The Command in the Battle of Bunker Hill

4. The next alleged error relates to the case of Captain Callender. Mr Swett lets his pen run as follows: "If any thing could be more wonderful than the author's mistaking one hill for another, when both have been before his eyes from his birth, it would be his adducing this case as one of disobedience, or a case of any kind to disprove that Putnam was the commander," p. 12. This indeed would be wonder upon wonder – if it were only true. But that I mistook Prospect Hill for Bunker Hill is one fancy; that this case of Callender is cited to disprove that Putnam was the commander, is another fancy. Where is it so "adduced?" Really Mr Swett's devotion to his hero leads him into strange misapprehensions. The reader will look in vain for such mistakes and citations in the pages of the Siege of Boston. Once more I ask, what in the name of common sense does Mr Swett mean? On page 164 of the Siege this very case is "adduced" among the things that bear in favor of Putnam, and no where is it cited against his "claims!" The very report made to the provincial congress, which Mr Swett accuses me of neglecting, was thoroughly studied, (and Mr Swett knew it) and is fairly quoted, and in favor of Putnam! Indeed this report, and the evidence given on the trial of Colonel Scammans were the main authorities for stating that General Putnam gave orders to the reinforcements.

But the strictures on pages 12, 13, relative to Callender, were not enough, and so Mr Swett (p. 22) adverts to this case again, and says: – "But allow the gentleman, as in regard to Callender, to manufacture his own case, grossly regardless of all known facts." What case have I manufactured? What "known facts" have I been regardless of? The chief thing that appears to be specified in this case is this: – "The author's declaration that Callender was tried for disobedience 27th June, seems to be a poetic license. Ward orders the court martial at that time, without the slightest intention of such a charge," p. 13. Why does not Mr Swett quote my language? But 1. He alludes here, I presume, to a remark (p. 185) of the Siege, when the question of command is not alluded to, but where an account is given of Callender, and it reads – "Capt. Callender, for disobedience of orders and alleged cowardice was tried June 27th." And again I say – "Captain Callender despised the charge of cowardice, and determining to wipe out the unjust stigma," &c. Now what sort of "license" has Mr Swett taken with my "declaration"? Something more than a poet's license, I fancy! 2. Any one would suppose, from Mr Swett's words, that Ward's order for a court martial specified what the charge was. Here it is – June 27, "The general orders that a general court martial be held this day at the lines, to try Captain Callender of the train of artillery. Witnesses on both sides to be duly summoned to attend a court which is to sit at 8 o'clock A. M., Col. Little president, Capt. Mosely judge advocate." What light does this throw on the matter? And what must be said of the character of Mr Swett's appeal to it?

5. Mr Swett, in denying that a portion of the troops refused to obey General Putnam, writes as follows: – "Now, we say with the utmost confidence, that, any few cases of cowardice out of the question, no military despot was ever obeyed with more implicit subjection than Putnam was throughout the battle, by every one, officers and men," – p. 10. This, coming from so thorough an investigator, from a thirty years' student of the battle, is worth examination; though, had it come from another, it might be passed over with the simple remark, that it indicated more dogmatism than knowledge. Mr Swett, however, confesses that he is leading "a forlorn hope."

Now General Putnam had little or nothing to do with the original detachment, if the two hundred Connecticut men, after they got to the rail fence, be excepted. There is no proof that he gave an order to it throughout the whole affair, but on the contrary, this is denied in the strongest terms. But his principal service was rendered in connection with the reinforcements, which arrived at the scene of action in the afternoon. After the first attack, he rode to Bunker Hill, and to the rear of it, to urge them forward. But they hesitated. He used every effort, especially, it is stated, at Charlestown Neck and on Bunker Hill, to overcome this reluctance. He ordered, entreated, encouraged and threatened, but all in vain. "The plea was" – I quote a report made in 1775 – "the artillery was gone, and they stood no chance for their lives in such circumstances, declaring they had no officers to lead them." They could not be prevailed upon to go where fighting was, and so large bodies of the troops remained out of the action. This fact is one of the most reliable, as well as most discreditable, relative to the battle. In truth, the state of things on Bunker Hill and in the rear of it, during the afternoon, was more like positive disobedience, than like "implicit subjection." However it may have been at Prescott's post there was no such efficient command in other parts of the field as is expressed in Mr Swett's language, anything he has written, or may write, to the contrary notwithstanding. There was confusion when he leaves the inference that there was order. The evidence on this point is conclusive – overwhelming.

Thus Captain Chester (1775) states: – "Those that came up as recruits were most terribly frightened, many of them, and did not march up with that true courage that their leader ought to have inspired them with." William Tudor (1775) says – "They were discouraged from advancing." Rev. John Martin (1775) says – "During the whole or most of the action Colonel Gerrish, with one thousand men was at the bottom of Bunker Hill and ought to have come up but did not." Contemporary authority as decisively connects General Putnam with the reinforcements. This is not denied. Thus Daniel Putnam, his son, states that he rode to the rear "to urge on reinforcements;" and Stiles states that he left the field to urge them on. Mr Swett, in his history, has no such "implicit subjection." He relates (p. 35) the efforts Putnam made at Charlestown Neck to induce the reinforcements that reached there to pass across; and although he "entreated, encouraged, and threatened," he could only get "some of the troops" "to venture over." Again, when Gerrish was on Bunker Hill with part of his regiment, the men disorganized and dispersed, "Putnam" —it is Mr Swett who writes this – "ordered them on to the lines; he entreated and threatened them, and some of the most cowardly he knocked down with his sword, but all in vain!" Once more, p. 41, he says – "Putnam rode to the rear and exhausted every art and effort to bring them on. Capt. Bailey only reached the lines." The evidence as to the confusion is equally clear. John Pitts (1775) says – "There never was more confusion and less command." In Major Gridley's sentence (1775) emphatic allusion is made to "the great confusion that attended" the transactions. Captain Chester (1775) says of things on Bunker Hill near the close of the battle – "When we arrived there was not a company in any kind of order." But why multiply testimony on this point? Mr Swett himself says, in his history, p. 50 – "Great allowance must be made for those unable, and those unwilling to go on; the men went on or off as they pleased and when they pleased!"

Now with such evidence – and this is but a tithe of what may be adduced – is it not surprising that such a claim of efficient command should be set up at this late day, with nothing but bare assertion to support it? If it were so, if there were this implicit subjection, this ready obedience, the enemies of General Putnam might ask with force, what they have asked in weakness – 'Why, if he was so obeyed, were not the troops at the lines? Could he not have led them up?' To affirm that he was obeyed implicitly, by officers and men, and then to be obliged to admit that those he commanded were not in battle raging a stone's throw off, is to place the brave old general in an awkward position, a position he never filled in his life time. Mr Swett's zeal here lacks discretion.

6. Another mistake seems to astonish Mr Swett "by its magnitude, nay its sublimity." He says – "According to him, the great battle of Bunker Hill was fought, on our side, by a headless mob; and, to prove this, he adduces the most incontrovertible argument in the world, were it true, that the army at Cambridge, which had been for two months collecting and organizing under the able and experienced Gen. Ward, assisted by a host of accomplished veteran officers, was itself a mob," – p. 3. No quotation is made to sustain these remarks, and none can be made. Nothing to warrant it can be found in the book, and it is enough to stamp it as glaring misrepresentation. I hold no such opinion. I adduce no such argument. It may be cruel to annihilate so much "magnitude" and "sublimity," but I must state that they have no better basis than Mr Swett's imagination.

In opposition to this "mob" theory, Mr Swett goes to the other extreme, and affirms, p. 18 – "That the army at Cambridge was regularly organized and consolidated under Ward, Warren, Putnam, and other officers in regular gradation, without any distinction in regard to the colonies whence the troops came." And this is repeated on p. 21, and again on p. 29. In fact this constitutes the foundation of one of Mr Swett's "incontrovertible" proofs that Putnam was the commander. It is strange that Mr Swett should venture upon such assertions flatly in the face of the most positive evidence. He makes no attempt to disprove the facts, first brought together in the Siege of Boston, (pp. 98 to 104) relative to the action of the colonies, and which were drawn entirely from contemporary MSS. and authorities. It is not necessary to repeat them here. They show that each of the four colonies commissioned its troops, supplied them with provisions, directed their disposition, and that it was not until after the battle of Bunker Hill that the Committee of War of Connecticut ordered Generals Spencer and Putnam, while their troops were in Massachusetts, to obey General Ward as commander-in-chief, in order that there might be "a due subordination;" and also advised the colonies of Rhode Island and New Hampshire to do the same respecting their troops. That the army (June 17, 1775) was regularly organized and consolidated is not true.

The evidence in relation to the want of organization in the Massachusetts army is ample. This army certainly cannot be said to have been settled under officers in "regular gradation." I have a report made to the provincial congress of Massachusetts, dated June 15, 1775, by a committee appointed "to consider the claims and pretensions of the colonels," which goes with much particularity into many cases, and recommends several to be commissioned, which was not done, however, until after the battle. On the 21st of June an important committee was raised "to inquire into the reason of the present want of discipline in the Massachusetts army, and to report to this congress what is the proper way to put said army into a proper regulation;" and on the next day, the congress ordered the committee of safety to present lists of persons worthy to be commissioned, "that so our army may be organized as soon as possible." The army regularly organized and consolidated! I beg Mr Swett will make himself acquainted with the facts, from authentic sources, before he writes again.

The old soldiers gave Mr Swett, when he prepared his history, better information than he writes in his last pamphlet. On page 11 (edition of 1826) he says: – "They (the troops) were strangers to discipline and almost to subordination. Though nominally organized into regiments, these were deficient in numbers, many of them only skeletons, and their respective ranks not ascertained. Some of the troops were yet serving as minute men, and the officers in a number of regiments were not yet commissioned." Again, p. 14: The Americans "were unable to appreciate the necessity of discipline or to understand the unorganized state of the army in every department!!" But in 1850 the same writer has it that this same army was "regularly organized and consolidated," and in "regular gradation." It really seems only necessary to adduce Mr Swett's facts to correct Mr Swett's imagination.

The reminiscences of the veterans go so far in this direction as to border even on injustice to the army, if they do not make it a mob. Thus, Gen. Dearborn states that "nothing like discipline had entered into the army," and Mr Thaxter, whom Mr Swett likes as an authority, writes severely on this point. He says: – "As to military discipline and command (in the battle) there was none; both officers and men acted as volunteers, each one doing that which he thought right." * * "At that time our army was little better than a mob, without discipline, and with little command till General Washington came, and Gates, and gave it some regularity." It would be quite easy to increase quotations of this character. But this will answer. It conveys a very incorrect idea of the army to say that it was a mob, but it is as incorrect to say that it was regularly organized and consolidated.

7. Mr Swett, p. 16, writes – "We are delighted to discover, at last, something amusing in one of the author's mistakes. He says Putnam had the command of a regiment, because he was complimented with the empty title of colonel of a particular regiment," &c. &c. And then follows nearly a page of matter in which "signing humble servant" in letters, "the king of Prussia," "the virgin Mary," "wolves heads," figure, along with surmises about my "hallucination," and my ideas about "the odd notion" of "perdition," and of "the head of the wolf Putnam slew." Here, as usual all through the pamphlet, if I am quoted at all, it is with gross injustice. But what is all this for? What is the offence? I am really at a loss to know what it is. On page 100, the action of Connecticut is stated, and that the regiments of Spencer and Putnam, and part of Parson's, were ordered to Cambridge. Will this be contested? On p. 168, it is stated that Putnam "was in command of the Connecticut troops stationed at Cambridge," and in another place are specified, the regiments and parts of regiments that were here. Will this be disputed? Again, I state, p. 168 – "No service was more brilliant than that of the Connecticut troops whom he (Putnam) was authorized to command." Again, p. 188 – "The Connecticut forces at Cambridge were under the command of General Putnam." Is there any thing wrong here? What is there then so amusing? What has drawn forth nearly a page of such attempt at ridicule? Is it that I name the undoubted fact from the records of the Connecticut assembly, that General Putnam had a regiment? Has Mr Swett forgotten how he commences his own account of the battle? His first paragraph, p. 18, reads – "The same order issued for one hundred and twenty of Gen. Putnam's regiment, and Capt. Gridley's company of artillery with two field pieces;" a statement, by the way, nearly all wrong: for "the same order" for Prescott's, Frye's, and Bridge's regiments to parade (see Fenno's MS. Orderly Book,) 1, did not embrace the Connecticut men; 2, nor Gridley's company; 3, there were two hundred men; and 4, they were not all taken from "Putnam's regiment" – four errors in less than three lines! But to return. Once more I ask, what is the mistake I have committed about Gen. Putnam's regiment? What is there so amusing? Where is the point of the ridicule?

Mr Swett throughout his pages has much matter rather personal, which may pass for what it is worth. He supposes how I would write on "chemistry" and "astronomy;" he compares me to a character Colman has in his "Broad Grins," and to a clergyman "fulminating" against the "flaunting top-knots our foremothers wore;" and he accuses me of mooting questions "on a par with that of free agency or the origin of evil." It is not, however, necessary even to specify other such matter. He makes President Adams, Sen., and Judge Tudor, after failing "so egregiously" on a certain question, jump into a "quickset hedge," and ascribes to me a power of following them with my "eyes shut." I feel honored in being put in such society, and as yet suffer no inconvenience from the place we occupy. But one remark I protest against. On p. 10 he says we are writing on a subject technical, and "concerning which both of us confess we know little or nothing." Here I claim at least the privilege of the dying. Positively, Mr Swett has no authority to act as my confessor. And how a person, who, in 1818, stated that "from his attention to military subjects," he consented to describe the battle, and who since, has had a thirty years' study of it, can in 1850 "confess" that professionally, he knows "little or nothing" about it, seems "most inconceivable."

The errors that have been examined appear to be the most material which Mr Swett has specified, though he names others, and even grows desponding over their number. He remarks, p. 10 – "We have made the supposition of the author's fundamental error being solitary; but errors, like misfortunes, never come alone. The lost traveller who wanders from the right road enters a boundless field of aberration, and at every step plunges deeper into a chaos of mistakes." The right road in this case is probably the beaten path of Mr Swett's history, and every step from it is aberration and a plunge deeper into "chaos." The reader can judge of the nature of some of these mistakes. Others are of like character. It is however, entirely inadmissible that facts resting on contemporary documents are to be proved errors by the recollection of aged people. Is it not a waste of words to refute charges based on this sort of proof? I have aimed to give a faithful relation of facts, and on this score fear no investigation and ask no quarter. But more of this in another place.

But in spite of this endeavor to state things exactly, it would be strange indeed if the "Siege of Boston" did not contain errors, for what book is without them? As yet none of much importance have been pointed out, though I should thank any one who will inform me of such as there are and should be glad to correct them. Two may be here acknowledged: one on page 135 where "to a slough," should read "towards a slough." I regret to have met with no particular contemporary description of the entrenchments, and hence quoted Mr Swett's words, and this error was copied from his History! (This quotation is acknowledged on p. 135 of Siege of Boston as from p. 20 of his History.) Another error is on page 164, where "riding down the hill" should read "going down the hill," an error inadvertantly made in copying for the press. Long before Mr Swett printed his pamphlet he knew how these errors occurred, and also knew they were acknowledged and corrected for a subsequent edition of the Siege of Boston. What more could be done?

When this is considered let the reader judge the spirit or purpose or honor that could have dictated Mr Swett's comments on these two errors. 1. Of the breastwork error, he says – "By describing it as reaching down to the slough he has represented it as longer than it was, and has marred and obscured by this mistake one of the principal features of the battle," &c., &c., p. 5. Indeed! Is this so? Let both descriptions be examined and it will be seen who, in this, has "marred and obscured" this battle the most. The Siege says, page 135 – "A breastwork beginning a short distance from the redoubt, and on a line with its eastern side, extended about one hundred yards north to a slough." The distance specified was taken by measure from Page's Plan – "to a slough" was taken from Mr Swett's History! The error is mostly corrected by the limitation. Now Mr Swett's description (History, p. 20, 1823 edition) reads – "A breastwork ran in a line with it north down to the slough." The error here has no corrective! My breastwork runs only "about one hundred yards north." Mr Swett's breastwork runs north down splash to the slough, – marring and obscuring (he says,) the principal features of the memorable Bunker Hill battle! But really he is altogether too severe on his mistake! 2. On the other error Mr Swett writes – "As if purposely to declare he did not think anything relative to Putnam deserving of ordinary care or attention, he says – 'This report states Callender was riding down the hill, when there is not a syllable of the kind,'" p. 13. Now, 1st, the words put upon me between quotation marks are not mine. This is not what I say. The statement in the Siege, p. 164, is – "In the report (1775) made to the Massachusetts provincial congress it is stated that on Bunker Hill he (Putnam) ordered Capt. Callender, who was riding down the hill, 'to stop and go back.'" This statement, substituting going for riding, is correct. The exact statement of the report is that "an officer of the train was drawing his cannon down" Bunker Hill, when General Putnam met him and ordered him "to stop and go back." "He refused, until the General threatened him with immediate death, upon which he returned up the hill again, but soon deserted his post. Another officer, who had the direction of another cannon, conducted much in the same manner." And in another place Captains Gridley and Callender are named as being the officers. Now, by comparing this report with an article on Callender in the Centinel (1818), it will be seen that it was Callender "who was going down the hill." The sentence in the Siege is quoted simply to show that Gen. Putnam gave orders in the battle, and is concise, but it was written with "care and attention." I fearlessly appeal to the report to sustain this remark. Let Mr Swett look at it closely, calmly, and surely he cannot again write that "there is not a syllable of the kind there!" As though I had manufactured the whole statement! Here, then, an inexact quotation from the Siege, and a false statement as to fact, are prefaced by an illiberal, unjust and even wanton remark. Let the Siege of Boston, I had almost written everywhere, answer whether its author "did not think anything" "deserving of ordinary care and attention" relative to General Putnam. While Mr Swett is dealing out such rank injustice, accusing me of "sacrificing" Putnam's character, of "racking my fancy" to discover objections against "his claims," and I know not what else, it is peculiarly gratifying to me to be able to show the impression which the pages of this volume, as far as they relate to Putnam, made on a candid critic. An article on the Siege of Boston, in the Philadelphia Bulletin – understood to be from the pen of William B. Reed, Esq., the accomplished author of the Life of President Reed – after, I fear, too favorable a notice of my labors, reads: —

"For one thing we especially thank Mr Frothingham – his defence of Putnam from the miserable imputations which anonymous or irresponsible writers of a late day have sought to cast on his memory. He does it thoroughly, and shows that at Bunker Hill, as on all occasions where he had a chance, the old man valiant did his duty well."

What but partizan feeling could have dictated such gross and groundless attacks on the integrity of the Siege of Boston as abound on nearly every page of Mr Swett's pamphlet?

Having thus shown what some of the accusations made against the History of the Siege of Boston amount to, I might here stop. If remarks on the Battle of Bunker Hill, to which I apprehended no intelligent inquirer would object, and a fair citation of the evidence on both sides, which it would have been grave neglect to have omitted, be excepted, the whole statement relative to the question of command is given in a few lines, and seemed to be such as the authorities quoted necessarily demanded. They will do it injustice who discover in it, or fancy they discover, any disposition to make out an exclusive hero, or to fortify an "invincible prepossession." The question really seems of little practical account. General Putnam acted throughout with that bravery that marked his nature, – at the rail fence and on the brow of Bunker Hill in the heat of the action, and in the rear of these urging on the reinforcements. Gen. Warren, armed with a musket, fought in the redoubt, where he remained throughout the action; General Pomeroy, in the same way, kept at the rail fence; Colonel Prescott commanded at the original entrenchments. How much would it add to the fame of either of these patriots, were it made out clear that either exercised, or was authorized to exercise, a general command? How much would it increase the gratitude posterity owes to their memory for their gallant conduct? With such views, even the zeal and positiveness, and injustice, of Mr Swett shall not make me a partizan. I have only gone where the evidence carried me.