The Life of Albert Gallatin

They travelled with all the slowness inevitable in the movements of those times from St. Petersburg to Amsterdam. There they arrived on the evening of the 4th March, and there they remained during four weeks. The situation of affairs did not grow better. The complete destruction of France was practically accomplished, and America was now left to oppose alone the whole power of England, which would infallibly be directed against her. On reaching Amsterdam Mr. Gallatin learned that Lord Castlereagh’s offer of direct negotiation had been promptly met on the part of Mr. Madison by the appointment of a new commission, of which Mr. Gallatin himself was not one, for the reason that at the time these nominations were made he was supposed to be on his way home to resume his post at the Treasury. When the mistake was discovered, and after it had become evident that the Treasury must no longer be left vacant, the President, on the 8th February, nominated Mr. Gallatin as a member of the new commission, and at the same time appointed Mr. G. W. Campbell Secretary of the Treasury. By this accident Mr. Gallatin, instead of standing first in the commission, was made its last member, and all his colleagues, Mr. Adams, Mr. Bayard, Henry Clay, and Jonathan Russell, took precedence of him.

These proceedings had no effect in changing Mr. Gallatin’s movements: whether first or last in the commission, or whether omitted from it entirely, he continued to superintend all the diplomatic operations connected with the proposed peace. Towards the end of March he received from Mr. Baring the necessary permission to visit England, and immediately afterwards he crossed the channel with Mr. Bayard and established himself in London. Almost at the same moment Mr. Clay and Mr. Russell arrived at Gottenburg, and brought with them Mr. Gallatin’s appointment as fifth commissioner. A considerable time necessarily elapsed before all the five envoys could be brought together, and during this interval Mr. Gallatin was quietly employed in smoothing the path of negotiation.

With the British government itself he held no direct communication on the difficult points involved in the future settlement, and if he still hoped to persuade that government to make concessions on the subject of impressment, his hope was altogether disappointed; neither Mr. Baring nor Lord Castlereagh himself would at that moment have dared to suggest the smallest concession on that point in the face of the excited popular feeling of England. Mr. Gallatin appears to have refrained from every attempt to negotiate on his own account, and to have contented himself with removing such obstacles and with setting in motion such influences as it was in his power to affect or control.

The first object he had at heart was the removal of the place of negotiation. Their instructions, not as yet known to Mr. Gallatin, authorized the envoys to treat, and assumed Gottenburg as the place, rejecting the British proposition to treat at London. Mr. Gallatin would have preferred London, because he believed, and with justice, that his chances were better with Lord Castlereagh than with any mere agent of the Foreign Office; but this point was one of pride as well as fear among Americans; to London they would not go, and accordingly Mr. Gallatin contented himself with changing the place of negotiation to Ghent. The following letter explains his motives for this movement.

GALLATIN TO HENRY CLAYLondon, 22d April, 1814.

Dear Sir, – We have just heard of your arrival, but have received no letters, and I am yet ignorant whether I am one of the new commission to treat of peace. My arrangements must depend on that circumstance, and I wait with impatience for the official account which you must have brought. For that reason Mr. Bayard addresses you and Mr. Russell in his own name, but I coincide fully with him in the opinion that the negotiations should by all means be opened here, or at least in Holland, if this is not rendered impracticable from the nature of the commission. If this has unfortunately been limited to treating of peace at Gottenburg, there is no remedy; but if the commission admits of a change of place, I would feel no hesitation in removing them at least to any other neutral place, whatever may be the language of the instructions. For their spirit would be fully answered by treating in any other friendly country as well as if at Gottenburg. On that point I feel great anxiety, because, on account of the late great changes in Europe, and of the increased difficulties thence arising in making any treaty, I do believe that it would be utterly impossible to succeed in that corner, removed from every friendly interference in our favor on the part of the European powers, and compelled to act with men clothed with limited authorities, and who might at all times plead a want of instructions.

You are sufficiently aware of the total change in our affairs produced by the late revolution and by the restoration of universal peace in the European world, from which we are alone excluded. A well-organized and large army is at once liberated from any European employment, and ready, together with a superabundant naval force, to act immediately against us. How ill prepared we are to meet it in a proper manner no one knows better than yourself; but, above all, our own divisions and the hostile attitude of the Eastern States give room to apprehend that a continuance of the war might prove vitally fatal to the United States.

I understand that the ministers, with whom we have not had any direct intercourse, still profess to be disposed to make an equitable peace. But the hope, not of ultimate conquest, but of a dissolution of the Union, the convenient pretence which the American war will afford to preserve large military establishments, and, above all, the force of popular feeling, may all unite in inducing the Cabinet in throwing impediments in the way of peace. They will not certainly be disposed to make concessions, nor probably displeased at a failure of negotiations. That the war is popular, and that national pride, inflated by the last unexpected success, cannot be satisfied without what they call the chastisement of America, cannot be doubted. The mass of the people here know nothing of American politics but through the medium of Federal speeches and newspapers faithfully transcribed in their own journals. They do not even suspect that we have any just cause of complaint, and consider us altogether as the aggressors and as allies of Bonaparte. In those opinions it is understood that the ministers do not participate, but it will really require an effort on their part to act contrary to public opinion, and they must, even if perfectly sincere, use great caution and run some risk of popularity. A direct, or at least a very near, intercourse with them is therefore highly important, as I have no doubt that they would go further themselves than they would be willing to intrust any other person. To this must be added that Lord Castlereagh is, according to the best information I have been able to collect, the best disposed man in the Cabinet, and that coming from France, and having had intercourse with the Emperor Alexander, it is not improbable that those dispositions may have been increased by the personal expression of the Emperor’s wishes in favor of peace with America. Whatever advantages may be derived from that circumstance and from the Emperor’s arrival here would be altogether lost at Gottenburg…

HENRY CLAY TO GALLATINGottenburg, 2d May, 1814.

Dear Sir, – I am rejoiced at finding you in Europe. We had great fears that you would have left it before our arrival and proceeded to America. Your rejection last summer in the Senate was very generally condemned by the people, and produced a reaction highly favorable to you. The total uncertainty in which the government was left as to your movements (for on the 1st February, when I left Washington, not one syllable had been received from either yourself or Mr. Bayard), and the increased and complicated concerns of the Treasury, produced a state of things highly embarrassing to the President; so much so that he could no longer resist the pressure to fill the Treasury. After this measure was determined on, it became more than ever desirable that the public should have the benefit of your services here. Had it not been confidently believed when the new commission was formed that you were on your way to America and would be there shortly, you would have been originally comprehended in it.

I have not time to say what I want to communicate on American affairs. Peace, necessary to our country before the astonishing events which have recently occurred on this side of the Atlantic, events with which the imagination can scarcely keep pace, will doubtless be now more than ever demanded. I think, however, you attach more consequence than belongs to the indications in the Eastern States. I have no doubt that a game of swaggering and gasconade has been played off there, without any serious intention to push matters to extremity. After a great deal of blustering about raising 20,000 men and declaring the freedom of the port of Boston, a meeting of the malcontents there determined it inexpedient to take any such measure during the last session of the Legislature. The truth is, they want men, they want money, the principal actors want courage. Yet I would not despise these appearances. If the British government should determine to land a considerable force in the Eastern States, avowing friendship to them and an intention only to war with the Southern States, or with the Administration, certainly very serious consequences might ensue, though I believe they would fall far short of conquest or dissolution…

On the point of removing the place of negotiation from Gottenburg to Ghent Mr. Gallatin was successful, and perhaps it was on the whole fortunate that he was disappointed in his wish to negotiate at London, for the delays consequent on the distance of Ghent were an element in the success of the negotiation.

Another point which Mr. Gallatin pertinaciously labored to gain was the active aid of the Emperor Alexander. What Romanzoff had been unable to effect, and what Moreau had died too soon to accomplish, Mr. Gallatin was bent upon doing by other means. Fortunately, his former ally, William H. Crawford, had been taken by Mr. Madison from the Senate and sent as minister to Napoleon, after whose fall he remained in Paris, waiting for new credentials and for recognition from Louis XVIII. As a diplomate, Mr. Crawford was not altogether successful; his temper and manners were little suited to the very delicate situation in which he was placed; nevertheless he was a person on whose aid Mr. Gallatin could thoroughly rely, and the assistance of La Fayette and Humboldt went far to supply his deficiencies. Mr. Gallatin, therefore, enrolled him also in the service, and wrote at some length, giving him a sketch of the situation in much the same language used in the letter to Mr. Clay of the next day, but with a different conclusion.

GALLATIN TO W. H. CRAWFORDLondon, 21 April, 1814.

The only external check to those dispositions [of enmity in England] can be found in the friendly interposition of the Emperor Alexander, not as a mediator, but as a common friend, pressing on this government the propriety of an accommodation and expressing his strong wishes for a general restoration of peace to the civilized world. I do not know whether your situation affords you means of approaching him, and can only state my opinion of the great importance that an early opportunity should be taken by you or any other person you may think fitted for the object, to call his attention to the situation in which we are left, and to the great weight which his opinion in favor of peace on liberal conditions, strongly expressed to this government, must necessarily have at this time. Of his friendly disposition for the United States there is no doubt; but we may be forgotten; and it is necessary that he should be apprised of the hostile spirit which prevails here, and which, if not balanced by some other cause, may even carry ministers beyond their own wishes and views. It should also be stated that our government having accepted one year ago the Emperor’s mediation, and not having supposed that, considering the political connection between him and Great Britain, she could reject that offer, no other provision was made on our part to obtain peace until our government was apprised, in January last, of the rejection of the mediation by England. Thus was a delay of a year produced, and the opening of our negotiations unfortunately prevented till after England is at peace with the rest of the world, a circumstance which, although it does not give us a positive right to claim the Emperor’s interference, affords sufficient ground to present the subject to his consideration. I entreat you to lose no time in taking such steps as may be in your power in that respect, and to write to me whatever you may think important for the success of the mission should be known to us…

On the 13th May, Mr. Crawford replied that he had attempted to carry out Mr. Gallatin’s wishes, and had received a polite rebuff from Count Nesselrode and no notice whatever from the Emperor. He added: “After I had failed in obtaining access to the Emperor of Russia and to his minister, I requested General La Fayette to endeavor, through Colonel La Harpe, to have the proper representations made to Nesselrode or to the Emperor. Every effort to effect this object has been abortive. It seems as if there had been a settled determination to prevent the approach of every person who is suspected of an attachment to the United States. The general has, however, come in contact several times with Baron Humboldt, the Prussian minister, who has imbibed already the British misrepresentations.”

La Fayette soon succeeded, however, in breaking down these barriers which English influence had raised about the Emperor. On the 25th May he wrote: “Mr. Crawford is better qualified than I am to give you all the information from this quarter which relates to American concerns. The confidence with which he honors my zeal has enabled me to discuss the matter with some influencing characters among the allied generals and diplomates. Two of the latter act a great part in the present negotiations. I found them well acquainted with British arguments and impressed with British prejudices which convinced me that care had been taken to influence their opinion. An opportunity has been seeked, which I am bound not to name, for putting directly under the eyes of Emperor Alexander a note of Mr. Crawford. You may depend it has been faithfully delivered, with proper comments, along with a letter, the copy of which Mr. Crawford has desired me to enclose. I expect this evening to meet the Emperor of Russia at a friend’s house, and shall try to obtain some conversation on the subject.”

On the 26th May, General La Fayette wrote the following letter to Mr. Crawford, who enclosed it on the 28th in a despatch to Mr. Gallatin.

LA FAYETTE TO W. H. CRAWFORD26th May, 1814.

My Dear Sir, – I passed the last evening in company with the Emperor Alexander, who, however prepossessed in his favor, has surpassed my expectations. He really is a great, good, sensible, noble-minded man, and a sincere friend to the cause of liberty. We have long conversed upon American affairs. It began with his telling me that he had read with much pleasure and interest what I had sent him. I found ideas had been suggested that had excited a fear that the people of the United States had not properly improved their internal situation. My answer was an observation upon the necessity of parties in a commonwealth, and the assertion that they were the happiest and freest people upon earth. The transactions with France and England were explained in the way that, although the United States had to complain of both, the British outrages came nearer home, particularly in the affair of impressments. He spoke of the actual preparation and the hostile dispositions of England. I of course insisted on the rejection of his mediation, the confidence reposed in him by the United States who hastened to send commissioners chosen from both parties, which he very kindly acknowledged. He said he had twice attempted to bring on a peace. “Do, sir,” said I, “make a third attempt; it must succeed; ne vous arrêtez pas en si beau chemin. All the objects of a war at an end, and the re-establishment of their old limits can the less be opposed as the Americans have gained more than they have lost. A protraction of the war would betray intentions quite perverse and hostile to the cause of humanity. Your personal influence must carry the point. I am sure your majesty will exert it.” “Well,” says he, “I promise you I will. My journey to London affords opportunities, and I will do the best I can.” I told him I had received a letter from Mr. Gallatin, now in London, and we spoke of him, Mr. Adams, Mr. Bayard, and the two new commissioners. I had also other occasions to speak of America; one afforded me by the Swedish Marshal Stadinck, who mentioned my first going over to that country; another by a well-intentioned observation of Mme. de Staël that she had received a letter from my friend Mr. Jefferson, of whom he spoke with great regard. This led to observations relative to the United States and the spirit of monopoly in England extending even to liberty itself. The Emperor said they had been more liberal in Sicily than I supposed them. I did not deny it, but expressed my fears of their protecting Ferdinand against the cortes. His sentiments on the Spanish affairs were noble and patriotic. The slave-trade became a topic upon which he spoke with philanthropic warmth. Its abolition will be an article in the general peace.

You see, my dear sir, I had fully the opportunity we were wishing for. If it has not been well improved, the fault is mine. But I think some good has been done. And upon the promise of a man so candid and generous I have full dependence. If you think proper to communicate these details to Mr. Gallatin, be pleased to have them copied. He spoke very well of him, and seemed satisfied with the confidence of the United States and the choice of their representatives to him. By his last accounts Mr. Adams was at St. Petersburg. The particulars of this conversation ought not, of course, to be published; but you will probably think it useful to communicate to the commissioners.

The obstinate determination of England to isolate the United States and cut off all means of co-operation between her and the Baltic powers became more and more evident as the season advanced, and stimulated Gallatin’s efforts. On the 2d June he wrote to Mr. Monroe from London: “I have remained here waiting for the answers of our colleagues at Gottenburg, and will depart as soon as I know that they and the British commissioners are on their way to the appointed place. The definitive treaty of European peace being signed and ratified, Lord Castlereagh is expected here this day, and the Emperor of Russia in the beginning of next week. I enclose copy of an extract of a letter of Mr. Crawford to me. I may add that I have ascertained that the exclusion of all discussions respecting maritime questions and of any interference in the American contest was one of the conditions proposed at the Châtillon conferences, and I have reason to believe that, with respect to the first point, a positive, and in the other at least a tacit, agreement have taken place in the late and final European negotiations at Paris.”

Doubtless one of Mr. Gallatin’s objects in remaining so long in London was to have a personal interview with the Emperor. La Fayette wrote to him from Paris on the 3d of June, recounting briefly the incidents of his own interview with the Emperor at the house of Mme. de Staël, and urging Mr. Gallatin to see him: “You may begin the conversation with thanking him for the intention to do so [to serve us] to the best of his power, which he very positively expressed to me. Our friend Humboldt, who has already spoken to him on the subject, would be happy to receive your directions for anything in his power. I hasten to scribble this letter to be forwarded by him.”

The Emperor Alexander came to London, and Mr. Gallatin had his interview on the 17th or 18th June. Of this interview Mr. C. J. Ingersoll, in his History of the War of 1812, has given a somewhat dramatic account, derived perhaps from Mr. Levett Harris, who had been secretary to the mission at St. Petersburg, and who, being now in London, accompanied Mr. Gallatin to the audience. Mr. Ingersoll has in that work so seldom succeeded in stating facts with correctness, that to quote him is usually to mislead. All Mr. Gallatin ever recorded on the subject of the interview is contained in his despatch of June 20 to Mr. Monroe: “Mr. Harris and myself had on the 17th an audience from the Emperor of Russia. His friendly dispositions for the United States are unimpaired; he earnestly wishes that peace may be made between them and England; but he does not give or seem to entertain any hope that he can on that subject be of any service. I could not ascertain whether he had touched the subject since he had been here; only he said, ‘I have made two – three attempts.’ If three, the third must have been now. He added, ‘England will not admit a third party to interfere in her disputes with you. This is on account of your former relations to her (the colonial state), which is not yet forgotten.’ He also expressed his opinion that, with respect to conditions of peace, the difficulty would be with England and not with us. On the whole, this conversation afforded no reason to alter the opinions expressed in my letter of 13th inst.124 I yesterday, with his permission, sent him a note, … which contains nothing new to you, and which will not probably produce any effect.”125

To these facts Mr. Ingersoll adds some details. According to him, the interview took place on the 18th, the day when the city of London gave its great banquet to the allied sovereigns at Guildhall. The time appointed by the Emperor for his audience was the hour before he left his residence in Leicesterfields to attend the entertainment; and Mr. Gallatin and Mr. Harris drove in “a mean and solitary hackney-coach, with a permit,” through the shouting crowd, unknown and unnoticed, except by an occasional jeer and a hail as “old Blucher” from the throng. The Emperor’s words are not given, but the substance was that Mr. Gallatin and his associates should take a high tone and outbrag the British.

The reader may safely assume that the Emperor said nothing of the kind, for Alexander was not a man to indulge in impertinence. He earnestly wished for peace, and he saw how small a chance there was of obtaining it. He doubtless spoke to Mr. Gallatin with perfect sincerity of his wishes and his acts; he may have hinted that America would gain little by showing too great eagerness for peace, but he would certainly have said nothing which, if repeated, could possibly have offended England. Indeed, he had gone to the extreme verge of civility in giving any audience at all to an American agent while he was himself the guest of the country with which America was then at war.

The result of all Mr. Gallatin’s efforts in this direction was, therefore, apparently a complete failure. The power of England was supreme in Europe, and whatever irritation the continental sovereigns may have felt under the extravagant maritime pretensions of Great Britain, not one of them ventured to lisp a word of remonstrance. Yet it is by no means certain that Mr. Gallatin was so unsuccessful as he seemed. The fate of the negotiation at Ghent hung on Lord Castlereagh’s nod, and among the many influences which affected Lord Castlereagh’s mind, a desire to preserve his friendly relations with Russia was one of the most powerful. The moment came when the British ministry had to decide the question whether to let the treaty fail or to abate British pretensions, and it can hardly be doubted that the repeated remonstrances of Russia had some share of influence in causing England to recoil from a persistent policy of war. At the crisis of the negotiation, on the 27th September, Lord Liverpool wrote to Lord Castlereagh, who was then at Vienna, advising him of the capture of Washington and the state of affairs at Ghent, and adding: “The Americans have assumed hitherto a tone in the negotiation very different from what their situation appears to warrant. In the exercise of your discretion as to how much you may think proper to disclose of what has been passing to the sovereigns and ministers whom you will meet at Vienna, I have no doubt you will see the importance of adverting to this circumstance, and of doing justice to the moderation with which we are disposed to act towards America. I fear the Emperor of Russia is half an American, and it would be very desirable to do away any prejudice which may exist in his mind or in that of Count Nesselrode on this subject.”126