Historical Introductions to the Symbolical Books of the Evangelical Lutheran Church

Yet Luther maintains that the conflict is seeming rather than real. Whatever may be true of the majestic God, it certainly cannot annul or invalidate what He has made known of Himself in the Gospel. There are and can be no contradictory wills in God. Despite appearances to the contrary, therefore, Christians are firmly to believe that, in His dealings with men, God, who saves so few and damns so many, is nevertheless both truly merciful and just. And what we now believe we shall see hereafter. When the veil will have been lifted and we shall know God even as we are known by Him, then we shall see with our eyes no other face of God than the most lovable one which our faith beheld in Jesus. The light of glory will not correct but confirm, the truths of the Bible, and reveal the fact that in all His ways God was always in perfect harmony with Himself.

Indeed, according to Luther, the truth concerning the majestic God, in whom we live and move and have our being, and without whom nothing can be or occur, in a way serves both repentance and faith. It serves repentance and the Law inasmuch as it humbles man, causing him to despair of himself and of the powers of his own unregenerate will. It serves faith inasmuch as it guarantees God's merciful promises in the Gospel. For if God is supreme, as He truly is, then there can be nothing more reliable than the covenant of grace to which He has pledged Himself by an oath. And if God, as He truly does, controls all contingencies, then there remains no room for any fear whether He will be able to fulfil His glorious promises, also the promise that nothing shall pluck us out of the hands of Christ. – Such, essentially was the teaching set forth by Luther in De Servo Arbitrio and in his other publications.

236. Object of Luther's "De Servo Arbitrio."

The true scope of De Servo Arbitrio is to prove that man is saved, not by any ability or efforts of his own, but solely by grace. Luther says: "We are not arguing the question what we can do when God works [moves us], but what we can do ourselves, viz., whether, after being created out of nothing, we can do or endeavor [to do] anything through that general movement of omnipotence toward preparing ourselves for being a new creation of His Spirit. This question should have been answered, instead of turning aside to another." Luther continues: "We go on to say: Man, before he is renewed to become a new creature of the kingdom of the Spirit, does nothing, endeavors nothing, toward preparing himself for renewal and the kingdom; and afterwards, when he has been created anew, he does nothing, endeavors nothing, toward preserving himself in that kingdom; but the Spirit alone does each of these things in us, both creating us anew without our cooperation and preserving us when recreated, – even as Jas. 1, 18 says: 'Of His own will begat He us by the Word of Truth that we should be a kind of firstfruits of His creatures,' He is speaking here of the renewed creature." (E. v. a. 7, 317; St. L. 18, 1909; compare here and in the following quotations Vaughan's Martin Luther on the Bondage of the Will, London, 1823.)

Man lacks also the ability to do what is good before God. Luther: "I reply: The words of the Prophet [Ps. 14, 2: "The Lord looketh down from heaven upon the children of men to see if there were any that did understand and seek God. They are all gone aside," etc.] include both act and power; and it is the same thing to say, 'Man does not seek after God,' as it would be to say, 'Man cannot seek after God.'" (E. 330; St. L. 1923.) Again: "Since, therefore, men are flesh, as God Himself testifies, they cannot but be carnally minded (nihil sapere possunt nisi carnem); hence free will has power only to sin. And since they grow worse even when the Spirit of God calls and teaches them, what would they do if left to themselves, without the Spirit of God?" (E. 290; St. L. 1876.) "In brief, you will observe in Scripture that wherever flesh is treated in opposition to the Spirit, you may understand by flesh about everything that is contrary to the Spirit, as in the passage [John 6, 63]: 'The flesh profiteth nothing.'" (E. 291; St. L. 1877.) "Thus also Holy Scripture, by way of emphasis (per epitasin), calls man 'flesh,' as though he were carnality itself, because his mind is occupied with nothing but carnal things. Quod nimio ac nihil aliud sapit quam ea, quae carnis sunt." (E. 302; St. L. 1890.)

According to Luther there is no such thing as a neutral willing in man. He says: "It is a mere logical fiction to say that there is in man a neutral and pure volition (medium et purum velle); nor can those prove it who assert it. It was born of ignorance of things and servile regard to words, as if something must straightway be such in substance as we state it to be in words, which sort of figments are numberless among the Sophists [Scholastic theologians]. The truth of the matter is stated by Christ when He says [Luke 11, 23]: 'He that is not with Me is against Me,' He does not say, 'He that is neither with Me nor against Me, but in the middle,' For if God be in us, Satan is absent, and only the will for good is present with us. If God be absent, Satan is present, and there is no will in us but towards evil. Neither God nor Satan allows a mere and pure volition in us; but, as you have rightly said, having lost our liberty, we are compelled to serve sin; that is sin and wickedness we will, sin and wickedness we speak, sin and wickedness we act." (E. 199; St. L. 1768.)

In support of his denial of man's ability in spiritual matters Luther quotes numerous Bible-passages, and thoroughly refutes as fallacies a debito ad posse, etc., the arguments drawn by Erasmus from mandatory and conditional passages of Scripture. His own arguments he summarizes as follows: "For if we believe it to be true that God foreknows and preordains everything, also, that He can neither be deceived nor hindered in His foreknowledge and predestination furthermore that nothing occurs without His will (a truth which reason itself is compelled to concede), then, according to the testimony of the selfsame reason, there can be no free will in man or angel or any creature. Likewise, if we believe Satan to be the prince of the world, who is perpetually plotting and fighting against the kingdom of Christ with all his might, so that he does not release captive men unless he be driven out by the divine power of the Spirit, it is again manifest that there can be no such thing as free will. Again, if we believe original sin to have so ruined us that, by striving against what is good, it makes most troublesome work even for those who are led by the Spirit, then it is clear that in man devoid of the Spirit nothing is left which can turn itself to good, but only [what turns itself] to evil. Again, if the Jews, following after righteousness with all their might rushed forth into unrighteousness, and the Gentiles, who were following after unrighteousness, have freely and unexpectingly attained to righteousness, it is likewise manifest, even by very deed and experience, that man without grace can will nothing but evil. In brief, if we believe Christ to have redeemed man by His blood, then we are compelled to confess that the whole man was lost; else we shall make Christ either superfluous, or the Redeemer only of the vilest part [of man] which is blasphemous and sacrilegious." (E. 366; St. L. 1969.)

237. Relation of Man's Will toward God's Majesty

According to Luther man has power over things beneath himself, but not over God in His majesty. We read: "We know that man is constituted lord of the things beneath him, over which he has power and free will, that they may obey him and do what he wills and thinks. But the point of our inquiry is whether he has a free will toward God, so that God obeys and does what man wills; or, whether it is not rather God who has a free will over man, so that the latter wills and does what God wills, and can do nothing but what God has willed and does. Here the Baptist says that man can receive nothing except it be given him from heaven: wherefore free will is nothing." (E. 359, St. L. 1957.)

God as revealed in the Word may, according to Luther, be opposed and resisted by man, but not God in His majesty. We read: "Lest any one should suppose this to be my own distinction, [let him know that] I follow Paul, who writes to the Thessalonians concerning Antichrist (2 Thess. 2, 4) that he will exalt himself above every God that is proclaimed and worshiped, plainly indicating that one may be exalted above God, so far as He is proclaimed and worshiped, that is, above the Word and worship by which God is known to us, and maintains intercourse with us. Nothing, however, can be exalted above God as He is in His nature and majesty (as not worshiped and proclaimed); rather, everything is under His powerful hand." (E. 221; St. L. 1794.)

God in His majesty is supreme and man cannot resist His omnipotence, nor thwart His decrees, nor foil His plans, nor render His omniscience fallible. Luther: "For all men find this opinion written in their hearts, and, when hearing this matter discussed, they, though against their will, acknowledge and assent to it, first, that God is omnipotent, not only as regards His power, but also, as stated His action; else He would be a ridiculous God; secondly, that He knows and foreknows all things, and can neither err nor be deceived. These two things, however, being conceded by the hearts and senses of all men they are presently, by an inevitable consequence, compelled to admit that, even as we are not made by our own will, but by necessity, so likewise we do nothing according to the right of free will, but just as God has foreknown and acts by a counsel and an energy which is infallible and immutable. So, then, we find it written in all hearts alike that free will [defined as a power independent of God's power] is nothing, although this writing [in the hearts of men] be obscured through so many contrary disputations and the great authority of so many persons who during so many ages have been teaching differently." (E. 268; St. L. 1851.)

The very idea of God and omnipotence involves that free will is not, and cannot be, a power independent of God. Luther: "However, even natural reason is obliged to confess that the living and true God must be such a one who by His freedom imposes necessity upon us, for, evidently, He would be a ridiculous God or, more properly, an idol, who would either foresee future events in an uncertain way, or be deceived by the events, as the Gentiles have asserted an inescapable fate also for their gods. God would be equally ridiculous if He could not do or did not do all things, or if anything occurred without Him. Now, if foreknowledge and omnipotence are conceded, it naturally follows as an irrefutable consequence that we have not been made by ourselves, nor that we live or do anything by ourselves, but through His omnipotence. Since, therefore, He foreknew that we should be such [as we actually are], and even now makes, moves, and governs us as such, pray, what can be imagined that is free in us so as to occur differently than He has foreknown or now works? God's foreknowledge and omnipotence, therefore, conflict directly with our free will [when defined as a power independent of God]. For either God will be mistaken in foreknowing, err also in acting (which is impossible), or we shall act, and be acted upon, according to His foreknowledge and action. By the omnipotence of God, however, I do not mean that power by which He can do many things which He does not do but that active omnipotence by means of which He powerfully works all things in all, in which manner Scripture calls Him omnipotent. This omnipotence and prescience of God, I say, entirely abolish the dogma of free will. Nor can the obscurity of Scripture or the difficulty of the matter be made a pretext here. The words are most clear, known even to children; the subject-matter is plain and easy, judged to be so even by the natural reason common to all, so that ever so long a series of ages, times, and persons writing and teaching otherwise will avail nothing." (E. 267; St. L. 1849.)

According to Luther, therefore, nothing can or does occur independently of God, or differently from what His omniscience has foreseen. Luther: "Hence it follows irrefutably that all things which we do, and all things which happen, although to us they seem to happen changeably and contingently, do in reality happen necessarily and immutably, if one views the will of God. For the will of God is efficacious and cannot be thwarted since it is God's natural power itself. It is also wise, so that it cannot be deceived. And since His will is not thwarted, the work itself cannot be prevented, but must occur in the very place, time, manner, and degree which He Himself both foresees and wills." (E. 134; St. L. 1692.)

238. God Not the Cause of Sin

Regarding God's relation to the sinful actions of men, Luther held that God is not the cause of sin. True, His omnipotence impels also the ungodly; but the resulting acts are evil because of man's evil nature. He writes: "Since, therefore, God moves and works all in all, He necessarily moves and acts also in Satan and in the wicked. But He acts in them precisely according to what they are and what He finds them to be (agit in illis taliter, quales illi sunt, et quales invenit). That is to say, since they are turned away [from Him] and wicked, and [as such] are impelled to action by divine omnipotence, they do only such things as are averse [to God] and wicked, just as a horseman driving a horse which has only three or two [sound] feet (equum tripedem vel bipedem) will drive him in a manner corresponding to the condition of the horse (agit quidem taliter, qualis equus est), i. e., the horse goes at a sorry gait. But what can the horseman do? He drives such a horse together with sound horses, so that it sadly limps along, while the others take a good gait. He cannot do otherwise unless the horse is cured. Here you see that when God works in the wicked and through the wicked, the result indeed is evil (mala quidem fieri), but that nevertheless God cannot act wickedly, although He works that which is evil through the wicked; for He being good, cannot Himself act wickedly, although He uses evil instruments, which cannot escape the impulse and motion of His power. The fault, therefore, is in the instruments, which God does not suffer to remain idle, so that evil occurs, God Himself impelling them, but in no other manner than a carpenter who, using an ax that is notched and toothed, would do poor work with it. Hence it is that a wicked man cannot but err and sin continually, because, being impelled by divine power, he is not allowed to remain idle, but wills, desires, and acts according to what he is (velit, cupiat, faciat taliter, qualis ipse est)." (E. 255; St. L. 1834.) "For although God does not make sin, still He ceases not to form and to multiply a nature which, the Spirit having been withdrawn is corrupted by sin, just as when a carpenter makes statues of rotten wood. Thus men become what their nature is, God creating and forming them of such nature." (E. 254; St. L. 1833.)

Though God works all things in all things the wickedness of an action flows from the sinful nature of the creature. Luther: "Whoever would have any understanding of such matters, let him consider that God works evil in us, i. e., through us, not by any fault of His, but through our own fault. For since we are by nature evil, while God is good, and since He impels us to action according to the nature of His omnipotence, He, who Himself is good, cannot do otherwise than do evil with an evil instrument, although, according to His wisdom, He causes this evil to turn out unto His own glory and to our salvation." (E. 257; St. L. 1837.) "For this is what we assert and contend, that, when God works without the grace of His Spirit [in His majesty, outside of Word and Sacrament], He works all in all, even in the wicked; for He alone moves all things, which He alone has created, and drives and impels all things by virtue of His omnipotence, which they [the created things] cannot escape or change, but necessarily follow and obey, according to the power which God has given to each of them – such is the manner in which all, even wicked, things cooperate with Him. Furthermore, when He acts by the Spirit of Grace in those whom He has made righteous, i. e., in His own kingdom, He in like manner impels and moves them; and, being new creatures, they follow and cooperate with Him; or rather, as Paul says, they are led by Him." (E. 317; St. L. 1908.) "For we say that, without the grace of God, man still remains under the general omnipotence of God, who does, moves, impels all things, so that they take their course necessarily and without fail, but that what man, so impelled, does, is nothing, i. e., avails nothing before God, and is accounted nothing but sin." (E. 315; St. L. 1906.)

Though everything occurs as God has foreseen, this, according to Luther, does not at all involve that man is coerced in his actions. Luther: "But pray, are we disputing now concerning coercion and force? Have we not in so many books testified that we speak of the necessity of immutability? We know … that Judas of his own volition betrayed Christ. But we affirm that, if God foreknew it, this volition would certainly and without fail occur in this very Judas… We are not discussing the point whether Judas became a traitor unwillingly or willingly, but whether at the time foreappointed by God it infallibly had to happen that Judas of his own volition betrayed Christ." (E. 270; St. L. 1853.) Again: "What is it to me that free will is not coerced, but does what it does willingly? It is enough for me to have you concede that it must necessarily happen, that he [Judas] does what he does of his own volition, and that he cannot conduct himself otherwise if God has so foreknown it. If God foreknows that Judas will betray, or that he will change his mind about it, – whichever of the two He shall have foreknown will necessarily come to pass, else God would be mistaken in foreknowing and foretelling, – which is impossible. Necessity of consequence effects this: if God foreknows an event, it necessarily happens. In other words, free will is nothing" [it is not a power independent of God or able to nullify God's prescience]. (E. 272; St. L. 1855.)

To wish that God would abstain from impelling the wicked is, according to Luther, tantamount to wishing that He cease to be God. Luther: "There is still this question which some one may ask, 'Why does God not cease to impel by His omnipotence, in consequence of which the will of the wicked is moved to continue being wicked and even growing worse?' The answer is: This is equivalent to desiring that God cease to be God for the sake of the wicked, since one wishes His power and action to cease, i. e., that He cease to be good, lest they become worse!" (E. 259; St. L. 1839.)

239. Free Will a Mere Empty Title

Luther considers free will (when defined as an ability in spiritual matters or as a power independent of God) a mere word without anything corresponding to it in reality (figmentum in rebus seu titulus sine re, E.v.a. 5, 230), because natural will has powers only in matters temporal and subject to reason, but none in spiritual things, and because of itself and independently of God's omnipotence it has no power whatever. We read: "Now it follows that free will is a title altogether divine and cannot belong to any other being, save only divine majesty, for He, as the Psalmist sings [Ps. 115, 3], can do and does all that He wills in heaven and in earth. Now, when this title is ascribed to men, it is so ascribed with no more right than if also divinity itself were ascribed to them, – a sacrilege than which there is none greater. Accordingly it was the duty of theologians to abstain from this word when they intended to speak of human power, and to reserve it exclusively for God, thereupon also to remove it from the mouth and discourse of men, claiming it as a sacred and venerable title for their God. And if they would at all ascribe some power to man, they should have taught that it be called by some other name than 'free will,' especially since we all know and see that the common people are miserably deceived and led astray by this term, for by it they hear and conceive something very far different from what theologians mean and discuss. 'Free will' is too magnificent, extensive, and comprehensive a term; by it common people understand (as also the import and nature of the word require) a power which can freely turn to either side, and neither yields nor is subject to any one," (E. 158; St. L. 1720.)

If the term "free will" be retained, it should, according to Luther, be conceived of as a power, not in divine things, but only in matters subject to human reason. We read: "So, then, according to Erasmus, free will is the power of the will which is able of itself to will and not to will the Word and work of God, whereby it is led to things which exceed both its comprehension and perception. For if it is able to will and not to will, it is able also to love and to hate. If it is able to love and to hate, it is able also, in some small degree, to keep the Law and to believe the Gospel. For if you will or do not will, a certain thing, it is impossible that by that will you should not be able to do something of the work, even though, when hindered by another, you cannot complete it." (E. 191; St. L. 1759.) "If, then, we are not willing to abandon this term altogether, which would be the safest and most pious course to follow, let us at least teach men to use it in good faith (bona fide) only in the sense that free will be conceded to man, with respect to such matters only as are not superior, but inferior to himself, i. e., man is to know that, with regard to his means and possessions, he has the right of using, of doing, and of forbearing to do according to his free will; although also even this is directed by the free will of God alone whithersoever it pleases Him. But with respect to God, or in things pertaining to salvation or damnation, he has no free will, but is the captive, subject, and servant, either of the will of God or of the will of Satan." (E. 160; St. L. 1722.) "Perhaps you might properly attribute some will (aliquod arbitrium) to man, but to attribute free will to him in divine things is too much, since in the judgment of all who hear it the term 'free will' is properly applied to that which can do and does with respect to God whatsoever it pleases, without being hindered by any law or authority. You would not call a slave free who acts under the authority of his master. With how much less propriety do we call men or angels truly free, who, to say nothing of sin and death, live under the most complete authority of God, unable to subsist for a moment by their own power." (E. 189; St. L. 1756.)

Lost liberty, says Luther, is no liberty, just as lost health is no health. We read: "When it has been conceded and settled that free will, having lost its freedom, is compelled to serve sin, and has no power to will anything good, I can conceive nothing else from these expressions than that free will is an empty word, with the substance lost. My grammar calls a lost liberty no liberty. But to attribute the title of liberty to that which has no liberty is to attribute an empty name. If here I go astray, let who can correct me; if my words are obscure and ambiguous, let who can make them plain and definite. I cannot call health that is lost health. If I should ascribe it to a sick man, I believe to have ascribed to him nothing but an empty name. But away with monstrous words! For who can tolerate that abuse of speech by which we affirm that man has free will, and in the same breath assert that he, having lost his liberty, is compelled to serve sin, and can will nothing good? It conflicts with common sense, and utterly destroys the use of speech. The Diatribe is rather to be accused of blurting out its words as if it were asleep, and giving no heed to those of others. It does not consider, I say, what it means, and what it all includes, if I declare: Man has lost his liberty, is compelled to serve sin, and has no power to will anything good." (E. 200; St. L. 1769.)

Satan causes his captives to believe themselves free and happy. Luther: "The Scriptures set before us a man who is not only bound, wretched, captive, sick, dead, but who (through the operation of Satan, his prince) adds this plague of blindness to his other plagues, that he believes himself to be free, happy, unfettered, strong, healthy, alive. For Satan knows that, if man were to realize his own misery, he would not be able to retain any one in his kingdom, because God could not but at once pity and help him who recognizes his misery and cries for relief. For throughout all Scripture He is extolled and greatly praised for being nigh unto the contrite in heart, as also Christ testifies, Isaiah 61, 1. 2, that He has been sent to preach the Gospel to the poor and to heal the broken-hearted. Accordingly, it is Satan's business to keep his grip on men, lest they recognize their misery, but rather take it for granted that they are able to do everything that is said." (E. 213; St. L. 1785.)