Institutes of the Christian Religion (Vol. 1 of 2)

XIII. Yet its attempts are not always so fruitless, but that it makes some discoveries, particularly when it applies itself to inferior things. Nor is it so stupid, as to be without some slender notion also of superior ones, however negligently it attends to the investigation of them; but it possesses not an equal ability for both. For it is when it goes beyond the limits of the present life, that it is chiefly convinced of its own imbecility. Wherefore, that we may better perceive how far it proceeds in every case according to the degrees of its ability, it will be useful for us to propose the following distinction; that there is one understanding for terrestrial things, and another for celestial ones. I call those things terrestrial which do not pertain to God and his kingdom, to true righteousness, or to the blessedness of a future life; but which relate entirely to the present life, and are in some sense confined within the limits of it. Celestial things are the pure knowledge of God, the method of true righteousness, and the mysteries of the heavenly kingdom. In the first class are included civil polity, domestic economy, all the mechanical arts and liberal sciences; in the second, the knowledge of God and of the Divine will, and the rule for conformity to it in our lives. Now, in regard to the first class, it must be confessed, that as man is naturally a creature inclined to society, he has also by nature an instinctive propensity to cherish and preserve that society; and therefore we perceive in the minds of all men general impressions of civil probity and order. Hence it is that not a person can be found who does not understand, that all associations of men ought to be governed by laws, or who does not conceive in his mind the principles of those laws. Hence that perpetual consent of all nations, as well as all individuals, to the laws, because the seeds of them are innate in all mankind, without any instructor or legislator. I regard not the dissensions and contests which afterwards arise, while some desire to invert all justice and propriety, to break down the barriers of the laws, and to substitute mere cupidity in the room of justice, as is the case with thieves and robbers. Others – which is a fault more common – think that unjust which legislators have sanctioned as just; and, on the contrary, pronounce that to be laudable which they have forbidden. For the former of these hate not the laws from an ignorance that they are good and sacred; but, inflamed with the violence of their passions, manifestly contend against reason, and under the influence of their lawless desires, execrate that which their judgments approve. The controversy of the latter of these is by no means repugnant to that original idea of equity which we have mentioned; for when men dispute with each other on the comparative merits of different laws, it implies their consent to some general rule of equity. This clearly argues the debility of the human mind, which halts and staggers even when it appears to follow the right way. Yet it is certainly true, that some seeds of political order are sown in the minds of all. And this is a powerful argument, that in the constitution of this life no man is destitute of the light of reason.

XIV. Next follow the arts, both liberal and manual; for learning which, as there is in all of us a certain aptitude, they also discover the strength of human ingenuity. But though all men are not capable of learning every art, yet it is a very sufficient proof of the common energy, that scarcely an individual can be found, whose sagacity does not exert itself in some particular art. Nor have they an energy and facility only in learning, but also in inventing something new in every art, or in amplifying and improving what they have learned from their predecessors. Though this excited Plato erroneously to assert that such an apprehension is only a recollection of what the soul knew in its preëxistent state, before it came into the body, it constrains us, by the most cogent reasons, to acknowledge that the principle of it is innate in the human mind. These instances, therefore, plainly prove, that men are endued with a general apprehension of reason and understanding. Yet it is such a universal blessing, that every one for himself ought to acknowledge it as the peculiar favour of God. To this gratitude the Author of nature himself abundantly excites us, by his creation of idiots, in whom he represents the state of the human soul without his illumination, which, though natural to all, is nevertheless a gratuitous gift of his beneficence towards every individual. But the invention and methodical teaching of these arts, and the more intimate and excellent knowledge of them, which is peculiar to a few, are no solid argument of general perspicacity; yet, belonging to both the pious and the impious, they are justly numbered among the natural talents.

XV. Whenever, therefore, we meet with heathen writers, let us learn from that light of truth which is admirably displayed in their works, that the human mind, fallen as it is, and corrupted from its integrity, is yet invested and adorned by God with excellent talents. If we believe that the Spirit of God is the only fountain of truth, we shall neither reject nor despise the truth itself, wherever it shall appear, unless we wish to insult the Spirit of God; for the gifts of the Spirit cannot be undervalued without offering contempt and reproach to the Spirit himself. Now, shall we deny the light of truth to the ancient lawyers, who have delivered such just principles of civil order and polity? Shall we say that the philosophers were blind in their exquisite contemplation and in their scientific description of nature? Shall we say that those, who by the art of logic have taught us to speak in a manner consistent with reason, were destitute of understanding themselves? Shall we accuse those of insanity, who by the study of medicine have been exercising their industry for our advantage? What shall we say of all the mathematics? Shall we esteem them the delirious ravings of madmen? On the contrary, we shall not be able even to read the writings of the ancients on these subjects without great admiration; we shall admire them, because we shall be constrained to acknowledge them to be truly excellent. And shall we esteem any thing laudable or excellent, which we do not recognize as proceeding from God? Let us, then, be ashamed of such great ingratitude, which was not to be charged on the heathen poets, who confessed that philosophy, and legislation, and useful arts, were the inventions of their gods. Therefore, since it appears that those whom the Scripture styles “natural men,” ψυχικους, have discovered such acuteness and perspicacity in the investigation of sublunary things, let us learn from such examples, how many good qualities the Lord has left to the nature of man, since it has been despoiled of what is truly good.

XVI. Yet let us not forget that these are most excellent gifts of the Divine Spirit, which for the common benefit of mankind he dispenses to whomsoever he pleases. For if it was necessary that the Spirit of God should infuse into Bezaleel and Aholiab the understanding and skill requisite for the construction of the tabernacle,572 we need not wonder if the knowledge of those things, which are most excellent in human life, is said to be communicated to us by the Spirit of God. Nor is there any reason for inquiring, what intercourse with the Spirit is enjoyed by the impious who are entirely alienated from God. For when the Spirit of God is said to dwell only in the faithful, that is to be understood of the Spirit of sanctification, by whom we are consecrated as temples to God himself. Yet it is equally by the energy of the same Spirit, that God replenishes, actuates, and quickens all creatures, and that, according to the property of each species which he has given it by the law of creation. Now, if it has pleased the Lord that we should be assisted in physics, logic, mathematics, and other arts and sciences, by the labour and ministry of the impious, let us make use of them; lest, if we neglect to use the blessings therein freely offered to us by God, we suffer the just punishment of our negligence. But, lest any one should suppose a man to be truly happy, when he is admitted to possess such powerful energies for the discovery of truth relating to the elements of this world, it must likewise be added, that all that faculty of understanding, and the understanding which is the consequence of it, is, in the sight of God, a fleeting and transitory thing, where there is not a solid foundation of truth. For the sentiment of Augustine, with whom, as we have observed, the Master of the Sentences and the Schoolmen have been constrained to coincide, is strictly true – that as the gratuitous or supernatural gifts were taken away from man after the fall, so these natural ones which remained have been corrupted; not that they can be defiled in themselves as proceeding from God, but because they have ceased to be pure to polluted man, so that he can obtain no praise from them.

XVII. Let us conclude, therefore, that it is evident in all mankind, that reason is a peculiar property of our nature, which distinguishes us from the brute animals, as sense constitutes the difference between them and things inanimate. For whereas some are born fools and idiots, that defect obscures not the general goodness of God. Such a spectacle should rather teach us that what we retain ought justly to be ascribed to his indulgence; because, had it not been for his mercy to us, our defection would have been followed by the total destruction of our nature. But whereas some excel in penetration, others possess superior judgment, and others have a greater aptitude to learn this or that art, in this variety God displays his goodness to us, that no one may arrogate to himself as his own what proceeds merely from the Divine liberality. For whence is it that one is more excellent than another, unless it be to exalt in our common nature the special goodness of God, which in the preterition of many, proclaims that it is under an obligation to none? Moreover, God inspires particular motions according to the vocation of each individual; of which many examples occur in the book of the Judges, where the Spirit of the Lord is said to “come upon” those whom he called to govern the people.573 Finally, in all important actions there is a special instinct; for which reason it is said that Saul was followed by valiant men, “whose hearts God had touched.”574 And Samuel, when he predicts his inauguration into the kingdom, thus expresses himself: “The Spirit of the Lord will come upon thee, and thou shalt be turned into another man.”575 And this is extended to the whole course of his government; as it is afterwards narrated concerning David, that “the Spirit of the Lord came upon him from that day forward.”576 But the same expression is used in other places in reference to particular impulses. Even in Homer, men are said to excel in abilities, not only as Jupiter has distributed to every one, but according as he guides him from day to day. And experience clearly shows, since the most ingenious and sagacious of mankind frequently stand still in profound astonishment, that the minds of men are subject to the power and will of God to govern them every moment; for which reason it is said, that “he taketh away the heart of the chief people of the earth, and causeth them to wander in a wilderness where there is no way.”577 Yet in this diversity we perceive some remaining marks of the Divine image, which distinguish the human race in general from all the other creatures.

XVIII. We now proceed to show what human reason can discover, when it comes to the kingdom of God, and to that spiritual wisdom, which consists chiefly in three things – to know God, his paternal favour towards us, on which depends our salvation, and the method of regulating our lives according to the rule of the law. In the two first points, but especially in the second, the most sagacious of mankind are blinder than moles. I do not deny that some judicious and apposite observations concerning God may be found scattered in the writings of the philosophers; but they always betray a confused imagination. The Lord afforded them, as we have before observed, some slight sense of his Divinity, that they might not be able to plead ignorance as an excuse for impiety, and sometimes impelled them to utter things, by the confession of which they might themselves be convinced. But they saw the objects presented to their view in such a manner, that by the sight they were not even directed to the truth, much less did they arrive at it; just as a man, who is travelling by night across a field, sees the coruscations of lightning extending for a moment far and wide, but with such an evanescent view, that so far from being assisted by them in proceeding on his journey, he is re-absorbed in the darkness of the night before he can advance a single step. Besides, those few truths, with which they, as it were, fortuitously besprinkle their books, with what numerous and monstrous falsehoods are they defiled! Lastly, they never had the smallest idea of that certainty of the Divine benevolence towards us, without which the human understanding must necessarily be full of immense confusion. Human reason, then, neither approaches, nor tends, nor directs its views towards this truth, to understand who is the true God, or in what character he will manifest himself to us.

XIX. But because, from our being intoxicated with a false opinion of our own perspicacity, we do not without great difficulty suffer ourselves to be persuaded, that in Divine things our reason is totally blind and stupid, it will be better, I think, to confirm it by testimonies of Scripture, than to support it by arguments. This is beautifully taught by John, in that passage which I lately cited, where he says that, from the beginning, “in God was life, and the life was the light of men. And the light shineth in darkness; and the darkness comprehended it not.”578 He indicates, indeed, that the soul of man is irradiated with a beam of Divine light, so that it is never wholly destitute either of some little flame, or at least of a spark of it; but he likewise suggests that it cannot comprehend God by that illumination. And this because all his sagacity, as far as respects the knowledge of God, is mere blindness. For when the Spirit calls men “darkness,” he at once totally despoils them of the faculty of spiritual understanding. Wherefore he asserts that believers, who receive Christ, are “born not of blood, nor of the will of the flesh, nor of the will of man, but of God;”579 as though he had said that the flesh is not capable of such sublime wisdom as to conceive of God and Divine things, without being illuminated by the Spirit of God; as Christ testified that his being known by Peter was owing to a special revelation of the Father.580

XX. If we were firmly persuaded of what, indeed, ought not to be questioned, that our nature is destitute of all those things which our heavenly Father confers on his elect through the Spirit of regeneration, here would be no cause of hesitation. For this is the language of the faithful by the mouth of the Prophet: “With thee is the fountain of life; in thy light we shall see light.”581 The Apostle confirms the same, when he says that “no man can say that Jesus is Lord, but by the Holy Ghost.”582 And John the Baptist, perceiving the stupidity of his disciples, exclaims, that “a man can receive nothing except it be given him from above.”583 That by “gift” he intends a special illumination, not a common faculty of nature, is evident from the complaint which he makes of the inefficacy of the many discourses in which he had recommended Christ to his disciples. “I see that words are unavailing to instruct the minds of men in Divine things, unless God give them understanding by his Spirit.” And Moses also, when he reproaches the people for their forgetfulness, yet at the same time remarks, that they cannot be wise in the mysteries of God but by the Divine favour. He says, “Thine eyes have seen the signs and those great miracles; yet the Lord hath not given you a heart to perceive, and eyes to see, and ears to hear.”584 What more would he express, if he had called them blockheads, destitute of all understanding in the consideration of the works of God? Whence the Lord, by the Prophet, promises, as an instance of peculiar grace, that he will give the Israelites “a heart to know” him;585 plainly suggesting that the mind of man has no spiritual wisdom any further than as it is enlightened by him. Christ also has clearly confirmed this by his own declaration, that no man can come to him, except the Father draw him.586 What! is he not himself the lively image of the Father, representing to us all “the brightness of his glory”?587 Therefore, he could not better manifest the extent of our capacity for the knowledge of God, than when he affirms that we have no eyes to behold his image where it is so plainly exhibited. What! did he not descend to the earth in order to discover to men the will of the Father? And did he not faithfully fulfil the object of his mission? He certainly did; but his preaching is not at all efficacious, unless the way to the heart be laid open by the internal teaching of the Spirit. Therefore, none come to him but they who have heard and learned of the Father. What is the nature of this hearing and learning? It is when the Spirit, by a wonderful and peculiar power, forms the ears to hear and the mind to understand. And lest this should appear strange, he cites the prophecy of Isaiah, where, predicting the restoration of the Church, he says, that all those who shall be saved “shall be taught of the Lord.” If God there predicts something peculiar concerning his elect, it is evident that he speaks not of that kind of instruction which is common also to the impious and profane. It must be concluded, therefore, that there is no admission into the kingdom of God, but for him whose mind has been renewed by the illumination of the Holy Spirit. But Paul expresses himself more clearly than all the others. Having professedly entered upon this argument, after he has condemned all human wisdom as folly and vanity, and even reduced it to nothing, he comes to this conclusion: “The natural man receiveth not the things of the Spirit of God; for they are foolishness unto him; neither can he know them, because they are spiritually discerned.”588 Whom does he call the natural man? him who depends on the light of nature. He, I say, has no apprehension of the mysteries of God. Why so? because through slothfulness he neglects them? Nay, even his utmost endeavours can avail nothing, “because they are spiritually discerned.” This implies, that being entirely concealed from human perspicacity, they are discovered only by the revelation of the Spirit; so that where the illumination of the Spirit is not enjoyed, they are deemed foolishness itself. He had before extolled “the things which God hath prepared for them that love him”589 above the capacity of our eyes, our ears, and our minds; he had even asserted that human wisdom was a kind of veil, by which the mind is prevented from a discovery of God. What do we want more? The Apostle pronounces that “God hath made foolish the wisdom of this world;”590 and shall we ascribe to it such a degree of sagacity, as would enable it to penetrate to God, and to the most secret recesses of the heavenly kingdom? Far be from us such extreme stupidity.

XXI. That which he here detracts from men, he in another place ascribes exclusively to God. Praying for the Ephesians, he says, “May God, the Father of glory, give unto you the Spirit of wisdom and revelation.”591 You hear now that all wisdom and revelation is the gift of God. What follows? “The eyes of your understanding being enlightened.” If they need a new revelation, they are certainly blind of themselves. It follows, “that ye may know what is the hope of your calling,” &c. He confesses, then, that the minds of men are not naturally capable of so great knowledge, as to know their own calling. Nor let any Pelagian here object, that God assists this stupidity or ignorance, when, by the teaching of his word, he directs the human understanding to that which, without a guide, it never could have attained. For David had the law, in which all desirable wisdom was comprised: yet, not content with this, he requested that his eyes might be opened to consider the mysteries of that law.592 By this expression he clearly signifies, that the sun arises on the earth, where the word of God shines on mankind; but that they derive little advantage from it, till he himself either gives them eyes or opens them, who is therefore called “the Father of lights;”593 because wherever he shines not by his Spirit, every thing is covered with darkness. Thus also the Apostles were rightly and abundantly taught by the best of all teachers: yet, if they had not needed the Spirit of truth594 to instruct their minds in that very doctrine which they had previously heard, they would not have been commanded to expect him. If, in imploring any favour of God, we confess our need, and if his promising it argues our poverty, let no man hesitate to acknowledge, that he is incapable of understanding the mysteries of God, any further than he has been illuminated by Divine grace. He who attributes to himself more understanding, is so much the blinder, because he does not perceive and acknowledge his blindness.

XXII. It remains for us to notice the third branch of knowledge, relating to the rule for the proper regulation of our life, which we truly denominate the knowledge of works of righteousness; in which the human mind discovers somewhat more acuteness than in the two former particulars. For the Apostle declares, that “when the Gentiles, which have not the law, do by nature the things contained in the law, these, having not the law, are a law unto themselves; which show the work of the law written in their hearts, their conscience also bearing witness, and their thoughts the mean while accusing or else excusing one another.”595 If the Gentiles have naturally the righteousness of the law engraven on their minds, we certainly cannot say that they are altogether ignorant how they ought to live. And no sentiment is more commonly admitted, than that man is sufficiently instructed in a right rule of life by that natural law of which the Apostle there speaks. But let us examine for what purpose this knowledge of the law was given to men; and then it will appear how far it can conduct them towards the mark of reason and truth. This is evident also from the words of Paul, if we observe the connection of the passage. He had just before said, “As many as have sinned without law, shall also perish without law; and as many as have sinned in the law, shall be judged by the law.” Because it might appear absurd that the Gentiles should perish without any previous knowledge, he immediately subjoins that their conscience supplies the place of a law to them, and is therefore sufficient for their just condemnation. The end of the law of nature, therefore, is, that man may be rendered inexcusable. Nor will it be improperly defined in this manner – That it is a sentiment of the conscience sufficiently discerning between good and evil, to deprive men of the pretext of ignorance, while they are convicted even by their own testimony. Such is the indulgence of man to himself, that in the perpetration of evil actions he always gladly diverts his mind as much as he possibly can from all sense of sin; which seems to have induced Plato to suppose, that no sin is committed but through ignorance. This remark of his would be correct, if the hypocrisy of men could go so far in the concealment of their vices, as that the mind would have no consciousness of its guilt before God. But since the sinner, though he endeavours to evade the knowledge of good and evil imprinted on his mind, is frequently brought back to it, and so is not permitted to shut his eyes, but compelled, whether he will or not, sometimes to open them, there is no truth in the assertion, that he sins only through ignorance.

XXIII. Themistius, another philosopher, with more truth, teaches that the human understanding is very rarely deceived in the universal definition, or in the essence of a thing; but that it falls into error, when it proceeds further, and descends to the consideration of particular cases. There is no man, who, if he be interrogated in a general way, will not affirm homicide to be criminal; but he who conspires the death of his enemy, deliberates on it as a good action. The adulterer will condemn adultery in general; but will privately flatter himself in his own. Here lies the ignorance – when a man, proceeding to a particular case, forgets the rule which he had just fixed as a general position. This subject is very excellently treated by Augustine, in his exposition of the first verse of the fifty-seventh Psalm. The observation of Themistius, however, is not applicable to all cases; for sometimes the turpitude of the crime so oppresses the conscience of the sinner, that, no longer imposing on himself under the false image of virtue, he rushes into evil with the knowledge of his mind and the consent of his will. This state of mind produced these expressions, which we find in a heathen poet: “I see the better path, and approve it; I pursue the worse.” Wherefore the distinction of Aristotle between incontinence and intemperance appears to me to be highly judicious. Where incontinence predominates, he says, that by the perturbation of the affections or passions, the mind is deprived of particular knowledge, so that in its own evil actions it observes not that criminality which it generally discovers in similar actions committed by other persons; and that when the perturbation has subsided, penitence immediately succeeds; that intemperance is not extinguished or broken by a sense of sin, but, on the contrary, obstinately persists in the choice of evil which it has made.