The Thirty Years' War, 1618-1648

In the summer of 1621 Christian levied a force with which he marched into the Catholic bishopric of Paderborn. The country was in the course of forcible conversion by its bishop, and there was still in it a strong Lutheran element, which would perhaps have answered the appeal of a leader who was less purely an adventurer. But except in word, Catholic and Protestant were alike to Christian, so long as money could be got to support his army. Castles, towns, farmhouses were ransacked for the treasure of the rich, and the scanty hoard of the poor. We need not be too hard on him if he tore down the silver shrine of a saint in the cathedral of Paderborn, and melted it into coin bearing the legend: – 'The friend of God and the enemy of the priests.' But it is impossible to forget he was the enemy of the peasants as well. Burning-masters appear among the regular officers of his army; and many a village, unable to satisfy his demands, went up in flames, with its peaceful industry ruined for ever. At last, satiated with plunder, he turned southward to the support of Mansfeld.

§ 14. Mansfeld will not make peace.

Such were the commanders into whose hands the fortunes of German Protestantism had fallen. Mansfeld told Vere plainly that whether there were a truce or not, he at least would not lay down his arms unless he were indemnified for his expenses by a slice out of the Austrian possession of Alsace.

§ 15. Tilly in the midst of his enemies.

If the three armies of the Margrave of Baden, of Christian of Brunswick, and of Mansfeld, could be brought to co-operate, Tilly, even if supported by Cordova's Spaniards, would be in a decided numerical inferiority. But he had the advantage of a central situation, of commanding veteran troops by whom he was trusted, and above all of being able to march or remain quiet at his pleasure, as not being dependent on mere pillage for his commissariat. He was inspired, too, by a childlike faith in the cause for which he was fighting as the cause of order and religion against anarchy and vice.

Section IV. —The Fight for the Lower Palatinate

§ 1. Frederick joins Mansfeld in the Palatinate.

By the middle of April the hostile armies were in movement, converging upon the Palatinate, where the fortresses of Heidelberg, Mannheim, and Frankenthal were safe in Vere's keeping. Frederick himself had joined Mansfeld's army in Alsace, and his first operations were attended with success. Effecting a junction with the Margrave of Baden he inflicted a severe check upon Tilly at Wiesloch. The old Walloon retreated to Wimpfen, calling Cordova to his aid, and he did not call in vain. Mansfeld, on the other hand, and the Margrave could not agree. Each had his own plan for the campaign, and neither would give way to the other. Besides, there were no means of feeding so large an army if it kept together. Mansfeld marched away, leaving the Margrave to his fate.

§ 2. Battle of Wimpfen.

The battle of Wimpfen was the result. On May 6 Tilly and Cordova caught the Margrave alone, and defeated him completely. As soon as the action was over, Cordova left the field to resist the progress of Mansfeld; and Mansfeld, whose men were almost starving, was unable to overcome serious resistance. There was nothing for it but a speedy retreat to Alsace.

§ 3. The Congress at Brussels.

In the meantime the diplomatists had met at Brussels. After some difficulties of form had been got over, Sir Richard Weston, the representative of England, sent to ask Frederick to agree to a truce. When the message reached him the battle of Wimpfen had not been fought, and his hopes were still high. A truce, he wrote to his father-in-law, would be his utter ruin. The country was exhausted. Unless his army lived by plunder it could not exist. A few days later he was a beaten man. On May 13 he gave way, and promised to agree to the truce. On the 28th all was again changed. He had learned that the Margrave of Baden hoped to bring back his army into the field. He knew that Christian of Brunswick was approaching from beyond the Main; and he informed Weston that he could do nothing to assist the negotiations at Brussels.

§ 4. Seizure of the Landgrave of Darmstadt.

On June 1 Frederick and Mansfeld marched out of Mannheim to meet Christian. On their way they passed by Darmstadt. The Landgrave was especially obnoxious to them, as a Lutheran prince who had warmly adopted the Emperor's side. Love of peace, combined with pretensions to lands in dispute with the Landgrave of Hesse Cassel, in which he hoped to be supported by Ferdinand, had made him a bitter enemy of Mansfeld and his proceedings; and though it was not known at the time that he was actually in receipt of a Spanish pension, Frederick was not likely to attribute to other than interested motives a line of action which seemed so incomprehensible.

§ 5. Mansfeld unable to pass the Main.

As soon as the troops reached Darmstadt, they commenced their usual work, ravaging the country, and driving off the cattle. To the Landgrave, who recommended submission to the Emperor as the best way of recovering peace, Frederick used high language. It was not in quest of peace that he had come so far. The Landgrave had a fortified post which commanded a passage over the Main, and its possession would enable the army to join Christian without difficulty. But the Landgrave was firm; and finding that a denial would not be taken, tried to avoid his importunate guests by flight. He was overtaken and brought back a prisoner. But even in this plight he would give no orders for the surrender of the post, and its commander resolutely refused to give it up without instructions. Before another passage could be found, Tilly had received reinforcements, and Frederick, carrying the Landgrave with him, was driven to retreat to Mannheim, not without loss.

§ 6. Condition of Mansfeld's army.

Once more Frederick was ready to consent to the cessation of arms proposed at Brussels. But Cordova and Tilly were now of a different opinion. Christian, they knew, would soon be on the Main, and they were resolved to crush him whilst he was still unaided. Lord Chichester, who had come out to care for English interests in the Palatinate, and who judged all that he saw with the eye of an experienced soldier, perceived clearly the causes of Frederick's failure. 'I observe,' he wrote, 'so much of the armies of the Margrave of Baden and of Count Mansfeld, which I have seen, and of their ill discipline and order, that I must conceive that kingdom and principality for which they shall fight to be in great danger and hazard. The Duke of Brunswick's, it is said, is not much better governed: and how can it be better or otherwise where men are raised out of the scum of the people by princes who have no dominion over them, nor power, for want of pay, to punish them, nor means to reward them, living only upon rapine and spoil as they do?'

§ 7. Battle of Höchst.

On June 20, the day before these words were written, Tilly and Cordova had met with Christian at Höchst, and though they did not prevent him from crossing the Main, they inflicted on him such enormous losses that he joined Mansfeld with the mere fragments of his army.

§ 8. Mansfeld abandons the Palatinate.

Great was the consternation at Mannheim when the truth was known. The Margrave of Baden at once abandoned his associates. Mansfeld and Christian, taking Frederick with them, retreated into Alsace, where Frederick formally dismissed them from his service, and thus washed his hands of all responsibility for their future proceedings.

§ 9. Frederick goes back to the Hague.

Retiring for a time to Sedan, he watched events as they passed from that quiet retreat. 'Would to God,' he wrote to his wife, 'that we possessed a little corner of the earth where we could rest together in peace.' The destinies of Germany and Europe had to be decided by clearer heads and stronger wills than his. After a short delay he found his way back to the Hague, to prove, as many a wiser man had proved before him, how bitter a lot it is to go up and down on the stairs which lead to the antechambers of the great: to plead for help which never is given, and to plan victories which never come.

CHAPTER IV.

MANSFELD AND CHRISTIAN IN NORTH GERMANY

Section I. —Mansfeld's March into the Netherlands

§ 1. Reduction of the Palatinate.

When once Tilly had got the better of the armies in the field, the reduction of the fortresses in the Palatinate was merely a work of time. Heidelberg surrendered on September 16. On November 8 Vere found Mannheim no longer tenable. Frankenthal alone held out for a few months longer, and was then given up to the Spaniards.

§ 2. Aims of the Catholics.

James still hoped that peace was possible, though the conference at Brussels had broken up in September. In the meanwhile, Ferdinand and Maximilian were pushing on to the end which they had long foreseen; and an assembly of princes was invited to meet at Ratisbon in November to assent to the transference of the electorate to the Duke of Bavaria.

1623

§ 3. The Electorate transferred to Maximilian.

Constitutional opposition on the part of the Protestants was impossible. In addition to the majority against them amongst the princes, there was now, by the mere fact of Frederick's exclusion, a majority against them amongst the Electors, a majority which was all the more firmly established when, on February 13, the transfer was solemnly declared. Maximilian was to be Elector for his lifetime. If any of Frederick's relations claimed that the electorate ought rather to pass over to them, they would be heard, and if their case appeared to be a good one, they would receive what was due to them after Maximilian's death. If, in the meanwhile, Frederick chose to ask humbly for forgiveness, and to abandon his claim to the electoral dignity, the Emperor would take his request for the restitution of his lands into favourable consideration. Against all this the Spanish ambassador protested; but the protest was evidently not meant to be followed by action.

§ 4. The North German Protestants.

The question of peace or war now depended mainly on the North German Protestants. Nobody doubted that, if they could hit upon a united plan of action, and if they vigorously set to work to carry it out, they would bring an irresistible weight to bear upon the points at issue. Unfortunately, however, such uniformity of action was of all things most improbable. John George, indeed, had more than once been urged in different directions during the past years by events as they successively arose. The invasion of the Palatinate had shaken him in his friendship for the Emperor. Then had come the kidnapping of the Landgrave of Darmstadt to give him a shock on the other side. Later in the year the news that an excuse had been found for driving the Lutheran clergy out of Bohemia had deeply exasperated him, and his exasperation had been increased by the transference of the electorate, by which the Protestants were left in a hopeless minority in the Electoral House. But the idea of making war upon the Emperor, and unsettling what yet remained as a security for peace, was altogether so displeasing to John George that it is doubtful whether anything short of absolute necessity would have driven him to war. What he would have liked would have been a solemn meeting, at which he might have had the opportunity of advancing his views. But if those views had been seriously opposed he would hardly have drawn the sword to uphold them.

§ 5. Mansfeld and Christian of Brunswick.

If the only danger to be apprehended by the North Germans had been the march of Tilly's army, it is not unlikely that the war would here have come to an end. Ferdinand and Maximilian would doubtless have respected the agreement of Mühlhausen, and there would hardly have been found sufficient determination in the northern princes to induce them to arm for the recovery of the Palatinate. But a new danger had arisen. Mansfeld and Christian had not laid down their arms when Frederick dismissed them in July, and so far from being ready to make sacrifices for peace, they were ready to make any sacrifices for the sake of the continuance of the war.

1622

§ 6. They establish themselves in Lorraine.

It was not long before the adventurers were forced to leave Alsace. They had eaten up everything that was to be eaten there, and the enemy was known to be on their track. Throwing themselves into Lorraine, they settled down for a time like a swarm of locusts upon that smiling land. But where were they to turn next? The French government hurried up reinforcements to guard their frontier. That road, at all events, was barred to them, and Christian, whose troops were in a state of mutiny, tried in vain to lead them towards the Lower Rhine. Whilst the leaders hardly knew what to do, they received an invitation to place themselves for three months at the disposal of the Dutch Republic.

§ 7. Battle of Fleurus.

Matters had not been going well with the Dutch since the re-opening of the war in 1621. Their garrison at Juliers had surrendered to Spinola in the winter, and the great Spanish commander was now laying siege to Bergen-op-Zoom, with every prospect of reducing it. To come to its relief Mansfeld would have to march across the Spanish Netherlands. On August 28 he found Cordova on his way to Fleurus, as he had stood in his way in the Palatinate the year before. Worse than all, two of his own regiments broke out into mutiny, refusing to fight unless they were paid. At such a time Mansfeld was at his best. He was a man of cool courage and infinite resource, and he rode up to the mutineers, entreating them if they would not fight at least to look as if they meant to fight. Then, with the rest of his force, he charged the enemy. Christian seconded him bravely at the head of his cavalry, fighting on in spite of a shot in his left arm. Three horses were killed under him. The loss was enormous on both sides, but Mansfeld gained his object, and was able to pursue his way in safety.

§ 8. Christian loses his arm.

Christian's arm was amputated. He ordered that the operation should be performed to the sound of trumpets. 'The arm that is left,' he said, 'shall give my enemies enough to do.' He coined money out of the silver he had taken from the Spaniards, with the inscription 'Altera restat.'

§ 9. Mansfeld in Münster and East Friesland.

Bergen-op-Zoom was saved. Spinola raised the siege. But Mansfeld's disorderly habits did not comport well with the regular discipline of the Dutch army. Those whom he had served were glad to be rid of him. In November he was dismissed, and marched to seek his fortune in the diocese of Münster. But the enemy was too strong for him there, and he turned his steps to East Friesland, a land rich and fertile, easily fortified against attack, yet perfectly helpless. There he settled down to remain till the stock of money and provisions which he was able to wring from the inhabitants had been exhausted.

Section II. —Christian of Brunswick in Lower Saxony

§ 1. Difficulties of the Lower Saxon circle.

Here then was a new rock of offence, a new call for the Emperor to interfere, if he was in any way to be regarded as the preserver of the peace of the Empire. But a march of Tilly against an enemy in East Friesland was not a simply military operation. Not a few amongst the northern princes doubted whether a victorious Catholic army would respect the agreement of Mühlhausen. Christian of Brunswick, of course, lost no time in favouring the doubt. For, whatever else might be questionable there was no question that the diocese of Halberstadt was no longer secured by the provisions of that agreement. Neither the League nor the Emperor had given any promise to those administrators who did not continue loyal to the Emperor, and no one could for a moment contend that Christian had ever shown a spark of loyalty.

§ 2. Christian and Tilly urge them to opposite courses.

On the one side was Christian, assuring those poor princes that neutrality was impossible, and that it was their plain duty to fight for the bishoprics and Protestantism. On the other side was Tilly, equally assuring them that neutrality was impossible, but asserting that it was their plain duty to fight for their Emperor against Mansfeld and brigandage. The princes felt that it was all very hard. How desirable it would be if only the war would take some other direction, or if Tilly and Christian would mutually exterminate one another, and rid them of the difficulty of solving such terrible questions!

§ 3. Halberstadt in danger.

But the question could not be disposed of. Halberstadt was a member of the Lower Saxon circle, one of those districts of which the princes and cities were legally bound together for mutual defence. The Lower Saxon circle, therefore, was placed between two fires. The Catholic troops were gathering round them on the south. Mansfeld was issuing forth from his fastness in East Friesland and threatening to occupy the line of the Weser on the north.

§ 4. Warlike preparations.

In February the circle determined to levy troops and prepare for war. But the preparations were rather directed against Mansfeld than against Tilly. If the Emperor could only have given satisfaction about the bishoprics, he would have had no vassals more loyal than the Lower Saxon princes. But in Ferdinand's eyes to acknowledge more than had been acknowledged at Mühlhausen would be to make himself partaker in other men's sins. It would have been to acknowledge that robbery might give a lawful title to possession.

§ 5. Christian invited to take service under his brother.

Almost unavoidably the circle became further involved in opposition to the Emperor. Christian's brother, Frederick Ulric, the reigning Duke of Brunswick-Wolfenbüttel, was a weak and incompetent prince much under his mother's guidance. Anxious to save her favourite son, the dashing Christian, from destruction, the Duchess persuaded the Duke to offer his brother a refuge in his dominions. If he would bring his troops there, he and they would be taken into the service of the Duke, a respectable law-abiding prince, and time would be afforded him to make his peace with the Emperor.

§ 6. The Battle of Stadtlohn.

Christian at once accepted the offer, and entered into negotiations with Ferdinand. But he had never any thought of really abandoning his adventurous career. Young princes, eager for distinction, levied troops and gathered round his standard. Every week the number of his followers increased. At last the neighbouring states could bear it no longer. The authorities of the circle told him plainly to be gone. Reproaching them for their sluggishness in thus abandoning the cause of the Gospel, he started for the Dutch Netherlands, with Tilly following closely upon him. On August 6 he was overtaken at Stadtlohn, within a few hours' march of the frontier, behind which he would have been in safety. His hastily levied recruits were no match for Tilly's veterans. Of 20,000 men only 6,000 found their way across the border.

Section III. —Danger of the Lower Saxon Circle

§ 1. Danger of the Northern bishoprics.

Christian's defeat, however disastrous, settled nothing. Mansfeld was still in East Friesland. The princes of Lower Saxony were still anxious about the bishoprics. Even if the agreement of Mühlhausen were scrupulously observed, was it so very certain that the bishoprics might not be wrenched from them in another way than by force of arms? The administrators held the sees simply because they had been elected by the chapters, and if only a Catholic majority could be obtained in a chapter the election at the next vacancy would be certain to fall upon a Catholic. Often it happened that the Protestant majority had taken care to perpetuate its power by methods of very doubtful legality, and it would be open to the Emperor to question those methods. It might even come to pass that strict law might turn the majority into a minority. Already, on April 18, the chapter of Osnabrück had chosen a Catholic to succeed a Protestant bishop, perhaps not altogether uninfluenced by the near neighbourhood of a Catholic army. Christian of Brunswick, certain that he would not be allowed to retain his see, had formally given in his resignation, and it was not impossible that with some manipulation the chapter of Halberstadt might be induced to follow the example of Osnabrück. The question of the bishoprics had, no doubt, its low and petty side. It may be spoken of simply as a question interesting to a handful of aristocratic sinecurists, who had had the luck to reap the good things of the old bishops without doing their work. But this would be a very incomplete account of the matter. Scattered as these bishoprics were over the surface of North Germany, their restitution meant nothing less than the occupation by the Emperor and his armies of points of vantage over the whole of the north. No one who casts his eyes over the map can doubt for an instant that, with these bishoprics open to the troops of the League, or it might be even to the troops of the King of Spain, the independence of the princes would have been a thing of the past; and it must never be forgotten that, as matters stood, the cause of the independence of the princes was inextricably bound up with the independence of Protestantism. If Ferdinand and Maximilian had their way, German Protestantism would exist merely upon sufferance; and whatever they and the Jesuits might say, German Protestantism was, in spite of all its shortcomings, too noble a creed to exist on sufferance.

§ 2. The Lower Saxon circle does nothing.

Would the members of the circle of Lower Saxony be strong enough to maintain their neutrality? They sent ambassadors to the Emperor, asking him to settle the question of the bishoprics in their favour, and to John George to ask for his support. The Emperor replied that he would not go beyond the agreement of Mühlhausen. John George gave them good advice, but nothing more. And, worse than all, they were disunited amongst themselves. Princes and towns, after agreeing to support troops for the common defence, had done their best to evade their duties. As few men as possible had been sent, and the money needed for their support was still slower in coming in. As usual, unpaid men were more dangerous to the country which they were called upon to protect than to the enemy. The circle came to the conclusion that it would be better to send the troops home than to keep them under arms. By the beginning of the new year, Lower Saxony was undefended, a tempting prey to him who could first stretch out his hand to take it.

§ 3. Low state of public feeling.

It was the old story. With the Empire, the Diet and the Church in the hands of mere partisans, there was nothing to remind men of their duty as citizens of a great nation. Even the idea of being members of a circle was too high to be seriously entertained. The cities strove to thrust the burden of defence upon the princes, and the princes thrust it back upon the cities. The flood was rising rapidly which was to swallow them all.

Section IV. —England and France

§ 1. Foreign powers ready to interfere.

In the spring of 1624 there was rest for a moment. Mansfeld, having stripped East Friesland bare, drew back into the Netherlands. The only army still on foot was the army of the League, and if Germany had been an island in the middle of the Atlantic, exercising no influence upon other powers and uninfluenced by them, the continuance in arms of those troops might fairly be cited in evidence that the Emperor and the League wished to push their advantages still further, in spite of their assertions that they wanted nothing more than assurance of peace.

§ 2. Ferdinand's weakness.

But Germany was not an island. Around it lay a multitude of powers with conflicting interests, but all finding in her distractions a fair field for pursuing their own objects. Ferdinand, in fact, had made himself just strong enough to raise the jealousy of his neighbours, but not strong enough to impose an impassible barrier to their attacks. He had got on his side the legal and military elements of success. He had put down all resistance. He had frightened those who dreaded anarchy. But he had not touched the national heart. He had taught men to make it a mere matter of calculation whether a foreign invasion was likely to do them more damage than the success of their own Emperor. Whilst he affected to speak in the name of Germany, more than half of Germany was neutral if not adverse in the struggle.