Memoirs of the Court and Cabinets of George the Third

I am, Sir, with great respect and esteem,

Your most faithful and humble servant,

Mornington.

LORD MORNINGTON TO THE MARQUIS OF BUCKINGHAM.

Hertford Street, July 19th, 1797.

My dear Lord,

I assure you that I felt no difficulty or delicacy whatever in communicating your letter to Mr. Pitt as soon as I received it, and I flatter myself that throughout the whole of the arrangement relative to India I have never been found deficient in any mark of regard for my old friend Hobart's interest or honour. Mr. Pitt authorized me to inform you that he would very soon write both to you and to Lord Hobart; and to that letter, whenever you receive it, I must refer you for the detail of facts on which Mr. Pitt is more competent to afford explanation than I. I must however declare, in justice both to Pitt and Dundas, that I see nothing in the conduct of either to justify the least suspicion of any other than the most cordial sentiments of good-will towards Hobart. I have said the same thing to Mr. Sullivan, whom you will probably see, and stated the grounds of my opinion at large. Mr. Pitt does not appear to admit that Lord Hobart's interests ever have been or can be made matter of negotiation. He says he has acted in the whole transaction, and will continue to act, conformably to his sense of public duty, and his unaltered feelings of friendship for Lord Hobart, to whom he will not fail to give a full statement of all his conduct. I believe Mr. Dundas's view of the subject to be nearly the same; but not being at liberty to communicate your letter to him, I have not been enabled to enter so fully with him into the discussion of its contents. However, I can inform you that his favourable intentions towards Lord Hobart remain precisely the same.

Mr. Sullivan will immediately communicate in person with Mr. Dundas on all the points of this business, and you will learn the result from him.

Nothing but the continual hurry and interruptions to which I am at present exposed could justify my having delayed so long the acknowledgment of your kind letter. Pray, my dear Lord, accept my cordial thanks for the many marks of friendship which it contains. I do not expect to sail before September, and you may be assured that I will make it my business to see you before my departure.

Ever, my dear Lord,

Yours most sincerely and affectionately,

Mornington.

The remaining letters of the year refer at intervals to the events in progress on the continent; events which occupy so large and prominent a space in history, as to render any detailed allusion to them unnecessary.

LORD GRENVILLE TO THE MARQUIS OF BUCKINGHAM.

Cleveland Row, April 28th, 1797

My dearest Brother,

I have this day seen Dutheil, and to-morrow I am to see the other; but there has been a blunder about it, or I should long since have seen him. I hardly know how to credit all I hear on that subject, and yet I must say I hear it from all quarters, agreeing in the essentials, though varying a little as to sub-divisions, according to the dispositions of the informants.

I hardly know how to tell myself, under these circumstances, what I wish about Hammond's mission, because the panic here is so disgraceful, that the country will not allow us to do them justice. If I thought others would do them that justice, my resolution would soon be taken; but I have not nerves to plunge my country into the horrors of a Jacobin Government to save myself the unpleasant task of being compelled to do worse for them than I am sure I could if they would but be quiet and suffer themselves to be saved. It is a curious speculation in history to see how often the good people of England have played this game over and over again, and how incorrigible they are in it. To desire war without reflection, to be unreasonably elated with success, to be still more unreasonably depressed by difficulties, and to call out for peace with an impatience which makes suitable terms unattainable, are the established maxims and the regular progress of the popular mind in this country. Yet, such as it is, it is worth all the other countries of the world put together, so we must not too much complain of it.

I am grieved to hear that your dear son has had another relapse, and should be extremely obliged to you if, whenever you can send me a better account, as I trust you will be able to do, you would let me have a line.

Ever most affectionately yours,

G.

LORD GRENVILLE TO THE MARQUIS OF BUCKINGHAM.

Cleveland Row, May 3rd, 1797.

My dearest Brother,

The Paris papers arrived this morning seem to confirm, beyond a doubt, the signature of peace with the Emperor. We know nothing more of it than you will find in those papers. The last accounts from Vienna which I have received were of the 17th, and they looked more like war than peace; but not enough so to give me any reason to doubt the fact.

The task which is now left to us, is no doubt arduous and difficult. It would not be in the least so with a country united, and feeling its own strength: but to contend against dejection, cowardice and disaffection at home, aiding a powerful enemy from without, is not a light or easy matter. It must, however, be tried; for I have no conception that any other use can be made of this event by the Directory, than that of exacting from us concessions, which I trust neither the country nor Parliament will bring themselves to listen to.

I hope you are all going on well at Stowe, and that your invalid is recovering. Have you seen my Prince? He is sensible, and well informed; though not exactly the picture of a young lover.

Ever most affectionately yours,

G.

LORD GRENVILLE TO THE MARQUIS OF BUCKINGHAM.

Cleveland Row, May 5th, 1797.

My dearest Brother,

The messenger is arrived this morning, and has brought us the confirmation of the Paris reports. The preliminaries were signed on the 18th; but we are still uninformed of the particulars of the conditions, except that they contain a stipulation for a Congress at Berne, to which the allies of the two parties are to be invited. I believe, from what I can collect from the very defective information which has yet reached us, that the articles have been drawn in so much haste and confusion, and by persons so little used to transact points of this nature, that they are unintelligible, and require explanation before they can be made public, or even communicated to other Courts. Thugut has resigned – this step having been taken in contradiction to his opinion – and a Count Cobenzl, now Austrian Minister at Petersburg, is supposed to be destined to succeed him. This is, in the whole of it, a great event, and big with the greatest consequences, whether good or bad —caliginosá nocte premit Deus.

You cannot see the state of Ireland more gloomily than I do. Possibly, if we have peace, that may leave us more at liberty to act in that quarter; but even then, what force have we? and to what objects are we to direct it, when the gentlemen are all flying from their duty, and either joining the adverse standard, or at best deserting their posts?

I rejoice to hear so good an account of your son, and I trust the attack is now over, though the recovery of strength must naturally be very slow.

Ever, my dear brother,

Most affectionately yours,

G.

Wells's ship's crew being harangued by him refused to cheer with the other ships, till the 'Glory' loaded her guns to fire upon her.

MR. T. GRENVILLE TO THE MARQUIS OF BUCKINGHAM.

Charles Street, May 9th, 1797.

My dearest Brother,

I cannot express to you my disappointment in the Portsmouth news, which I found upon my return to town yesterday evening. By the post of Saturday, the letters from the fleet were better than they had ever been; and the officers themselves seemed in much better heart and spirits. On Sunday, however, it broke out afresh: representations were handed about, complaining that the speeches of Lord Howe, Lord Spencer and the Duke of Clarence, were meant to disappoint the seamen of what had been promised them, and it was suggested that the 'Marlborough' was to be kept back, and made an example of when the fleet had sailed. Upon these pretences, the delegates began going round to each ship: Colpoys told his crew he would not admit them; they mutinied, and he ordered his marines to fire, who did so, and badly wounded four mutineers; but the fire was returned by the crew, who overpowered the officers and the marines, confined Colpoys, and threatened to hang Lieutenant Bover. To save him, Colpoys asserted that Bover had been ordered so to act by him, and that he had an order for this discipline from the Admiralty, which order he gave to the delegates. The order was a very proper order from the Admiralty to every captain, requiring him to give no cause of complaint to the men on the subject of provisions, requiring him to keep up a proper discipline, and to exert a proper spirit in resisting any appearance of mutiny. This order, we since hear, is stated as an act of treachery in the Admiralty as against the seamen.

Upon this tumult in the 'London,' the crews of the other ships took possession of the arms, and many confined their officers to their cabins. The post of to-day brings no new or different state of things, except an account that three of the mutineers are dead in Haslar Hospital of their wounds; and that Campbell, Nichols, Talbot, one or two other captains, and many lieutenants, have been put on shore at St. Helen's.

A messenger was dispatched last night with the news of the vote of the House of Commons having passed unanimously, but it is doubtful whether in this high wind he could get to the fleet; and all these circumstances show so little colour or pretence of real complaint, that I cannot help fearing the evil is more deeply rooted in the influence of Jacobin emissaries and the Corresponding Society, and to their machinations the vote of yesterday will afford no answer. Upon the whole, this is the worst state of things which I have seen. The ground of the mischief is not known to the officers, and as far as I can see, they have no heart or nerves to meet this formidable calamity. With this wind they might have sailed; but with what has happened in the 'London,' and with so many officers put on shore, one can hardly now wish the fleet to sail.

The last accounts from Brest announce about twenty sail, but not in a very forward state of readiness; but this state of our fleet cannot be news to them, and they will doubtless profit of an opportunity which perhaps they have themselves created.

At half-past one no news was come. If I hear more before the post goes out, I will add it.

God bless you, dearest brother.

MR. T. GRENVILLE TO THE MARQUIS OF BUCKINGHAM.

Charles Street, May 11th, 1797.

My dearest Brother,

Great anxiety again prevailed here by an account which arrived at midnight, that the delegates were on board the 'London,' and it was feared they were urging for the execution of Colpoys and his captain; but a few hours afterwards, news arrived that Colpoys' crew had resisted the delegates; that even the most mutinous ships, viz. the 'Duke' and 'Mars,' were returned to their duty, and that most of the ships had desired their officers to join them again. I have also read a letter from Payne, who writes in high spirits, and says that there is now a complete hostility on the part of the well-affected as against the mutineers, and that he has just spoke a cutter from the 'Queen Charlotte' with twenty or thirty well-affected men on board, who were going to every ship in the fleet, to insist upon everything being quiet, and upon their going instantly to sail in quest of the French. Lord Howe would arrive about nine this morning, with a warrant under the King's sign-manual, for making such final arrangement as might be necessary for the sailing of the fleet, if he should find it so disposed to sail. Not a word from Lord Bridport, except to acknowledge the communication of the Act of Parliament!

Under these circumstances, there is every reason to suppose that one may hope the immediate storm is a little blown over, and that no new resource need be looked for such as you suggest; but the apprehension of my mind is still extremely great, because I am more and more convinced that Jacobin management and influence is at the bottom of this evil; and till that influence is traced and rooted out, there is, in my view, no chance of safety. The tampering with the soldiers by conversation and handbills is another unanswerable proof of the system by which all this mischief moves forward; and the activity of Brest in the last accounts, seems to confirm, as far as such preparation can, their knowledge of, if not their participation in, this mischief.

Orde has written from Plymouth, that he hopes to get the ships there to sea before any communication is had of this new mutiny.

Things look badly, as I believe, in Ireland; but those of Government, whom I ever see, are so entirely occupied, that I write to you more from my own guess than from their communication.

God bless you, dearest brother.

I know no foreign news of any sort, nor have I seen William these three or four last days.

A third effort to effect a pacification with France had been entered upon by Lord Grenville in the month of June. On this occasion his Lordship addressed a direct application to M. de la Croix, expressing his readiness without delay to open a discussion of the views and pretensions of both parties. To this communication M. de la Croix replied by accepting the proposal; and the town of Lisle was appointed for the meeting of the ambassadors.

Lord Malmesbury was again appointed on the part of England; and it became evident at once that his re-appearance in that capacity was not very satisfactory to the French Government, M. de la Croix coldly signifying the consent of the Directory to negotiate with Lord Malmesbury, but adding that another choice would have augured more favourably for the speedy conclusion of peace.

The conference at Lisle seems to have taken its colour all throughout from this preliminary distrust of the English envoy. It lasted up to the 17th of September; and ended as it began, in a fruitless debate about Lord Malmesbury's powers to treat in full. In the meanwhile, the event known by the name of the Revolution of Fructidor took place in Paris, the meeting was broken up, and Lord Malmesbury left Lisle on the 18th of September.

LORD GRENVILLE TO THE MARQUIS OF BUCKINGHAM.

Cleveland Row, Sept. 20th, 1797.

My dearest Brother,

Late last night we got a messenger from Lord Malmesbury, with an account that he was ordered away from Lisle, and was on his way to London, where he arrived this morning. It is not easy to say beforehand what effects it will produce here, where people's spirits are so susceptible of alarm and depression; but I really think, in the manner of doing the thing, the Directory have done everything they could to play our game.

The dissatisfaction will be great in France, but they seem, for the moment, completely masters there. Ireland is our weakest point, and to that our attention must be most directed; for anything else I have very little apprehension.

I think it probable that the consequences of this new state of things will be to detain me in and about town, and to put an end to my hopes of a journey to Stowe or Wotton; but I am not yet quite sure as to this. I hope we shall not be in a hurry to meet Parliament, as I understand that it will not be necessary, in point of finance, till about the middle of November. Between this and that time many things may still happen to raise people's spirits, which I should fear would in the present moment be much depressed, whatever pains we took to raise them.

Ever, my dearest brother, most affectionately yours,

G.

1798

CONDITION OF ENGLAND – PLANS FOR THE NATIONAL DEFENCES – THE AUGMENTATION OF THE MILITIA – VOLUNTARY SUBSCRIPTIONS – A REBELLION BREAKS OUT IN IRELAND – LORD CORNWALLIS SUCCEEDS LORD CAMDEN AS LORD-LIEUTENANT – LORD BUCKINGHAM VOLUNTEERS FOR IRELAND – DIFFERENCES WITH LORD CORNWALLIS – MR. THOMAS GRENVILLE IS APPOINTED ON A MISSION TO VIENNA AND BERLIN.

A rebellion in Ireland, and a threat of invasion from France, for which active preparations were making on the coast and in the Channel, almost exclusively absorbed the attention of Government at the beginning of the year 1798, and demanded all the resources which the devotion of the people could contribute to the protection of the country. The extremity of the public danger had the effect of uniting all classes in a combined effort for self-preservation; and the national enthusiasm was pronounced so strongly and unanimously on this point, that the heads of the Opposition, shattered and enfeebled, retired from the fruitless contest they had been so long waging against the Administration, and left Mr. Pitt and his colleagues in almost undisturbed possession of both Houses of Parliament.

But security was not to be purchased without great sacrifices. The expenditure of the past year had amounted to the enormous sum of twenty-five millions and a half; and Mr. Pitt found it necessary, in order to provide a supply equal to the emergencies of the future, to introduce an entirely new system of finance. He proposed to triple the amount of the existing assessed taxes, with a limitation, restraining the maximum of taxation to the tenth of each person's income; and to borrow the remainder of what was required without creating any additional debt, by appropriating the produce of the sinking fund.

There was a violent resistance in both Houses to this plan; Mr. Fox, Mr. Sheridan, and others, who had previously seceded, re-appearing in their places for the express purpose of opposing it; but it was carried, nevertheless, by large majorities. Several other measures, to provide means for carrying on the war, and strengthening the national defences, were also introduced; and at no period, since the commencement of hostilities, was public opinion declared so energetically in favour of the ministerial policy. Numerous circumstances contributed to feed the popular ardour as the year advanced. Splendid naval victories inspired the highest confidence in the ultimate issues of the war; commerce once more resumed its former activity; the harvest was unusually abundant; and all branches of trade and industry reached a height of prosperity that completely relieved the depression under which they had suffered during the preceding year.

The most active measures were set on foot to promote the common object of protecting the empire against foreign invasion and domestic treason. The most prominent of them was a plan for augmenting the Militia, afterwards matured and introduced by Mr. Dundas; and the collection of subscriptions towards the formation of a national defence fund. No greater proof could be given of the zeal of the people, at a period when their burthens were already so excessive, than the munificence and promptitude of their contributions on this occasion. At a meeting of bankers and merchants held in the open square of the Royal Exchange, upwards of forty-six thousand pounds were collected on the spot; the King subscribed £20,000; the Queen £5,000; numerous mercantile firms and private individuals contributed large sums, varying from £3,000 to £10,000; and the Bank of England, the noble tribute of £200,000. That this urgent necessity should have pressed heavily upon those public men whose position made a heavy demand upon their patriotism, was to be expected, and in some instances, sacrifices were made to an extent which rendered unavoidable the reduction of their domestic establishments; but no considerations of personal inconvenience were suffered to interfere with the paramount claims of duty. The subjoined letters throw considerable light on these transactions, and are of especial interest from the minute details they present respecting the measures that were adopted in this great emergency for augmenting and organizing the Militia force of the kingdom.

LORD GRENVILLE TO THE MARQUIS OF BUCKINGHAM.

Cleveland Row, Feb. 2nd, 1798.

My dearest Brother,

I saw yesterday in Pitt's hands your letter to him. The sacrifice you make is certainly very great, and such as I could not have thought myself at liberty to advise, though I am glad on the whole that your determination is such as it is; not that I am very much attached (but quite the contrary) to the idea of raising public supplies by voluntary contributions, and still less by contributions soi-disant voluntary, but in reality extorted by popular clamour and prejudice. But after that business has been carried as far as it has, it would have been too invidious for you to have put yourself in a breach which I think ought never to have been made. I am much concerned at what you say in your letter to Pitt respecting the personal inconvenience to which this step will subject you, and particularly as to the idea of your doing anything that can look like an avowed intention of suspending your residence at Stowe. It seems to me that nothing is more natural than that this state of things should lead to reduction of your establishments; and I believe in so doing you will only follow a very general example, though I appear to be selected as a much more striking instance of it than I have yet been able, with my best endeavours, to make myself. It will also be very easy for you, quartered in Essex, to be as much or as little as you please at Stowe in the course of the year; but any avowal of quitting that residence would, I think, do you a needless injury.

You will receive in a day or two the circular letter for calling out the supplementary Militia, with the explanation of the manner in which this is intended to be executed, so as to make it a muster of the whole, but an embodying only of a part.

War with America and Portugal seems quite determined on at Paris; nor do I see how Denmark can keep herself out of the scrape, though she will most certainly do her best. The general opinion is that Mulin has established his superiority over Barras and Buonaparte. There can be no doubt of the intention to invade us here or in Ireland, or both.

The capture of the packet leaves us still without official or direct accounts from the West Indies, but all the accounts we get are favourable.

I enclose you, in confidence, a paper, which I think will be interesting to you. You will be so good as not to have seen it, and to return it to me. It is of course to be kept under lock and key. It is unpublished, and meant to remain so.

Ever most affectionately yours,

G.

MR. T. GRENVILLE TO THE MARQUIS OF BUCKINGHAM.

Charles Street, April 27th, 1798.

My dearest Brother,

It is only from your letter to William that I have learnt what is the actual state of the discussion which you had begun upon the subject of the flank companies of the Militia, and very sorry I am to find that it is likely to take any shape which can be unpleasant or disagreeable to you. The measure itself is one which I have understood to be one of the few measures upon which, in point of necessary military preparation, all our officers are agreed, and which, if I recollect right, you yourself are as strongly inclined to as anybody, though not precisely in the mode recommended by the Commander-in-chief; if the objections which you felt on the point of Militia establishment had been equally felt and adopted by the generality of the commanding officers of Militia, some way or other must, I suppose, have been found to accommodate the difficulties of such a representation; but in the present instance (as far as I could collect from Fortescue, who was at a pretty numerous meeting of all the Militia commanders who were in town), there was not any one of those who did not express their readiness to adopt this plan, and their approbation of it; so that, in fact, this matter, so far from being taken up by the generality of commanding officers in the same light in which you had objected to it, has really the sanction of every commanding officer, except, as I am told, Lord Berkeley, Lord Carnarvon and yourself.

Under these circumstances, much as I regret that any arrangement could be proposed and could be likely to be carried, which is so disagreeable to you, you will, however, I am sure, agree with me that it stands upon very different ground, when it stands upon the ground of individual opinions, from what it would have done if it had been taken up by the whole or the majority or a large part of the Militia. My best hopes are that some mode may yet be found which may place your own regiment in the shape that you had wished; and William has, I know, taken all the pains he can to urge the adoption of all or of any of the modifications of this order, which may make it less objectionable to you; and I cannot therefore but hope that his zeal and anxiety in this will carry it to a better shape for you as far as you are immediately interested. But we live in times of such pressing public duty, and the military post to which you are called and in which you are placed, is one so forward both in danger and in honourable distinction to you, that I should not do my duty by you if I did not (however uncalled upon for that opinion) add that, in my poor judgment, no state of military arrangements or orders can for a moment admit of the possibility of your giving up your command in an hour of danger, as immediate as that in which I write. I know you will give me credit for the honesty of this opinion, as well as for the affection which calls it forth from me.