The Command in the Battle of Bunker Hill

And in such capacity he did his duty fearlessly, faithfully, well. He was on horseback, and rode quickly from place to place.3 His main service was in connection with the reinforcements. He gave orders to them, not in the redoubt, not, I think, near the redoubt, but at the rail fence, and on Bunker Hill, and in the rear of this. He stated himself – so Stiles says – that there was "a reinforcement within half a mile" that ought to have gone on to the hill, but the heavy fire at "the open causeway" deterred it, and that "in the heat of the action he went away to fetch across this reinforcement." Now this service is consistent with the duty of a patriotic volunteer "collecting men," but is it consistent with the duty of a responsible commander, ordering a battle? What would be thought of a general, who, in the heat of an action, should leave the field, and go half a mile after a reinforcement, and not get back until a retreat had commenced? Is it not at considerable hazard to General Putnam's reputation that, with such contemporary evidence to meet as there is in this case – the authenticity of which cannot be successfully impugned – the position is maintained that he was the immediate and responsible commander of this battle? But to return: General Putnam most probably left the hill after the first attack. He next is seen braving the balls at Charlestown Neck, and, in the rear of it, urging on the backward troops. Thus Samuel Bassett says he came in full gallop to Ploughed Hill (Mount Benedict) from the neck, (which, probably, was after the first attack) exclaiming, "Up my brave boys, for God's sake! We drive them;" and Sargent and Cooke say that he was at Prospect Hill, at an hour and under circumstances, which must have been while the battle was going on. Here the contemporary evidence (Stiles and Pitts) and the soldiers' statements (Bassett, Sargent and Cooke) harmonize. The retreat (Stiles says) had commenced before he got back. But he must soon have rode to Bunker Hill, for he is found here by a messenger Col. Scammans sent; and when his regiment got to this hill he ordered it forward. On the brow of this hill, where there was hot fighting, he put himself between the retreating throng and the advancing enemy; and, regardless of personal danger, he urged the flying troops to stop. "Make a stand here!" he exclaimed, "We can stop them yet! In God's name form! and give them one shot more!" There are other circumstances that will harmonize with this detail; and if it will not furnish a stage on which to act the Major Small romance – where Putnam saves Small's life – all that need be said is, that it is time to ignore some of the romance that has accumulated about the battle of Bunker Hill.

In all this, General Putnam acted as a general officer would have acted. He gave orders, undoubtedly, not only to the Connecticut officers and troops, over whom he had a specific command, but to others over whom he had no special command. If it be true that even in an army of allies the oldest or highest officer ranks, still it is also true there must be the requisite discipline, regularity and subordination, to allow this principle to operate, and that the officer who appears on a field of battle to take the command from an inferior officer, must be ordered on by his superior. Such in either particular is not the case here. Every thing was in an irregular, half-organized, transition state, and there is no more evidence that Ward ordered Putnam on than that he ordered Pomeroy (his senior) or Warren on. Besides: he was neither the highest nor oldest allied officer, for Whitcomb, Warren, and Pomeroy ranked him. Indeed it has been stated, by those defending Putnam, that Ward could not order him on. Thus Hon. John Lowell remarks: "It is certainly true that there could not in the nature of the case have been any authorized commander." General Putnam might give orders, even accompany them with threats, and yet not be detached to supercede Prescott. In so trying a scene, an officer so popular on being seen in the field, would naturally be looked up to for advice and applied to for orders. A case in point is that of Arnold at Saratoga. He was only not ordered by Gates on to the field, but was actually under arrest, yet seeing the necessity of prompt and decisive action, he galloped about, giving orders, leading on the troops, and was obeyed as though he were ordered on. So with General Putnam during the Bunker Hill battle. He rode about from place to place, cheering all with whom he came in contact, "aiding and encouraging where the case required." Some of the officers and troops not under his immediate command respected his authority, while others refused to obey him. Some of the Connecticut forces whom he ordered to the field, did a brilliant service, and indeed no service was more brilliant; but some of the Massachusetts forces, whom he labored hard to get into the battle, behaved badly. Indeed in the afternoon, during the battle, and in the rear of Bunker Hill, there was great confusion, as Captain Chester's excellent and life-like letter (July 12, 1775) firmly establishes. That Gen. Putnam was not successful in getting these backward troops into action, in sheer justice, ought to be ascribed neither to his lack of energy nor of conduct, but to the hesitancy of inexperienced troops, to the want of spirit in some of their officers, and to the general lack of discipline and subordination in the army. General Putnam was not blamed for this at the time, but on the contrary, his services as an officer throughout the siege are spoken of in letters in terms of lively approbation. Indeed among all the documents of the time – I mean those I have seen – in print or in manuscript, there is not a disparaging remark on his services this day; and none occur until the unjust comments made by General Wilkinson in his memoirs, printed in 1816. Still, to represent that the detachment sent to Bunker Hill was under his command, and that Colonel Prescott acted under his orders, is to contradict the most positive evidence and violate the integrity of history.

William Prescott was one of the French war veterans. He served as a lieutenant of a company under General Winslow at the capture of Cape Breton, and so decided was the military talent he displayed, that he attracted the particular notice of the British commander-in-chief, who urged him to accept a commission of a lieutenancy in the regular army. This he declined, as he was unwilling to adopt a military profession and leave his native country. He was born in Groton, but he lived in that part of it which was set off, and became Pepperell. Here he took a prominent part in the questions that arose between the colonies and the mother country, and on the popular side. He represented Pepperell in the celebrated convention of committees held in Boston in 1768, in the convention of Middlesex county Aug. 30, 1774, when the boldest measures were determined upon, and in the provincial congress of October. He is called on the records of this congress Captain William Prescott. He was not a member at the time of the battle. He had been also chairman of the Pepperell committee of safety. He was chosen colonel of the minute men, when they organized agreeably to the advice of the provincial congress, and it was in this capacity that, on the "Lexington Alarm," he hastened at the head of his men to Cambridge, and acted as one of the members of the first council of war. To him were assigned some of the earliest duties of the campaign. On the 27th of May he received a colonel's commission in "the Massachusetts army," being then about fifty years of age.

Among the Massachusetts colonels there was, at that time, no one more distinguished, both in the civil and military line, than Colonel Prescott. And when the resolution to occupy Bunker Hill, so unanimously advised by the Massachusetts committee of safety, was so suddenly taken by the council of war, the selection of an officer to perform this service could not have fallen upon a patriot of greater decision of character, or a soldier of more dauntless resolution. His established reputation furnishes a sufficient reason for his being selected for so dangerous and trying a duty. Though in the afternoon of June 16, his regiment, with Frye's and Bridge's, was required to parade at six o'clock, yet it was not until evening that he received orders in writing to take the command of a detachment. He received them directly from General Ward. They required him to proceed, at the head of his detachment, to Bunker Hill, and there erect such fortifications as he and Colonel Gridley – the chief engineer of the Massachusetts army – should judge proper for its defence; and he was instructed not to communicate his orders until after he had passed Charlestown Neck. Thus he was regularly detached for a special service, and as such marched at the head of his troops. "General Putnam" – so Judge Prescott expressly states from information from his father – "did not head the detachment from Cambridge to Bunker Hill, nor march with it." It was under the entire command of Colonel Prescott.

In all the evidence, it is only twice that Colonel Prescott, up to about the time of the attack, appears in consultation with general officers: once in the night, in reference to the place to be fortified, and once just before the enemy made his first landing, in reference to the removal of the entrenching tools. It may be well to look at both these cases.

When Colonel Prescott, in the evening of June 16th, arrived at Charlestown Neck, he halted, and sent a small party, under Captain Nutting, to the lower part of the town, to serve as a guard. He soon marched over to Bunker Hill, and again halted. It was here, probably, that he communicated his orders to his officers, and held a consultation as to the place to be fortified. Other officers, who did not march with the detachment, were present, and took part in the discussion. Samuel Gray (Letter July 12, 1775,) gives the best account of what took place. He states that "the engineer and two generals went on to the hill at night, and reconnoitred the ground; that one general and the engineer were of opinion we ought not to entrench on Charlestown Hill (Breed's Hill) till we had thrown up some works on the north and south ends of Bunker Hill, to cover our men in their retreat, if that should happen; but on the pressing importunity of the other general officer it was consented to begin as was done." One of these generals was General Putnam. There is no data to determine who the other was, but rather from the estimation which Gen. Whitcomb's character was held, his recent appointment as major general, and the fact he was on active duty, than from anything else, it may be inferred that he was the general. No account states that Colonel Prescott here received an order; but Judge Prescott does say that the responsibility of the decision rested with him. When the troops got to the spot, so Prescott states, "the lines were drawn by the engineer." After the men were at labor General Putnam, and probably the other general, returned to Cambridge.

The other instance, which was before the British landed, occurred between eleven and twelve o'clock in the forenoon. The men had mostly ceased to labor on the entrenchments, and the entrenching tools had been piled in the rear of them. General Putnam rode on horseback to the redoubt, and consulted Colonel Prescott relative to beginning works on Bunker Hill; he also remarked to the colonel that the entrenching tools ought to be sent off or they might be lost. General Heath first relates this circumstance, and he is supported by the depositions of several soldiers. Col. Prescott replied that if he (Prescott) sent any of the men away not one of them would return. To this Putnam replied, "they shall every man return." "A large party," Heath says, "was then sent off with the tools, and not one of them returned. In this instance the colonel was the best judge of human nature." No order was given to Colonel Prescott, and the collision of opinion was merely as to whether the men would return to the redoubt. It is probable, by the way, that this affair of the tools is the kernel of truth there is in the stories told of Putnam's riding off the field with parcels of "pickaxes," "spades," "tents," or "tent-poles," on his horse. As though an officer with his reins in one hand and his sword in the other, would or could have, in the thick fight of such a retreat as that of Bunker Hill, such gear about him. These stories are neither consistent with a general's duty nor with a coward's fear.

Such are the only two occasions where mention is made of any thing done when Colonel Prescott, up to about the hour of the attack, was in consultation with general officers. It is, however, now admitted, that he was the commander during the night of June 16th, and until the next day about two o'clock in the afternoon. He detached guards to the shores, convened his officers in council, applied directly to General Ward for reinforcements, and no general officer gave him an order. It is at the precise time when Generals Warren, Pomeroy and Putnam came on to the field that the command is said to have changed. But no authority states that General Ward ordered on one of these generals to supercede Prescott; and that their volunteer presence, so far as the fact is concerned, changed the command, is expressly denied by contemporary testimony. Besides, it is thoroughly refuted by Colonel Prescott's admirable letter giving an account of the action. This letter throws great light on the battle; for it specifies, for the first time, important dispositions that were made, and important orders that were given, and who gave them. It indicates any thing rather than a change of command at this precise time. If this letter is characterised by directness and modesty, it has also a soldier's frankness.

But there may be said to have been, in the action, a divided command. Colonel Prescott's letter, in connection with another contemporary letter (July 22, 1775,) of almost equal interest and authority, written by Captain John Chester, an accomplished Connecticut officer in the battle, clearly shows this; and, in fact, it is only necessary to put together a few passages from these two letters, which have so long lain in manuscript, to show minutely how it originated. At the time the British first landed, between one and two o'clock, there had been but one position taken, (the small parties stationed in Charlestown, and, possibly, slight works just began on Bunker Hill, excepted) – namely, that of the first entrenchments, close together, on Breed's Hill. Here were the Massachusetts troops and the two hundred Connecticut men, – the New Hampshire forces not having arrived. The enemy, on landing at Moulton's Point, immediately formed in three solid columns; but soon there were indications that he intended to surround the redoubt. It might have been as General Howe, with a party, reconnoitered the entrenchments, or on the appearance of a flanking party. Colonel Prescott saw the necessity of a counteracting movement. But let the two letters tell the story. Chester says: "They (the British) were very near Mystic River, and, by their movements, had determined to outflank our men and surround them and their fort. But our officers in command, soon perceiving their intention, ordered a large party of men (chiefly Connecticut) to leave the fort, and march down and oppose the enemy's right wing." That is, the enemy appeared determined to move his right wing along the shore of Mystic River and surround the fort, and this "large party" was detached to take a position to prevent him. Now Prescott says: "I ordered the train, with two field pieces, to go and oppose them (the British) and the Connecticut forces to support them." The train did not do the required service, but it was otherwise with the Connecticut forces. Chester adds: "This they did, and had time to form somewhat regularly behind a fence half of stone and two rails of wood. Here nature had formed something of a breastwork, or else there had been a ditch many years agone. They grounded arms, and went to a neighboring parallel fence and brought rails, and made a slight fortification against musket ball." Now Samuel Gray, (July 12, 1775,) states that this party was under the command of Captain Thomas Knowlton. Here, then, is a clear, circumstantial and authentic contemporary account, which cannot be set aside. It was Colonel Prescott, not General Putnam, who gave the important order for Captain Knowlton to leave the fort and "oppose the enemy's right wing," which occasioned the construction of the rail fence breastwork that ran down to Mystic River; and to this gallant and noble soldier, of keen military eye, who had admirable discretion as well as marked bravery, belongs the honor of beginning this celebrated defence. In a short time after it had been commenced, and while his men were thus occupied, Colonel Stark, and, closely following him, Colonel Reed, each at the head of a New Hampshire regiment, came on, took position here, and went on extending this work. General Putnam also came here, and what more like him than that, as the companies were falling into line, and the British were slowly marching to the attack, he should ride about, and speak cheering words, and give them orders, and tell them how to place the rails, and exclaim, "Man the rail fence, for the enemy is flanking on us fast!" "Men, you are all marksmen; don't any of you fire until you see the white of their eyes." Such facts are stated by several of the soldiers in their depositions. Indeed the evidence, with few exceptions, will agree well in fixing Putnam, on the first attack, at the rail fence. This attack was made about half past three.

In this way, there had been two positions taken, when the British made their assault, the last one – the rail fence – being at the base of Bunker Hill, some six hundred feet in the rear of the first one at Breed's Hill; the diagonal line between the two being but slightly protected, if protected at all. It was General Howe's plan first to turn this last position, "to penetrate" the rail fence by his light infantry, surround the fort, and cut off a retreat. Lieut. Page's plan of the battle, which has been accurately engraved for the Siege of Boston, by far the best plan, (so correct that its ground work finely agrees with Felton & Parker's excellent plan of Charlestown, taken in 1848,) has named on it the order in which it was intended the British troops should advance upon the redoubt, after this part of the defence had been forced. "But," says a British letter, July 5, 1775, "how could we penetrate? Most of our grenadiers and light infantry, the moment of presenting themselves, lost three fourths, and many nine-tenths of their men; some had only eight and nine men a company left; some only three, four, five." Another British letter says it "was found to be the strongest post ever occupied by any set of men." The noble service done here is universally acknowledged. General Putnam was here during the first attack, but after it he rode to the rear to urge on the reinforcements. Pomeroy, Stark, Reed, McClary and Knowlton, however, remained here during the battle, and towards the close they were joined by others. This brave band did not retreat until the main body under Prescott was obliged to leave the hill. Where all behaved so gallantly, it is delicate to name the most active officer. After Putnam left, Colonel Stark was the senior officer, who had a special command. But there was little military order, or general command here. Hence Colonel Stark, his son Major Stark, General Dearborn, and others, were in the habit of stating that there was no general command, and even no efficient command at all, but that every one fought pretty much on his own hook.

But Colonel Prescott did not go to the rail fence. His letter clearly warrants the inference that, after he ordered Captain Knowlton out of the fort, he had no intercourse with him or with the forces that took position there. Of Knowlton's party he says, they went "I suppose to Bunker Hill." (The rail fence was at the base of this hill.) Of the New Hampshire troops he says – "There was a party of Hampshire, in conjunction with some other forces, lined a fence at a distance of threescore rods back of the fort, partly to the north." The committee of safety account also indicates that this was a separate party. Other authorities are to the same point. Wilkinson, for instance, states that there was no concert or coöperation between the party at the fence and the main position at the redoubt. Pomeroy, Putnam, Stark, Knowlton, and other officers, named as being at the fence, are not named as being, during the battle, in the redoubt. But Colonel Prescott remained at the original entrenchments. Soon after he detached Captain Knowlton to the important duty assigned to him, he detached the lieutenant colonel and major of his own regiment for other duty. He says – "I commanded my Lieut. Col. Robinson and Major Woods, each with a detachment, to flank the enemy, who, I have reason to think, behaved with prudence and courage." The depositions of the soldiers are too confused to admit of a satisfactory detail of the movements of these two parties. The service performed by the brave Captain Walker, of Chelmsford, so far from being a reckless volunteer dash, was probably done by Prescott's order, and under one of those higher officers. The letter of Prescott mentions other particulars, indicating independent command, and states that he kept "the fort about one hour and twenty minutes after the attack with small arms." He then gave the order to retreat. The first position was the important post of the day, the main object of the enemy; and here Prescott remained certainly the regular, responsible, authorized commander – "the proper commanding officer," Heath writes, "during the whole action." Dr Eliot, I think, of all the contemporary authorities who name the officers, observes this distinction between the two positions. He says – "Colonel Prescott commanded the party within the lines, and Colonel Stark the men who were without, behind a rail fence."

Now such efficient, uncontrolled, command – without, however, this discrimination – is positively asserted by the contemporary evidence and sustained by subsequent depositions. Thus James Thatcher says: "The incomparable Colonel Prescott marched at the head of the detachment, and though several general officers were present he retained the command during the action." John Pitts says: "No one appeared to have any command but Colonel Prescott, whose bravery can never be enough acknowledged and applauded." Peter Thatcher says that he "commanded the provincials." William Tudor says "Colonel Prescott appeared to have been the chief." To this may be added subsequent statements. I select, here, only two. Judge Prescott states that no general officer "ever exercised or claimed any authority or control over him, before or in the battle;" and the anecdotes he gives, as woven into the narrative in the Siege of Boston, harmonize with this independent command. Several of the soldiers mention his efficiency in glowing terms. Thus the brave Captain Bancroft, in the redoubt, says: "He continued throughout the hottest of the fight to display admirable coolness and a self-possession that would do honor to the greatest hero of any age. He gave his orders deliberately, and how effectually they were obeyed I need not tell." What the estimate of his services by his contemporaries was, may be gathered from the enthusiastic remark of Samuel Adams, (Sept. 26, 1775,) – "Until I visited headquarters, at Cambridge, I never heard of the valor of Prescott at Bunker Hill." "Too much praise," Heath also says, "can never be bestowed on the conduct of Colonel William Prescott."

Colonel Prescott continued in the service through the year 1776; distinguished himself again at the memorable retreat from the city of New York, and served under Gates at the capture of Burgoyne. He died at Pepperell, Oct. 13, 1795. A simple tablet over his grave marks the place where his ashes repose. It is time that a monument worthy of his deeds should be erected to his memory.

Such were the parts which general officers, on or off the field, performed in this memorable battle. Colonel Prescott, acting under written orders, was regularly detailed for the service of fortifying Bunker Hill, and, from the time he ordered ground to be broken until he ordered the ground to be abandoned, he kept at the original entrenchments, and acted the part of a commanding officer, no general officer giving him an order, and none having been ordered to supercede him; General Warren, a volunteer in spite of the affection that would have kept him from the field, without having any special command, remained in the redoubt and fought side by side with Prescott; General Pomeroy, fighting with a bravery worthy of his veteran renown, but with no special command, remained at the rail fence; General Putnam, in the regular command of the Connecticut troops stationed at Cambridge, was active, energetic and fearless throughout, ordering them on to the field, giving orders to other troops, and aiding and encouraging, as a patriotic volunteer, wherever his services seem to have been required; and General Ward, keeping at his headquarters, having frequent communication with the battle field, directed the general movements of the troops to such a degree that, at the time, he was regarded as the responsible general commander. Such seems to be the conclusion which the evidence warrants.