The Speech of Monkeys

Some months ago I made a record of the voice of the great Anubis baboon, in Philadelphia. I did not expect to find in him an elevated type of speech; but my purpose was to compare it with other Simian sounds, to see if I could not establish a series of steps in the quality of vocal sounds which would coincide with certain other characters. I had found by the study of certain cranial forms that certain vocal types conformed to certain skulls, and were as much a conformation thereof as are the cerebral hemispheres. I then believed, and have had no cause since to recede from it, that the vocal powers were correctly measured by the gnathic index; that the mind and voice were commensurate; and that as the cranio-facial angle widens the voice degrades in quality and scope. In man, I find the highest vocal type, and just as we descend in the cranial scale, the vocal type descends into sounds less flexible, less capable, and less musical. These deductions apply only to mammals; among birds, insects, &c., a different order may prevail.

RECORDS OF LIONS

The records of the lions show some strange features in the construction of sound; and when analysed on the phonograph present some novel effects. The sound as a whole appears to be broken into broad waves or pulsations; but on analysing it the fundamental tones somewhat resemble the sounds produced by drawing a mallet rapidly across the keyboard of a xylophone, and are characterised by a peculiar resonance something like the tremulous vibrations of a thin glass containing a small quantity of water. Each of these separate fundamental sounds, or sound units as they appear to be, can be further reduced to still smaller vibrations; and the result suggests that the fundamental sounds themselves are an aggregation of smaller vibrations. I have not as yet been able to compare the notes one by one with the scale of the xylophone in order to ascertain whether or not they obey the laws of sound upon which is founded the chromatic scale of music. The lion makes only a small number of different sounds, nearly of the same pitch. I have not analysed the vocal sounds of the other felines to ascertain to what extent they coincide with those of the lion; but his appear to be somewhat unlike any other sounds which I have examined.

Among the few sounds of birds which I have analysed, I may mention the Trumpeter Crane. I have made one record of this bird which was sufficiently loud to enable me to obtain some idea of the character of the sound. I am in doubt as to what the real mode of producing this sound is. The volume of sound evidently comes from the mouth of the bird; but while in the act of making it, he appears to bring the whole body into use, even the feathers appear to take some part in its production, and the whole frame of the bird vibrates in the act. The record which I have shows some resemblance, on analysis, to the sound made by the lion; but it is not sufficiently strong to admit of analysing the sound units or fundamental sounds.

DIFFERENCE IN PHONES OF GENERA

From the many sounds that I have analysed, it appears to me that there is a difference in the phones of all different genera, and that the phonetic basis of human speech more closely resembles that of the Simian than any other sounds; but I wish to be understood distinctly not to offer this in evidence to establish any physical, mental, or phonetic affinity between mankind and Simians. I merely state the facts from which all theorists may deduce their own conclusions.

CHAPTER XIV

Monkeys and the Mirror – Some of their Antics – Baby Macaque and her Papa – Some other Monkeys.

I have incidentally mentioned elsewhere the use of the mirror in some of my experiments, but I have not described in detail how it affected various monkeys. Of course, it does not always affect the same monkey in the same way at different times, nor does it affect all monkeys of the same species in exactly the same way, and therefore I cannot deduce a rule from my experiments by which the species can be determined by its conduct before the glass.

PUCK AND NELLIE WITH MIRROR

When Puck saw himself in the mirror he undoubtedly mistook the image for another monkey, to which he would talk more freely than he would to the sounds made by the phonograph. He would frequently caress the image, and show signs of friendship; at the same time he was very timid and retiring.

Nellie would chatter to herself in the mirror, and seemed never to tire of looking at that beautiful monkey she saw there, and I do not think the propensity could be accounted for merely by her sex. I do not think she ever quite understood where that monkey was concealed, and the scores of times in a day that she would turn the glass around was evidence that she never fully despaired of finding it.

I accidentally dropped a small mirror one day by the cage in which there was a green monkey. The glass was broken into many small pieces. Quick as thought, the green monkey thrust her arm through the bars, grabbed the largest piece, and got it into her cage before I was fully aware of what she was trying to do. The fragment was about an inch wide by an inch and a half long. She caught a glimpse of herself in the glass, and her conduct was more like that of a crazy monkey than anything I can compare it to. She peeped into the fragment of the mirror, which she seemed to regard as a hole in something which separated her from another monkey. She held it up over her head at arm's-length, laid it down on the floor, held it against the wall, and twisted herself into every pose to get a better peep at that mysterious monkey on the other side of something, she could not tell what. When the glass was reversed, she seemed much perplexed, and would sometimes jump high off the floor, and turn herself entirely around, as if to untangle the mystery. Then again she would discover the right side of the glass, and would go through these antics again. Several times while holding it against the wall she would put her eyes close up against the glass, just as she would to a knot-hole in the wall. I tried in vain for some time to get the glass away from her lest she might injure herself with it, but only succeeded after considerable labour and through the help of her keeper.

McGINTY'S DELIGHT WITH MIRROR

McGinty always tries to find the image behind the glass. He reaches his little black hand as far as he can around behind it, peeps over and under it, pecks on the glass with his fingers, kisses and caresses it, and grins at it with infinite delight. He often tries to turn the glass around to look on the back of it, and when he finds no monkey there he works his eyebrows as if perplexed, and utters a sound which reminds me of a child under similar circumstances saying "gone" when in play something is concealed from it to make the child believe it is lost. Then he will suddenly turn the glass around again, as if the thought had just occurred to him, and when he again discovers the image, he will laugh, chatter, peep and peck at the glass, as if to say "There it is, there it is!" But, like all other monkeys, he does not quite understand where that monkey conceals itself when he peeps over the glass.

Mickie does not appear to enjoy the sight of himself in the glass. He always looks at it earnestly but doubtfully, and utters a low sound in a kind of undertone, frowns and scowls as though he regarded the new monkey as an intruder. He rarely talks to the image only with this low, muttering sound, and never tries to find it by reaching his hand behind the glass or making any other investigation. Mickie, however, has been very much petted, in consequence of which he is very selfish, just as children become under like treatment.

Little Nemo always looked at himself in the glass in the most inquisitive and respectful manner, without ever winking an eye or betraying any sign of emotion, except that he would caress the image in the glass over and over again by pressing his lips to it in perfect silence. Indeed, his conduct would suggest to you that he regarded the image as a portrait of some dear departed one, which awoke the tender memories of the past and filled the heart too full for utterance. His sedate manners were very becoming.

Dodo always appeared to be afraid of the image. She would merely take a peep and turn away. She would sometimes utter a single sound, but rarely touched her mouth to the glass, and never felt behind it for the other monkey. This, perhaps, was due to the fact that she was afraid of some of the other inmates of the cage, and I do not think that she desired the colony increased.

Nigger always showed great interest in the mirror when left alone, but when the other monkeys would crowd around to peep into the glass he would always leave to avoid trouble with them.

"UNCLE REMUS," THE WHITE-FACE

"Uncle Remus," the white-face, always goes through a series of facial contortions with the gravity of a rural judge. He will look into the glass, and then at me, as if to say "Where did you get that monkey?"

The little baby Macaque, who was born in Central Park, tries to engage the image in a romp, reaches for it in the glass, clucks, jumps playfully to her perch, and looks back to see if the image follows; then she will return to the glass, and try again to induce the little ghost to join her in her play. Again, she will spring to her perch, looking back, but does not understand why it will not join her. During all this, the baby's father, a sedate old Macaque, looks on with suspicion and a scowl, and on a few occasions has pulled the baby away from the glass, as if he knew that there was something wrong, and expressed his opinion in a low, ominous growl. He reminds me at times of some people whom I have seen that look very wise, and intimate by their conduct that they know something.

Another little Macaque makes the most indescribable faces, and works her lips in that peculiar fashion which I have elsewhere described, but she does not utter one sound. She merely looks in silence, and never tries to find the monkey concealed behind the glass.

THE SPIDER MONKEY

The spider monkey is a study worthy of great minds. When shown her image in the glass, she takes her seat on the floor, crosses her legs, and fixes herself as if she expected to spend the day there. She will then look into the glass and utter a low sound, and begin to reach out her long arms in search of the other monkey. It is surprising to see how she will adjust her reach as you change positions with the glass. Of course, as you remove the mirror from her the image is removed accordingly, and she extends or contracts her reach to suit that distance. This is not, however, an evidence of her mathematical skill, since to her mind the image is doubtless a real thing, and she is governed by the same instinct or judgment in reaching for it as she would be if it were real. More than any other, the spider monkey seems to admire herself in the glass; notwithstanding she is about the homeliest of all the Simian tribes, yet she will sit for hours in almost perfect silence, and gaze upon her image.

CHAPTER XV

Man and Ape – Their Physical Relations – Their Mental Relations – Evolution was the Means – Who was the Progenitor of the Ape? – The Scale of Life.

If we could free our hands from the manacles of tradition and stand aloof from our prejudices, and look the stern facts in the face, we should be compelled to admit that between man and ape there is such a unity of design, structure and function, that we dare not in the light of reason deny to the ape that rank in Nature to which he is assigned by virtue of these facts. Physiologically, there is no hiatus between man and ape which may not be spanned by such evidence as would be admitted under the strictest rules of interpretation. We may briefly compare these two creatures in a broad and general way, so that the unscientific and casual reader may comprehend.

MAN AND APE

The skeleton of man is only the polished structure of which that of the ape is the rough model. The identity of the two, part by part, is as much the same as the light sulky is the outgrowth of the massive framework of the old-time cart. Whether man and ape are related by any ties of blood or not, it is evident that they were modelled on the same plan, provided with the same means, and designed for like purposes, whatever they may be. The organs of sensation and the functions which they discharge are the same in both, and the same external forces addressing themselves thereto produce the same results. I do not mean to say that the same organ in each is developed in the same degree as that in the other, for this is not the case even in different individuals of the same kind. In the muscular system of the one is found an exact duplicate of the other, except in such slight changes of model as will better adapt the parts to those conditions of life under which the animal having them may be placed, and through the whole physical structure of both we find that unity of part and purpose in structure and function, in bone, muscle, nerve, and brain. It has been shown beyond a reasonable doubt that the brain in the higher races of mankind has reached its present form through a series of changes which are constant and definite; and this organ in the lower types of man resembles more that of the ape than does the same organ in the higher types of man; and by a method of deduction, such as we use to determine the height of a tree or the width of a stream by the length of a shadow, we find that the fiducial lines which bound the planes in the perspective of man's cerebral growth, likewise embrace those of the ape. While it is a fact that the mind of man so far transcends that of the ape, it is also a fact that in reaching this condition it has passed through such planes as those now occupied by the ape. The physical changes of man's brain do not appear to keep pace with the growth of his mind. This may be a paradox, but the evidence upon which it rests is ample to sustain it.

MAN AND APE

I do not pretend to know whether man was evolved from ape, or ape from man; whether they are congenetic products of a common authorship, or the masterpieces of two rival authors; but I cannot see in what respect man's identity would be affected, whatever may be the case. If it be shown that man descended from the ape, it does not change the facts which have existed from the beginning, nor does it change the destiny to which he is assigned. If it can be shown that apes descended from man, it does not leave upon man the censure for this degeneracy. If man has risen from the low plane of brutehood which the ape now occupies, has scaled the barriers which now separate him from apes, and has climbed to the divine heights of mental and moral manhood, the ape deserves no praise for this. On the other hand, if apes have fallen from the state of man, have wandered so far from the gates of light, and are now wandering in the twilight of intellect and degradation, it is no reproach to man; and while I shall not sit in judgment in the cause, nor testify on either side, I am willing to accept whatever verdict may be founded on the real facts, and I shall not appeal therefrom. But I shall not allow my prejudice to conceal the truth, whenever it is shown to me. It is always acceptable to my mind, and, stripped of all sophistry and oblique conditions, it would appear the same to every mind.

That evolution is the mode by which the world was peopled, there is little doubt, but there are many details yet unsettled as to the manner in which this was effected. I cannot regard the matter as proven beyond appeal that man has come from any antecedent type that was not man, nor yet do I deny that such may be the case; but I do deny that the broad chasm which separates man from other primates cannot be crossed on the bridge of speech; and while this does not prove their identity or common origin, it does show that Nature did not intend that either one should monopolise any gift which she had to bestow. It is as reasonable to believe that man has always occupied a sphere of life apart from that of apes, as to believe that apes have occupied a sphere of life apart from birds, except that the distance from centre to centre is greater between birds and apes than that distance between apes and man. So far as any fossil proofs contribute to our knowledge, we find no point at which the line is crossed in either case; and the earliest traces of man's physiological history find him distinctly man, and this history reaches back on meagre evidence many, many centuries before historic time. Among these earlier remains of man, we find no fossils of the Simian type to show that he existed at that time; but at a somewhat later period we find some remnants of the Simian type in deposits of Southern Europe; but they are of the smaller tribes, and have been assigned to the Macacus. We cannot trace the history of this genus from that to the present time to ascertain whether they were the progenitors of apes or not; but between this type and that of apes the hiatus is as broad as that which intervenes between the ape and man.

That somewhere in the lapse of time all genera began, admits of no debate; and by inversion it is plain that all generic outlines must focus at the point from which they first diverged, and such an operation does not indicate that man and Simian have ever been more closely allied than they are at the present time; but the evidence is clear that man has been evolved from a lower plane than he now occupies. The inference may be safely applied to apes, as progress is the universal law of life.

The question has been asked, "Who is the progenitor of man?" The solution of this problem has engaged the most profound minds of modern time. If it be said in reply that apes were the progenitors of man, the question then arises, "Who was the progenitor of the ape?" If it be said that man and ape had a common progenitor, a like question arises, and it becomes necessary to connect all types allied to each other as these two types are physically allied. If man is the climax of a great scheme in Nature by which one type is gradually transformed into another, we must descend the scale of life by crossing the chasm which lies between mankind and apes, another lying between the apes and monkeys, another between the monkeys and baboons, another between the baboons and lemurs, and yet another between the lemurs and the lemuroids, and thus from form to form like islands in the great sea of life. From man to infinity the question constantly recurs, and over each hiatus must be built a separate bridge.

DARWIN'S PROFOUND WORK

Darwin has given to the world the most profound and conscientious work, and from the chaos and confusion of human ignorance and bigotry has erected the most sublime monuments of thought and truth. It does not detract from his character and honesty, nor lessen the value of his labours, to admit that he may have been mistaken in some conclusions which he deduced from the great store of facts at his command.

It is not the purpose of this work, however, to enter into a discussion of any theory aside from speech and its possible origin and growth, but all subjects pertaining to life, thought, and the modes of living and thinking, must contribute in some degree to a clear understanding of the subject in hand.

DARWIN'S SIN OF OMISSION

It has been a matter of surprise to me that so careful and observant a man as Mr. Darwin should have so nearly omitted the question of speech from a work of such ample scope, such minute detail, and such infinite care as characterises the "Descent of Man," and such like works. But science will cheerfully forgive an error, and pardon the sin of omission in one who has given to the world so much good.

CHAPTER XVI

The Faculty of Thought – Emotion and Thought – Instinct and Reason – Monkeys Reason – Some Examples.

The study of biology has revealed many facts which conspire to show that the incipient forms of animal and vegetable life are the same in those two great kingdoms; and parallel with this fact, I think it can be shown that the faculty of expression goes hand in hand with life. And why should not this be the case? From the standpoint of religion, I cannot see why the bounty of God should not be equal to such a gift, nor can I conceive of a more sublime act of universal justice than that all things endowed with thought, however feeble, should be endowed with the power of expressing it. From the standpoint of evolution, I cannot understand by what rule Nature would have worked to develop the emotions, sensations, and faculties alike in all these various forms, and make this one exception in the case of speech. It does not seem in keeping with her laws. From the standpoint of chance, I cannot see why such an accident might not have occurred at some other point in the scale of life, or why such anomalies are not more frequent. Man appears to be the only one. From any point of view we take, it does not seem consistent with other facts. All other primates think and feel, and live and die under like conditions and on like terms with man; then why should he alone possess the gift of speech?

FACULTY OF THOUGHT

I confess that such an inference is not evidence, however logical; but I have many facts to offer in proof that speech is not possessed by man alone. It is quite difficult to draw the line at any given point between the process of thought and those phenomena we call emotions. They merge into and blend with each other like the colours in light, and in like manner the faculty of speech, receding through the various modes of expression, is for ever lost in the haze and distance of desire. The faculty of reason blends into thought like the water of a bay blends into the open sea; there is nowhere a positive line dividing them. When we are in the midst of one we point to the other, and say, "There it is;" but we cannot say at what exact point we pass out of one into the other.

THE POWER OF REASONING

To reason is to think methodically and to judge from attending facts. When a monkey examines the situation and acts in accordance with the facts, doing a certain thing with the evident purpose of accomplishing a certain end, in what respect is this not reason? When a monkey remembers a thing which has passed and anticipates a thing which is to come; when he has learned a thing by experience which he avoids through memory and the apprehension of its recurrence, is it instinct that guides his conduct? When a monkey shows clearly by his actions that he is aware of the relation between cause and effect, and acts in accordance therewith, is it instinct or reason that guides him? If there be a point in the order of Nature where reason became an acquired faculty, it is somewhere far below the plane occupied by monkeys. Their power of reasoning is far inferior to that of man, but not more so than their power of thinking and expression; but a faculty does not lose its identity by reason of its feebleness. When the same causes under the same conditions prompt man and ape alike to do the same act in the same way, looking forward to the same results, I cannot understand why the motive of the one should be called reason, and that of the other called instinct. Scholars have tried so hard to keep the peace between theology and themselves, that they have explained things in accordance with accepted belief in order that they might not incur the charge of heresy. To this end they have reconciled the two extremes by ignoring the means, and making a distinction without a difference on which to found it.

Whatever may be the intrinsic difference between reason and instinct, it is evident to my mind that the same motives actuate both man and ape in the same way, but not to the same extent. I am aware that many acts performed by Simians are meaningless to them and done without a well-defined motive. The strong physical resemblance between man and ape often causes one to attach more importance to the act than it really justifies. In many cases the same act performed by some other animal less like man would scarcely be noticed. To teach an ape or monkey to eat with knife, fork, cup and spoon, to use a napkin and chair, or such like feats, does not indicate to my mind a high order of reason; nor it is safe to judge the mental status of these creatures from such data. When he is placed under new conditions and committed to his own resources, we are then better able to judge by his conduct whether he is actuated by reason or not.

CONNECTING CAUSES AND EFFECTS

In any simple act where a monkey can see the cause connected with, and closely followed by, the effect, he is actuated by reason, and while he may not be able to explain to his own mind a remote or complex cause but simply accepts the fact, it does not make the act any less rational in a monkey than the same act would be in man where he fails to grasp the ultimate cause. The difference is that man is able to trace the connecting causes and effects through a longer series than a monkey can. Man assigns a more definite reason for his acts than a monkey can; but it is also true that one man may assign a more definite reason for his acts than another man can for his when prompted by the same motives to the same act.