The Battle of Gettysburg 1863

So far this army had been a school in which mediocrity had risen. The really great commander had not yet forced his way to the front in spite of cabals in or out of the army. There had been a series of experiments – disastrous experiments. No army had ever marched more bravely to defeat or so seldom to victory. Few expected victory now.

Yielding to an imperative order, Meade found the Herculean task thrust upon him, with the fact staring him in the face that a defeated general meant a disgraced one.

But even then he did not find himself free to handle his army as he thought proper, because in Halleck he had always a tutor and critic who from his easy-chair in Washington assumed to supervise the acts of the commander in the field. Upon a not over-confident general the effect was especially pernicious. The war-cry at Washington was, "Beat the enemy, but make no mistakes!" This was constantly ringing in Meade's ears. As Halleck was an excellent closet strategist, some of his suggestions would have been eminently proper and useful, could he have been on the spot himself, but under existing conditions they could serve only to make Meade still more hesitating and timid. Handled in this way, no army has ever achieved great results, and no army ever will achieve them.

At the close of the Third Day's sanguinary encounter with Lee, Meade had found himself victorious. The fact that the fortune of war had thus placed the initiative in his hands seems to have become a source of embarrassment and perplexity; from that moment his acts became timid, halting, partial. When pressed to more active measures he flew into a passion.

The fault, as we look at it, was not so much in the commander as in the man. Meade the commander could do no more than Meade the man. He was no genius. He was only a brave, methodical, and conscientious soldier, who, within his limitations, had acted well his part. Under Grant he made an excellent so-called second in command.

It has been said that in defending itself successfully, the Union army had done all that could be expected, under the circumstances. Must we then admit that for Lee not to conquer was in itself a victory? Unquestionably there was a prevalent, a somewhat overshadowing, feeling that all the best generalship was on the Confederate side.

By a sort of perversity of the human mind, a certain class of critics is always found ready to prove why a beaten general is the best general.

Nevertheless, Lee himself goes down in history as a general who never won a decisive victory.

He was certainly lucky at Gettysburg. For a time his great reputation silenced the voice of criticism. His own subordinates are now accusing him of making fatal mistakes. May it not be equally true that Lee rashly undertook more at Gettysburg than he was able to perform? He has as good as admitted it. Carried away by a first success, he committed the old mistake of underrating his adversary. His victory of the first day was due to no combinations of his own, because he was then completely ignorant of where the Federal army was. He supposed it at least twenty miles off. His success of the second, again, arose first out of an entire misconception on his part as to the Union position, which was nowhere near where he thought it was, and next from a piece of recklessness on the part of one of the Union generals, by which an inferior force was again opposed to a superior one. On the third, he used means wholly inadequate to the work in hand, yet of his own planning; and on all three days, with the field of battle under his eye, little or no manœuvring for advantage of position, and plenty of time to look about him in, he signally failed to secure coöperation among his corps commanders. We see no evidence here, we confess, of generalship. Indeed, this inability to make himself obeyed indicates a serious defect somewhere. Like another great but also unfortunate captain, Lee might have exclaimed in bitterness of spirit, "Incomprehensible day! Concurrence of unheard-of fatalities! Strange campaign when, in less than a week, I three times saw assured victory escape from my grasp! And yet all that skill could do was done."

Gettysburg made no reputations on either side. It may have destroyed some illusions in regard to the invincibility of Confederate generals. Meade succeeded because he was able to move troops to threatened points more rapidly than his assailant, but the battle was won more through the gallantry of the soldiers than by the skill of their generals. Victory restored to them their feeling of equality – their morale. And that was no small thing.

Considered with reference to its political effect upon the fortunes of the Confederacy, not to have succeeded was even worse than not to have tried at all, since it settled the question, once and for all, of achieving independence on Northern soil. Peace without submission was no longer possible, because the end was no longer in doubt. It came at last. And never in the history of the world, it is believed, have the victors shown such magnanimity to the vanquished.

THE END

APPENDIX

ARMY OF THE POTOMAC AS IT FOUGHT AT GETTYSBURG

Major-Gen. George G. Meade, CommandingSTAFF

Major-Gen. Daniel Butterfield, Chief of Staff; Brig. – Gen. M. R. Patrick, Provost Marshal-General; Brig. – Gen. Seth Williams, Adjutant-General; Brig. – Gen. Edmund Shriver, Inspector-General; Brig. – Gen. Rufus Ingalls, Q. M. General; Brig. – Gen. Gouverneur K. Warren, Chief of Engineers; Brig. – Gen. Henry J. Hunt, Chief of Artillery; Col. Henry F. Clarke, Chief Commissary; Major John Letterman, Chief of Medical Department; Major D. W. Flagler, Chief Ordnance Officer; Capt. L. B. Norton, Chief Signal Officer.

FIRST ARMY CORPSMajor-Gen. John F. Reynolds

First Division.– Brig. – Gen. James S. Wadsworth. First Brigade: Brig. – Gen. Solomon Meredith; Second Brigade: Brig. – Gen. Lysander Cutler.

Second Division.– Brig. – Gen. John C. Robinson. First Brigade: Brig. – Gen. Gabriel R. Paul; Second Brigade: Brig. – Gen. Henry Baxter.

Third Division.– Maj. – Gen. Abner Doubleday. First Brigade: Brig. – Gen. Thos. A. Rowley; Second Brigade: Col. Roy Stone; Third Brigade: Brig. – Gen. Geo. J. Stannard; Artillery Brigade: Col. Chas. S. Wainwright.

SECOND ARMY CORPSMajor-Gen. Winfield S. Hancock

First Division.– Brig. – Gen. John C. Caldwell. First Brigade: Col. Edwin E. Cross; Second Brigade: Col. Patrick Kelly; Third Brigade: Brig. – Gen. S. K. Zook; Fourth Brigade: Col. John R. Brooke.

Second Division.– Brig. – Gen. John Gibbon. First Brigade: Brig. – Gen. William Harrow; Second Brigade: Brig. – Gen. Alex. S. Webb; Third Brigade: Col. Norman J. Hall.

Third Division.– Brig. – Gen. Alexander Hays. First Brigade: Col. Samuel S. Carroll; Second Brigade: Col. Thomas A. Smyth; Third Brigade: Col. Geo. L. Willard; Artillery Brigade: Capt. J. G. Hazard.

THIRD ARMY CORPSMajor-Gen. Daniel E. Sickles

First Division.– Major-Gen. David B. Birney. First Brigade: Brig. – Gen. C. K. Graham; Second Brigade: Brig. – Gen. J. H. H. Ward; Third Brigade: Col. Philip R. De Trobriand.

Second Division.– Brig. – Gen. Andrew A. Humphreys. First Brigade: Brig. – Gen. Joseph B. Carr; Second Brigade: Col. Wm. R. Brewster; Third Brigade: Col. Geo. C. Burling; Artillery Brigade: Capt. Geo. E. Randolph.

FIFTH ARMY CORPSMajor-Gen. George B. Sykes

First Division.– Brig. – Gen. James Barnes. First Brigade: Col. W. S. Tilton; Second Brigade: Col. J. B. Sweitzer; Third Brigade: Col. Strong Vincent.

Second Division.– Brig. – Gen. Romayn B. Ayres. First Brigade: Col. Hannibal Day; Second Brigade: Col. Sidney Burbank; Third Brigade: Brig. – Gen. S. H. Webb.

Third Division.– Brig. – Gen. S. Wiley Crawford. First Brigade: Col. Wm. McCandless; Second Brigade: Col. Joseph W. Fisher; Artillery Brigade: Capt. A. P. Martin.

SIXTH ARMY CORPSMajor-Gen. John Sedgwick

First Division.– Brig. – Gen. H. G. Wright. First Brigade: Brig. – Gen. A. T. A. Torbert; Second Brigade: Brig. – Gen. J. J. Bartlett; Third Brigade: Brig. – Gen. D. A. Russell.

Second Division.– Brig. – Gen. A. P. Howe. Second Brigade: Col. L. A. Grant; Third Brigade: Brig. – Gen. T. H. Neill.

Third Division.– Brig. – Gen. Frank Wheaton. First Brigade: Brig. – Gen. Alex. Shaler; Second Brigade: Col. H. L. Eustis; Third Brigade: Col. David J. Nevin; Artillery Brigade: Col. C. H. Tompkins.

ELEVENTH ARMY CORPSMajor-Gen. Oliver O. Howard

First Division.– Brig. – Gen. Francis C. Barlow. First Brigade: Col. Leopold von Gilsa; Second Brigade: Brig. – Gen. Adelbert Ames.

Second Division.– Brig. – Gen. A. von Steinwehr. First Brigade: Col. Chas. R. Coster; Second Brigade: Col. Orlando Smith.

Third Division.– Major-Gen. Carl Shurz. First Brigade: Brig. – Gen. A. von Schimmelpfennig; Second Brigade: Col. Waldimir Kryzanowski; Artillery Brigade: Maj. Thos. W. Osborn.

TWELFTH ARMY CORPSMajor-Gen. Henry W. Slocum

First Division.– Brig. – Gen. Alpheus S. Williams. First Brigade: Col. Archibald L. McDougall; Second Brigade: Brig. – Gen. Henry H. Lockwood; Third Brigade: Col. Silas Colgrove.

Second Division.– Brig. – Gen. John W. Geary. First Brigade: Col. Chas. Candy; Second Brigade: Col. Geo. A. Cobham, Jr.; Third Brigade: Brig. – Gen. Geo. S. Greene; Artillery Brigade: Lieut. Edw. D. Muhlenberg.

CAVALRY CORPSMajor-Gen. Alfred Pleasonton

First Division.– Brig. – Gen. John Buford. First Brigade: Col. Wm. Gamble; Second Brigade: Col. Thos. C. Devin; Reserve Brigade: Brig. – Gen. Wesley Merritt.

Second Division.– Brig. – Gen. D. McM. Gregg. First Brigade: Col. J. B. McIntosh; Second Brigade: Col. Pennock Huey; Third Brigade: Col. J. I. Gregg.

Third Division.– Brig. – Gen. Judson Kilpatrick. First Brigade: Brig. – Gen. Elon J. Farnsworth; Second Brigade: Brig. – Gen. Geo. A. Custer.

HORSE ARTILLERY

First Brigade: Capt. John M. Robertson; Second Brigade: Capt. John C. Tidball.

ARTILLERY RESERVEBrig. – Gen. R. O. Tyler

First Regular Brigade: Capt. D. R. Ransom; First Volunteer Brigade: Lieut. – Col. F. McGilvery; Second Volunteer Brigade: Capt. E. D. Taft; Third Volunteer Brigade: Capt. James F. Huntington; Fourth Volunteer Brigade: Capt. R. H. Fitzhugh.

1

Gettysburg is the county seat of Adams County; is one hundred and fourteen miles west of Philadelphia. Pennsylvania College is located here.

2

The National Cemetery was dedicated by Abraham Lincoln, Nov. 19, 1863; it is a place of great and growing interest and beauty. The National Monument standing on this ground, where sleeps an army, was dedicated by General Meade in 1869. The monument itself was designed by J. G. Batterson, of Hartford, Conn., the statuary by Randolph Rogers. In 1872 the cemetery was transferred to the national government. A large part of the adjoining ridge is in charge of the Gettysburg Battlefield Memorial Association, a corporation formed under the laws of Pennsylvania for the preservation of the field and its landmarks. No other battle-ground was ever so distinctly marked or so easily traced as this.

3

Shells remain sticking in the walls of some buildings yet. A memorial stone at the steps in front of the Lutheran church, on Chambersburg street, indicates the spot where Chaplain Howell, of the 90th Pennsylvania Volunteers, was shot dead while entering the church, then being used as a hospital.

4

The Lutheran Seminary was used both as a hospital and observatory by the Confederates. Lee's headquarters were in a little stone house quite near the seminary buildings, which are not more than half a mile from the centre of Gettysburg.

5

In 1863 all these hills were much more densely wooded than now, so forming an impenetrable screen to their defenders.

6

The bowlder-strewn strip of ground lying between Devil's Den and Little Round Top is the most impressive part of the field, I think.

7

He withdrew two corps, by his left, to Culpepper, leaving one in the trenches of Fredericksburg. Had this corps been crushed while thus isolated, as it ought, Lee's invasion must have ended then and there.

8

A glance at the map shows how the northerly bend of the Potomac facilitated an invasion by this route. The outposts at Harper's Ferry and Winchester having been forced, there was nothing to stop the enemy's advance.

9

The Confederate army comprised three infantry corps, and one of cavalry. Each corps had three divisions, each division averaged a little over four brigades, of which there were thirty-seven present at Gettysburg. The British Colonel Freemantle, who accompanied Lee's army, puts the strength of these brigades at two thousand eight hundred men each. The relative strength of the army corps was more nearly equal than in those of the Union army. The Confederates brought with them two hundred and seventy pieces of artillery.

10

The main body, under Stuart, had gone around the rear of the Union army, by Lee's permission, in the expectation of harassing it while on the march, and of then rejoining Ewell, on the Susquehanna. It failed to do either, and many attribute all of Lee's misfortunes in this campaign to the absence of Stuart.

11

Jenkins, who commanded, was paid in his own coin at Chambersburg, by the proffer of Confederate scrip in payment for some alleged stolen horses. He himself had been professedly paying for certain seized property in this same worthless scrip.

12

Contrast this with the generous, even prodigal, way the Union soldiers were provided for, and who can doubt the devotion of these ragged Confederates to their cause?

13

So long as this division remained at York, the question as to where Lee meant to concentrate would be still further confused. See diagram.

14

Early levied a contribution on the borough, which the town council evaded by pleading poverty.

15

A small Union force which had been holding the bridge set it on fire on the approach of the Confederates.

16

This was Colonel Freemantle, who has a good word for everything Confederate. On being courteously received within the Union lines after Gettysburg, he was much surprised to find that the officers were gentlemen.

17

At Pittsburg defensive works were begun. In Philadelphia all business was suspended, and work vigorously pushed on the fortifications begun in the suburbs. At Baltimore the impression prevailed that Lee was marching on that city. The alarm bells were rung, and the greatest consternation prevailed.

18

A great lukewarmness in the action of the people of Pennsylvania is testified to on all sides. See Professor Jacobs' "Rebel Invasion," etc. About sixteen thousand men of the New York State militia were sent to Harrisburg between the 16th of June and the 3d of July; also several thousand from New Jersey (but ordered home on the 22d). General Couch was put in command of the defences of Harrisburg.

19

Hooker would not cross the Potomac until assured that Lee's whole army was across. He kept the Blue Ridge between himself and Lee in obedience to his orders to keep Washington covered.

20

The presence of Lee's cavalry would have allowed greater latitude to his operations, distressed the Pennsylvanians more, and enabled Lee to select his own fighting-ground.

21

So long as these passes were securely held, Lee would be shut up in his valley.

22

Open to serious objections; but then, so are all plans. Tied down by his orders, Hooker would have taken some risks for the sake of some great gains. By closing every avenue of escape, it would have ensured Lee's utter ruin, provided he could have been as badly beaten as at Gettysburg.

23

This feeling was so well understood at Washington that a report was spread among the soldiers that McClellan, their old commander, was again leading them, and the report certainly served its purpose.

24

The army was not up to its highest point of efficiency. It had just lost fifty-eight regiments by expiration of service. This circumstance was known to Lee. The proportion of veterans was not so great as in the Confederate army, or the character of the new enlistments as high as in 1861 and 1862.

25

Besides Meade, there were Hancock, Reynolds, and Humphreys – a triumvirate of some power with that army. Pennsylvania had also seventy-three regiments and five batteries with Meade.

26

While thus feeling for Lee along the mountain passes with his left hand, Meade was reaching out the right as far as possible toward the Susquehanna, or toward Early at York.

27

This was Longstreet's scout, Harrison. "He said there were three corps near Frederick when he passed there, one to the right and one to the left; but he did not succeed in getting the position of the other." —Longstreet.

28

This shows how little foundation exists for the statements of the Comte de Paris and others that Hooker's strategy compelled Lee to cross the mountain, when it is clear that he knew nothing whatever of Hooker's intentions. This is concurred in by both Lee and Longstreet. Moreover, Hooker had scarcely put his strategy in effect when he was relieved.

29

In point of fact, the concentration was first ordered for Cashtown, "at the eastern base of the mountain." —Lee. Ewell and Hill took the responsibility of going on to Gettysburg, after hearing that the Union cavalry had been seen there.

30

On the night of June 30th, Meade's headquarters and the artillery reserve were at Taneytown, the First Corps at Marsh Run, Eleventh at Emmettsburg, Third at Bridgeport, Twelfth at Littlestown, Second at Uniontown, Fifth at Union Mills, Sixth and Gregg's Cavalry at Manchester, Kilpatrick's at Hanover – a line over thirty miles long.

31

By being compelled to ford streams without taking off shoes or stockings, the men's feet were badly blistered.

32

Upon taking command, Meade is said to have expressed himself as "shocked" at the scattered condition of the army.

33

Buford's information was quite exact. "June 30, 10.30 P.M. I am satisfied that A. P. Hill's corps is massed just back of Cashtown, about nine miles from this place. Pender's division of this corps came up to-day, of which I advised you. The enemy's pickets, infantry and artillery, are within four miles of this place, at the Cashtown road." —Buford to Reynolds.

34

Colonel Chapman Biddle puts the Confederate force in camp around Cashtown or Heidlersburg, each eight miles from Oak Ridge, at thirty-five thousand of all arms; perhaps rather an over-estimate of this careful writer.

35

His horse carried him a short distance onward before he fell. His body was carried to the rear, in a blanket, just as Archer was being brought in a prisoner.

36

When attacked in this way a battery is at the mercy of its assailants.

37

General Abner Doubleday succeeded to the command of the First Corps on Reynolds' death.

38

The First Corps finally held a line of about a mile and a half, from the Hagerstown to the Mummasburg road.

39

The head of this corps arrived at about 12.45 and the rear at 1.45 P.M. It would take not less than an hour to get it into position from a half to three-fourths of a mile out of Gettysburg.

40

It is a well-settled principle of war as well as of common sense that a corps commander may disregard his orders whenever their literal execution would be in his opinion unwarranted by conditions unknown to, or unforeseen by, the general in command of the army when he issued them. This refers, of course, to an officer exercising a separate command, and not when in the presence of his superior.

41

The positions of the several corps that afternoon were as follows, except the First and Eleventh: Second at Taneytown, Third at Emmettsburg, Fifth at Hanover, Sixth at Manchester, and Twelfth at Two Taverns.

42

Heth, Rodes, and Early admit a loss of five thousand eight hundred without counting prisoners. The prisoners taken by the First Corps would swell this number to about eight thousand.

43

It seems plain that next to Reynolds Hancock was the one in whom Meade reposed most confidence.

44

This was the Seventh Indiana, which had been acting as escort to the trains. It brought five hundred fresh men to Wadsworth's division.

45

By General Morgan's account, one thousand five hundred fugitives were collected by the provost guard of the Twelfth Corps, some miles in rear of the field.

46

This was a brigade of nine months' men, called in derision the "Paper Collar Brigade." No troops contributed more to the winning of this battle, though only three of its five regiments were engaged.

47

Johnson was then coming up. This is equivalent to an admission that Ewell did not feel able to undertake anything further that night with the two divisions that had been in action.

48

While conveying the idea that the position was good, Hancock's message was, in reality, sufficiently ambiguous. It, however, served Meade's turn, as his mind was more than half made up already.

49

The Seventh Indiana brought up five hundred men; Stannard's brigade two thousand five hundred more.

50

The Union corps would not average ten thousand men present in the ranks, although the Sixth bore sixteen thousand on its muster rolls. Some corps had three, some two divisions. There were too many corps, and in consequence too many corps commanders, for the best and most efficient organization.

51

This was Pickett's, left at Chambersburg to guard the trains.

52

Lee's corps commanders in council seem more like a debating society: Meade's more like a Quaker meeting.

53

On the night of the first, the Confederate right did not extend much, if any, south of the Hagerstown, or Fairfield, road. As the fresh troops came up they were used in extending the line southward. Anderson's division was the first to move down to Hill's left. It was his skirmishers that first became engaged with Sickles'.

54

We have seen Meade first planning an attack on that side, which was why he was drawing troops over there. He designed having the Third Corps occupy the position vacated by Geary, however, and so directed.

55

In consequence of his exhausted condition, from incessant marching and fighting, Buford was to be relieved by other troops.

56

General Daniel E. Sickles, commanding the Third Corps.

57

The enemy were seeking to mask their movements to the Union left behind these skirmishers.

58

The peach-orchard knoll was Sickles' bugbear. He thought it much to be preferred to the position he was in. It was, however, fully commanded from Little Round Top.