The Memoirs of Admiral Lord Beresford

When the boat's crew has been selected, the first duty of the coxswain is to show them how to pull and to ensure their motions being as one. Starting from their laying on their oars, he should make them stretch aft towards him as far as they can, with straight arms, sitting with their chests square to their oars, with their hands, not too far from and not too close to each other, firmly grasping the looms of the oars, with their arms at about right angles to the body and themselves looking the coxswain straight in the face (in river-pulling parlance "eyes in the boat"). It is impossible for a man to sit square to his oar if he is looking over his shoulder. The coxswain should begin practising his crew in the above position, without allowing them to catch the water until they are perfect.

The oars should catch the water with a firm and vigorous grip, absolutely simultaneously, the great effort of the man being made as the oar catches the water and not as it leaves it. The oar should b pulled through with a strong, steady, powerful stroke, no jerks whatever being given. A jerk bends or breaks an oar, but it does not send the boat ahead; and a man who pulls a steady stroke will stay three miles to the two miles of the man who jerks. The oar should never be feathered higher than is necessary. The oars should be feathered as level as possible with each other in order to ensure, as far as may be, that the blades of the oars catch the water absolutely together.

The coxswain should see that the crew wear no belts and that the waistbands of their trousers are loose about the waist. If a man's trousers are tight, they become irksome when he stretches aft as far as he can over his toes. Each one of these details requires the earnest and constant attention of the coxswain, and he should see that each movement is carried out slowly, deliberately, quietly and perfectly, before he begins to get his crew into hard training. Spurts should always be avoided until a crew is fit to pull a race. When the coxswain wishes to spurt he should warn the crew for a spurt, state loudly the number of strokes he wishes to spurt, and then count them distinctly as they are pulled. The crew will then all put forth their greatest effort together. A spurt of three strokes may win a race, in the event of one of the opposing boat's crew catching a crab, or their stroke becoming unequal, or one or more of them being for the moment jaded.

The usual method for training adopted by coxswains is, however, of a different character. They order the men to pull hard from the moment they form their crew; they pay not the slightest regard to the important details which must be attended to in order that any crew may have a chance of winning a strongly contested race; they appear to think that a boat's crew cannot be trained unless the coxswain oscillates his body with an excitement which apparently borders on insanity; and they accompany these oscillations with weird and nervous cries such as "Hup with her!" "Lift her!" "Hang on her!" "Back on her!" "Squeeze her!" "Heave on her!" and similar noises. It is well to cheer up a crew with vocal accompaniments to their strokes, but that is by no means the most important factor in enabling them to win.

As a crew proceeds in its training and becomes slowly and quietly fit, dumb-bells and running will be found useful auxiliaries to pulling, particularly if the regular practice is stopped while the ship is at sea, but on no account should a coxswain allow one of his boat's crew to be over-trained. He should inquire after the health of the crew every morning, and should be most careful that they do not get a chill or a cold after practice. Some men require more work than others to get them in hard condition; a good coxswain will attend to this point, and will be careful that all his boat's crew reach the starting-point in the pink of condition. He will also see that the thwarts are smooth and comfortable, the looms of the oars smooth and capable of being easily grasped, that the stretchers are secured so that they can neither slip nor carry away, and that every small detail (whose failure at the critical moment might jeopardise the chances of a race) is attended to. The coxswain must also attend to the incidentals of training, such as chafed sterns and blistered hands, which if not treated may incapacitate a man from pulling in a race. Chafing on the stern is best treated by fomenting with hot water and the application of zinc powder afterwards. Blisters on hands are best treated by pricking them with a needle in the live flesh just outside the blister, pressing the water out of it, and wearing a rag over the injury until the two skins have set together again. A coxswain should also attend to the feeding of his crew during training, as no man can ever be produced fit at the starting-post who is too much addicted to pudding.

There are two illustrations which exemplify the necessity for a man to lean well aft with straight arms when commencing his stroke: (1) If a man were holding on to a ridge-rope or other rope for his life, he would never hold on with his arms bent, but would keep them quite straight for the simple reason that he could hold on longer and stronger. (2) If a man, in a sitting position, wished to raise a weight, the pulley used being rove through a block at his feet, he would never dream of sitting upright prising with his feet and leaning back from the upright position, but he would bend forward well on his toes and pull with his strength and his weight. Tackles and weights were rigged in the Undaunted in order that the men might learn these truths by practice.

Another important matter for a coxswain is to see that the conditions on all points are clearly made out in writing before the race, and are signed by himself and the coxswain of the competing boat. The date, the time, the boats, the composition of the crew, the stakes, which should always be low (high stakes invariably lead to bad feeling) and which in no case should exceed 5s. per man and 10s. per coxswain; the precise course, i. e. the distance, and on which side, all marks, etc., are to be left, and also whether the oars are to be Service or private: all these things should be clearly defined. There has been more bad feeling bred between vessels owing to the want of such details having been clearly defined than to any other contingency that arises in boat racing. This is notably the case as to oars. Wherever it is possible a straight course should be selected, but if the length of the race does not admit of a straight course each boat should have its own separate buoy to round.

Coxswains should use every endeavour to get permission to have their boats hoisted for three or four days (with the exception of the time necessary for practice) before any forthcoming race in order to get the boat properly dry. They should get any ragged splinters planed off the keel, have all surplus paint scraped off and get the bottom of the boat as smooth as possible. They should also see the oars trimmed and exactly suited both by length and balance of weight to the small or great beam of the boat according to the thwart on which they are pulled.

Boat pulling is a healthy and a manly recreation, and if properly practised with friendly rivalry, can there be a doubt that it generates that activity of mind which is generally associated with activity of body? It also produces that courage, endurance, nerve and muscle which have so long been the distinctive features of the British race. It provokes a spirit of manliness, a generosity of mind and a love of fair play.

If all conditions are made out clearly and fairly, a beaten crew invariably accepts the verdict in a gallant and a chivalrous manner. After a race, no such remarks should be heard from the beaten crew as an offer to double or treble the stakes and pull again or words of similar character, showing either that the beaten crew cannot accept their defeat in a spirit worthy of the name of British man-of-war men, or that owing to the conditions of the race not having been clearly defined, some misunderstanding has arisen which has naturally engendered a bitter feeling in the minds of those who have just suffered the poignancy of defeat.

The training and practice which are necessary to put the boats' crews of men-of-war into that state of condition in which they may reasonably expect to win a race, must to a large extent cultivate those habits of discipline which are so essential for the comfort and efficiency of our great Service.

Admiral Sir George Tryon, while he was commander-in-chief in the Mediterranean, and while I was in command of the Undaunted, caused a boat to be specially built to race my boat. We had six races, all of which the Undaunted won. The Undaunted's racing boat was built flatter in the floor than the ordinary pattern of Service boats. One of the races with Sir George Tryon's boat was rowed in a whole gale of wind, over a course of four miles. The Undaunted's boat was half-full of water, and three of the knees of the thwarts were broken, when she crossed the line. This kind of racing is extremely heavy work, for the Service boats are massively built in order to carry weight, such as guns, stores ammunition. The oars are so heavy that there is nearly as much labour involved in lifting the oar from the water and coming forward as in pulling it through the water.

The admiral-superintendent's boat at Malta was never beaten. She was a beautiful boat, built by Maltese, and manned by a splendid Maltese crew. I raced her with my crew twice, once when I was captain of the Undaunted, and again when I was second in command in the Mediterranean (with flag in Ramillies), and lost the race on both occasions. In the second race, the Maltese, having the inside place resorted to the well-known manoeuvre of steering us off all the way up to the buoy and then turning sharply to round it.

While stationed at Alexandria during the time of my command of the Undaunted, we used to have a regatta open to all comers, any boat and any rig, every Friday. The Arab boats used to enter. Their great sail area and flat bottoms gave them a great advantage in running, or on the wind; but they could not tack. They were obliged to wear in a beat to windward, because their sail dipped before all. I beat them twice with a copy of Captain (now Admiral) Fitzgerald's racing rig, in the launch. A Service launch is of course built for heavy work and for carrying loads, such as supplies and ammunition. The Service rig has one mast, with mainsail and staysail, called the De Horsey rig. Captain Fitzgerald stepped the single mast aft, and fitted a bigger spar forward, equipped it with a big dipping lug, abolished the staysail, and used ballast. The object of the De Horsey rig was to give a sail equipment with as little gear as possible. Captain Fitzgerald's object was to race; and I may take this opportunity of saying that I consider Admiral Fitzgerald to have been the finest boat-sailer whom I have met in the Service.

When he was commander of the Agincourt in the Channel Squadron, he won the first Admiral's cup presented in the Navy, in 1872. In that year, Admiral Sir Geoffrey Hornby gave a cup to be sailed for by the boats of the Channel Squadron, being the first admiral to present a cup. The conditions, as described by Admiral Fitzgerald in his Memories of the Sea, were: "Any sails, any rig, any shaped false keel, but no sinking ballast; that is to say, the boat must float when full of water; and there is generally a handicap for size."

While I was commander of the Thunderer, I fitted the steam pinnace as a racing boat, taking out the engines and boilers and equipping her with a big cutter rig. The boat had a yacht section, but was without a heavy keel, so that I had to ballast her heavily. She went very fast in a light breeze, but when a puff came she would heel over and take in water. In case of accident, I ballasted her with a length of chain cable, shackled to ringbolts on her bottom, the other end made fast to a rope and a buoy. Rear-Admiral William Dowell, who was then second in command of the Channel Squadron (afterwards Admiral Sir William Montague Dowell, G.C.B.), challenged me to a race in Portland Harbour. Admiral Dowell sailed in his six-oared galley, which carried a private rig of two dipping lugs. I was confident of beating him, but the admiral knew better. He knew I should have to ease my sheets when the breeze freshened. At first I went away from him, but when I was just inside the breakwater, a puff came, over went the boat, and it went down under me. Dowell, seeing that I was swimming safely and that the boats of the Fleet were coming to pick me up, went on and won the race.

When I went to dine with him that night, he greeted me with:

"Last time I saw you, you were swimming about in the harbour."

In the meantime, owing to the device of ballasting my boat with chain cable and buoying the end of it, we were able to pick her up. The Thunderer came over the place where she was sunk, hauled the cable up to the hawse pipe, and hove the boat to the surface.

My old friend, Admiral Sir William Montague Dowell G.C.B., was a most distinguished officer. He served in the China war, 1840-1, served as gunnery lieutenant of the Albion in the Black Sea, and was promoted for services with the Naval Brigade at Sevastopol; served again in China, in 1857, being present at the capture of Canton; commanded the Barrosa in the straits of Simonoseki, 1864, being specially mentioned; received the C.B. for services in Japan. He was A.D.C. to the Queen; commanded the West Coast of Africa and Cape of Good Hope Station, 1867-71; after having been second in command of the Channel Squadron, senior officer on the Coast of Ireland, and vice-admiral in command of the Channel Squadron, he was temporarily attached to the Mediterranean Fleet and served in the Egyptian war of 1882, receiving the K.C.B., and the thanks of the House of Commons. He was afterwards commander-in-chief in China, and subsequently commander-in-chief of Devonport. He was one of the Three Admirals who framed the Report upon the Naval Manoeuvres of 1888, in which were formulated the principles of British naval supremacy.

I won many races in a Una boat, the Weasel, built at Cowes, during the time of my command of the royal yacht Osborne. The Prince of Wales built a similar boat. Prince Louis of Battenberg, steering the Prince's boat, beat me in a most exciting race, in which the betting was long odds on my boat. The fact was, that trying to be very clever, I put too much ballast in the boat, and so lost the race.

CHAPTER LII

THE MEDITERRANEAN STATION

Forty-four years had elapsed since I was a midshipman in H.M.S. Marlborough, flagship in the Mediterranean, when I hoisted my flag in H.M.S. Bulwark as commander-in-chief upon that station, in June 1905. Those changeful years had seen the Old Navy out and the New Navy in; their revolutions had transformed the whole material aspect of the Navy; and the essential spirit of the Navy, adapting itself to new conditions remained unaltered. One result, perhaps inevitable, of the swift progress of scientific invention, was that the public attention was concentrated upon purely material matters regarding the Navy as a fighting machine automatically operated; and conceiving of officers and men as workers in a factory, who had nothing to do but to press buttons and to manipulate levers. This unfortunate delusion was fostered by the politicians, who were quick to use it for their own ends.

The Mediterranean Fleet consisted of Bulwark (flag), Formidable, Implacable, Irresistible, London, Prince of Wales, Queen, Venerable (flag of second in command, Vice-Admiral Sir Harry T. Grenfell, K.C.B., C.M.G., and afterwards of Rear-Admiral Francis C. B. Bridgeman, M.V.O.); three attached cruisers, three special service vessels; the Third Cruiser Squadron, Leviathan, (flag of Rear-Admiral the Hon. Hedworth Lambton, C.V.O., C.B.), Carnarvon, Lancaster, Suffolk, two attached ships, and 22 destroyers.

The Staff consisted of: chief of staff, Captain Frederick C. D. Sturdee, C.M.G, M.V.O.; flag-commander, Fawcet Wray; flag-lieutenant, Charles D. Roper (signal officer); flag-lieutenant, Herbert T. C. Gibbs; secretary, Fleet Paymaster John A. Keys; engineer-captain, Edwin Little; intelligence officer, Major John M. Rose, R.M.A. The flag-captain was Osmond de B. Brock; the commander Hugh P. E. T. Williams.

The Mediterranean is the finest training station in the world; and it is the more to be regretted that the Mediterranean Fleet is always so deficient in numbers, that Fleet training must be conducted at a disadvantage. Eight battleships represent the smallest practicable unit for tactical purposes, nor does that number allow sufficient margin for the necessary deductions due to the absence of ships under repair or refitting. Upon one occasion, six out of the eight were absent under repair at one time, and in all cases the absence was unavoidable.

The eight battleships required twenty attached cruisers, as compared with the three allocated. Although improvements had been effected, the Fleet in 1905 was still deficient in auxiliaries, such as fleet colliers, repair ships, depot ships.

The popular and political delusion that under modern conditions the duties of the naval officer have become mechanical is so far from the reality, that, in truth, they have never been more complex and onerous; nor is it possible that they should be rightly performed in war, in default of the most assiduous practice in peace. It is thus the business of an admiral constantly to exercise the Fleet both collectively and individually; and as the discharge of that duty tasks his energies to the utmost, there is little to record during a sea command except the cruises, exercises and manoeuvres which constantly occupy a Fleet.

In June, 1905, for instance, the Mediterranean Fleet left Malta and proceeded upon a cruise; met the Atlantic Fleet at the end of July; exercised combined manoeuvres with the Atlantic Fleet; proceeded upon another cruise, and so on; never going to sea without practising some exercise or manoeuvre. All exercises and manoeuvres of importance were treated in a memorandum, in which was explained the lessons to be learned from them, and which was circulated to the officers of the Fleet.

Every morning when the Fleet was at sea, except on Sundays and in very bad weather, small tactical and turning movements were executed from 7.30 to 8 a.m., the movements of each individual ship being carried out by the officer of the watch, all lieutenants taking it in turn to relieve the deck, and being put in charge of the ship for this period of time. The captains did not interfere in the handling of the ship, unless the officer of the watch placed the ship, or a consort, in a position of danger. The lieutenants themselves made out the commander-in-chief's signals and their purport without the assistance of the captain or of the yeoman of signals. Officers of the watch were informed that they need not be afraid of making a mistake; for, everyone was liable to make a mistake; and the rest of the Fleet learned more when an error occurred than when all went smoothly and correctly.

During the forenoons, there was usually practised some short manoeuvre in which an admiral or a captain took charge of the Fleet, and manoeuvred it as he pleased, the commander-in-chief reserving to himself the right to negative any signal which he might consider dangerous or useless. After the admirals and captains had manoeuvred the Fleet as a whole, it was divided into opposing Fleets, officers, selected by the commander-in-chief, taking charge of these Fleets. Each squadron endeavoured to gain the initial position or advantage. Once that position was obtained, the Fleets were ordered to separate, and two other officers respectively took charge of the opposing squadrons.

Great care was observed that orders relative to speed, and to the distance within which opposing fleets were not to trespass, were rigidly observed. Officers were informed that all peace manoeuvres must be regarded as a game, and that no game should be played unless the rules were implicitly obeyed. The principle was that no manoeuvre should last very long, being much more instructive if it were short, and were frequently practised.

The practice of taking the soldiers for short voyages was instituted. About twenty men of the Royal Garrison Artillery at Malta, with an officer, a sergeant and a corporal, were embarked in each vessel, the non-commissioned officers and men messing and working with the Royal Marines.

The periodical delivery of lectures by officers of all branches upon Service subjects was instituted, the lectures taking place under the presidency of the commander-in-chief at the Royal Naval Canteen, Malta. Discussions were encouraged, and a great deal of interest and enthusiasm was aroused.

My old friend and distinguished countryman, Sir George White, who was then Governor of Gibraltar, asked me to deliver a lecture to the soldiers of the garrison upon the advantages of temperance. In dealing with this subject, I always tell men to box, run, ride, row, and by all means to get physically fit, when they would be in a condition they would not forfeit for the sake of indulgence. On this occasion, I said that, although I was over sixty years of age, I could outlast a youngster in endurance, adding that "I never took any liquor now." The address must have been reported in the English papers; for I received a letter from a dear old lady (quite unknown to me) telling me how thankful she was that I, as a public man, had given up the dreadful vice of intoxication.

After I had consulted the head of every department in every ship collectively, two detailed plans of war organisation were drawn up: one, a plan of preparation for war; two, a plan for immediate action. The first contained the procedure to be followed if war was expected; the second, the procedure to be followed on the eve of an engagement. Both covered every detail of the internal organisation of every ship in the Fleet, and specified the duties of every officer, man and boy. These plans were circulated to the officers of the Fleet.

Another important element of preparation for war is the rapid and efficient repair of defects. Under the old system, a defect which could not be repaired by the ship's artificers – as for instance, a piece of work involving a heavy casting or forging – was left until the ship visited the dockyard, when the dockyard officials came on board, took measurements, executed the work and fitted it to the ship. The result was that there were many complaints of defective fitting.

Under the new system, introduced in the Mediterranean Fleet, all repairs which could not be effected in the ship, were specified by the ship's artificers, who also made measured drawings of the new work required. The specifications and drawings were forwarded by the senior officer to the dockyard, with directions that the work should be executed as soon as possible, so that upon the arrival of the ship at the dockyard, the required fitting would be at once supplied to the ship. It would then be fixed by the ship's artificers who had furnished the working drawings to the dockyard, and who, provided that the work was rightly executed, would thus be responsible both for accuracy of manufacture and of fitting. By this means, delay was avoided and the work was efficiently and promptly executed.

Before I left England to take up my appointment, I resolved to do my best to eradicate that curse of the Service, Malta fever. The authorities were naturally sceptical of my success; for, although many attempts had been made to solve the problem, no one had hitherto succeeded in abating the scourge.

Certain obvious precautions were at once enforced. Junior officers were not allowed to remain on shore after sunset, without overcoats; all milk received on board was boiled; the Fleet was kept away from Malta as much as possible during the dangerous months of June, July, August and September; and the officers and men of those ships which were at Malta during the summer, were sent upon long route marches and were afforded plenty of exercise to keep them fit. These measures reduced the number of cases of Malta fever from 197 of the previous year (1905) to 137.