The Memoirs of Admiral Lord Beresford

The Fleet assembled at Spithead in November, 1907, to receive his Majesty the Emperor of Germany; and in the following May, the Fleet assembled at Dover to receive President Fallières.

In the summer of 1908, the Fleet proceeded upon a cruise in Norwegian waters. Their Majesties the King and Queen of Norway, with the little Crown Prince Olaf, honoured the flagship with a visit when the Fleet lay at Esbjerg. At Skagen, on the evening of 7th July, when the Fleet was lying at anchor, the Hohenzollern, flying the flag of his Majesty the Emperor of Germany, was suddenly sighted, together with the escorting cruiser Stettin and the destroyer Sleipner. By the time his Imperial Majesty had reached the lines, the ships were manned and dressed over all. A salute of twenty-one guns was fired; and the Hohenzollern was cheered as she steamed down the lines.

During my absence in Norwegian waters, I was the subject of a violent attack in the Press and elsewhere, due to a misapprehension. I recall the circumstance, because I am proud to remember that it was an Irishman, and he a political opponent, who, alone among all the members of the House of Commons, stood up and protested against an attack being made upon a brother Irishman when he was absent and unable to reply.

Their Majesties King Edward and Queen Alexandra visited the Channel Fleet on 7th August, 1908, in the Victoria and Albert, accompanied by the Prince of Wales in the Alexandra. His Majesty honoured the King Edward VII and the Hibernia, second flag, with a visit. The flag-officers of the Fleet had the honour of lunching with their Majesties on board the Victoria and Albert.

Upon one of the Fleet cruises in the north, the flagship was passing under the Forth Bridge, when a spar caught on a girder of the bridge and carried away. Ere it could fall, Flag-Lieutenant Gibbs, with his customary presence of mind and pluck, threw me upon the deck, and himself on the top of me, to save me from the falling spar. Luckily, it touched neither of us.

There being no provision against mines dropped in time of war, it was suggested by me that the North Sea trawlers should be enlisted to sweep for mines; because they were accustomed to the difficult work of towing and handling a trawl. The proposal was afterwards adopted.

In March, 1909, the Admiralty, in addition to other changes, having suddenly reduced the length of ships' commissions from three years to two years, I was ordered to haul down my flag and come on shore.

Accordingly, my flag was hauled down at Portsmouth on Wednesday, 24th March, 1909, after fifty years' service.

I cannot close this chronicle without expressing my profound appreciation of the loyalty and affection shown to me by my brother officers and by the men of the Royal Navy. Few events in my life have touched me more deeply than the presence of so many of my old shipmates among the crowds which assembled upon Portsmouth Hard when I came on shore after hauling down my flag, and which filled Waterloo Station and its approaches when I arrived in London. Nor can I omit to record my sense of the kind and generous reception given to me by my brother officers, who attended, in numbers that constituted a record, the dinner, over which I presided, given by the Royal Navy Club of 1765 and 1785, on the anniversary of the battle of Trafalgar next ensuing after my coming on shore.

It was a satisfaction to me when I came on shore, and it is a satisfaction to me now, to think that I pulled my pound in the Navy.

Doubtless, like other men of action, I have made mistakes. But I may justly claim that I have always held one purpose with a single mind: to do my best for the good of the Service and for the welfare of the officers and men of the Royal Navy; and in following that purpose, I have tried to disregard consequences which might affect my own fortunes, and which, in fact, have often proved injurious to them. And to the purpose which I have followed since I was a boy, I shall devote the rest of my life.

POSTSCRIPT

THE MAKING OF AN ADMIRAL

One of our greatest naval administrators, the late Admiral of the Fleet Sir Frederick Richards, was constantly preoccupied with a problem, of which he used often to speak. "How are we to make great admirals?" he would say. It is a question of the highest moment. A great admiral may be born, but he must also be made. The making of an admiral has been the study of the best minds in the Navy for generations. And for this reason: In time of war, all must depend on one man, and that man the admiral in command. Upon his knowledge, ability and resolution will rest the fate of the country and of the Empire. That simple fact is not generally realised by the public. They do not understand that in time of war the statesman, the diplomatist, the politician must all give place to one man, the admiral in command at sea.

Every decade of naval officers has added something to the knowledge of what must go to the making of a great sea-officer. The establishment of the War College, the institution of the War Staff at the Admiralty, the private studies of individual naval officers, the practice of holding manoeuvres: all these things are valuable endeavours toward the same end. It remains, however (I believe), the fact that there exists no treatise on the ordinary administrative duties to be fulfilled by an admiral.

During many years I had the habit of making notes concerning all matters connected with the administration of a Fleet. These notes I hope to arrange and to publish. In the meantime, I have ventured to think that the contribution of some observations dealing with the administrative duties of an admiral in command, embodying the results of many years' experience at sea, might be of use.

There is no position in the world requiring more tact than that of a commander-in-chief of a large Fleet. It is only by the exercise of consummate tact that a Fleet can be maintained in the most rigid state of discipline and, at the same time, cheery, happy and smart. Therefore it is that a knowledge of human nature is essential to the admiral.

Two admirals may do the same thing or may give the same order; one is perfectly successful, the other is not. One knows HOW to give an order, the other does not.

Success depends not only on what is done, but on the way in which it is done. Cheerful obedience to an order depends, not on the order but, on the way the order is given. In handling men, much depends on what is said, but much more depends upon the way in which it is said.

The art of successful administration of men consists in the prevention of accident, misdemeanour, or regrettable incidents. It does not consist in putting things right after the unpleasant event has occurred. Nearly all slackness and untoward incidents are preventable by the exercise of forethought, common sense and good organisation. Most of the matters that go wrong, causing irritation and fault-finding on the part of the admiral, are often due to the failure to look ahead of the admiral himself.

When a Fleet proceeds to sea, the cruisers are often to be observed sobbing and sighing at full speed, trying to get into the position ordered, after the Fleet has left the harbour, when, by the use of a little judgment, they might have been sent out previously, and so have got on the correct line of bearing at slow speed, without any trouble.

The usual method in life is to let a mistake occur, and then to put it right afterwards. It is upon this point that the world forms most unfair opinions. The man who keeps things right seldom gets any credit. It is the man who puts things right who gets it. The history of war affords many examples of this tendency.

A commander-in-chief who, by his organisation and by his appreciation of facts and positions, wins an action with small loss, often gets little credit. On the other hand, an officer who makes some blunder by which he loses a number of officers and men, but who eventually wins his action, is made a popular hero. In other words, the man with the blind pluck of a bulldog gets more credit than the man who, by his strategy and tactical ability, wins a more or less bloodless victory.

An admiral should remember that in peace or war he can satisfactorily administer his Fleet only through the loyalty and zeal of his captains. Frequent personal interviews promote confidence; and such confidence must be of benefit to the admiral. He need not take his captains' views, but he will gain a great deal of useful information from officers who are just as keen to make the Fleet as perfect as possible as he is himself.

Admirals should not publicly identify themselves with their own flagships in the same way as a captain may identify himself with his ship. To the admiral ALL ships should be the same, and private ships should feel that the admiral takes quite as much interest in their well-being and their whole life as he does in his own flagship. The admiral should therefore avoid, even in private conversation, speaking of "my commander," "our launch," etc. etc. A flagship, her officers and men, have many advantages. In return for these privileges, a flagship should make every effort to be a pattern of smartness and efficiency; and the admiral must be constantly on the alert lest he show partiality or favour to his flagship. Nothing makes more jealousy in a Fleet than a belief that the flagship is favoured at the expense of the rest of the Fleet, either in routine duty or in any other respect.

Flagships must have many privileges, but they should not be increased. For instance, her boats should take precedence in drawing beef or stores; but in all matters connected with competitive drills, carrying out station orders, etc. etc., all ships must be equal in the admiral's eye and mind.

An admiral should continually go on board the ships of the Fleet, talk to the captains, and obtain their ideas and recommendations on various subjects.

The best plan is to notify a ship a day or two beforehand that the commander-in-chief is coming on board on Sunday at the time most convenient to the captain; and to follow the captain's usual routine for Sunday inspection. This method gives the captain an opportunity of bringing to the admiral's notice any officer or man who has in any way distinguished himself. It strengthens the captain's hands, and has a good effect upon the Fleet. It lets the men see their admiral; while the admiral can remark the state of the ship and run all his Fleet up to the smartest ship.

It is wiser to administer a Fleet by commendation than by condemnation. If commendation is given for good and smart actions, condemnation for bad, slackness becomes far more severely condemned, and no sympathy for it is aroused.

Any smart action performed by an officer or man should be appreciated publicly by signal. This is complimentary to the officer or man and to the ship in which he is serving at the time. Every one is grateful for appreciation.

The old style in the Navy was never to commend anything that was well done; to do well was considered to be no more than a man's duty. On the other hand, anything that was badly done led to severe reprimands.

When a good officer or man knows that the admiral appreciates his work, it cheers the Fleet and raises its whole tone. It is right to be severe on those who do their work lazily or badly; but it is quite as necessary to appreciate those who do their work well.

An admiral should continually inspect some of the various departments of the ships under his command. By personal observation he is certain to find out something which would not come to his notice in any other way, and he may therefore prevent things from going wrong in their initial stages.

The admiral should invariably inspect anything that may have gone wrong in any of the ships under his command, owing to accident, carelessness, or misadventure: such as a derrick, cable, or capstan carrying away, or any defect in the engine or boiler rooms. He should then talk over the method of repair with the captain and the departmental officers. This procedure often saves time and trouble, as the admiral gives directions for the accident to be repaired in the way he desires from the first, thereby obviating the necessity of altering the plans afterwards. It also encourages those who are going to execute the work.

The admiral should let the captains know that they can come on board the flagship and consult him at any time they like, day or night, and that he will always be glad to see them.

Captains should always come to see, or write to, the admiral on any matter which they wish to be settled, no matter how trivial it may appear. They should not go to the secretary; for, if they do, it puts the secretary in a false position, and may cause mistakes and wrong conceptions.

Captains may go to the chief of the staff upon minor questions; but it is, as a rule, better for them to go straight to the admiral.

The consideration of captains, expressed by the words, "I don't think I will bother the admiral about this question," is understood, but should be regarded as mistaken. It is the admiral's business to be bothered.

The admiral should be considerate and courteous to all those under his command, remembering that there are two sides to every question.

When the admiral personally inquires into any case, with the object of fixing responsibility upon an individual, he should be suave in his manner, even if condemnation is given. He should endeavour to send a man away wearing a smile rather than a scowl.

The admiral should remember this maxim particularly when he feels irritated at seeing something done which appears careless, or opposed to the orders laid down. He should always maintain an unruffled demeanour, and be perfectly calm and collected under all circumstances. To fail in this respect is to confuse both himself and those under his command: a condition which cannot add to that smartness and coolness so necessary when a difficulty or an accident occurs in the Fleet.

The management of a ship or a Fleet is full of irritation and worries. These can only be decreased by officers remaining calm and collected.

All men are liable to make mistakes. The best men often make the most glaring mistakes. A smart man acting under a mistake will move his ship to starboard or to port quicker than a slow man, and his mistake will therefore appear the greater.

An admiral should never make a signal to one of the captains (unless he happens to have a very bad and slack captain), implying that the captain could have done much better than he did. Captains, as a rule, wish to obey loyally and thoroughly. Mistakes are not intentional.

If a signal is executed in a manner contrary to the intention of the admiral, either it is an ambiguous signal, or it has been misunderstood. Unforeseen contingencies of this kind are certain to happen in war. Practices in peace illustrate what such contingencies may be, and develop the necessary measures to prevent them.

A very common method of pointing out mistakes is to signal what was ordered and what should have happened, omitting to state what was actually done. But all these points should be inserted in the signal.

Officers or men should never be allowed to state what might, could, or should have been done. The point at issue is what WAS or what IS. Much valuable time is lost in explaining the circumstances on the theory of what might, could, or should have been done.

Before finding fault by signal, the admiral should ask the captain in question how a mistake occurred. By so doing it can be seen whether it is necessary to find fault or not. If the explanation is satisfactory the captain should be so informed.

Much unnecessary irritation and bad feeling caused by sudden and drastic signals may thus be avoided.

The admiral will often find that the mistake was a natural mistake, which he himself might have made had he been in the captain's place. When captains know that the admiral is scrupulously fair, they become devoted to him.

An admiral should always be most careful that he is right himself before finding fault with those under him. If he should afterwards find that his contention was wrong, or that there was a misunderstanding, the admiral should invariably acknowledge his mistake. This action commands respect and is only chivalrous and seamanlike.

When an admiral has satisfied himself that anything, no matter how small, is not carried out according to orders, he should call attention to it by signal (as a rule, by a general signal), and by thus pointing out the mistake to the Fleet, he prevents the same error from occurring again.

In such matters as clothes not properly stopped on, boats and booms not square, etc., an admiral should inquire who is responsible. If men are not standing to attention when the colours are hoisted, he should ask for the name of the officer of the watch. If a boat is improperly handled under sail or oars, he should ask for the name of the officer or coxswain of the boat.

The admiral's staff should always inform him of such matters as boats pulling badly, or not being run up to the davit head, men not standing properly to attention, or not doubling to obey all orders of the pipe, etc. The effect of a signal calling attention to these matters is lost if it is made some time after the event.

There should always be an officer responsible for every duty on board a man-of-war, and the admiral should always make on these occasions the signal, "Indicate name of officer responsible."

The admiral should always make sure, when finding fault with a ship, that his flagship is absolutely correct as regards the particular detail in question. If this is not the case he should call his flagship's attention to it at the same time.

Admirals and captains are often heard saying, "Look at the way they are doing so and so," referring to boat pulling or to the way a rope is handled, or a boat hoisted, quite forgetting that it is the fault of the admiral or captain that the duties are done badly or are not carried out according to their satisfaction. The admiral is responsible for the whole administration, smartness and efficiency of his Fleet; the captains are responsible for the whole administration, smartness and efficiency of their ships. In the Royal Navy, officers and men are loyal to the core, and everything that is done badly is due to the senior officer of the Fleet or of the ship not giving his orders clearly, and not showing beforehand what he wants done, and how it is to be done.

The admiral should never give an order relative to routine or administration without seeing that it is obeyed. Many orders given in a memorandum or circular are forgotten after the first few weeks or months, and so they lapse.

An officer should be told off to summarise and report that such orders have been carried out during the preceding week.

It is of no use for the admiral to give orders and directions unless he sees that they are actually carried out in the manner he intended.

If the admiral is not careful that all orders of his own and of the Admiralty are punctually obeyed, he will find that some captains accurately carry out the order and some do not. This irregularity causes discontent in some ships and slackness in others, disturbing that harmony which should prevail in a fleet. A "happy-go-lucky" method breeds irritation.

If papers are ordered to be sent in, or drills are ordered to be carried out, or if any matter connected with the Fleet is ordered to be undertaken at some future date, the admiral should always make a signal or reminder some days before the date. The argument that a man "ought to know and ought not to forget" does not prevent irritation if he does forget.

If an officer or man is slack, he should always be found fault with; it distresses the good officers and men to see that a slack individual gets along as well as those that are smart.

If the admiral observes anything incorrect relative to individuals in a ship's company, such as dress, etc., he should inquire whether the irregularity is common to the ship, and have this irregularity corrected right through the ship. Failing this method, he may be often finding fault on the same point, instead of having the whole matter put right by one signal or memorandum.

The admiral should often look over his own station orders to remind himself of the orders he has issued.

An admiral should, if possible, always send written messages to officers, in order to avoid constantly sending for officers. He should always date the messages. This maxim applies to the admiral's flagship as well as to other ships.

Sending messages verbally may cause great irritation, and may be prejudicial to discipline, for two distinct reasons: —

(i) The messenger may give the message in terms which are very irritating. Every one on the bridge hears the message delivered.

(ii) Human nature being what it is, the admiral, like other people, may be in a state of irritation, more particularly if he wants a thing done quickly or if he thinks that things are not being done well. He is not so likely to blurt out some rough and irritating expression if he writes the message or order.

In addition, it is neither good for discipline nor congenial to that respect which is shown to officers, if the signalman or others hear a rough message delivered to the chief of the staff, captain, or other officers.

The admiral should always let the Fleet under his command know beforehand the time which he intends to carry out practices, or to anchor or to weigh the Fleet. This rule particularly applies to the hours set apart for meals. Disturbance in the middle of meals causes needless irritation, and work never goes well in a man-of-war or anywhere else under irritation.

Admirals should as far as is possible let the officers and men of the Fleet know the dates of arrivals and departures from ports, so that all should be in a position to communicate with their friends and to arrange their private affairs conveniently.

If the admiral intends to be afloat with his flag flying very near the dinner-hour, or at any time that station orders annul guards and bands, he should signal "Annul Guards and Bands." Without such signal some ships are certain to turn them up while others will not do so, causing confusion.

When the admiral is inspecting a division of men, all ratings should take off their caps. The admiral should first inspect the chief petty officers and petty officers, and when he has done these ratings should be ordered to put on their caps. By so doing, the fact is emphasised that the petty officer's position in the ship is superior, and that the admiral recognises it to be so.

The admiral should see the sick in hospital constantly. His visit cheers the men, and shows them that the admiral knows that they are sick, and that he sympathises with them. There have been many cases where the interest shown by the admiral in a man who is dangerously ill has so cheered the patient that he has taken a turn for the better and has ultimately recovered.

If a serious accident occurs on board any ship, either at drill or in the execution of other duty whereby officers or men are killed or wounded, the admiral should inform the whole Fleet with regret, giving the names of officers and men. This procedure is respectful to those under his command who are killed or wounded in the execution of their duty. They have suffered or died for their country just as much as though killed or wounded in action with the enemy. The admiral should personally go and see the wounded daily, if possible.

An admiral should let his officers know that he expects everything on board the ships to be shipshape, that is to say, kept in such condition and order as befits one of His Majesty's ships of war.

The admiral should always give as much leave as possible, having regard to the exigencies of the service and of duty. A free gangway for special leave men should be kept at all possible places, so that one watch can always go ashore daily if they are so minded.

Trouble with regard to breaking leave and drunkenness is generally brought about by want of discretion on the part of the commanding officer in giving leave. Keeping men on board for long periods, and then letting them go ashore with a great deal of money, involves the temptation to some to break leave, and to others to drink more than is good for them.