England, Canada and the Great War

The Crown Colonies have also done their share of duty with great devotion.

The admirable result which for the last four years has been shining bright and glorious all over the world, is that, contrary to teutonic expectations, the war, far from breaking asunder the British Empire, has wonderfully solidified her mighty edifice, by an intensity of loyalty to her free institutions, to her glorious flag, which the enjoyment of the blessings of peace would not have proved so easily possible.

CHAPTER IX.

The Nationalist Error

The leaders of our Nationalist School have for years strenuously laboured to pervert the mind of our French-Canadian compatriots by the false pretensions that we were, in some mysterious way, coerced to participate in the European War. Even previous to the days of the South African conflict, they boldly took the stand that Canada should, on no account, and under no circumstances whatever, participate in what they called the Wars of the Empire —les guerres de l'Empire. Canada, they affirmed, had only to defend her own territory if attacked.

Fully appreciating how insidious and dangerous such theories were, I endeavoured to show, as forcibly as I could, that there had been no attempt by England at coercion of this Dominion to help her in the struggle against Germany. Of course, as previously explained, Great Britain being at war with the German Empire, the whole British Empire was at war. But no one in England ever intended to propose to force the colonies to engage actively into the fight. The Imperial Parliament would certainly not have taken into consideration any such proposition.

But is it not plain and beyond discussion that we, ourselves, had the undoubted right to intervene in the war to the extent that we would consider it our bounden duty to do so?

Evidently we could not remain neutral in the great conflict. At the very moment that Great Britain was at war with Germany, Canada, a British Colony, was part and parcel of the belligerent Sovereign State, the British Empire. By an incredible misconception, the Nationalist leaders confounded neutrality with non-participation in the war, if we had so decided.

To be, or not to be, neutral, was not within our constitutional rights. If Germany, either by land or by sea, had attacked our territory, as she had the undoubted belligerent right to do, would it have availed us an iota to implore her mercy by affirming that we were neutral? Could we have pretended that she was violating neutral territory?

No one with the least notion of International Law would for a moment hesitate to give the true answers to those questions.

But the very different question to participate, or not, in the war, was for us alone to decide according to our constitutional charter. We have freely, deliberately, decided to do our share in the great war. We continue and persevere in our noble task, freely and deliberately.

It is admitted by all that under the actual constitutional organization of the Empire, the Imperial Parliament could not require the autonomous colonies to participate in the war. But no one can assuredly deny to that Parliament the right, in the case of an imminent peril, to formulate the desire that the autonomous colonies would help Great Britain to conjure the threatened calamity.

But, in the present case, the Imperial Parliament has not even been under the necessity of expressing such a legitimate wish, for the obvious reason that the colonies at once took their patriotic stand in favor of the cause of England and her Allies. If the colonies had not so decided, of their own free will, it is most likely that the Imperial Parliament would not have expressed the wish for the assistance of the Dominions overseas.

The hearty support granted by the colonies to Great Britain, to develop its full value, had to be spontaneous, enthusiastic. Such it was, such it is, and such it will be to the last day of the conflict which victorious conclusion we are so strongly determined to achieve.

CHAPTER X.

Had Canada The Right To Help England?

Not satisfied to do the best it could to persuade our French-Canadian countrymen that they had been coerced into the war by England, our "Nationalist School" extensively used the argument that Canada had not the right to intervene into the European struggle. I refuted this erroneous pretension by the following propositions, the very essence of our constitutional rights and liberties: —

1. – The Canadian Cabinet had the undoubted constitutional right to advise His Excellency the Governor-General to approve the measures to be taken to give effect to their decision to participate in the war, decision and measures for which they were responsible to the Canadian Parliament and to the Canadian Electorate.

2. – The Canadian Parliament had the undoubted constitutional right to approve or disapprove the decision and the measures of the Cabinet. Parliament approved that decision and those measures, acting within their constitutional right.

3. – Even at the time I was writing, it could evidently be affirmed that the Canadian Electorate had approved the stand taken by both the Canadian Cabinet and the Canadian Parliament according to well known and defined constitutional usages.

Was it not proved beyond reasonable controversy, that the Canadian people heartily approved the decision of their Parliament to help in the great war?

Let me summarize the evidence as follows: —

1. – The war policy of the Cabinet, at the special session called in August, 1914, for that very purpose, was unanimously approved by Parliament, no Senator and no Member of the House of Commons moving to censure the responsible ministers for their decision to have Canada to participate in the war. The two great political parties have solemnly sanctioned that decision.

2. – Public opinion was also very strongly proved by the almost unanimity of the public press patriotically supporting the stand taken by Parliament. The exceptions were so few, that, as usual, they contributed to emphasize the soundness of the general rule.

3. – During the three years following the decision of the Canadian Parliament, a great number of large public meetings were held throughout Canada, and addressed by many leading and influential citizens all approving the action of Parliament. The meetings enthusiastically concurred in the powerful indorsation of the war policy of the speakers.

In a few public gatherings some disapproval was expressed, but not one meeting would go to the length of passing "Resolutions" censuring the Cabinet and the Parliament of Canada, or declaring that our Dominion should not have interfered into the war.

4. – Not one petition against the Canadian intervention into the war was addressed to Parliament.

5. – Leading Clergymen, of all denominations; leaders of political associations almost of all shades of opinion; financial, industrial, commercial leaders, all of them approved the patriotic interference of Canada into the war.

6. – The evident general approval of the unanimous decision, taken in 1916, to extend the Parliamentary term.

7. – The wonderful success of the public loans raised for war purposes.

8. – The enlightened and generous patriotism with which the country has accepted and paid war taxation.

9. – But, above all, the voluntary recruiting of four hundred thousand men of all social conditions who have rallied to the flag of the Empire for the defence of her existence and for the triumph of Civilization and Justice.

I, therefore, drew the undeniable conclusion that, contrary to the "Nationalist" pretension, Canada was participating in the war in the most regular constitutional way, without even the shadow of a breach of our Canadian autonomy, of our constitutional rights and liberties.

CHAPTER XI.

The Duty of Canada

Having affirmed that Canada had no right to interfere in the war, the "Nationalist" leaders at once concluded that she was not in duty bound to do so. That most discreditable inference was, of course, the natural sequence of the wrong principle aforesaid. They further drew the conclusion that it was no part of the duty of Canadians to join the Colors to help winning the war.

It was in flat contradiction of those erroneous notions that I positively declared, in my letter dedicating my book to my French Canadian compatriots, that "in defending with the most sincere conviction the sacred cause of the Allies, I am doing my duty as a free subject of the British Empire, as a citizen of Canada and of the Province of Quebec, as a son of France, as a devoted servant of Justice and Right."

Very narrow minded indeed is the man who has no higher conception of his duty than the one limiting him to the observance of positive and negative laws enacted by the legitimate authority to protect society and every one of its members.

When England, together with the other leading nations, was brutally challenged by Germany, and threatened in her very national existence, it is beyond comprehension that Canada, and all the British colonial possessions overseas, could so mistake their bounden duty as to refuse rushing to help the Mother Country in such a trying occurrence. Moreover, have we not, merely as men, duties to perform to protect Civilization against the deadly attack of barbarism, to have Justice and Right triumphant in international relations?

It is a matter of deep wonder to me that any one could have been so blind as not to perceive that in joining with Great Britain to defend the cause of the Allies, we were surely defending our own territory, our own soil, our own homes. How incredible was the "Nationalist" contention that we should have waited for the actual German attack of our land before mustering our resources of resistance. Who could not see, at a glance, that if Germany had, as it fully expected, easily triumphed over the combined forces of France, England and Russia, it would have been sheer madness to attempt resisting the victorious onslaught of a few hundred thousands of her veteran soldiers, whose valour would have been doubled by the enthusiasm of their European conquest.

After mature consideration of the possible results of the disastrous defeat of the combined efforts of the Allies, both on land and sea, the conclusion was forced upon my mind that Germany, ferociously elated by such a wonderful success, would no doubt have exacted from England the cession of Canada to her Empire. So that without even firing a gun against our territory, our wide Dominion would have been instantly transferred from the British to the German Sovereignty. I shuddered at such a vision, and still more deeply realized how much we, Canadians, were all in duty bound to help the Allies in crushing Prussian militarism.

CHAPTER XII.

The Soudanese and South African Wars

In the two previously mentioned pamphlets, Mr. Bourassa argued at length to prove that Canada had been led to intervene in the great European war as a consequence of her intervention in the South African War. It is well known throughout the Dominion that the South African conflict was the occasion chosen by the "Nationalist" leader to proclaim his doctrine that the autonomous colonies should have nothing to do with the wars of the Empire – les guerres de l'empire. He then strongly opposed Canadian support of Great Britain in her struggle in South Africa.

In one of his pamphlets, Mr. Bourassa affirmed that the Government of Sir John A. Macdonald had, in 1884, refused the request of the Imperial Government to interfere in its favour in the Soudanese war. Well aware of the events of this struggle, I positively knew that the "Nationalist" leader's assertion was not borne out by the facts, and was historically false. I considered it my duty, in a special chapter, to explain fully the circumstances of the case to my French Canadian countrymen.

It should be well remembered that England was brought into the Soudanese conflict on account of her relations with Egypt, which she had delivered from the Turkish yoke.

Mr. Bourassa prefaced his above mentioned affirmation by recalling the fact that it was in consideration of the Soudanese difficulties that "for the first time in the history of the Colonial Empire of Great Britain, offers of armed support were made by the autonomous colonies."

Is it not evident that if – as was true – such offers were made spontaneously by the Colonies, it cannot be pretended that the proffered armed support was asked by England. If England did not solicit such support, it is plain that Sir John A. Macdonald and his Cabinet could not refuse what was never applied for.

What are the true historical facts?

In November 1884, General Laurie, who has represented one of the electoral divisions of Nova Scotia at Ottawa, who has also held a seat in the British House of Commons, took the initiative to propose to raise a Canadian regiment for the campaign in the Soudan. In the regular official way, General Laurie's offer was addressed to the Secretary of State for the Colonies, Lord Derby. The Imperial Government declined the offer.

On the 7th of February, 1885, on hearing the news of the disaster of Khartoum, which caused great excitement in England, and naturally created a strong public feeling to avenge the outrage, General Laurie, always enthusiastic, tendered anew his services. He was not the only Canadian officer wishing to go and fight the cruel Soudaneses. A member of the Canadian Parliament, Colonel Williams, commanding the 46th volunteer battalion of Durham-East, also desired to take part in the African campaign with his regiment. On the 9th of February, 1885, he tendered his proposition to Sir Charles Tupper, then High Commissioner in London, who sent it to the Colonial Office.

On the 10th of February, His Excellency the Governor General, Lord Lansdowne, cabled to the Colonial Secretary that the offers of military service were very numerous. This spontaneous movement, so rapidly spreading, was the forerunner of those of 1899 and 1914. Thirty years ago, and long before, there were brave men in Canada. There always have been and ever will be.

These news were no doubt very encouraging for the Imperial authorities.

Lord Derby, thanking Lord Lansdowne, begged him to say "Whether they (the offers of service) are sanctioned and recommended by the Dominion Government."

On the 12th of February, Lord Lansdowne answered Lord Derby that the Dominion Government was ready to approve recruiting in Canada for service in Egypt or elsewhere, provided that the men would be enlisted under the authority of the Imperial Army Discipline Act, and the expense paid by the Imperial Treasury.

It consequently follows from the above despatches that the Soudanese campaign offered to many officers of our volunteer Militia the long wished for opportunity to freely tender their services to the Imperial Government; that the British authorities never applied to the Canadian Government, then presided by Sir John A. Macdonald, for armed support in Soudanese Africa; that, on being officially informed of the offers of service received by His Excellency the Governor General, the Colonial Secretary, before accepting or declining them, enquired if the Canadian Government sanctioned and recommended them; that the Governor General answered him in the affirmative, the recruiting to be made according to the Imperial Military Act at the expense of the Imperial exchequer.

On the 16th of February, the War Minister, then the Marquis of Hartington, informed the Colonial Secretary that he had come to the conclusion to decline with thanks the offers of service from Canada, for the reason that it would have taken too long a time to recruit and organize the regiments offered by General Laurie and Colonel Williams.

Was I not right, when I refuted Mr. Bourassa's assertion, in saying that if a refusal was then given, it was by the British Government who had received the freely tendered services, and not by the Canadian Government, to whom no demand of armed support had been made by Great Britain?

If it is indeed very astonishing that Mr. Bourassa should have taken the responsibility to affirm that the Government of Sir John A. Macdonald had refused to help Great Britain in the Soudanese campaign, it is easy to understand his object in so doing. His purpose was to convince his French Canadian readers that the political leaders at the head of the Government, in 1899 and 1914, together with the Canadian Parliament, had, in a revolutionary way, reversed the traditional policy of Canada of non-intervention in the "wars of the Empire" —les guerres de l'empire. And to achieve his end, so detrimental to the best interests of the Dominion, he did not hesitate to draw an absolutely erroneous conclusion from undeniable historical facts.

The "Nationalist" leader was very anxious to charge the chieftains of the two great political parties with an equal responsibility for what he terms a "Revolution" in our relations with the Mother Country. With this object constantly in view, he pretended that the intervention of Canada in the South African War created the precedent which brought about the Dominion participation in the European war, in 1914. In order to stir up to the utmost the prejudices of the French Canadians, he boldly qualified the South African conflict as an infamous crime on the part of England.

Unfortunately, the true history of the difficulties which culminated in the Boer War of 1899, was at the time little known throughout Canada, and even less particularly in the Province of Quebec. At the outbreak of the struggle, wishing to form a sound opinion of the causes of which it was the direct outcome, I made an exhaustive study of the South African question, beginning at the very inception of the Dutch settlement dating as far back as 1652, the year during which the Dutch East India Company occupied Table Bay. Six years later, in 1658, French Huguenots reached South Africa, joining with the Dutch Reformists, who rather energetically did all they could to assimilate them. Still later on, besides some few German immigrants, a third group of Europeans settled on the African coast. They were Englishmen.

All the Europeans, on landing in South Africa, few in numbers, had at once to contend with the black race numbering many millions. The history of the long struggle between European civilization, represented by the English and Dutch immigrants, and African barbarity, is indeed very interesting. Carefully read and studied in all its bearings, it strongly impressed upon my mind the conviction that had it not been for the timely armed protection they often solicited and received from England, the Dutch Boers would certainly have been annihilated by the tribes of the black race. They could not hope to successfully resist the onslaughts to which they were repeatedly submitted. They were saved from utter destruction by the strong arm of Great Britain, occupying an important strategical position by her Cape Colony. The British Government had favoured the settlement of the sons of England in South Africa, for the purpose of assuring, by a powerful naval station, the freedom of communication with the great regions soon to develop into her vast Indian Empire.

How, and under what circumstances, was British Sovereignty established in South Africa? I considered this question the most important to ascertain, in order to judge fairly the history of the last century in those regions. It was settled by the Peace Congress of Vienna, in 1815. All the European nations represented at that congress, have sanctioned British Sovereignty in South Africa upon the condition of the payment by England to the Kingdom of the Netherlands, of which Holland was then a part, of the sum of $30,000,000. Consequently the Sovereign Rights of Great Britain in South Africa were henceforth undeniable.

In my French book, I somewhat extensively summarized the development of the British and Dutch groups of settlers in South Africa. It is well known that the Boers are of Dutch origin. That a rivalry did develop between the two national elements, is not to be wondered at by any one having some knowledge of the history of the world.

I do not consider it necessary to go at any length in relating the vicissitudes of the conflict between the aspirations of the Boer element and the undoubted rights of British suzerainty. As a rule they are sufficiently well known by my English readers.

But I wish to emphasize the two undeniable facts: first, that throughout this protracted contest, England did perseveringly try to favour South Africa with the largest possible measure of political liberty. Second, that the crisis was finally brought about by the persistent determination of the Government of Pretoria to refuse justice to the Uitlanders and to the British capitalists who, at the urgent request of President Kruger, had invested many millions in the development of the very valuable mines recently discovered in the Transvaal territory.

Though England had agreed to the establishment of the two Republics of the Transvaal and Orange, she had maintained her suzerainty on those territories, which suzerainty the Government of Pretoria had again recognized by the Convention of 1884.

The most convincing proof that England did not intend any unfair design against the South African Republics, is the fact that she did not prepare to resist the armed attack of the Government of Pretoria which could be easily foreseen by the intense organization they were evidently making to impose Boer supremacy in South Africa.

In his very unjust appreciation of the policy of Great Britain in South Africa, Mr. Bourassa kept no account whatever of the very important fact that war was declared against England by the South African Republic. How could Great Britain have been guilty of a hideous crime in not bowing to the dictate of President Kruger and his Government, as the "Nationalist" leader said, is beyond comprehension.

England was absolutely within her right in accepting the challenge of the Government of Pretoria, and fighting to maintain her flag and her Sovereignty in South Africa.

Fortunately, the South African War, characterized by deeds of heroism on both sides, has had the most satisfactory conclusion. It is to be hoped that for many long years the future of that great country is settled with all the blessings that political liberty and free institutions will surely confer on that important part of the British Empire. The Boers themselves have fully recognized that their own national development cannot be better guaranteed and safeguarded than by the powerful Sovereignty pledged to their protection, on the only condition of their loyal allegiance to the flag waving on the fair land where they can multiply in peace, prosperity and happiness. The enthusiasm and the admirable courage with which they have rallied to the support of Great Britain and her Allies in the present war, is the best evidence how much they appreciate the advantages of their new conditions in the great South African Dominion destined to such a grand future.

I most sincerely deplore the persistent efforts of the "Nationalist" leader to pervert more and more the mind of my French Canadian countrymen by his so very unfair appreciation of the nature of the South African conflict. It was with the hope of counteracting them that I introduced a special chapter in my French edition explaining, as fully as I could, though in a condensed form, the South African question.

The assertion that the participation of Canada in the present European war was the sequence of the precedent of our intervention in the South African struggle, is also most injustifiable and untenable. Had Canada taken no part whatever in the South African War, it would not have made the least difference with regard to the decision of the Canadian people to support Great Britain and the Allies in their gigantic effort to put an end to Prussian terrorism. The assertion which I most emphatically contradict could have no other object but to prejudice the public mind against Canadian intervention in any of the wars of the Empire —les guerres de l'empire.

CHAPTER XIII.

British and German Aspirations Compared

In the attempt to justify his opposition to the Canadian armed support of the Allies' cause, Mr. Bourassa repeatedly asserted that Great Britain was as much as Germany aspiring to rule the whole world. He pretends that there is no difference between Anglo-Saxonism and Germanism.