The Memoirs of Admiral Lord Beresford

The Taotai at Shanghai informed Acting-Consul-General Brenan that he had received orders to arrest Kang Yu Wei upon his arrival, and that a reward of 2000 dollars was offered for his capture, and requested Mr. Brenan to search for the fugitive in all British ships arriving at Shanghai. By this time the Chinese detectives and policemen were wildly excited by the prospect of securing 2000 dollars that Mr. Brenan feared they would attempt forcibly to board British ships before they entered the harbour. He therefore determined to intercept the Chungking before the Chinese officials could reach her; but desiring to avoid the open implication of the Consulate in the matter, he accepted the services volunteered by Mr. J. O. P. Bland (joint author of China under the Empress Dowager). Mr. Bland, who spoke Chinese, took a steam-launch, met the Chungking some miles out at sea, transhipped Kang Yu Wei, and put him on board the P. and O. steamer Ballaarat, then lying outside Woosung. Captain Field, commanding the Ballaarat, placed an armed sentry upon Kang Yu Wei's cabin. The people in the Chungking, knowing that H.M.S. Esk was at Woosung, told the Chinese officials at Shanghai that Kang Yu Wei had been put on board her. This information diverted attention from the Ballaarat for the moment.

The Chinese officials, however, eventually determined to follow the Ballaarat in a gunboat, when, two days later (29th September), the Ballaarat sailed for Hong Kong. The British authorities, learning also that two more Chinese gunboats were ordered to lie in wait for the P. and O. boat, arranged that she should be escorted to Hong Kong by H.M. cruiser Bonaventure, commanded by my old friend and brother-in-arms in the Soudan campaign, Captain R. A. J. Montgomerie. Being pursued by the Chinese gunboat, Montgomerie cleared for action; luckily for them, the Chinese declined to risk an affair with one of the finest fighting officers in Her Majesty's service; and Kang Yu Wei was landed in safety at Hong Kong. Here, Major-General Black placed him under police protection. The procedure followed by Captain Montgomerie in accordance with the orders of Vice-Admiral Sir Edward Seymour, then commander-in-chief on the China station, not only saved the life of the patriot Kang Yu Wei, but prevented the occurrence of the difficulties which would have arisen had the Chinese attempted to board the Ballaarat.

With the object of ascertaining the views of the Reform Party concerning the future of China and its relation to the extension of trade and commerce, I invited Kang Yu Wei to visit me. He arrived surrounded by a bodyguard of policemen, for a price was set on his head. Apparently the poor man felt it already loose, for, as he talked, he kept turning it over his shoulder; and little wonder; for it was only three or four days since his brother and five of his colleagues had been executed in Pekin.

"Reforms in the East," said Kang Yu Wei, "invariably demanded martyrs; and, if China did not go to pieces in the meantime, posterity would honour the six dead gentlemen." In reply to my question as to the present position of the Reform Party, he said it was "completely crushed, but not killed," and would ere long revive; a prophecy which has been fulfilled.

Kang Yu Wei affirmed that, contrary to the general opinion abroad, all educated Chinamen believed that Reform alone could prevent the dissolution of an Empire 4000 years old; that by degrees the mass of the people were accepting the new doctrines; that the Reformers relied upon Great Britain to help them to carry their schemes into execution; and that, were they to attain power, they would certainly open China to the trade and commerce of the world, because such a policy would increase the strength and riches of the Empire.

The impression left upon my mind by Kang Yu Wei was that he was loyal, patriotic, and unselfishly devoted to his country, and undoubtedly he was in earnest.

In the course of many conversations held with the compradors (managers) of the great mercantile houses in China, I ascertained that, while several of them were frankly in favour of Reform, all of them agreed that the Reformers had acted in haste, neglecting to prepare their way by means of careful organisation.

THE CHINESE NEW MODEL

Arriving at Pekin on 16th October, 1898, I was kindly invited by Sir Claude Macdonald, British Minister Plenipotentiary, to stay at the Legation. To all Foreign Ministers accredited to Pekin I paid my respects and presented my credentials, which were given to me by the President of the Associated Chambers of Commerce of Great Britain, Sir Stafford Northcote, and which showed that I had been asked to make a report on British trade and commerce, its future development, and what security existed throughout the Chinese Empire for such trade and commerce.

On 20th October, I visited the Tsung-li Yamen; a body created, in 1861, for the purpose of conducting diplomatic negotiations with the representatives of Foreign Powers, and consisting of eight members, of whom three are Manchus and five are Chinese. I was presented to Prince Ching, the President, and was requested to address the members. In my speech, I dwelt upon the anxiety as to the future on the part of British traders on account of the want of security for capital, and the ignoring of treaties by the Chinese; suggested that, unless China organised her military and police forces in order to give security for trade and commerce, foreign countries would adopt the policy embodied in the expression "Spheres of Influence"; affirmed that the British desired no addition to be made to the British Empire, either in the nature of dominion, sphere of influence, or protectorate; explained that what the commercial communities desired was free and uninterrupted opportunities for trade, with equal rights and privileges for all the nations of the world, a policy expressed by the words "Open Door"; and stated that in order to establish such a policy, it was essential that China should maintain her integrity.

Prince Ching asked me how I thought trade and commerce could be better protected that it was at present.

I replied that the only effective method would be thoroughly to reorganise the Chinese army, abolishing the system of maintaining provincial armies; that, as Great Britain had 64 per cent. of the whole foreign trade of China, she was naturally anxious as to its adequate security; and that it was possible that the British Government would allow a British officer to assist the Chinese in putting their army in order; adding that I had no official authority whatever to make the statement, but merely put it forward as a suggestion. I also suggested that should the Chinese Government consider the proposal, it might be well for them to invite other nations which had large trading interests with China, to lend a few officers and non-commissioned officers to work with the British in the reorganisation of the army.

Prince Ching observed that they already had German officers to drill some of their troops; and that Captain Lang, the British naval officer, was in the Chinese service to help them to organise their Fleet. He did not mention, however, what I afterwards discovered, that Captain Lang had found the admiral sitting on the quarter-deck playing fan-tan with his own sentry. Captain Lang subsequently resigned his appointment.

When Prince Ching and some members of the Tsung-li Yamen returned my visit, Prince Ching informed me that the Emperor and the Empress Dowager approved of my suggestions; and that his Excellency Chung Chi Tung, Viceroy of Hunan and Hupeh, had been ordered to have 2000 of his troops ready to be placed under a British officer for drill and organisation, as an experiment, which might possibly lead to the reorganisation of the army as a whole. I replied that as I was in no way authorised to take any responsibility with regard to this matter, any action taken on the part of the Tsung-ii Yamen must go through the British Minister to the British Government. Prince Ching said that it was the intention of the Tsung-li Yamen formally to inform Sir Claude Macdonald of the wishes of the Chinese Government.

My interpreter on these occasions was Mr. Fulford of the British Legation, and all that passed between myself and the high Chinese officials in Pekin was made known by Mr. Fulford to the British Minister.

The question of providing adequate security for British subjects and for British trade and commerce, was thus frankly raised at the beginning. Indeed, all hinged upon its solution. The safety of life and property always depends ultimately upon disciplined force. The force at the disposal of the Chinese Government was scattered, ill-organised and largely inefficient. But, with the men, money and resources actually available, it would have been perfectly feasible to have formed an army of a million men. Such was my view at the time, and I have seen no reason to change it since.

At the request of the Tsung-li Yamen, I drew up the entire scheme complete in every detail for the organisation of the Chinese army; and on several occasions it was discussed with me by the Chinese Ministers at great length.

Briefly described, my scheme was based upon the principle upon which the Imperial Maritime Customs had been formed. The Imperial Maritime Customs was charged with the duty of collecting Custom House dues, which were hypothecated to secure the external indebtedness of China. All nations were represented upon it, and, because Great Britain possessed by far the larger share of Chinese trade, a British officer was placed at its head. The business was impartially managed under the Chinese Government for the common welfare of China and of other nations; and in the result the arrangement worked admirably.

The proposal was, then, to organise the army upon the same basis; appointing officers of those nations who owned interests in China; and, as Great Britain possessed the largest interests, placing a British officer in command under the Chinese Government. Under these conditions, the army would be enabled to secure China both against foreign aggression and internal disturbance. In a word, it would ensure stable government. Under existing conditions, stable government was impossible; for the methods of the Empress Dowager consisted in playing off one party against another, and one viceroy against another. Tsu Hsi succeeded in maintaining her personal ascendancy; but at the cost of so weakening the State, that it was liable to fall a prey to foreign ambition and foreign cupidity.

The Chinese high officials argued the whole subject with great acumen. They objected that the commander-in-chief might embark upon a career of personal aggrandisement. I replied that as he would be under the Chinese Government, and that as he would be further restricted by his dependence upon an international body of officers, there could be no such danger. And I asked the Chinese whether they had any reason to be dissatisfied with Sir Robert Hart's administration of the Customs. They answered at once that his services were invaluable to China, and said that he worked so hard in Chinese interests that "he might have been a Chinaman."

I then pointed out that a British officer at the head of the army would occupy the same position with regard to the army as Sir Robert Hart occupied with regard to the Customs; offered to select for them the best general I could find for the executive command; and informed them that I was myself prepared to undertake the administrative command.

The objection that the creation of such an army might offend foreign susceptibilities, was also met by the argument that foreign officers would command it.

In reply to a courteous question, I stated that my object in proposing the scheme was to benefit China; and that the reason why I desired to benefit China was that an improvement in Chinese administration must necessarily profit British interests.

I also discussed the subject with his Excellency Yung Lu, he who had executed the coup d'état which resulted in the defeat of the Reformers and the imprisonment of the Emperor Kuang Hsu. Yung Lu, who commanded one of the foreign-drilled armies, stated that the reorganisation of the Chinese army under British and foreign officers would be carried into execution; and asked me whether, supposing that China put the whole of her armies under British officers, Great Britain would assist her in any quarrel that might arise between her and any other Power.

The direct question was highly significant.

My reply, of course, was that I was unable to discuss political questions; but that Great Britain had no desire to involve herself in quarrels which might arise among other countries.

Yung Lu courteously invited me to visit the military forces then quartered round Pekin; a privilege of which I afterwards availed myself.

Having formulated my scheme for the reorganisation of the Chinese army, founded upon a general knowledge of the requirements of the situation, I proceeded to fulfil in detail that part of my instructions received from the President of the Associated Chambers of Commerce directing me to report "whether the organisation of the Chinese civil and military administration is sufficiently complete to ensure adequate protection to commercial ventures." Accordingly, I visited all the forts and arsenals forming the coast and river defences of the Chinese Empire, and utilised the opportunities, most courteously extended to me by the various viceroys, of inspecting the Imperial military forces.

For the sake of simplicity, the results of my investigations into military and naval conditions are here grouped together; although these investigations were necessarily conducted side by side with my inquiries into commercial affairs, the two elements being often present in the same locality.

China's military forces were then sharply divided between Manchu and Chinese, or North and South. The Manchu, or Northern, forces were manned and officered entirely by Manchus, and enjoyed privileges which were denied to the Chinese army. Nearly every Southern army was commanded by two generals, a Manchu and a Chinese, the Manchu being the real head.

The provincial armies are maintained at the expense of the viceroys. In the Province of Chihli, General Yuan Shih Kai's army, and the Imperial armies at and around Pekin, are maintained by the Board of Revenue out of Imperial taxes; so that the Imperial armies permanently quartered round Pekin are State-paid. The generals in command of the Provinces administer their armies entirely according to their own discretion. As these officers are responsible for the payment and maintenance of the forces under their command, much of the money which should go to the army is apt to stick with its general.

When I mentioned these circumstances to the members of the Tsung-li Yamen, one of them blandly asked me if I included his army in my description.

I replied that his Excellency could not but be aware that he received supplies of pay, clothes and rice for an establishment of 10,000, although the actual number was one half or less; and that when his army was inspected, he filled the ranks by hiring coolies for the occasion. My response evoked an irreverent outburst of applause from the interested audience of coolies. "The English Mandarin," they cried, "knows all about our old mandarins! That is just what happens."

YUAN SHIH KAI

In October, 1898, I went to Hsiao Chao to visit Yuan Shih Kai, the high official who informed Yung Lu of the plot of the Reformers to seize the Empress Dowager, and so brought about the coup d'état. I remained two days and a night with the general; witnessed the parade of all his troops, and their manoeuvres, and examined their equipment and victualling. I was permitted to examine the pay-sheets, and obtained every detail connected with the establishment and maintenance of the force.

General Yuan Shih Kai is a Chinaman, and his army was composed of Chinese. It numbered 7400 men. They appeared to be smart, of fine physique, well fed, and their uniforms were well kept. Their parade and manoeuvres were smartly executed, their discipline was excellent. All their equipment was serviceable and efficient, with the exception of their artillery.

It was on this occasion that I had a conversation with Yuan Shih Kai, which, in the light of subsequent events in China, it may be not uninteresting to recall.

Yuan Shih Kai expressed his anxiety concerning the future of his country; which, he said, was in a lamentable state of weakness, and which the States of Europe were desirous of dividing among themselves; and in this connection he was inclined favourably to regard the proposal to combine the various Chinese armies into one great Imperial force.

Upon that, I asked Yuan if he were acquainted with the history of China. Being one of the governing class, and therefore a scholar of the ancient meticulous pedantic class, he probably knew the whole of it by heart; and he replied in the affirmative.

"Then," I said, "have you not observed that every Chinese dynasty has been founded by a successful general?"

The man who is now (1913) President of the Chinese Republic looked at me impassive as a statue, and held his peace.

Yuan Shih Kai was well aware of the fact that throughout the East the ruler is always "He," never "They"; and for this reason he subsequently endeavoured, after the death of the Empress Dowager, to preserve the authority of the Emperor.

Years afterwards, before leaving England for China, Dr. Sun Yat-sen, who was accompanied by General Homer Lea of the United States, lunched with me. General Homer Lea was, I think, to conduct the reorganisation of the Chinese army.

ARMS AND MEN

The armies which I had the privilege of inspecting, or concerning which I obtained information, were: the army of General Sung, distributed along the coast about Kinchow, which apparently consisted of 10,000 men out of a paper strength of 20,000; the army of General Soon Ching at Lutai, which was also at half strength, consisting of 7000 men out of 15,000, distributed among 30 camps, and having some Russian officers; and the army of General Tung Fu Chan, near Pekin, which was a disorderly and an undisciplined rabble; the army of General Nieh, which consisted of about 13,000 men, distributed among 30 camps between Hsiao Chao and Tientsin, with five Russian instructors; the Pekin Field Force, which was commanded from the Palace, and which consisted of 10,000 picked men, well armed but badly drilled; the cavalry camp at Kaiping, theoretically consisting of 1500 men, and having three Russian officers; and the army of General Yi Ke Tong, consisting of from 8000 to 15,000 men scattered about in Manchuria. I also saw the armies, or some part of them, of the Viceroys Chung Chai Tung, Liu Kwen Yi, Hsu Ying Kwei, Tau Chung Liu, and Kwei. Besides these, I was informed that there were in Mongolia 100,000 cavalry.

Among the various armies were distributed 14 different patterns of rifles, varying from the Mauser to the gingal. Some contingents were armed with bows and arrows; others carried bird-cages and fans, being distinguishable as soldiers only by their badge. The armies exhibited as many degrees of efficiency among themselves as their weapons.

Nevertheless, I came to the conclusion that here was all the material from which to evolve an excellent army. The Chinese have all the qualities of a good soldier: they are sober, obedient, quick to learn and courageous. The requirements were proper food, pay, clothing, drill and competent officers.

While I was at Newchwang I obtained what information was available with regard to the numbers and location of the Russian troops in Eastern Siberia and in Manchuria The total number was then about 12,000 men.

In the course of my inspection, at the Viceroy's invitation, of the powerful forts on the Yangtse River, I observed that one fort, which was intended to fire up the river, was so constructed that only one gun out of six could be trained in the required direction, so that if the other guns were brought to bear, the guns' crews would be killed. The face of the fort, instead of being at right angles to the course of the river, was parallel to it. At my suggestion, a dummy figure was placed in position; a gun was fired in the required direction; and sure enough the shot blew the effigy to pieces and went wandering among the junks crowding the river. The Chinese said that the English Mandarin was the cleverest mandarin they had ever seen; and explained that the fort had not been built in the right position because the ground was swampy.

Among my observations of forts elsewhere, I noted a battery of 60-ton muzzle-loading guns, which were loaded by depressing their muzzles into the magazine. I ventured to suggest that any carelessness in sponging out the guns might result in the explosion of the magazine. The general said that the English Mandarin was extraordinarily clever; and explained that a year previously a magazine had been blown up for the very reason I had indicated, had killed forty-two men, and had then been rebuilt upon the same plan.

At another fort I noted that the powder used for the heavy guns was unsuitable, and ventured to suggest that it might burst the gun.

"Yes, it does," said the general simply. "We have lately blown the breech off two 12-inch 50-ton Krupp guns, killing and wounding thirty men." And he congratulated the English Mandarin upon his extraordinary powers of divination. After the general's explanation I understood how it was that in another fort two 12-inch Krupp guns were fitted with Armstrong breech mechanism. The Krupp breech having been blown off, the Shanghai arsenal had neatly fitted them with Armstrong breeches.

Observing that a powder-mill at Canton had open gratings for windows, and stood in the midst of a sandy plain, I ventured to suggest that the sand might blow in, and that a spark from it might cause an explosion.

"Yes, it does," said the mandarin. "It blew up two years ago and killed and wounded twenty men." He added that although it had been rebuilt upon the same plan, it was not intended to use it again; and expressed his admiration for my remarkable penetration.

At one of the arsenals, the workman boring a 6-pounder gun had his speed too fast and his feed too thick, so that his machine was taking out chips of metal and jumping under the strain. My guide observed placidly that the man didn't seem to know how to do it. The European instructor, he explained, had left. I offered to replace him for the occasion; took off my coat; and being an old hand at the lathe managed to set the machine right in about an hour's work. Then there suddenly arose a great crying and calling among the coolies outside. I thought a riot was beginning; but the tumult was only the coolies in their innocent way screaming their delight that "the English Mandarin could do what their own old mandarins couldn't."

I drew up a report with regard to the forts and arsenals in China. The general conclusion was that enormous sums of money were being expended on war material which, in most cases, was totally useless, although the establishments were often capable, under European instructors, of turning out work which would compare with the best in Europe. Two or three of these arsenals, rightly managed, would serve to equip a million men for less money than was already being expended.

H.I.M. NAVY

I also visited the Chinese Navy, which was divided into two squadrons, the Peyang squadron in the North and the Nanyang squadron in the South. The Peyang squadron consisted of three cruisers, one torpedo cruiser, and one torpedo gunboat. The Nanyang squadron was composed of seven cruisers, four old gunboats, and four torpedo boats. The Fleet as a whole was undermanned, but there were many men who had been well trained by English instructors. The only dockyard is at Foochow.

Many Chinese authorities having asked my advice as to the fleet, I recommended them to put their ships in order for police purposes, and to utilise them for the purpose of checking piracy; advised them not to spend any more money on their navy, because their army was of greater importance; and pointed out the waste involved in keeping about the coasts and in the river hundreds of man-of-war junks.

Throughout China, I found among the high officials at least an ostensible agreement with my views concerning the necessity of reorganising the army: agreement which was no doubt largely dictated by the very present fear of Russian aggression.