Government in the United States, National, State and Local

Mode of Election of Senators.– In regard to the mode of election of senators there was a wide difference of opinion among the members of the convention. Some favored choice by the people; others favored election by the lower house of Congress; some proposed appointment by the President from persons nominated by the state legislatures; while others proposed election by the state legislatures, which was the method finally agreed upon. Choice by the legislature, it was felt, would be the means of forming a connecting link between the state governments and the national government and would thereby tend to attach the former to the latter – an important consideration then, in view of the prevailing jealousy of the state governments toward the national government. Finally, it was believed that choice by the legislature would tend to secure the election of senators of greater ability since the members of the legislature would be more familiar with the qualifications of candidates than the masses of the people could hope to be.

Objections to the Method of Choice by the Legislature.– One of the practical objections to the original method of choosing senators was that it frequently led to long and stubborn contests which sometimes ended in deadlocks. Not infrequently the legislature failed to elect a senator and the state was left with a vacancy in the senate. In such cases the governor could not fill the vacancy by appointment as he did when a senator died or resigned; the seat remained vacant until a senator was chosen by the legislature. From 1890 to 1912 not less than eleven states at one time or another were represented in the senate by one member only, and in 1901 Delaware, on account of repeated deadlocks, had no senator at all at Washington to speak for the state. Not infrequently such contests were broken through the selection of a second-rate man or by an alliance between the members of the minority party and certain members of the majority.

Bribery.– The breaking of deadlocks was sometimes accomplished by bribery or other improper influences. Indeed charges of bribery and corruption in connection with the election of senators came to be very common, and there is little doubt that between 1895 and 1910 a number of wealthy men found their way into the senate through the votes of legislators who were liberally paid for their support. Under these circumstances it was frequently said that the senate was no longer truly representative of the interests of the people.

Interference with Legislative Business.– A prolonged senatorial contest also interfered too much with the regular business of the state legislature. Where the session is limited to two or three months, as it frequently is, the inroads upon the time at the disposal of the legislature for looking after the needs of the state were considerable.28 Members were badgered by candidates, passions and animosities were engendered, a party coloring was given non-partisan measures, and the votes of members on legislative measures were sometimes determined by the senatorial contest, rather than by the merits of the measure on which they were called to vote.

Popular Election of Senators.– The dissatisfaction with the old method of choosing senators led to a movement to secure an amendment to the Constitution providing for the election of senators by the people. But the senate itself for a long time blocked every attempt of this kind. Five different times between 1893 and 1911 the national house of representatives by a large majority proposed an amendment for this purpose, but each time the senate refused its concurrence. In one form or another the legislatures of thirty-one states approved of the method of popular election and wherever a referendum was taken on the proposition, as was done in California, Nevada, and Illinois, the popular indorsement was overwhelming. Finally, in 1912, the senate yielded, and both houses of Congress adopted a resolution proposing an amendment providing for the popular election of senators, which was ratified by the necessary number of states during the following year. Under this seventeenth amendment the senators of each state are elected by vote of such persons as are entitled to vote for members of the lower house of the legislature.

The seventeenth amendment provides that whenever a vacancy occurs in the senate the governor of the state in which the vacancy occurs shall issue a writ of election for the filling of such vacancy, but that the legislature may authorize the governor to fill the vacancy by a temporary appointment, the appointee to hold until a senator may be chosen by popular election. In practice special elections are rarely called for filling vacancies. In most states the governor makes a temporary appointment, the appointee holding until the next regular election when the people elect his successor.

Qualifications of Senators.– The qualifications prescribed for eligibility to the senate are the same in principle as those required of representatives, though a little different in degree. Thus a senator must be at least thirty years of age, must have been a citizen of the United States for nine years and must be a resident of the state at the time of his election. It was thought that the longer term and higher qualifications would tend to give greater dignity and strength to the upper chamber than would be found in the lower house, and at the same time a higher average of ability.

There is no provision of the Constitution which requires a senator to be a resident of a particular part of the state, but in some states there is a custom that the two senators shall be taken from different sections. Thus in Vermont custom requires that one senator shall come from the section of the state east of the Green Mountains and the other from the west side. Sometimes when there is a large city in the state it is the custom to choose one of the senators from the city and the other from the country. For a long time Maryland did not trust this matter to custom but by law enacted that one of the senators should be an inhabitant of the eastern shore and the other of the western shore.

Character of the Senate.– In the early days when the states were generally regarded as sovereign communities, senators were looked upon somewhat as ambassadors to the national government, and the right to instruct them as to how they should vote on important questions was sometimes claimed and asserted by the legislatures. Sometimes the senators obeyed the instructions, sometimes they refused; and in the latter case there were no means of enforcing obedience. Not infrequently senators are "requested" by the legislature of the state which they represent to vote for or against a particular bill.

The Senate undoubtedly possesses elements of strength and efficiency which are not to be found in the lower house. As it is a much smaller body, debate there can be carried on with more effectiveness, and the individual member has greater opportunity to make his influence felt upon legislation. The efficiency of the Senate is further increased by the fact that its members are generally men of more mature age and larger legislative experience, many of them having already served their apprenticeship in the lower house. Moreover, owing to the longer term, they are more independent of the popular opinion of the moment and, therefore, under less temptation to yield to popular clamor and vote for measures which their better judgment condemns. These facts, it may be added, have tended to increase the attractiveness of the Senate as a legislative body and to draw into it statesmen of larger ability than the lower house has been able to attract.

At the same time, these elements of strength have to some extent been sources of weakness. The attractions of the Senate have stimulated the ambitions of rich men who have few other qualifications than the possession of great wealth, and so it came to pass that a considerable proportion of the members of the upper house were representatives of great corporations and of other forms of wealth. This was not necessarily an evil, but it was often said that the senators were irresponsive to public opinion. Moreover, the Senate has been criticized for usurping to a considerable extent the powers of the executive department in regard to appointments and the conduct of foreign affairs, and has encroached upon the powers of the lower house in respect to the initiation of revenue bills. Finally, the tradition of senatorial courtesy, which makes it possible for a single senator to deadlock indefinitely the proceedings of the Senate, has been criticized as being quite out of harmony with reasonable notions of legislative procedure. All these charges, however, have been vigorously denied by many defenders of the Senate. Some of them are well founded, but all in all, the Senate compares favorably with the best upper chambers of other countries.

Decisions as to Congressional Elections and Membership.– Each house of Congress is the judge of the election, qualifications, and returns of its own members, that is, it is empowered to determine whether a member who claims to have been elected has been legally chosen and whether he really possesses the qualifications prescribed by the Constitution for membership in the house. It seems to be admitted that either house may also refuse to admit a member for other reasons than those prescribed by the Constitution, as, for example, for having been convicted of a crime or because he is insane or suffering with a dangerous contagious disease. Thus in 1900 the house of representatives refused to allow a member from Utah to take his seat because he was living in violation of the anti-polygamy laws, and in 1919 it excluded a Socialist member from Wisconsin for disloyalty during the war.

Contested Elections.– Frequently there is a contested election from a state or district, that is, two men claim to have been elected to the same seat, in which case the house must decide which one is entitled to the seat. In such a case the claims of the contestant and the contestee are heard by the committee on privileges and elections, which makes a report to the house with a recommendation as to which shall be given the seat. Unfortunately, contested election cases are not always settled on their merits, the seat being usually given to the claimant who belongs to the party which has a majority in the house. In England this source of party favoritism is removed by vesting the settlement of cases of contested elections in the courts, which are more apt to decide such contests on their merits.

Power of Expulsion.– When a member has once been admitted to his seat, he can be deprived of it only by expulsion, and to prevent the employment of this power for party purposes, the Constitution provides that the concurrence of two thirds of the members shall be necessary to expel a member. Several instances of expulsion have occurred in the past. Senator Blount of Tennessee was expelled from the senate in 1797, and a number of other cases occurred in each house during the Civil War.

Compensation of Members of Congress.– The Constitution declares that senators and representatives shall receive a compensation for their services, the same to be paid out of the treasury of the United States. Under the Articles of Confederation, each state paid its own members of Congress, and there was no uniformity in respect to the scale of compensation. Some states paid much smaller salaries than others and in order to reduce the burden of maintaining their representatives, the states generally sent to Congress the fewest number of representatives required, and as each state had only one vote, nothing was lost by having a minimum number present. One other objection to the method of state payment was that it tended to make the representative dependent upon his state and caused him to feel that he was the representative of a state rather than of the country as a whole.

In fixing the amount of the compensation of its members, Congress is subject to no restrictions. It may fix the salary at any amount it pleases, may make it retroactive in effect or may increase the amount at any time during the term for which the members are chosen. The present salary of senators and representatives is $7,500 per year, but the Speaker of the house receives $12,000 per year. In addition, each member receives an allowance for a secretary, a small sum for stationery, and mileage of twenty cents per mile going and coming by the nearest route between his home and the national capital. This mileage is intended to cover the traveling expenses of the member and his family.

In some of the countries of Europe until recently members of Parliament did not receive any compensation from the public treasury unless they happened to be members of the cabinet; this was the rule in Great Britain prior to 1911. Sometimes, however, members who represented the socialist or labor party were paid by voluntary contributions by the members of their party. The advantage of paying members of Congress a reasonable compensation is that it enables competent men without private incomes to serve the state equally with the well-to-do, who are not dependent upon their public salaries for a livelihood.

The Franking Privilege.– Another privilege which Congress allows its members is to send their mail through the post office without the payment of postage. The spirit of the law restricts the privilege to the official correspondence of members, but the privilege is generally abused. Thus a senator from South Carolina was recently criticized by the post-office department for franking his typewriter through the mails. President Taft in his annual message to Congress in December, 1910, dwelt upon the abuses of this privilege by members of Congress and other government officials. The postmaster general in 1914 called attention to a recent instance in which more than 300,000 pamphlets were circulated under the frank of a member of Congress, the postage on which would have amounted to $57,000. They related not to public business but to the interest of a certain industry in which he was concerned.

Rights and Privileges of Members of Congress.– The Constitution provides that members shall not be arrested in any case except treason, felony, and breach of the peace, during their attendance at the sessions of their respective houses and in going to and from the same; and for any speech or debate in either house, they cannot be questioned in any other place. The purpose of the first provision is to prevent interference with members in the discharge of their high and responsible duties, through arrest for trivial offenses or trumped-up charges. If a member, however, commits an offense amounting to a breach of the peace, his immunity from arrest ceases and he may be dealt with by the courts as any other offender. The object of the second provision is to secure to members absolute freedom of speech on the floor of Congress by relieving them from the liability to prosecution for slander for anything they may say in the course of debate.

Disqualifications.– On the other hand, the Constitution provides that no person holding any office under the United States shall be a member of either house of Congress during his continuance in office. This provision was adopted in pursuance of the view that the executive and legislative departments should, as far as practicable, be kept separate. Moreover, no senator or representative may, during the time for which he is elected, be appointed to any civil office which shall have been created or the emoluments of which shall have been increased during such time. The purpose of this provision is to prevent Congress from creating new offices or increasing the salaries of existing offices for the benefit of members who might desire to be appointed to them.

Special Functions of the Senate.– The senate is not only a coequal branch of the national legislature but it possesses in addition certain powers not enjoyed by the lower house.

Share in the Appointing Power.– First of all, it shares with the President the power of appointment to federal offices. The Constitution makes its approval necessary to the validity of all appointments made by the executive, the idea being that the participation of the senate would serve as a restraint upon the errors or abuses of the President and thus insure the appointment of honest and capable men to office. But it was never intended to give the senate anything more than the negative power of rejecting the nominations of the President. It is his power to nominate and that of the senate to approve or disapprove the nomination. Nevertheless, there has grown up in the senate a practice by which the senators from a particular state in which an appointment to a federal office is to be made, claim the right to select the appointee themselves and when they have agreed upon him to present his name to the President for appointment; provided, of course, that they are of the same party as the President. If the President refuses to comply with the request of the senators from a particular state, and nominates an official who is unacceptable to them, the custom of "senatorial courtesy," which has become one of the traditions of the senate, requires that the senators from the other states shall stand by their associates in question and reject the nomination of the President. In this way the senate has, in effect, assumed the power of dictating to the President appointments to many federal offices in the states, such as those of postmaster, federal judge, attorney, revenue collector, and the like. If the two senators from a state belong to different political parties, the one with whom the President is in political sympathy controls the federal patronage in the state.

Share in the Treaty-Making Power.– The senate also shares with the President the power of making treaties with foreign countries. The ordinary procedure is for the President, through the Department of State, to negotiate the treaty, after which it is laid before the senate for its approval. Approval by a two-thirds vote of the senators is necessary to the validity of the treaty. The purpose of giving the senate a share in the treaty-making power was to provide a check or restraint upon the possible abuses or errors of the executive. The extraordinary majority required for the approval of the treaty, however, has frequently proved a handicap and led to the defeat of a number of valuable treaties. Thus a small political minority can prevent the ratification of a treaty and sometimes does so when it sees an opportunity to reap political advantage thereby.

The Constitution speaks of the "advice and consent" of the senate, but in practice all the senate does is to give its consent. In the early days, however, the President not infrequently requested the "advice" of the senate before starting the negotiation of a treaty, and if the advice was unfavorable the proposed negotiations were abandoned. Even now if the President has doubts as to whether a proposed treaty would receive the approval of two thirds of the senate he will sometimes consult with the members of the senate committee on foreign relations and with other influential members, before beginning the negotiations.

The senate may reject a treaty in toto, and has done so in many instances, or it may amend a treaty laid before it, in which case it must be sent back to the government of the other country which is a party thereto for concurrence in the amendments. After the senate has consented to the ratification of a treaty, the President may ratify it or not as he likes.

The Senate as a Court of Impeachment.– Another special function of the senate is that of acting as a court for the trial of impeachment cases. The Constitution declares that the President, Vice President, and all civil officers of the United States shall be removed from office on impeachment for and conviction of treason, bribery, or other high crimes and misdemeanors. Military and naval officers are tried by court-martial and are not therefore liable to impeachment.29 To impeach an officer is to bring charges against him. So far as federal officers are concerned this power belongs exclusively to the house of representatives, which acts somewhat as a grand jury does in finding indictments against ordinary criminals. When sitting as a court of impeachment the senators are under a special oath, and when the President is on trial the chief justice of the Supreme Court is the presiding officer instead of the Vice President, who, in such a case, would be directly interested in the outcome of the trial, since in the event of the conviction and removal of the President he would succeed to the office. Managers appointed by the house of representatives appear at the bar of the senate to prosecute the charges preferred by the house, witnesses are examined, evidence presented, and the accused is defended by counsel of his own choosing. In order to prevent the employment of the impeachment power for party purposes, the Constitution provides that the concurrence of two thirds of the senators shall be necessary to convict.

The punishment which the senate may inflict in case of conviction is limited to removal from office and disqualification from holding office in the future. The Constitution makes it mandatory upon the senate to remove the convicted official, but whether he shall forever be disqualified from holding office in the future is left to the discretion of the senate. In England the House of Lords, which tries impeachment cases, is not limited in the extent of punishment which it may inflict, but may, at its discretion, sentence the convicted official to imprisonment or the payment of a fine. While the senate of the United States cannot do this, the person convicted and removed may, nevertheless, be indicted and tried by the courts as any other criminal may.

The procedure of removing an officer by impeachment is so cumbersome and unwieldy that it has rarely been resorted to. During our entire history there have been only eight impeachment trials of federal officers, and of these there were convictions in but three cases.30 If this were the only method of removal it would be difficult to get rid of corrupt and incompetent officials, but it must be remembered that any federal official except the judges may be removed from office by the President for any reason that to him seems fit and proper; and the power is frequently exercised.

References.– Andrews, Manual of the Constitution, pp. 47-68. Beard, American Government and Politics, chs. xii-xiii. Bryce, The American Commonwealth (abridged edition), chs. ix-xii. Harrison, This Country of Ours, ch. ii. Hart, Actual Government, ch. xiii. Hinsdale, American Government, chs. xvii-xxiii. Wilson, Congressional Government, secs. 1273-1293.

Documentary and Illustrative Material.– 1. Copy of the Congressional Directory. 2. Copies of the Congressional Record. 3. A map showing the Congressional districts of the state.

Research Questions

1. How many representatives in Congress has your state?

2. Is there any evidence that your state is "gerrymandered"?

3. In what congressional district do you live? How many counties are there in the district? What is its population? How much does the population vary from the congressional ratio? Who is your representative? How many terms has he served? What is his party? By how large a majority was he elected?

4. Who is the senior senator from your state? The junior senator? How many terms has each served? To which of the three classes does each belong?

5. If the first congressional ratio of one member for 30,000 inhabitants were now in force, what would be the number of representatives in the house? Give arguments for and against the proposition that a house of 435 members is too large.

6. Is the present salary of members of Congress sufficiently large to attract the best men? Do you think the European custom of not paying salaries to members of Parliament a wise one?

7. Do you think members of Congress are morally entitled to "constructive" mileage, that is, for mileage not actually traveled, as where one session merges into another?

8. Members of the British Parliament are elected for a term of five years, those of the German Reichstag for five years, those of the French Chamber of Deputies for four years. In view of these rather long terms, do you think a two-year term for American representatives is too short?