Thirty Years' View (Vol. II of 2)

The motion of Mr. Miller was not voted upon. It was summarily disposed of, without the responsibility of a direct vote. The enemies of Mr. Van Buren having secured the presiding officer at the start, all motions were decided against them; and after a long session of storm and rage, intermitted during the night for sleep and intrigue, and resumed in the morning, an eighth ballot was taken: and without hope for Mr. Van Buren. As his vote went down, that for Messrs. Cass, Buchanan, and R. M. Johnson rose; but without ever carrying either of them to a majority, much less two-thirds. Seeing the combination against him, the friends of Mr. Van Buren withdrew his name, and the party was then without a candidate known to the people. Having killed off the one chosen by the people, the convention remained masters of the field, and ready to supply one of its own. The intrigue, commenced in 1842, in the Gilmer letter, had succeeded one-half. It had put down one man, but another was to be put up; and there were enough of Mr. Van Buren's friends to defeat that part of the scheme. They determined to render their country that service, and therefore withdrew Mr. Van Buren, that they might go in a body for a new man. Among the candidates for the vice-presidency was Mr. James K. Polk, of Tennessee. His interest as a vice-presidential candidate lay with Mr. Van Buren, and they had been much associated in the minds of each other's friends. It was an easy step for them to support for the first office, on the loss of their first choice, the citizen whom they intended for the second. Without public announcements, he was slightly developed as a presidential candidate on the eighth ballot; on the ninth he was unanimously nominated, all the president-makers who had been voting for others – for Cass, Buchanan, Johnson – taking the current the instant they saw which way it was going, in order that they might claim the merit of conducting it. "You bring but seven captives to my tent, but thousands of you took them," was the sarcastic remark of a king of antiquity at seeing the multitude that came to claim honors and rewards for taking a few prisoners. Mr. Polk might have made the same exclamation in relation to the multitude that assumed to have nominated him. Their name was legion: for, besides the unanimous convention, there was a host of outside operators, each of whom claimed the merit of having governed the vote of some delegate. Never was such a multitude seen claiming the merit, and demanding the reward, for having done what had been done before they heard of it.

The nomination was a surprise and a marvel to the country. No voice in favor of it had been heard; no visible sign in the political horizon had announced it. Two small symptoms – small in themselves and equivocal in their import, and which would never have been remembered except for the event – doubtfully foreshadowed it. One was a paragraph in a Nashville newspaper, hypothetically suggesting that Mr. Polk should be taken up if Mr. Van Buren should be abandoned; the other, the ominous circumstance that the Tennessee State nominating convention made a recommendation (Mr. Polk) for the second office, and none for the first; and Tennessee being considered a Van Buren State, this omission was significant, seeming to leave open the door for his ejection, and for the admission of some other person. And so the delegates from that State seemed to understand it, voting steadily against him, until he was withdrawn.

The ostensible objection to the last against Mr. Van Buren, was his opposition to immediate annexation. The shallowness of that objection was immediately shown in the unanimous nomination of his bosom friend, Mr. Silas Wright, identified with him in all that related to the Texas negotiation, for Vice-President. He was nominated upon the proposition of Mr. Robert J. Walker – a main-spring in all the movements against Mr. Van Buren, whose most indefatigable opponents sympathized with the Texas scrip and land speculators. Mr. Wright instantly declined the nomination; and Mr. George M. Dallas, of Pennsylvania, was taken in his place.

The Calhoun New York convention expired in the conception. It never met. The Tyler Baltimore convention was carried the length of an actual meeting, and went through the forms of a nomination, without the distraction of a rival candidate. It met the same day and place with the democratic convention, as if to officiate with it, and to be ready to offer a pis aller, but to no purpose. It made its own nomination – received an elaborate letter of thanks and acceptance from Mr. Tyler, who took it quite seriously; and two months afterwards joined the democracy for Polk and Dallas, against Clay and Frelinghuysen – his old whig friends. He had co-operated in all the schemes against Mr. Van Buren, in the hope of being taken up in his place; and there was an interest, calling itself democratic, which was willing to oblige him. But all the sound heart of the democracy recoiled from the idea of touching a man who, after having been raised high by the democracy, had gone over to the whigs, to be raised still higher, and now came back to the democracy to obtain the highest office they could give.

And here ends the history of this long intrigue – one of the most elaborate, complex and daring, ever practised in an intelligent country; and with too much success in putting down some, and just disappointment in putting up others: for no one of those who engaged in this intrigue ever reached the office for which they strived. My opinion of it was expressed, warmly but sincerely, from the first moment it was broached to me on the steps of the Capitol, when accosted by Mr. Brown, down to the rejection of the treaty in the Senate, and the defeat of Mr. Van Buren in the convention. Of this latter event, the author of this View thus wrote in a public letter to Missouri:

"Neither Mr. Polk nor Mr. Dallas has any thing to do with the intrigue which has nullified the choice of the people, and the rights of the people, and the principles of our government, in the person of Mr. Van Buren; and neither of them should be injured or prejudiced by it. Those who hatched that intrigue, have become its victims. They who dug a pit for the innocent have fallen into it; and there let them lie, for the present, while all hands attend to the election, and give us our full majority of ten thousand in Missouri. For the rest, the time will come; and people now, as twenty years ago (when their choice was nullified in the person of General Jackson), will teach the Congress intriguers to attend to law-making and let President-making and un-making alone in future. The Texas treaty, which consummated this intrigue, was nothing but the final act in a long conspiracy, in which the sacrifice of Mr. Van Buren had been previously agreed upon; and the nomination of Mr. Wright for Vice-President proves it; for his opinions and those of Mr. Van Buren, on the Texas question, were identical, and if fatal to one should have been fatal to the other. Besides, Mr. Van Buren was right, and whenever Texas is admitted, it will have to be done in the way pointed out by him. Having mentioned Mr. Wright, I will say that recent events have made him known to the public, as he has long been to his friends, the Cato of America, and a star of the first magnitude in our political firmament."

And now, why tell these things which may be quoted to the prejudice of democratic institutions? I answer: To prevent that prejudice! and to prevent the repetition of such practices. Democracy is not to be prejudiced by it, for it was the work of politicians; and as far as depended upon the people, they rebuked it. The intrigue did not succeed in elevating any of its authors to the presidency; and the annexation treaty, the fruit of so much machination, was rejected by the Senate; and the annexation afterwards effected by the legislative concurrence of the two powers. From the first inception, with the Gilmer letter, down to the Baltimore conclusion in the convention, the intrigue was carried on; and was only successful in the convention by the help of the rule which made the minority its master. That convention is an era in our political history, to be looked back upon as the starting point in a course of usurpation which has taken the choice of President out of the hands of the people, and vested it in the hands of a self-constituted and irresponsible assemblage. The wrong to Mr. Van Buren was personal and temporary, and died with the occasion, and constitutes no part of the object in writing this chapter: the wrong to the people, and the injury to republican institutions, and to our frame of government, was deep and abiding, and calls for the grave and correctional judgment of history. It was the first instance in which a body of men, unknown to the laws and the constitution, and many of them (as being members of Congress, or holding offices of honor or profit) constitutionally disqualified to serve even as electors, assumed to treat the American presidency as their private property, to be disposed at their own will and pleasure; and, it may be added, for their own profit: for many of them demanded, and received reward. It was the first instance of such a disposal of the presidency – for these nominations are the election, so far as the party is concerned; but not the last. It has become the rule since, and has been improved upon. These assemblages now perpetuate themselves, through a committee of their own, ramified into each State, sitting permanently from four years to four years; and working incessantly to govern the election that is to come, after having governed the one that is past. The man they choose must always be a character of no force, that they may rule him: and they rule always for their own advantage – "constituting a power behind the throne greater than the throne." The reader of English history is familiar with the term, "cabal," and its origin – taking its spelling from the initial letters of the names of the five combined intriguing ministers of Charles II. – and taking its meaning from the conduct and characters of these five ministers. What that meaning was, one of the five wrote to another for his better instruction, not suspecting that the indefatigable curiosity of a subsequent generation would ever ferret out the little missive. Thus: "The principal spring of our actions was to have the government in our own hands; that our principal views were the conservation of this power – great employments to ourselves – and great opportunities of rewarding those who have helped to raise us, and of harming those who stood in opposition to us." Such was the government which the "cabal" gave England; and such is the one which the convention system gives us: and until this system is abolished, and the people resume their rights, the elective principle of our government is suppressed: and the people have no more control over the selection of the man who is to be their President, than the subjects of kings have over the birth of the child who is to be their ruler.

CHAPTER CXXXVII.

PRESIDENTIAL: DEMOCRATIC NATIONAL CONVENTION: MR. CALHOUN'S REFUSAL TO SUBMIT HIS NAME TO IT: HIS REASONS

Before the meeting of this convention Mr. Calhoun, in a public address to his political friends, made known his determination not to suffer his name to go before that assemblage as a candidate for the presidency, and stated his reasons for that determination. Many of those reasons were of a nature to rise above personal considerations – to look deep into the nature and working of our government – and to show objections to the convention system (as practised), which have grown stronger with time. His first objection was as to the mode of choosing delegates, and the manner of their giving in their votes – he contending for district elections, and the delegates to vote individually, and condemning all other modes of electing and voting:

"I hold, then, that the convention should be so constituted, as to utter fully and clearly the voice of the people, and not that of political managers, or office holders and office seekers, and for that purpose, I hold it indispensable that the delegates should be appointed directly by the people, or to use the language of General Jackson, should be 'fresh from the people.' I also hold, that the only possible mode to effect this, is for the people to choose the delegates by districts, and that they should vote per capita. Every other mode of appointing would be controlled by political machinery, and place the appointments in the hands of the few, who work it."

This was written ten years ago: there have been three of these conventions since that time by each political party: and each have verified the character here given of them. Veteran office holders, and undaunted office seekers, collusively or furtively appointed, have had the control of these nominations – the office holders all being forbid by the constitution to be even electors, and the office seekers forbid by shame and honor (if amenable to such sensations), to take part in nominating a President from whom they would demand pay for their vote. Mr. Calhoun continues:

"I object, then, to the proposed convention, because it will not be constituted in conformity with the fundamental articles of the republican creed. The delegates to it will be appointed from some of the States, not by the people in districts, but, as has been stated, by State conventions en masse, composed of delegates appointed in all cases, as far as I am informed, by county or district conventions, and in some cases, if not misinformed, these again composed of delegates appointed by still smaller divisions, or a few interested individuals. Instead then of being directly, or fresh from the people, the delegates to the Baltimore convention will be the delegates of delegates; and of course removed, in all cases, at least three, if not four degrees from the people. At each successive remove, the voice of the people will become less full and distinct, until, at last, it will be so faint and imperfect, as not to be audible. To drop metaphor, I hold it impossible to form a scheme more perfectly calculated to annihilate the control of the people over the presidential election, and vest it in those who make politics a trade, and who live or expect to live on the government."

Mr. Calhoun proceeds to take a view of the working of the constitution in a fair election by the people and by the States, and considered the plan adopted as a compromise between the large and the small States. In the popular election through electors, the large States had the advantage, as presenting masses of population which would govern the choice: in the election by States in the House of Representatives, the small States had the advantage, as the whole voted equally. This, then, was considered a compromise. The large States making the election when they were united: when not united, making the nomination of three (five as the constitution first stood), out of which the States chose one. This was a compromise; and all compromises should be kept when founded in the structure of the government, and made by its founders. Total defeat of the will of the people, and total frustration of the intent of the constitution, both in the electoral nomination and the House choice of a President, was seen in the exercise of this power over presidential nominations by Congress caucuses, before their corruption required a resort to conventions, intended to be the absolute reflex of the popular will. Of this Mr. Calhoun says:

"The danger was early foreseen, and to avoid it, some of the wisest and most experienced statesmen of former days so strongly objected to congressional caucuses to nominate candidates for the presidency, that they never could be induced to attend them; among these it will be sufficient to name Mr. Macon and Mr. Lowndes. Others, believing that this provision of the constitution was too refined for practice, were solicitous to amend it, but without impairing the influence of the smaller States in the election. Among these, I rank myself. With that object, resolutions were introduced, in 1828, in the Senate by Colonel Benton, and in the House by Mr. McDuffie, providing for districting the State, and for referring the election back to the people, in case there should be no choice, to elect one from the two highest candidates. The principle which governed in the amendment proposed, was to give a fair compensation to the smaller States for the surrender of their advantage in the eventual choice, by the House, and at the same time to make the mode of electing the President more strictly in conformity with the principles of our popular institutions, and to be less liable to corruption, than the existing. They (the resolutions of McDuffie and Benton) received the general support of the party, but were objected to by a few, as not being a full equivalent to the smaller States."

The Congress presidential caucuses were put down by the will of the people, and in both parties at the same time. They were put down for not conforming to the will of the people, for incompatibility between the legislative and the elective functions, for being in office at the same time, for following their own will, instead of representing that of their constituents. Mr. Calhoun concurred in putting them down, but preferred them a hundred times over to the intriguing, juggling, corrupt and packed machinery into which the conventions had so rapidly degenerated.

"And here let me add, that as objectionable as I think a congressional caucus for nominating a President, it is, in my opinion, far less so than a convention constituted as is proposed. The former had indeed many things to recommend it. Its members consisting of senators and representatives, were the immediate organs of the State legislatures, or the people; were responsible to them, respectively, and were for the most part, of higher character, standing, and talents. They voted per capita, and what is very important, they represented fairly the relative strength of the party in their respective States. In all these important particulars, it was all that could be desired for a nominating body, and formed a striking contrast to the proposed convention; and yet, it could not be borne by the people in the then purer days of the republic. I, acting with General Jackson and most of the leaders of the party at that time, contributed to put it down, because we believed it to be liable to be acted on and influenced by the patronage of the government – an objection far more applicable to a convention constituted as the one proposed, than to a congressional caucus. Far however was it from my intention, in aiding to put that down, to substitute in its place what I regard as a hundred times more objectionable in every point of view. Indeed, if there must be an intermediate body between the people and the election, unknown to the constitution, it may be well questioned whether a better than the old plan of a congressional caucus can be devised."

Mr. Calhoun considered the convention system, degenerated to the point it was in 1844, to have been a hundred times more objectionable than the Congress caucuses which had been repudiated by the people: measured by the same scale, and they are a thousand times worse at present – having succeeded to every objection that was made against the Congress caucuses, and superadded a multitude of others going directly to scandalous corruption, open intrigue, direct bargain and sale, and flagrant disregard of the popular will. One respect in which they had degenerated from the Congress caucus was in admitting a State to give its full vote in nominating a President, which could either give no vote at all, or a divided one, to the nominated candidate. In the Congress caucus that anomaly could not happen. The members of the party only voted: and if there were no members of a party from a State, there was no vote from that State in the caucus: if a divided representation, then a vote according to the division. This was fair, and prevented a nomination being made by those who could do nothing in the election. This objection to the convention system, and a grievous one it is as practised, he sets forth in a clear and forcible point of view. He says:

"I have laid down the principle, on which I rest the objection in question, with the limitation, that the relative weight of the States should be maintained, making due allowance for their relative party strength. The propriety of the limitation is so apparent, that but a few words, in illustration, will be required. The convention is a party convention, and professedly intended to take the sense of the party, which cannot be done fairly, if States having but little party strength, are put on equality with those which have much. If that were done, the result might be, that a small portion of the party from States the least sound, politically, and which could give but little support in Congress, might select the candidate, and make the President, against a great majority of the soundest, and on which the President and his administration would have to rely for support. All this is clearly too unfair and improper to be denied. There may be a great difficulty in applying a remedy in a convention, but I do not feel myself called upon to say how it can be done, or by what standard the relative party strength of the respective States should be determined; perhaps the best would be their relative strength in Congress at the time. In laying down the principle, I added the limitation for the sake of accuracy, and to show how imperfectly the party must be represented, when it is overlooked. I see no provision in the proposed convention to meet it."

The objection is clearly and irresistibly shown: the remedy is not so clear. The Congress representation for the time being is suggested for the rule of the convention: it is not always the true rule. A safer one is, the general character of the State – its general party vote – and its probable present party strength. Even that rule may not attain exact precision; but, between a rule which may admit of a slight error, and no rule at all to keep out notorious unfounded votes – votes representing no constituency, unable to choose an elector, having no existence when the election comes on, yet potential at the nomination, and perhaps governing it: between these two extremes there is no room for hesitation, or choice: the adoption of some rule which would exclude notoriously impotent votes, becomes essential to the rights and safety of the party, and is peremptorily demanded by the principle of popular representation. The danger of centralizing the nomination – (which, so far as the party is concerned, is the election) – in the hands of a few States, by the present convention mode of nomination, is next shown by Mr. Calhoun.

"But, in order to realize how the convention will operate, it will be necessary to view the combined effects of the objections which I have made. Thus viewed, it will be found, that a convention so constituted, tends irresistibly to centralization – centralization of the control over the presidential election in the hands of a few of the central, large States, at first, and finally, in political managers, office-holders, and office-seekers; or to express it differently, in that portion of the community, who live, or expect to live on the government, in contradistinction to the great mass, who expect to live on their own means or their honest industry; and who maintain the government; and politically speaking, emphatically the people. That such would be the case, may be inferred from the fact, that it would afford the means to some six or seven States lying contiguous and not far from the centre of the Union, to control the nomination, and through that the election, by concentrating their united votes in the convention. Give them the power of doing so, and it would not long lie dormant. What may be done by combination, where the temptation is so great, will be sure ere long to be done. To combine and conquer, is not less true as a maxim, where power is concerned, than 'divide and conquer.' Nothing is better established, than that the desire for power can bring together and unite the most discordant materials."

After showing the danger of centralizing the nomination in the hands of a few great contiguous States, Mr. Calhoun goes on to show the danger of a still more fatal and corrupt centralization – that of throwing the nomination into the meshes of a train-band of office-holders and office-seekers – professional President-makers, who live by the trade, having no object but their own reward, preferring a weak to a strong man because they can manage him easiest: and accomplishing their purposes by corrupt combinations, fraudulent contrivances, and direct bribery. Of these train-bands, Mr. Calhoun says: