew up in line, by order of nations, at equal intervals – Harudes, Marcomanni, Suevi, Triboces, Vangiones, Nemetes, and Sedusii; and, to deprive themselves of all possibility of flight, inclosed themselves on the sides and in the rear by a circuit of carriages and wagons, on which they placed their women: dishevelled and in tears, these implored the warriors, as they marched to the battle, not to deliver them in slavery to the Romans. In this position, the Roman army faced the east, and the German army the west, and their lines extended over a space now partly covered by the forest of Nonnenbruch.227

Cæsar, still more to animate his soldiers, determined to give them witnesses worthy of their courage, and placed at the head of each legion either one of his lieutenants or his quæstor.228 He led the attack in person, with his right wing, on the side where the Germans seemed weakest. The signal given, the legions dash forward; the enemy, on his side, rushes to the encounter. On both sides the impetuosity is so great that the Romans, not having time to use the pilum, throw it away, and fight hand to hand with the sword. But the Germans, according to their custom, to resist an attack of this kind, form rapidly in phalanxes of three or four hundred men,229 and cover their bare heads with their bucklers. They are pressed so close together, that even when dead they still remain standing.230 Such was the ardour of the legionaries, that many rushed upon these sort of tortoises, tearing away the bucklers, and striking the enemies from above.231 The short and sharp-pointed swords of the Romans had the advantage over the long swords of the Germans.232 Nevertheless, according to Appian, the legions owed their victory chiefly to the superiority of their tactics and the steadiness with which they kept their ranks.233 Ariovistus’s left did not resist long; but while it was driven back and put to flight, the right, forming in deep masses, pressed the Romans hard. Young P. Crassus, commander of the cavalry placed at a distance from the thick of the battle, and better placed to judge of its incidents, perceived this, sent the third line to the succour of the wavering legions, and restored the combat. Soon Ariovistus’s right was obliged to give way in its turn; the rout then became general, and the Germans desisted from flight only when they reached the Rhine, fifty miles from the field of battle.234 They descended, no doubt, the valley of the Ill as far as Rhinau, thus retracing a part of the road by which they had come. (See Plate 4.) Cæsar sent his cavalry after them; all who were overtaken were cut to pieces; the rest attempted to swim across the river, or sought safety in boats. Among the latter was Ariovistus, who threw himself into a boat235 he found attached to the bank. According to Plutarch and Appian,236 80,000 men perished in the combat and during the pursuit. Two of the wives of the German king experienced the same fate; one was a Sueve, the other a Norician. Of his two daughters, one was killed and the other taken prisoner. Cæsar says that, as he himself pursued the enemy with his cavalry, he experienced a pleasure equal to that given by victory when he recovered, first Procillus, loaded with a triple chain, and who had thrice seen the barbarians draw lots whether he should be burnt alive or not, and, subsequently, M. Mettius, both of whom, as we have seen, had been sent by him as messengers to Ariovistus.

The report of this glorious exploit having spread beyond the Rhine, the Suevi, who had come to its banks, returned home. The Ubii, who dwelt near the river, pursued their terrified bands, and slew a considerable number of the fugitives.

Cæsar, having concluded two great wars in one single campaign, placed his army in winter quarters among the Sequani rather sooner than the season required – at the beginning of September – and left them under the command of Labienus. He then left, and went to hold the assemblies in Cisalpine Gaul.237

Observations.

IX. There are several things worthy of remark in this campaign: —

1. The resolution taken by Cæsar to gain possession of Besançon, and thus to anticipate Ariovistus. We see the importance which he attaches to that military position as a point of support and of supply.

2. The facility with which a whole legion transforms itself into cavalry.

3. The judicious use which Cæsar makes of his light troops (alarii), by assembling them in mass, so that the enemy should believe in a greater number of legions.

4. Lastly, this singular circumstance, that the third line, which serves as reserve and decides the fate of the battle, receives from young P. Crassus, and not from the general-in-chief, the order to attack.

The dates of the principal events of this year may be indicated in the following manner: —

CHAPTER V.

WAR AGAINST THE BELGÆ

(Year of Rome 697.)(Book II. of the “Commentaries.”)

League of the Belgæ. Cæsar advances from Besançon to the Aisne.

I. THE brilliant successes gained by Cæsar over the Helvetii and the Germans had delivered the Republic from an immense danger, but at the same time they had roused the distrust and jealousy of most of the nations of Gaul. These conceived fears for their independence, which were further increased by the presence of the Roman army in Sequania. The irritation was very great among the Belgæ. They feared that their turn to be attacked would come when Celtic Gaul was once reduced to peace. Besides, they were excited by influential men who understood that, under Roman domination, they would have less chance of obtaining possession of the supreme power. The different tribes of Belgic Gaul entered into a formidable league, and reciprocally exchanged hostages.

Cæsar learnt these events in the Cisalpine province, through public rumour and the letters of Labienus. Alarmed at the news, he raised two legions in Italy, the 13th and 14th, and, in the beginning of spring,238

sent them into Gaul, under the command of the lieutenant Q. Pedius.239 It is probable that these troops, to reach Sequania promptly, crossed the Great St. Bernard, for Strabo relates that one of the three routes which led from Italy into Gaul passed by Mount Pœrinus (Great St. Bernard), after having traversed the country of the Salassi (Valley of Aosta), and that this latter people offered at first to assist Cæsar’s troops in their passage by levelling the roads and throwing bridges across the torrents; but that, suddenly changing their tone, they had rolled masses of rock down upon them and pillaged their baggage. It was no doubt in the sequel of this defection that, towards the end of the year 697, Cæsar, as we shall see farther on, sent Galba into the Valais, to take vengeance on the mountaineers for their perfidious conduct and to open a safe communication with Italy.240

As soon as forage was abundant, he rejoined his legions in person, probably at Besançon, since, as we have seen, they had been placed in winter quarters in Sequania. He charged the Senones and the other Celts who bordered upon Belgic Gaul to watch what was doing there and inform him of it. Their reports were unanimous: troops were being raised, and an army was assembling. Cæsar then decided upon immediately entering into campaign.

His army consisted of eight legions: they bore the numbers 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, and 14. As their effective force, in consequence of marches and previous combats, cannot have been complete, we may admit a mean of 5,000 men to the legion, which would make 40,000 men of infantry. Adding to these one-third of auxiliaries, Cretan archers, slingers, and Numidians, the total of infantry would have been 53,000 men. There was, in addition to these, 5,000 cavalry and a body of Æduan troops under the command of Divitiacus. Thus the army of Cæsar amounted to at least 60,000 soldiers, without reckoning the servants for the machines, drivers, and valets, who, according to the instance cited by Orosius, amounted to a very considerable number.241

After securing provisions, Cæsar started from Besançon, probably in the second fortnight in May, passed the Saône at Seveux (see Plate 4), crossed the country of the Lingones in the direction of Langres, at Bar-sur-Aube, and entered, towards Vitry-le-François, on the territory of the Remi, having marched in about a fortnight 230 kilomètres, the distance from Besançon to Vitry-le-François.242

The Remi were the first Belgic people he encountered in his road (qui proximi Galliæ ex Belgis sunt). Astonished at his sudden appearance, they sent two deputies, Iccius and Adecumborius, the first personages of their country, to make their submission, and offer provisions and every kind of succour. They informed Cæsar that all the Belgæ were in arms, and that the Germans on that side of the Rhine had joined the coalition; for themselves, they had refused to take any part in it, but the excitement was so great that they had not been able to dissuade from their warlike projects the Suessiones themselves, who were united with them by community of origin, laws, and interests. “The Belgæ,” they added, “proud of having been formerly the only people of Gaul who preserved their territory from the invasion of the Teutones and Cimbri, had the loftiest idea of their own valour. In their general assembly, each people had engaged to furnish the following contingents: – The Bellovaci, the most warlike, could send into the field 100,000 men; they have promised 60,000 picked troops, and claim the supreme direction of the war. The Suessiones, their neighbours, masters of a vast and fertile territory, in which are reckoned twelve towns, furnish 50,000 men; they have for their king Galba, who has been invested, by the consent of the allies, with the chief command. The Nervii, the most distant of all, and the most barbarous among these peoples, furnish the same number; the Atrebates, 15,000; the Ambiani, 10,000; the Morini, 25,000; the Menapii, 7000; the Caletes, 10,000; the Veliocasses and the Veromandui, 10,000; the Aduatuci, 19,000; lastly, the Condrusi, Eburones, Cæresi, and Pæmani, comprised under the general name of Germans, are to send 40,000; in all, about 296,000 men.”243

Cæsar’s Camp at Berry-au-Bac.

II. Cæsar could judge, from this information, the formidable character of the league which he had now to combat. His first care was to try to divide the hostile forces, and, with this view, he induced Divitiacus, in spite of the friendly relations which had long united the Ædui with the Bellovaci, to invade and ravage the territory of the latter with the Æduan troops. He then required the senate of the Remi to repair to his presence, and the children of the principes to be brought to him as hostages; and then, on information that Galba was marching to meet him, he resolved to move to the other side of the Aisne, which crossed the extremity of the territory of the Remi (quod est in extremis Remorum finibus),244 and encamp there in a strong position, to await the enemy’s attack. The road he had hitherto followed led straight to the Aisne, and crossed it by a bridge at the spot where now stands the village of Berry-au-Bac. (See Plate 7.) He marched in great haste towards this bridge, led his army across it, and fixed his camp on the right side of the road, on the hill situated between the Aisne and the Miette, a small stream with marshy banks, which makes a bend in that river between Berry-au-Bac and Pontavert. (See Plate 8.) This hill, called Mauchamp, is of small elevation (about 25 mètres) above the valley of the Aisne, and in its length, from east to west, it presents sufficient space for the Roman army to deploy. Laterally, it sinks to the level of the surrounding ground by slight undulations, and the side which looks upon the Miette descends by a gentle slope towards the banks of the stream. This position offered several advantages: the Aisne defended one side of the camp; the rear of the army was protected, and the transports of provisions could arrive in safety through the countries of the Remi and other friendly peoples. Cæsar ordered a work to be constructed on the right bank of the Aisne, at the extremity of the bridge, where he established a post (see Plates 8 and 9),245 and he left on the other side of the river the lieutenant Q. Titurius Sabinus with six cohorts. The camp was surrounded by a retrenchment twelve feet high, and by a fosse eighteen feet wide.246

Meanwhile the Belgæ, after having concentrated their forces in the country of the Suessiones, to the north of the Aisne, had invaded the territory of the Remi. On their road, and at eight miles from the Roman camp (see Plate 7), was a town of the Remi called Bibrax (Vieux-Laon).247 The Belgæ attacked it vigorously, and it was defended with difficulty all day. These peoples, like the Celts, attacked fortresses by surrounding them with a crowd of combatants, throwing from every side a great quantity of stones, to drive the defenders away from the walls; then, forming the tortoise, they advanced against the gates and sapped the walls. When night had put a stop to the attack, Iccius, who commanded in the town, sent information to Cæsar that he could hold out no longer, unless he received prompt succour. Towards midnight the latter sent him Numidians, Cretan archers, and Balearic slingers, who had the messengers of Iccius for their guides. This re-enforcement raised the courage of the besieged, and deprived the enemy of the hope of taking the town; and after remaining some time round Bibrax, laying waste the land and burning the hamlets and houses, they marched towards Cæsar, and halted at less than two miles from his camp. Their fires, kindled on the right bank of the Miette, indicated a front of more than 8,000 paces (twelve kilomètres).

The great numbers of the enemy, and their high renown for bravery, led the proconsul to resolve to postpone the battle. If his legions had in his eyes an incontestible superiority, he wished, nevertheless, to ascertain what he could expect from his cavalry, which was composed of Gauls. For this purpose, and to try, at the same time, the courage of the Belgæ, he engaged them every day in cavalry combats in the undulated plain to the north of the camp. Once certain that his troops did not yield in valour to those of the enemy, he resolved to draw them into a general action. In front of the entrenchments was an extensive tract of ground, advantageous for ranging an army in order of battle. This commanding position was covered in front and on the left by the marshes of the Miette. The right only remained unsupported, and the Belgæ might have taken the Romans in flank in the space between the camp and the stream, or turned them by passing between the camp and the Aisne. To meet this danger, Cæsar made, on each of the two slopes of the hill, a fosse, perpendicular to the line of battle, about 400 paces (600 mètres) in length, the first reaching from the camp to the Miette, the second joining it to the Aisne. At the extremity of these fosses he established redoubts, in which were placed military machines.248