Fundamental Philosophy, Vol. 2 (of 2)

NOTE TO BOOK EIGHTH

(3) Perhaps some of my readers, who are not well acquainted with the history of philosophy, may think that I have extended the explanation of the idea of the infinite to too great length, and consider these questions as serving rather to subtilize, than to acquire solid knowledge. This is a great mistake. At all times the philosophical questions of the idea of the infinite have held a prominent position, and at the present time there is scarcely any which require to be more carefully examined, if we wish to stay the progress of pantheism. I shall not cease to repeat that a great many of the most serious errors have their birth in a confusion in their fundamental ideas; if one is well grounded in these ideas, he has nothing to fear from certain works whose secret in leading one astray, consists in using incomprehensible words, or in giving a false sense to those which can be understood. However this may be, I would remind those who believe these questions mere scholastic cavils, that they must regard as cavillers the most eminent philosophers of ancient and modern times.

NOTE TO BOOK NINTH

(4) I know that some modern philosophers, and more especially M. Cousin, reject the accusation of pantheism, and explain in their own way those passages of their works in which this error is professed. As it is not possible for me to examine at any length, a question which would require the insertion of long extracts, I merely refer the reader to what I have said in the body of the work, and with respect to M. Cousin, to the extracts which I have made in my Letters to a Skeptic in Matters of Religion, Letter I. It is not the fault of M. Cousin's adversaries that he has used such clear expressions that no man of sound judgment can doubt that they contain a full profession of pantheism. Leaving to the philosopher the responsibility of his intentions, I shall only beg our young men not to judge lightly of the disputes of the neighboring kingdom, which are not always received here through faithful organs; and to withhold their faith from those who would attempt to persuade them that there is no ground for the alarms of men of sound philosophical doctrine.

THE END

1

Traité des Sensations. Préface.

2

See Chap. I.

3

Book III.

4

Transcendental Æsthetics, § 1.

5

He speaks of intuitive perception, not of perception in general.

6

Transcendental Logic. Introduction.

7

Transc. Log. Transc. Anal. Book I., Chap. I., Sec. I.

8

Transcendental Logic. Book II., Chap. III.

9

See what has been said concerning representation, immediate intelligibility, and representation of causality and ideality, in Chapters X., XI., XII., and XIII., of Book I. of this work.

10

See Chap. VI.

11

See Book I., Chs. III. and XXIII.

12

See Bk. I., Ch. XXVI.

13

P. I., Q. L. XXIX., A. 12.

14

Ib. Q. L. XXXIV., A. 5.

15

See Chs. XII. and XIII.

16

See Ch. XX.

17

See Ch. XXI.

18

See Bk. I., Chs. XXXVI., XXVII., and XVIII.

19

See Bk. IV., Ch. XXIII. to Ch. XXVII.

20

Sec. 5, P. 1, C. 3, A. 1, § 2.

21

See Book IV., Ch. XXI.

22

See L. IV., C. XXIII. to XXVII.

23

See L. IV., C. XXX.

24

See L. IV., C. V.

25

See L. V., C. X.

26

See L. IV., C. XXVIII. and XXIX.

27

See Lib. III., Ch. XX.

28

See Lib. III., Chs. XII., XIII., and XIV.

29

See Ch. III.

30

Trans. Æsth. II., A. § 6. w. f.

31

See Bk. IV., Chapters XIV. and XV.

32

See Bk. I., Ch. III.

33

See Bk. I., Ch. XX.

34

See Bk. I., Ch. XXV.

35

See Bk. I., Chap. III.

36

See Book V., Ch. XI.

37

See Book V., Chapters XIV., XV., and XVI.

38

See Chap. V.

39

See Bk. III., Chaps. XIX., XXI., XXIV., XXV., XXVI., XXVII. and XXVIII.

40

I am speaking of the difference between positive quantities; for with regard to other quantities we may express an infinite difference algebraically. Let the two quantities be (∞ – a) and (-a). The difference between them will be expressed in this equation, D=(∞ – a) – (-a) = ∞ – a + a = ∞.

41

See Book III., Chapter VIII.

42

Lettres entre Leibnitz et Clarke, Vième Écrit. de Leibnitz, § 73.

43

Von den Paralogismen der reinen Vernunft, p. 297.

44

See Bk. IV., Chs. XIII., XIV., XV., XVI., XXI., and XXII.

45

Critik der reinen Vernunft, p. 298.

46

Critik der reinen Vernunft, p. 299.

47

See Book VIII., Chapters XII. and XIV.

48

See Chaps. VI., VII., VIII., IX., and X.

49

Non ergo per essentiam suam, sed per actum suum se cognoscit intellectus noster, et hoc dupliciter. Uno quidem modo particulariter, secundum quod Sortes, vel Plato percipit se habere animam intellectivam ex hoc, quod percipit se intelligere. Alio modo in universali, secundum quod naturam mentis humanæ ex actu intellectus consideramus. Sed verum est quod judicium, et efficacia hujus cognitionis per quam naturam animæ cognoscimus, competit nobis secundum derivationem luminis intellectus nostri a veritate divina, in qua rationes omnium rerum continentur, sicut supra dictum est. Unde August. dicit in 9 de Trin. Intuemur inviolabilem veritatem, ex qua perfecte quantum possumus, deffinimus, non qualis sit uniuscujusque hominis mens, sed qualis esse sempiternis rationibus debeat. Est autem differentia inter has duas cognitiones; nam ad primam cognitionem de mente habendam sufficit ipsa mentis præsentia, quæ est principium actus, ex quo meus percipit seipsam: et ideo dicitur se cognoscere per suam præsentiam. Sed ad secundam cognitionem de mente habendam, non sufficit ejus præsentia: sed requiritur diligens, et subtilis inquisitio. Unde et multi naturam animæ ignorant, et multi etiam circa naturam animæ erraverunt. Propter quod August. dicit 10 de Trin. de tali inquisitione mentis, Non velut absentem se quærat mens cernere; sed præsentem quærat discernere; id est cognoscere differentiam suam ab aliis rebus, quod est cognoscere quidditatem, et naturam suam. S. Thom. Sum. Theol. P. I. Q., LXXXVII., A. 1.

50

Odyss., Bk. IV.

51

See Bk. I., Chap. VII.

52

Grundlage der gesammten Wissensehaftslehre. Erst. Th. 1. § 6. b.

53

Here, as elsewhere, in the examination of Fichte's system, I have translated the German word setzen and the Spanish poner by the verb to suppose. Had I known any better word I should have used it, but I think this sufficiently explains the philosopher's meaning. I have also found the French word poser which exactly corresponds to it, and which M. Cousin uses in his sketch of Fichte's system, translated suppose by Mr. Ripley, in the Specimens of Foreign Literature. – Translator.

54

See Bk. IV., from Ch. I. to X.

55

Grundlage der gesammten Wissenschaftslehre, I. Theil, § I., pp. 97-98.

56

Ib., II., Th. § 4. B., p. 129.

57

Ib., D., pp. 137-8.

58

Ib., Deduction der Vorstellung, III., pp. 233-4.

59

See Bk. IV., Chs. XXIII., XXIV., XXV., XXVI., and XXVII.; and Bk. V., Chs. VII. and VIII.

60

Ib., § 3., pp. 106-7.

61

Ib., III., Th. § 5, II., p. 256.

62

Ib., p. 255.

63

See Bks. II., III., and IV.

64

See Bk. III., Ch. XVII.

65

Kant, Critik der reinen Vernunft, Trause. Log.

66

Preface of the edition of Leipsic, 1838.

67

See Bk. V., Chs. IX. and X.

68

See Bk. V., Ch. IX.

69

See Bk. I., Ch. VIII. to XIV.

70

See Bk. I., Ch. XXV.

71

See the whole of Book VIII.

72

See Bk. IV., Chs. XXIII., XXIV., XXV., XXVI., and XXVII.

73

See Ch. II.

74

See Bk. VIII., Ch. XX. to the end.

75

See Bk. IV., Chs. XXII. to XXVIII., and Bk. V., Chs. VII. and VIII.

76

See Bk. V., Chs. VII. and VIII.

77

See Bk. VII.

78

See Bk. VII., Chs. IV. and V.

79

Lett. filos. sulle vicissit. della filosofia, Lettera XIV.

80

See Book V., Chap. IX.

81

See Bk. I., Chap. XXV.

82

See Bk. IV., Chaps. XI., XIII., XIV., XV., XVI., XIX., XX., XXI., and XXII.

83

See Bk. IV., Chap. XXI.

84

Ib., § 135.

85

Ib., § 134.

86

Ib., § 130.

87

Ib., Chap. XXII.

88

Ib., § 139.

89

See Book IV., Ch. XXII.

90

See Bk. IX., Chs. VI., VII., IX., and XI.

91

See Bk. IX.

92

See Ch. XIII.

93

See Bk. III.

94

See Chs. XI. and XIII.

95

See Ch. XII.

96

See Bk. IV., Chs. XXIV., XXV., XXVI., and XXVII.

97

See §§ 210, 211, 212, and 213.

98

Part II., ch. xxiii. De la durée et du temps.

99

II. part, ch. ii., § 9.