A Christian Directory, Part 4: Christian Politics

Answ. Because the authority of this famous divine is with his party so great, I shall adventure to say something, lest his words do the more harm; but not by confident opposition, but humble proposal and submission of my judgment to superiors and wiser men, as being conscious of my own inferiority and infirmity. I take all this to be an assertion no where by him proved (and by me elsewhere disproved fully). Laws are the effects and signs of the ruler's will; and instruments of government. Legislation is the first part of government; and if the whole body are naturally governors, the pars imperans and pars subdita are confounded. If the most absolute monarch can make no laws, then disobeying them were no fault. It is enough that their power be derived from God immediately, though the persons be chosen by men. Their authority is not derived from the people's consent, but from God, by their consent, as a bare condition sine qua non. What if a community say all to their elected king, "We take not ourselves to have any governing power to give or use, but we only choose you or your family to that office which God hath instituted, who in that institution giveth you the power upon our choice;" can any man prove, that such a king hath no power, but is a tyrant; because the people disclaim the giving of the power; when indeed they do their duty? Remember that in all this we speak not of the government of this or that particular kingdom, but of kingdoms and other commonwealths indefinitely.41

Object. II. But, saith he, lib. viii. p. 192, "Unto me it seemeth almost out of doubt and controversy, that every independent multitude before any certain form of regimen established, hath under God supreme authority, full dominion over itself," —

Answ. If by dominion were meant propriety, every individual hath it; but for governing power, it seemeth as clear to me, that your independent multitude hath no civil power of government at all; but only a power to choose them governors; while they have no governors, they have no governing power, for that maketh a governor.

Object. III. Ibid. "A man who is lord of himself, may be made another's servant," &c.

Answ. 1. He may hire out himself to labour for another; because he hath so far the power of himself, and his labour is his own, which he may sell for wages; but in a family, that the master be the governor to see God's laws obeyed by his servants, is of divine appointment, and this governing power the servant giveth not to his master, but only maketh himself the object of it. 2. The power that nature giveth a man over himself, is tota specie distinct from civil government; (as Dr. Hammond hath well showed against I. G.) An individual person hath not that power of his own life as the king hath. He may not put himself to death, for that which the king may put him to death for. 3. If this were true, that every individual, by self-resignation, might give a king his power over him; yet a posse ad esse non valet consequentia; and that it is not so is proved, in that God the universal Sovereign hath prevented them, by determining himself, of his own officers, and giving them their power in the same charter by which he enableth the people to choose them. Therefore it is no better reasoning than to say, If all the persons in London subjected themselves to the lord mayor, he would thereby receive his power from them, when the king hath prevented that already, by giving him the power himself in his charter; and leaving only the choice of the person to them; and that under the direction of the rules which he hath given them.42

Object. IV. But saith he, lib. viii. p. 193, "In kingdoms of this quality, (as this we live in,) the highest governor hath indeed universal dominion, but with dependency upon that whole entire body over the several parts whereof he hath dominion; so that it standeth for an axiom in this case, The king is major singulis, universis minor."

Answ. If you had included himself, it is certain that he cannot be greater than the whole, because he cannot be greater than himself. But seeing you speak of the whole in contradistinction from him, I answer, that indeed in genere causæ finalis, the sovereign is universis minor, that is, the whole kingdom is naturally more worth than one, and their felicity a greater good; or else the bonum publicum, or salus populi, could not be the end of government; but this is nothing to our case; for we are speaking of governing power as a means to this end; and so in genere causæ efficientis, the sovereign (yea, and his lowest officer) hath more authority or jus regendi than all the people as such (for they all as such have none at all); even as the church is of more worth than the pastor, and yet the pastor alone hath more authority to administer the sacraments, and to govern the people, than all the flock hath; for they have none either to use or give, (whatever some say to the contrary,) but only choose him to whom God will give it.43

Object. V. Saith the reverend author, lib. viii. p. 194, "Neither can any man with reason think, but that the first institution of kings, (a sufficient consideration wherefore their power should always depend on that from which it did always flow,) by original influence of power from the body into the king, is the cause of kings' dependency in power upon the body: by dependency we mean subordination and subjection."

Answ. 1. But if their institution in genere was of God, and that give them their power, and it never flowed from the body at all, then all your superstructure falleth with your ground-work. 2. And here you seem plainly to confound all kingdoms by turning the pars imperans into the pars subdita, and vice versa; if the king be subject, how are they his subjects? I will not infer what this will lead them to do, when they are taught that kings are in subordination and subjection to them. Sad experience hath showed us what this very principle would effect.

Object. VI. Ibid.44 "A manifest token of which dependency may be this; as there is no more certain argument, that lands are held under any as lords, than if we see that such lands in defect of heirs fall unto them by escheat; in like manner it doth follow rightly that seeing dominion when there is none to inherit it, returneth unto the body, therefore they which before were inheritors of it, did hold it in dependence on the body; so that by comparing the body with the head as touching power, it seemeth always to reside in both; fundamentally and radically in one, in the other derivatively; in one the habit, in the other the act of power."

Answ. Power no more falleth to the multitude by escheat, than the power of the pastor falls to the church, or the power of the physician to the hospital, or the power of the schoolmaster to the scholars; that is, not at all. When all the heirs are dead, they are an ungoverned community, that have power to choose a governor, but no power to govern, neither (as you distinguish it) in habit nor in act, originally nor derivatively. As it is with a corporation when the mayor is dead, the power falleth not to the people.

Therefore there is no good ground given for your following question, "May a body politic then at all times withdraw in whole or in part the influence of dominion which passeth from it, if inconveniences do grow thereby?" Though you answer this question soberly yourself, it is easy to see how the multitude may be tempted to answer it on your grounds, especially if they think your inconvenience turn into a necessity; and what use they will make of your next words, "It must be presumed that supreme governors will not in such cases oppose themselves, and be stiff in detaining that, the use whereof is with public detriment." A strange presumption.

Object. VII. "The axioms of our regal government are these, Lex facit regem; the king's grant of any favour made contrary to law is void; Rex nihil potest nisi quod jure potest."

Answ. If lex be taken improperly for the constituting contract between prince and people, and if your facit have respect only to the species and person, and not the substance of the power itself, then I contradict you not. But if lex be taken properly for authoritativa constitutio debiti, or the signification of the sovereign's will to oblige the subject, then lex non facit regem, sed rex legem.45

Object. VIII. Lib. viii. p. 210, "When all which the wisdom of all sorts can do is done for the devising of laws in the church, it is the general consent of all that giveth them the form and vigour of laws; without which they could be no more to us than the counsels of physicians to the sick. Well might they seem as wholesome admonitions and instructions, but laws could they never be, without consent of the whole church to be guided by them, whereunto both nature and the practice of the church of God set down in Scripture, is found every way so fully consonant, that God himself would not impose, no not his own laws upon his people, by the hand of Moses, without their free and open consent."

Answ. 1. Wisdom doth but prepare laws, and governing power enacteth them, and giveth them their form; but the whole body hath no such governing power, therefore they give them not their form.46 2. The people's consent to God's laws gave them not their form or authority; this opinion I have elsewhere confuted, against a more erroneous author. Their consent to God's laws was required indeed, as naturally necessary to their obedience, but not as necessary to the being or obligation of the law. Can you think that it had been no sin in them to have disobeyed God's laws, unless they had first consented to them? Then all the world might escape sin and damnation, by denying consent to the laws of God. 3. This doctrine will teach men that we have no church laws;47 for the whole church never signified their consent. Millions of the poorer sort have no voices in choosing parliament men or convocations; and this will teach the minor dissenting part, to think themselves disobliged for want of consenting; and will give every dissenting part or person a negative voice to all church laws. 4. A single bishop hath a governing power over his particular church, and they are bound to obey him, Heb. xiii. 7, 17. And if the governing power of one pastor be not suspended for want of the consent of any or all the people, then much less the governing power of king and parliament.

Object. IX. Lib. viii. p. 220. "It is a thing even undoubtedly natural, that all free and independent societies should themselves make their own laws; and that this power should belong to the whole, not to any certain part of a politic body – ."

Answ. This is oft affirmed, but no proof at all of it; in many nations the representatives of the whole body have the legislative power, or part of it. But that is from the special constitution of that particular commonwealth, and not from nature, nor common to all nations. All that naturally belongeth to the people as such, was but to choose their law-makers, and secure their liberties, and not to make laws themselves, by themselves, or mere representers.

Object. X. Lib. viii. p. 221. "For of this thing no man doubteth, namely, that in all societies, companies, and corporations, what severally each shall be bound unto, it must be with all their assents ratified. Against all equity it were, that a man should suffer detriment at the hands of men, for not observing that which he never did, either by himself or by others, mediately agree to – ."

Answ. I am one that more than doubt of that which you say no man doubteth of. Do you not so much as except God's laws, and all those that only do enforce them, or drive men to obey them? As men are obliged to obey God, whether they consent or not; so are they to obey the laws of their sovereigns, though they never consented to them, no nor to their sovereignty, as long as they are members of that commonwealth, to the government whereof the sovereign is lawfully called, millions of dissenters may be bound to obey, till they quit the society.

Object. XI. Lib. viii. p. 221. "If magistrates be heads of the church, they are of necessity christians."

Answ. That can never be proved. A constitutive head indeed must be a christian, and more, even a pastor to a particular church, and Christ to the universal. This headship our kings disclaim; but a head of the church, that is, over the church, or a coercive governor of it, the king would be if he were no christian. As one that is no physician may be head over all the physicians in his kingdom; or though he be no philosopher, or artist, he may be head over all the philosophers and artists; and in all their causes have the supreme coercive power; so would the king over all protestants if he were no protestant, and over all christians if he were no christian. But you think, that he that is no member of the church cannot be the head of it. I answer, not a constitutive, essential head as the pastor is; but he may be the head over it, and have all the coercive power over it. What if the king be not a member of many corporations in his kingdom? Yet as he is head of the kingdom, he is head of, or over them, as they are parts of it.

Object. XII. Lib. viii. p. 218, 223, 224. "What power the king hath, he hath it by law: the bounds and limits of it are known; the entire community giveth order," &c. p. 223. "As for them that exercise power altogether against order, although the kind of power which they have may be of God, yet is their exercise thereof against God, and therefore not of God, otherwise than by permission, as all injustice is." p. 224. "Usurpers of power, whereby we do not mean them that by violence have aspired unto places of highest authority, but them that use more authority than they did ever receive in form and manner before mentioned. Such usurpers thereof as in the exercise of their power, do more than they have been authorized to do, cannot in conscience bind any man to obedience."

Answ. It is true that no man can exercise more power than he hath: the power that we speak of being ἐξουσία, jus regendi, it is impossible to use more authority than they have; though they may command beyond and without authority. And it is true, that where a man hath no authority or right to command, he cannot directly bind obedience. But yet a ruler may exercise more power than man ever gave him, and oblige men to obedience thereby. God giveth them power to govern for his glory, according to his laws, and to promote obedience to those laws of God (in nature and Scripture) by subordinate laws of their own. And all this the sovereign may do, if the people, at the choice of him or his family, should only say, We take you for our sovereign ruler: for then he may do all that true reason or Scripture make the work of a sovereign ruler, even govern the people by all such just means as tend to the public good and their everlasting happiness: and yet that people that should do no more but choose persons or families to govern them, and set them no bounds, do give no power to those they choose, but determine of the persons that shall have power from God. Yet it is granted you, that if the person or family chosen, contract with them to govern only with such and such limitations, they have bound themselves by their own contract; and thus both specifications of government and degrees of power come in by men. But always distinguish, 1. Between the people's giving away their propriety, (in their goods, labours, &c. which they may do,) and giving authority, or governing power (which they have not to give). 2. Between their naming the persons that shall receive it from the universal King, and giving it themselves. 3. Between bounding and limiting power, and giving power. 4. And between a sovereign's binding himself by contract, and being bound by the authority of others.48 If they be limited by contracts, which are commonly called the constitutive or fundamental laws, it is their own consent and contract that effectively obligeth and limiteth them; of which indeed the people's will may be the occasion, when they resolve that they will be governed on no other terms: but if the contract limit them not, but they be chosen simply to be the summæ potestates, without naming any particular powers either by concession or restraint, then as to ruling they are absolute as to men, and limited only by God, from whose highest power they can never be exempt, who in nature and Scripture restraineth them from all that is impious and unjust, against his laws and honour, or against the public happiness and safety. And here also remember, that if any shall imagine that God restraineth a magistrate when it is not so, and that the commands of their governors are contrary to the word of God, when it is no such matter, their error will not justify their disobedience.

Though I have answered these passages of this reverend author, it is not to draw any to undervalue his learned writings, but to set right the reader in the principles of his obedience, on which the practice doth so much depend.

And I confess, that other authors of politics say as much as Mr. Hooker saith, both papists and protestants; but not all, nor I think the soundest: I will instance now in Alstedius only, (an excellent person, but in this mistaken,) who saith, Encyclop. lib. xxiii. Polit. cap. 3. p. 178. Populus universus dignior et potior est tum magistratu tum ephoris. – Hinc recte docent Doct. Politici, populum obtinere regnum et jura majestatis proprietate et dominio: principem et ephoros usu et administratione (whereas the people have not the regnum vel jura majestatis any way at all). —Si administratores officium suum facere nolint, si impia, et iniqua mandent, si contra dilectionem Dei et proximi agant, populus propriæ salutis curam arripiet, imperium male utentibus abrogabit, et in locum eorum alios substituet. – Porro ephori validiora ipso rege imperia obtinent: principem enim constituunt et deponunt; id quod amplissimum est præeminentiæ argumentum. Atque hæc prærogative mutuis pactis stabilitur. – Interim princeps summam potestatem obtinere dicitur, quatenus ephori administrationem imperii, et cumulum potestatis ipsi committunt. Denique optimatum universorum potestas non est infinita et absoluta, sed certis veluti rhetris et clathris definita, utpote non ad propriam libidinem, sed ad utilitatem et salutem populi alligata. Hinc illorum munia sunt regem designare, constituere, inaugurare, constitutum consiliis et auxiliis juvare; sine consensu et approbatione principis, quamdiu ille suum officium facit, nihil in reipublicæ negotiis suscipere: nonnunquam conventum inscio principe agere, necessitate reipublicæ exigente. – Populum contra omnis generis turbatores et violatores defendere.– I suppose Mr. Hooker's principles and Alstedius's were much the same. I will not venture to recite the conclusion, cap. 12. p. 199. R. 5. de resistendo Tyranno.

Many other authors go the same way, and say that people have the majestas realis (both papists, and protestants, and heathens). But I suppose that what I have said against Hooker will serve to show the weakness of their grounds: though it is none of my purpose to contradict either Hooker or any other, so far as they open the odiousness of the sin of tyranny, (which at this day keepeth out the gospel from the far greatest part of the world, and is the greatest enemy to the kingdom of Christ,) nor yet as they plead for the just liberties of the people; but I am not for their authority.

Direct. II. Begin with an absolute, universal, resolved obedience to God, your Creator and Redeemer, who is your sovereign King, and will be your final, righteous Judge. As he that is no loyal subject to the king, can never well obey his officers; so he that subjecteth not his soul to the original power of his Creator, can never well obey the derivative power of earthly governors.

Object. But, you may say, experience teacheth us, that many ungodly people are obedient to their superiors as well as others. I answer, materially they are, but not formally, and from a right principle, and to right ends: as a rebel against the king, may obey a justice of peace for his own ends, as long as he will let him alone, or take his part; but not formally, as he is the king's officer; so ungodly men may flatter princes and magistrates for their own ends, or on some low and by-account, but not sincerely as the officers of God. He is not like to be truly obedient to man, that is so foolish, dishonest, and impious, as to rebel against his Maker; nor to obey that authority which he first denieth, in its original and first efficient cause. Whatever Satan and his servants may say, and however some hypocrites may contradict in their practices the religion which they profess, yet nothing is more certain, than that the most serious, godly christians, are the best subjects upon earth; as their principles themselves will easily demonstrate.

Direct. III. Having begun with God, obey your governors as the officers of God, with an obedience ultimately divine.49 All things must be done in holiness by the holy. That is, God must be discerned, obeyed, and intended in all; and therefore in magistrates in a special manner. In two respects magistrates are obeyed, or rather flattered, by the ungodly; first, as they are men that are able to do them corporal good or hurt: as a horse, or dog, or other brute will follow you for his belly, and loveth to be where he fareth best. Secondly, as the head of his party, and encourager of him in his evil way, when he meets with rulers that will be so bad. Wicked men love wicked magistrates for being the servants of Satan; but faithful men must honour and obey a magistrate, as an officer of God; even a magistrate as a magistrate, and not only as holy, is an officer of the Lord of all. Therefore the fifth commandment is as the hinge of the two tables; many of the ancients thought that it was the last commandment of the first table, and the moderns think it is the first commandment of the last table; for it commandeth our duty to the noblest sort of men; but not merely as men, but as the officers of God. They debase magistrates that look at them merely as those that master other men, as the strongest beast doth by the weaker: nothing will make you sincere and constant in your honouring and obeying them, but taking them as the officers of God, and remembering by whose commission they rule, and whose work they do; that "they are the ministers of God to us for good," Rom. xiii. 1-5. If you do not this, 1. You wrong God, whose servants they are; for he that despiseth, despiseth not man but God. 2. You wrong the magistrate, as much as you should do an ambassador, if you took him to be the messenger of some Jack Straw, or some fellow that signifieth no more than his personal worth importeth. 3. And you wrong yourselves; for while you neglect the interest and authority of God in your rulers, you forfeit the acceptance, protection, and reward of God. Subjects as well as servants must learn that great lesson, Col. iii. 23-25, "Whatsoever ye do, do it heartily as to the Lord, and not unto men: knowing that of the Lord ye shall receive the reward of the inheritance, for ye serve the Lord Christ: but he that doth wrong shall receive for the wrong, which he hath done; and there is no respect of persons." So Eph. vi. 5-8. Magistrates are as truly God's officers as preachers: and therefore as he that heareth preachers heareth him, so he that obeyeth rulers obeyeth him: the exceptions are but the like in both cases: it is not every thing that we must receive from preachers; nor every thing that we must do at the command of rulers; but both in their proper place and work, must be regarded as the officers of God; and not as men that have no higher authority than their own to bear them out.

Direct. IV. Let no vices of the person cause you to forget the dignity of his office, The authority of a sinful ruler is of God, and must accordingly be obeyed: of this read Bishop Bilson at large in his excellent treatise of Christian Subjection; against the papists that excommunicate and depose princes whom they account heretics, or favourers of them. Those sins which will damn a man's soul, and deprive him of heaven, will not deprive him of his kingdom, nor disoblige the subjects from their obedience. An infidel, or an ungodly christian, (that is, a hypocrite,) is capable of being a prince, as well as being a parent, husband, master; and the apostle hath taught all, as well as servants, their duty to such. 1 Pet. ii. 18-21, "Servants, be subject to your masters with all fear; and not only to the good and gentle, but also to the froward; for this is thankworthy, if a man for conscience toward God, endure grief, suffering wrongfully. For what glory is it if when you are buffeted for your faults, you take it patiently? but if when ye do well and suffer for it ye take it patiently, this is acceptable with God; for even hereunto were ye called." Though it be a rare mercy to have godly rulers, and a great judgment to have ungodly ones, it is such as must be borne.50