Old and New Paris: Its History, Its People, and Its Places, v. 2

Almost as much nonsense has been written about the Francs-Tireurs in the German papers as about the Uhlans in the French. They were not necessarily savages nor assassins, nor anything of the kind. In the occupied provinces they were simply insurgents, and they led everywhere the life of insurgents, belonged to the same class or classes of society from which insurgents usually come, and, like insurgents, were adored by their own people and shot as felons if they fell into the hands of the enemy.

The few I came across were certainly not the kind of persons likely to commit the acts of violence and rapine with which the Francs-Tireurs were generally credited. The Francs-Tireurs I met were loungers from the Parisian boulevards, who had put on the semblance of a uniform and gone out to see whether they could be of any use in stopping the advance of the Prussians, and they would no more have committed an act of highway robbery than General Garibaldi would have picked a pocket. But side by side with the Francs-Tireurs of good education – the Francs-Tireurs whose photographs were found worthy of being enclosed in lockets – there were Francs-Tireurs of a lower type: there were escaped prisoners, deserters, and fugitives, the last remnants of the great armies that had from time to time been cut in pieces, and the amalgam formed by these different elements was doubtless not a nice one. Even the gentlemanly Franc-Tireur, if fallen into bad circumstances, might be a dangerous person to meet; he would be ashamed to show himself in the character of a robber, and from sheer self-respect might begin by killing his victim.

The Prussians, however, could not, like the young ladies of France, distinguish between the noble-minded Franc-Tireur and the Franc-Tireur who was a mere cut-throat. What they required was that he should carry papers showing that he belonged to some regularly organised corps, that he should wear a uniform recognisable at gun-shot distance, and that the distinctive marks of the uniform should be “inseparable from the person.” Let him comply with these conditions, and the Franc-Tireur, if he fell into the hands of the enemy, instead of being shot or condemned to ten years’ imprisonment, was treated as a prisoner of war.

It seems hard to insist that William Tell shall put on a uniform “recognisable at gun-shot distance,” and that the distinctive signs of the uniform worn by Masaniello shall be “inseparable from the person”; but if William Tell dresses like a civilian he places his enemy at a notable disadvantage, and the same may be said of Masaniello, if Masaniello has nothing military about him but his cap, which he can get rid of at a moment’s notice and replace by a wide-awake or a cotton nightcap.

There were, I believe, some bodies of Francs-Tireurs regularly incorporated in the French army, and they, to the Prussians, were of course like any other French soldiers. Such were “Les partisans de Gers,” who had account-books showing that they were in Government service, whose officers carried commissions, and whose military character was admitted, though their only “distinctive marks” were a red sash worn over a black coat and a Calabrian hat. Neither, then, of the “distinctive marks” was inseparable from the person. It was evident, all the same, that the partisans of Gers were men who had assumed the character of soldiers in good faith, with the intention of supporting it to the end.

But the original, typical Franc-Tireur carried no papers, wore no recognisable uniform; nor were the chiefs of bands responsible to any superior officer.

As for the individual members of such bands, how were the Prussians to distinguish between them and men shooting at other men from unpolitical motives? And, apart from the customs of war, would not the common law, strictly administered, condemn them everywhere as brigands?

Why, then, did not the Francs-Tireurs, for their own sake, form themselves into regular bodies and never show except in uniform? The reason was simple enough. They did not wish to be always soldiers. They desired now and then to retire into private life, and to profit by the privileges of the civilian. As troops, moreover, in the service of the Government they would have had to drill, to do regular military duty, to subject themselves, in short, to discipline, for which, as a rule, they had no taste. Otherwise, why, instead of becoming Francs-Tireurs, did they not join the Garde Mobile or the regular army, from which they could, in the most legitimate manner, have been detached for partisan warfare?

In less than a fortnight after the battle of Sedan, the King of Prussia, advancing towards Versailles, had established his headquarters at Férrières. It was here on the 18th and 19th of September, 1870, in the château belonging to Baron Rothschild, that Jules Favre, Vice-President of the Government of National Defence and Minister of Foreign Affairs, conferred with Count Bismarck; when the latter declared his readiness to sign an armistice on condition that three fortresses, Strasburg, Phalsburg, and Toul, were placed in the hands of the Germans. To the minister who (borrowing a phrase from the oath of the Templars) had declared that “not one inch of our territory, not one stone of our fortresses should ever be ceded,” these conditions were for the moment obviously unacceptable. On the 20th of September the Germans took possession of Versailles, which was unable to offer the least resistance, and soon afterwards the town became the headquarters of the Great General Staff, with General von Moltke at its head; also of the King of Prussia and Count Bismarck.

Versailles now became the headquarters of correspondents from all parts of the world, and a grave question – that of the maintenance of war-vessels in the Black Sea – having arisen between England and Russia, it was to Versailles that Mr. Odo Russell was sent, on the part of the English Foreign Office, to make representations to Count Bismarck, who had undertaken, in his own language, the part of “honest broker” between the Powers at variance.

An interesting account of the occupation of Versailles by the Germans was published three years after the conclusion of peace. It would be useful for the future historian, whose possible wants have been so much studied of late years, if the municipal authorities of other French towns which during the war of 1870 fell into the power of the Germans would put together and publish the official documents relating to the occupation, as the authors of this volume have done in regard to the occupation of Versailles. Strictly speaking, the authors of the work in question are the Prussians themselves. But the materials, in the form of requisitions, summonses to appear, condemnations to pay, proclamations, menaces and occasional remissions of punishment, were collected by M. Rameau, Mayor of Versailles, and by him entrusted for publication to M. Delerot, who, considering the hatred he felt and was bound to feel for the conquerors and oppressors of his country, showed commendable moderation in his manner of presenting the papers. Invasion must always be intolerable to the invaded. No Brussels conferences or Geneva conventions, however much they may alleviate the miseries of the battle-fields, can soften the hard lines of a foreign occupation in its general features; and M. Delerot would not be more – he would be something less – than human were he able to take a perfectly just view of the conduct of the Prussians in France. The truth is that they behaved badly if we judge them by a high ideal standard; admirably if we judge them by the standard of what has been done by former invaders engaged in invasions on the same vast scale and of the same momentous character as that of 1870.

The book in question is too full of matter for one to give an idea of its contents, either by means of notes or by a connected series of extracts. But some notion of its general character may be conveyed by the reproduction of a few stories from it.

The king, to begin with the most important of all the personages assembled at Versailles, was in the habit of receiving anonymous letters from all parts of the occupied country, and it would appear that he was quite ready to answer them. Not, however, knowing the authors of the epistles, he was obliged to content himself with writing notes for replies on the margin of these curious documents. To one correspondent, who charges him (on the strength of an accusation originally made by M. Jules Favre) with having declared, on entering France, that he made war “not on the French people, but on the Emperor Napoleon,” he justly answers, “Je n’ai jamais dit cela.” To a correspondent who insults and curses him, and who signs himself “Un Français qui ne t’aime pas,” he quietly remarks, “Il me semble!” One writer addresses him, in allusion to the siege of Strasburg, as “Sire Bombardeur!” Another, after exhausting all the terms of abuse he can think of in the French language, calls him, in plain English, “old rascal.”

Mention must not be omitted of the part played, in connection with the invasion, by the money-lender attached to the Prussian forces. He was no miserable camp-follower bent on securing much plunder by small advances of ready money, nor private bill-discounter prepared to “oblige” officers with loans on notes of hand. He was an officially recognised financial agent, representing a syndicate of foreign bankers, who, to enable the municipalities and the occupied towns to execute the requisitions and pay the contributions imposed on them, offered, with a generosity rare in time of war, to lend the necessary funds in return for promises to pay, secured on the local taxes. The arrival of Herr Betzold was announced in the Moniteur de Versailles, the official journal published by the Germans throughout the occupation; and a few days afterwards his benevolent project for enabling destitute French municipalities to satisfy the most exorbitant Prussian demands was made known through the columns of the little sheet, which thus found itself transformed for a time into a financial newspaper. A second time attention was called to the advantages to be derived from the scheme; but neither the eloquent articles of the Moniteur de Versailles nor the friendly personal representations of Herr Betzold himself had any effect upon the municipality. The mayor refused to pledge the future resources of the town, or rather, refused to pledge them to the Prussians. A loan was found indispensable, but the bonds were offered to and taken by the inhabitants. The interest was fixed at five per cent., principal and interest both to be paid off within three months of signing the peace.

While on the subject of contributions and the means taken to enable the conquered populations to pay them, I may point out – what some professors of international law are perhaps unaware of – that the Prussians no longer recognise the right of maritime Powers in time of war to seize merchant vessels belonging to the enemy. The contribution of 1,000,000 francs per occupied department, to which M. Delerot devotes some pages, was ordered by way of reprisal, and as an indemnity for the losses inflicted upon German commerce by French men-of-war.

The most serious charge brought by M. Delerot against the Prussians is that at Bougival they attacked and wounded a certain number of the inhabitants, on the ground, and apparently under the distinct impression, that they had been fired at with an air-gun: an instrument which, as M. Delerot assures us, is found only in scientific laboratories. The Prussians to whom the outrage in question is attributed were temporarily retreating in face of a sortie from Paris; and according to M. Delerot, they simply deluded themselves into a belief that the inhabitants of Bougival had assumed towards them an attitude which, under the circumstances, inhabitants are likely enough to adopt.

The fact that a formal trial was instituted, and that it resulted in two of the inhabitants being found guilty and shot, would seem to show that there must have been some sort of evidence against them, though M. Delerot will have it that the Prussians were under a delusion on the subject. It is clear, however, from the facts, adduced as such by M. Delerot himself, that the Prussians wished, not so much to act with severity as to be thought severe. The object, indeed, of most punishments in civilised warfare is, not to punish offenders retributively and in a spirit of vengeance for what they have done, but to deter other possible offenders from imitating their example. No one imagines that there is anything morally wrong in a civilian’s wishing to defend his country. But if troops do not molest the civil population, they consider that they have a right to require in return that civilians shall not molest them. One day, then, when a number of peasants taken in arms were brought to Versailles, the Prussians announced loudly their intention to shoot them. But M. Delerot and his friends observed that, instead of being taken to the place of execution, the peasants were imprisoned. On leaving Versailles, the Prussian authorities gave up to the mayor a list of the persons thrown into gaol during their occupation; and M. Delerot republishes it, with the names of the prisoners, the offences charged against them, and so on. The list certainly shows that many persons were incarcerated on trivial accusations: among others a servant-girl for having returned a box on the ears to an officer; someone else for having been found “in possession of a diary containing insulting expressions addressed to the King of Prussia”; a third for having recognised a Prussian spy; a fourth for having “followed Count Bismarck.” M. Delerot would, perhaps, have preferred that this last victim of precautionary measures should have been allowed to pursue Count Bismarck, who, walking out alone, was sometimes completely mobbed; so that on one occasion he reproached his pursuers with their ignorance of the “usages of war,” adding that if some impetuous young officer found himself surrounded in such a manner, he would probably make use of his sword. Thus, if Count Bismarck ended by objecting altogether to followers, he did not do so until they had become a serious nuisance.

The arrest of a man who had “recognised” a Prussian spy is interesting as an example of an action perfectly innocent, and, indeed, praiseworthy in itself, but which of necessity entailed upon its author a period of forced seclusion. A spy recognised, even by one individual, is a spy lost unless the individual who has recognised him be at once removed from public life.

To a large extent, M. Delerot’s work, independently of the fact that it is well put together and contains a mass of valuable and interesting information, is impartial. “Impartiality!” exclaims Victor Hugo in his “Napoleon le Petit.” “Strange virtue for an historian, which Tacitus never possessed!” Thereupon Victor Hugo proceeds to “déchirer” his victim “en style de Juvenal.” M. Delerot claims to have seen things, and to state them precisely as they took place. But, with the best intentions, such an attitude would be impossible for a citizen and official of Versailles writing the moment after the occupation had come to an end, with the wound constantly and inevitably inflicted on his patriotism still fresh. He has nothing extenuated, and he has set down much, if not in malice, at least in anger. But he has striven, though not always with success, to render justice to the Prussians, especially to the Crown Prince, Count Moltke, and even Prince Bismarck.

CHAPTER XLVIII.

VERSAILLES AND THE COMMUNE

The Communists or Communards – The “Internationale” – Bismarck and the National Guard – The Municipal Elections – The Insurrection – Thiers – Paris During the Commune – Concluding Remarks

NO sooner had peace been signed between France and Germany than a desperate conflict took place in the streets of the capital, which led to a two months’ war between the regular troops established at Versailles and a mass of federated battalions of the National Guard in Paris itself. The Communards are known in England as the “Communists”; and, having after a time adopted certain theories on the subject of labour and the division of property as part of their programme, they are generally looked upon as Communists in the socialistic sense of the word. The Communard movement of 1871 was, above all, a revolutionary attempt to establish absolute municipal self-government in Paris. It recalled, then, from the first the Commune of the great Revolution, when Pétion was Mayor of Paris, with Robespierre and Danton among his councillors and officials. The Paris Commune of the first Revolution declared all other authorities suspended. It joined the extreme party known as the Mountain (from occupying the highest benches in the Assembly), organised the movement which resulted in the fall of the moderate, well-intentioned Girondists, and remained faithful to Robespierre throughout the Reign of Terror until the overthrow of the revolutionary tyrant. The very name of Commune was then abolished, and in lieu of a central municipal power, Paris was divided into twelve distinct municipalities.

Count Bismarck at Versailles had recommended the disarming of the National Guard. His well-meant advice was regarded with suspicion, though, as he had foreseen, the revolutionary spirit of the force in question soon asserted itself. Already on the 18th of March the National Guard had resisted the action of some Line regiments. The Municipal Elections of the 26th proved favourable to the projected Communal Government, and, on the 29th, the Commune was formally proclaimed. The Red Republicans, leaders in every revolutionary movement, had, since the dethronement of Napoleon III. and the proclamation of the Republic in September, 1870, never ceased to attack what they considered the conservative character of the Government of National Defence; and in demanding measures of a more democratic kind, they aimed in particular at decentralisation, municipal independence, and the introduction of a federated system made up of self-governing communes. These views were supported in good faith by politicians of the extreme Republican side. But they were adopted also, and spread abroad with many pernicious additions, by political agitators, revolutionists, and adventurers of the worst kind. The members of the “Internationale” – a society for the promotion of revolution everywhere, of which but little has lately been heard – did their best to fan the insurrectionary flame; and soon every form of discontent had its representatives, and every impossible chimera its supporters among the leaders of what was still called the Commune.

The vagabondism which gave to the Commune so many adherents had been generated and developed during the siege, and there were numbers of men in Paris, composing the worst portion of the National Guard, who saw in the end of the war the end also of their living at Government expense, and who looked forward with dismay to the return of regular work, the enforcement of creditors’ claims, the collection of rents and taxes, and a hundred other inconveniences which they had evaded during the war. On the triumphal entry of the German army into Paris, March 1st, 1871, detachments of the National Guard had, by express stipulation, though contrary to Bismarck’s advice, been allowed to remain under arms for the preservation of order in the streets, and a considerable quantity of cannon having been entrusted to their care (in order to prevent its falling into the hands of the Germans, who by the terms of the armistice had every right to it), they afterwards, when summoned to do so by General Aurelle de Paladines, refused to give it up. It was on this occasion that the National Guard came into collision with the regular troops, who had been instructed to receive the artillery from them. Their determination not to part with the field-pieces placed beneath their protection was at first attributed to an honourable patriotic feeling. But the National Guard lost no time in seeking ammunition for their artillery, and they took possession of several magazines. They were attacked by some bodies of regular troops, but succeeded in giving a good account of their opponents, some of whom were induced to join them. A Central Committee of the National Guard was now formed, and inflammatory proclamations were put forward demanding that the National Guard should have the right to elect its own officers; that the daily war pay of one franc and a half should be secured to each National Guard until he could obtain work, and that General Aurelle de Paladines should be displaced in order to make room for a commander of their own choosing. In regard to general politics, they demanded universal suffrage and the formal subjection of all military power to the civil authority of the Paris municipality: Paris commune, that is to say.

The chief of the new National Government, M. Thiers, saw that the time for suppressing the movement in favour of the Commune had arrived. The National Guard had carried their artillery to the heights of Montmartre, and some ten thousand of the regular troops now took up positions of attack at the base of the hill. They then pressed upwards to the summit, overcame the guard placed outside the insurgents’ camp, took the cannon, and made several hundred prisoners. Having once got possession of the cannon, the regular troops do not seem to have known what to do with their capture. News of the affair spread rapidly through the workmen’s quarters of Montmartre and Belleville, and the alarm having been beaten, several battalions of National Guards mustered and marched to the hill on whose crest the cannon still remained. One of the regiments entrusted with the custody of the guns fraternised with the assailants, and the victory of the National Guards was thus made easy. The insurgents remained in possession of the guns, and the few troops who remained loyal to their colours were allowed to withdraw. Soon afterwards, on the same day, a small body of regular troops was cut off from the main column by a party of insurgents, and General Clément Thomas, former commander of the National Guard of Paris, was taken prisoner and shot. By mid-day on the 18th, the insurgents were in full possession of Montmartre, and towards evening, the Government troops having been driven from the field, they penetrated into other quarters, and now for the first time established themselves in the Place Vendôme. Soon after dark, they occupied the Hôtel de Ville without encountering any resistance. By midnight they had made it their headquarters, the regular troops having meanwhile returned to Versailles. On the morning of the 19th, the federated Guards held every point within their power, and the Central Committee were the rulers of the city. The Government over which M. Thiers presided was already established at Versailles.

Nothing could be stranger than the way in which the forts around Paris were now occupied. Those on the eastern and north-eastern side were still in the hands of the Germans. The regular Government held Mont-Valérien, the most important of all the forts. The other forts had fallen into the power of the federated battalions of the National Guard, who now made preparations for defending the city against a second siege.

Elections were at this juncture made to a municipal assembly; the Commune was declared to be the only true and legitimate Government of the city; and a Journal Officiel de la Commune de Paris was founded, in which a series of decrees was immediately published. The old revolutionary calendar was restored, March 29th being announced as “the eighth of Germinal, year 79.” Laws were issued requiring every able-bodied citizen, from nineteen to forty, to serve in the National Guard; a partial remission of overdue rents was granted; three years’ time was given for payment in full of overdue notes and bills, and the daily pay of the National Guards was raised to two and a half francs. All articles, moreover, that had been pawned for a sum not exceeding twenty francs were to be returned to their owners; pensions were to be paid to the widows and orphans of those falling in the insurrection; and all factories whose owners had left Paris were to become the property of the workmen employed in them.

The Commune now proceeded to organisation, and, after many lively debates in the Assembly, an executive committee was formed, when the conduct of the Communal Government assumed a definite shape. Ministers were appointed, and one of the leading members of the Commune – he happened to be the best-dressed man amongst them – was named, at a time when Paris was cut off from all communication with the outer world, “Director of External Affairs” – “Directeur des Affaires Extérieures.” “Ce monsieur,” said Rochefort, when he heard of the appointment, “a plus d’extérieur que d’affaires.”