A Christian Directory, Part 4: Christian Politics

4. Natural infirmities must be numbered with faults, though they be not moral vices, as to the contracting of an obligation, if they be in a person capable of contracting. As if you have some special defect of memory or ignorance of the matter which you are about. Another who is no way faulty by over-reaching you, must not be a loser by your weakness. For he that cometh to the market, or contracteth with another that knoweth not his infirmity, is to be supposed to understand what he doth, unless the contrary be manifest: you should not meddle with matters which you understand not; or if you do, you must he content to be a loser by your weakness.

5. Yet in such cases, another that hath gained by the bargain, may be obliged by the laws of equity and charity, to remit the gain, and not to take advantage of your weakness; but he may so far hold you to it, as to secure himself from loss; except in cases where you become the object of his charity, and not of commutative justice only.

Quest. V. Is a drunken man, or a man in a transporting passion, or a melancholy person, obliged by a contract made in such a case?

Answ. Remember still, that we are speaking only of contracts about matters of profits or worldly interest; and not of marriage or any of another nature. And the question as it concerneth a man in drunkenness or passion, is answered as the former about culpable error; and as it concerneth a melancholy man, it is to be answered as the former question, in the case of natural infirmity. But if the melancholy be so great as to make him uncapable of bargaining, he is to be esteemed in the same condition as an idiot, or one in deliration or distraction.

Quest. VI. But may another hold a man to it, who in drunkenness or passion maketh an ill bargain, or giveth or playeth away his money; and repenteth when he is sober?

Answ. He may (ordinarily) take the money from the loser, or him that casteth it thus away; but he may not keep it for himself: but if the loser be poor, he should give it to his wife or children whom he robbeth by his sin: if not, he should either give it to the magistrate or overseer for the poor, or give it to the poor himself. The reason of this determination is, because the loser hath parted with his propriety, and can lay no further claim to the thing; but yet the gainer can have no right from another's crime: if it were from an injury, he might, so far as is necessary to reparations; but from a crime he cannot; for his loss is to be estimated as a mulct or penalty, and to be disposed of as such mulcts as are laid on swearers and drunkards are. Only the person by his voluntary bargain, hath made the other party instead of the magistrate, and authorized him (in ordinary cases) to dispose of the gain, for the poor or public good.

Quest. VII. Am I obliged by the words or writings which usually express a covenant, without any covenanting or self-obliging intention in me, when I speak or write them?

Answ. Either you utter or write those words with a purpose to make another believe that you intend a covenant; or at least by culpable negligence, in such a manner as he is bound so to understand you, or justified for so understanding you: or else you so use the words, as in the manner sufficiently to signify that you intend no covenant or self-obligation. In the former case you bind yourself (as above said); because another man is not to be a loser, nor you a gainer or a saver, by your own fraud or gross negligence. But in the latter case you are not bound, because an intent of self-obliging is the internal efficient of the obligation; and a signification of such an intent, is the external efficient, without which it cannot be. If you read over the words of a bond, or repeat them only in a narrative, or ludicrously; or if a scrivener write a form of obligation of himself, to a boy for a copy, or to a scholar for a precedent, these do not induce any obligation in conscience, nor make you a debtor to another. Thus also the case of the intent of the baptizer or baptized (or parent) is to be determined.

Quest. VIII. May a true man promise a robber money, for the saving of his life, or of a greater sum, or more precious commodity?

Answ. Yes, in case of necessity, when his life or estate cannot better be preserved; and so taxes may be paid to an enemy in arms, or to a plundering soldier (supposing that it do no other hurt, which is greater than the good). Any man may part with a lesser good to preserve a greater; and it is no more voluntary or imputable to our wills, than the casting of our goods into the sea to save the vessel and our lives.

Quest. IX. May I give money to a judge, or justice, or court officer, to hire him to do me justice, or to keep him from doing me wrong; or to avoid persecution?

Answ. You may not, in case your cause be bad, give any thing to procure injustice against another; no nor speak a word for it nor desire it: this I take as presupposed. You may not give money to procure justice, when the law of the land forbiddeth it, and when it will do more hurt accidentally to the others than good to you: when it will harden men in the sin of bribery, and cause them to expect the like from others. But except it be when some such accidental greater hurt doth make it evil, it is as lawful as to hire a thief not to kill me: when you cannot have your right by other means, you may part with a smaller matter for a greater.

Quest. X. But if I make such a contract, may the other lawfully take it of me?

Answ. No: for it is now supposed that it is unlawful on his part.

Quest. XI. But if under necessity of force I promise money to a robber, or a judge, or officer, am I bound to perform it when my necessity is over?

Answ. You have lost your own propriety by your covenant, and therefore must not retain it; but he can acquire no right by his sin: and therefore some say that in point of justice you are not bound to give it him, but to give it to the magistrate for the poor; but yet prudence may tell you of other reasons a fine to give it the man himself, though justice bind you not to it; as in case that else he may be revenged and do you some greater hurt; or some greater hurt is any other way like to be the consequent; which it is lawful by money to prevent. But many think that you are bound to deliver the money to the thief or officer himself; because it is a lawful thing to do it, though he have no just title to it; and because it was your meaning, or the signification of your words in your covenant with him; and if it were not lawful to do it, it could not be lawful to promise to do it, otherwise your promise is a lie. To this, those of the other opinion say, that as a man who is discharged of his promise by him that it was made to, is not to be accounted false if he perform it not; so is it as to the thief or officer in question; because he having no right, is to you as the other that hath quit his right. And this answer indeed will prove, that it is not strict injustice not to pay the money promised; but it will not prove that it is not a lie to make such a promise with an intent of not performing it, or that it is not a lie to make it with an intent of performing it, and not to do it when you may. Though here a Jesuit will tell you that you may say the words of a promise, with an equivocation or mental reservation to a thief or persecuting magistrate (of which see more in the chapters of lying, vows, and perjury). I am therefore of opinion that your promise must be sincerely made, and according to the true intent of it you must offer the money to the thief or officer; except in case the magistrate forbid you, or some greater reason lie against it, which you foresaw not when you made the promise. But the offender is undoubtedly obliged not to take the money.

The same determination holdeth as to all contracts and promises made to such persons, who by injurious force constrained us to make them. There is on us an obligation to veracity, though none to them in point of justice, because they have no proper right; nor may they lawfully take our payment or service promised them. And in case that the public good unexpectedly cross our performance, we must not perform it: such like is the case of conquerors, and those that upon conquest become their vassals or subjects upon unrighteous terms. But still remember, that if it be not only a covenant with man, but a vow to God, which maketh him a party, the case is altered, and we remain obliged.

Quest. XII. But may I promise the thief or bribe-taker to conceal his fault? And am I obliged to the performance of such a promise?

Answ. This is a promise of omitting that which else would be a duty. It is ordinarily a duty to reveal a thief and bribe-taker that he may be punished. But affirmatives bind not ad semper; no act (especially external) is a duty at all times, therefore not this, of revealing an offender's fault. And if it be not always a duty, then it must be none when it is inconsistent with some greater benefit or duty; for when two goods come together, the greater is to be preferred: therefore in case that you see in just probability, that the concealment of the sinner will do more hurt to the commonwealth or the souls of men, than the saving of your life is like to do good, you may not promise to conceal him, or if you sinfully promise it, you may not perform it; but in case that your life is like to be a greater good than the not promising to conceal him, then such a promise is no fault, because the disclosing him is no duty. But to judge rightly of this is a matter of great difficulty. If it be less than life which you save by such a promise, it oft falls out that it is a lesser good than the detecting of the offence.

But it will here be said, If I promise not to conceal a robber, I must conceal him nevertheless; for when he hath killed me, I cannot reveal him: and I must conceal the bribe-taker; for till I have promised secrecy, I cannot prove him guilty. And he that promiseth to forbear a particular good action whilst he liveth, doth yet reserve his life for all other good works; whereas if he die, he will neither do that nor any other. But this case is not so easily determined: if Daniel die, he can neither pray nor do any good on earth. And if he live he may do much other good, though he never pray; and yet he might not promise to give over praying to save his life. I conceive that we must distinguish of duties essential to the outward part of christianity, or of constant, indispensable necessity; and duties which are alterable, and belong only to some persons, times, and places; also between the various consequents of omissions. And I conceive that ordinarily a man may promise for the saving of his life, that he will forbear a particular, alterable duty or relation; as to read such a commentary, to speak with such a minister, to be a magistrate or a minister, &c. in case we have not before bound ourselves never to give over our calling till death; and in case that the good which will follow our forbearance, is likely (to a judicious person) to be greater than the evil. But no man may promise to omit such a duty as God hath made necessary during life; as not to love God, or fear, or trust him; not to worship him, and call upon him, and praise him; not to do good to men's souls or bodies in the general; or not to preach or pray while I am a minister of Christ; or not at all to govern while you are a governor; for all these contradict some former and greater promises or duties. Nor may you omit the smallest duty to save your life, at such a time when your death is like to do more good, than your life would do without that one duty. Apply this to the present case.

Quest. XIII. If another man deceive me into a promise or covenant against my good, am I bound to perform it when I have discovered the deceit?

Answ. Yes, 1. In case that the law of the land, or other reasons for the public good, require it. 2. Or in case that you were faulty by negligence, heedlessness, or otherwise guilty of your own deceit, in any considerable and avoidable degree. Otherwise, in that measure that he deceived you, and in those respects, you are not obliged.

Quest. XIV. If the contracting parties do neither of them understand the other, is it a covenant? Or if it be, whose sense must carry it?

Answ. If they understand not each other in the essentials of the contract, it is no contract in point of conscience; except where the laws for the public safety do annex the obligation to bare external act. But if they understand not one another in some circumstances, and be equally culpable or innocent, they must come to a new agreement in those particulars; but if one party only be guilty of the misunderstanding, he must bear the loss, if the other insist on it.

Quest. XV. Am I bound to stand to the bargains which my friend, or trustee, or servant maketh for me, when it proveth much to my injury or loss?

Answ. Yes, 1. If they exceed not the bounds of that commission or trust which they received from you. 2. Or if they do, yet if by your former trusting and using them, or by any other sign, you have given the other party sufficient cause to suppose them intrusted by you to do what they do, so that he is deceived by your fault, you are bound at least to see that he be no loser by you; though you are not bound to make him a gainer, unless you truly signified that you authorized them to make the contract. For if it be merely your friend's or servant's error, without your fault, it doth not bind you to a third person. But how far you may be bound to pardon that error to your friend or servant, is another question; and how far you are bound to save them harmless. And that must be determined by laying together all other obligations between them and you.

Quest. XVI. If I say I will give such or such a one this or that, am I bound thereby to do it?

Answ. It is one thing to express your present mind and resolution, without giving away the liberty of changing it; and it is another thing to intend the obliging of yourself to do the thing mentioned. And that obligation is either intended to man, or to God only; and that is either in point of rendition and use, or in point of veracity, or the performance of that moral duty of speaking truth. If you meant no more in saying, I will do it, or I will give it, but that this is your present will, and purpose, and resolution, yea, though it add the confident persuasion that your will shall not change; yet this no further obligeth you than you are obliged to continue in that will; and a man's confident resolutions may be lawfully changed upon sufficient cause. But if you intended to alienate the title to another, or to give him present right, or to oblige yourself for the future to him by that promise; or to oblige yourself to God to do it by way of peremptory assertion, as one that will be guilty of a lie if you perform it not; or if you dedicate the thing to God by those words as a vow; then you are obliged to do accordingly (supposing nothing else to prohibit it).

Quest. XVII. Doth an inward promise of the mind not expressed, oblige?

Answ. In a vow to God it doth; and if you intend it as an assertion obliging you in point of veracity, it doth so oblige you that you must lie. But it is no contract, nor giveth any man a title to what you tacitly thought of.

Quest. XVIII. May I promise an unlawful thing (simply so) without an intention of performing it, to save my life from a thief or persecutor?

Answ. No: because it is a lie, when the tongue agreeth not with the heart. Indeed those that think a lie is no sin when it hurteth not another, may justify this, if that would hold good; but I have before confuted it, part i. in the chapter against lying.

Quest. XIX. May any thing otherwise unlawful become a duty upon a promise to do it?

Answ. This is answered before, part i. chapter of perjury and vows: a thing unlawful will be so still, notwithstanding a vow or promise; and some so of that also which is unlawful antecedently but by accident; as e. g. It is not simply unlawful to cast away a cup of wine or a piece of silver (for it is lawful upon a sufficient cause); but it is unlawful to do it without any sufficient cause. Now suppose I should contract with another that I will do it; am I bound by such a contract? Many say no, because the matter is unlawful though but by accident; and the contract cannot make it lawful. I rather think that I am bound in such a case; but yet that my obligation doth not exclude me wholly from sin; it was a sin before I promised it (or vowed it) to cast away a farthing causelessly. And if I causelessly promised it, I sinned in that promise; but yet there may be cause for the performance: and if I have entangled myself in a necessity of sinning whether I do it or not, I must choose the lesser sin; for that is then my duty. (Though I should have chosen neither as long as I could avoid it.) In a great and hurtful sin I may be obliged rather to break my covenant than to commit it, yet it is hard to say so of every accidental evil: my reasons are, 1. Because the promise or covenant is now an accident to be put into the balance; and may weigh down a lighter accident on the other side (but I know that the great difficulty is to discern which is indeed the preponderating accident).

2. I think if a magistrate command me to do any thing which by a small accident is evil (as to spend an hour in vain, to give a penny in vain, to speak a word which, antecedently, was vain) that I must do it; and that then it is not vain because it manifesteth my obedience (otherwise obedience would be greatly straitened). Therefore my own contract may make it my duty; because I am able to oblige myself as well as a magistrate is. 3. Because covenant-breaking (and perjury) is really a greater sin than speaking a vain word; and my error doth not make it no sin, but only entangles me in a necessity of sinning which way soever I take.

Quest. XX. If a man make a contract to promote the sin of another for a reward, (as a corrupt judge or lawyer, officer or clerk, to promote injustice; or a resetter, to help a thief; or a bawd or whore, for the price of fornication,) may he take the reward, when the sin is committed (suppose it repented of)?

Answ. The offender that promised the reward, hath parted with his title to the money; therefore you may receive it of him (and ought, except he will rightly dispose of it himself); but withal to confess the sin and persuade him also to repent: but you may not take any of that money as your own (for no man can purchase true propriety by iniquity); but either give it to the party injured, (to whom you are bound to make satisfaction,) or to the magistrate or the poor, according as the case particularly requireth.

Quest. XXI. If I contract, or bargain, or promise to another, between us two, without any legal form or witness, doth it bind me to the performance?

Answ. Yes, in foro conscientiæ, supposing the thing lawful; but if the thing be unlawful in foro Dei, and such as the law of the land only would lay hold of you about, or force you to, if it had been witnessed, then the law of the land may well be avoided, by the want of legal forms and witnesses.

Quest. XXII. May I buy an office for money in a court of justice?

Answ. Some offices you may buy (where the law alloweth it, and it tendeth not to injustice); but other offices you may not: the difference the lawyers may tell you better than I, and it would be tedious to pursue instances.

Quest. XXIII. May one buy a place of magistracy or judicature for money?

Answ. Not when your own honour or commodity is your end: because the common good is the end of government; and to a faithful governor, it is a place of great labour and suffering, and requireth much self-denial and patience. Therefore they that purchase it as a place of honour, gain, or pleasure, either know not what they undertake, or have carnal ends; else they would rather purchase their liberty and avoid it. But if a king, or a judge, or other magistrate, see that a bad man (more unfit to govern) is like to be put in, if he be put by, it is lawful for him to purchase the people's deliverance at a very dear rate (even by a lawful war, which is more than money, when the sovereign's power is in such danger): but the heart must be watched, that it pretend not the common good, and intend your own commodity and honour; and the probable consequents must be weighed; and the laws of the land must be consulted also; for if they absolutely prohibit the buying of a place of judicature, they must be obeyed.156 And ill effects may make it sinful.

Quest. XXIV. May one sell a church benefice, or rectory, or orders?

Answ. If the benefice be originally of your own gift, it is at first in your power to give part or all, to take some deductions out of it or not: but if it be really given to the church, and you have but the patronage or choice of the incumbent, it is sacrilege to sell it for any commodity of your own: but whether you may take somewhat out of a greater benefice, to give to another church which is poorer, dependeth partly on the law of the land, and partly upon the probable consequents. If the law absolutely forbid it, (supposing that unlawful contracts cannot be avoided unless some lawful ones be restrained,) it must be obeyed for the common good; and if the consequent of a lawful contract be like to be the more hurtful encouragement of unlawful ones, such examples must be forborne, though the law were not against them. But to sell orders is undoubted simony; (that is, the office of the ministry, or the act of ordination;) though scribes may be paid for writing instruments.

Quest. XXV. May a man give money for orders or benefices, when they cannot otherwise be had?

Answ. This is answered in quest. xxii. 1. If the law absolutely forbid it, for the common safety, you may not. 2. If your end be chiefly your own commodity, ease, or honour, you may not. But in case you were clear from all such evils, and the case were only this, whether you might not give money to get in yourself, to keep out a heretic, a wolf, or insufficient man, who might destroy the people's souls, I see not but it might well be done.

Quest. XXVI. May I give money to officers, servants, or assistants for their furtherance?

Answ. For writings or other servile acts about the circumstantials you may; but not (directly or indirectly) to promote the simoniacal contract. What you may not give to the principal agent, you may not give his instruments or others for the same end.

Quest. XXVII. May I give or do any thing afterward by way of gratitude, to the patron, bishop, or any others, their relations or retainers?

Answ. Not when the expectation of that gratitude was a (secret or open) condition of the presentation or orders; and you believe that you should not else have received them: therefore promised gratitude is but a kind of contracting. Nor may you show gratitude by any scandalous way, which seemeth simony. Otherwise, no doubt but you may be prudently grateful for that or any other kindness.

Quest. XXVIII. May not a bishop or pastor take money for sermons, sacraments, or other offices?

Answ. Not for the things themselves; he must not sell God's word and sacraments, or any other holy thing. But they that serve at the altar may live on the altar, and the elders that rule well are worthy of double honour; and the mouth of the ox that treadeth out the corn should not be muzzled. They may receive due maintenance while they perform God's service, that they may be vacant to attend their proper work.

Quest. XXIX. May one person disoblige another of a promise made to him?

Answ. Yes, if it be no more than a promise to that person; because a man may give away his right; but if it be moreover a vow to God, or you intend to oblige yourself in point of veracity under the guilt of a lie if you do otherwise, these alter the case, and no person can herein disoblige you.

Quest. XXX. But what if the contract be bound by an oath, may another then release me?

Answ. Yes, if that oath did only tie you to perform your promise; and were no vow to God, which made him a party by dedicating any thing to him; for then the oath being but subservient to the promise, he that dischargeth you from the promise, dischargeth you also from the oath which bound you honestly to keep it.