The Land of the Miamis

On the fifth day of July, Colonel John Butler, of the British Indian department, Joseph Brant, and about fifty Indians from the council of the tribes on the Maumee, arrived at Niagara. On the seventh, the commissioners, and a number of the civil and military officers of the crown being present, Brant addressed the American envoys and said in substance that he was representing the Indian nations who owned all the lands north of the Ohio "as their common property;" that the treaty had been delayed on account of the presence of the American army north of the Ohio; that the tribes wanted an explanation of these warlike appearances, and desired to know whether the commissioners were authorized "to run and establish a new boundary line between the lands of the United States, and of the Indian nations." On the next day, the commissioners gave full answer. They informed the Indian deputation that the purposes of the United States were wholly peaceful; that the Great Chief, General Washington, had strictly forbidden all hostilities, and that the governors of the states adjoining the Ohio had issued orders to the same effect. However, to satisfy the tribes, they would immediately dispatch a messenger on horseback to the seat of the government, with a request that the "head warrior," General Wayne, be instructed to remain quietly at the posts until the event of the treaty could be known. This was faithfully done. With reference to the running of a new boundary line, the commissioners expressly stated that they were vested with full authority to that end, but that mutual concessions were necessary to a reconcilement, and that this should be plainly understood by both sides. On the ninth of July, Brant gave assurance that the answer of the commissioners had been satisfactory, "Brothers: We think, from your speech, that there is a prospect of our coming together. We, who are the nations at the westward are of one mind; and, if we agree with you, as there is a prospect that we shall, it will be binding and lasting. Brothers; Our prospects are the fairer, because all our minds are one. You have not spoken before to us unitedly. Formerly, because you did not speak to us unitedly, what was done was not binding. Now you have an opportunity of speaking to us together; and we now take you by the hand, to lead you to the place appointed for the meeting." In explanation of this peaceful language and his subsequent conduct, Brant afterwards wrote that, "for several years (after the peace of 1783), we were engaged in getting a confederacy formed, and the unanimity occasioned by these endeavors among our western brethren, enabled them to defeat two American armies. The war continued without our brothers, the English, giving any assistance, excepting a little ammunition; and they seeming to desire that a peace might be concluded, we tried to bring it about at a time when the United States desired it very much, so that they sent commissioners from among their first people, to endeavor to make peace with the hostile Indians. We assembled also, for that purpose, at the Miami River, in the summer of 1793, intending to act as mediators in bringing about an honorable peace; and if that could not be obtained, we resolved to join with our western brethren in trying the fortunes of war. But to our surprise, when on the point of entering on a treaty with the Commissioners, we found that it was opposed by those acting under the British government, and hopes of further assistance were given to our western brethren, to encourage them to insist on the Ohio as a boundary between them and the United States." Whatever the truth may be as to Brant's peaceful intentions on the ninth of July, his attitude was certain on the fourth of the succeeding August. On that date, according to Roosevelt, the treacherous pensioner wrote to Alexander McKee that "we came here not only to assist with our advice, but other ways, * * * we came here with arms in our hands." Following the advice of his British counsellors, he advised the northwestern Indians not to yield an inch, and to stand on the Ohio as their southern boundary.

The Commissioners of the United States were doomed to meet with a sudden and unexpected interruption of their proceedings. On the twenty-first of July they arrived at the mouth of the Detroit river. They immediately addressed a note to McKee informing him of their arrival, and expressing a desire to meet with the confederated tribes. On the twenty-ninth of July a deputation of over twenty Indians, among whom was the Delaware chief, Buck-ong-a-he-las, arrived with Captain Matthew Elliott. On the next day, and in the presence of the British officers, the Wyandot chief, Sa-wagh-da-wunk, after a brief salutation, presented to the Commissioners a paper writing. It contained this ultimatum, dictated beyond doubt by the British agents: "Brothers: You are sent here by the United States, in order to make peace with us, the confederate Indians. Brothers: You very well know that the boundary line, which was run between the white people and us, at the treaty of Fort Stanwix, was the river Ohio. Brothers: If you seriously design to make a firm and lasting peace, you will immediately remove all your people from our side of that river. Brothers: We therefore ask you, are you fully authorized by the United States to continue, and firmly fix on the Ohio river, as the boundary between your people and ours?" This document was signed by the confederated nations of the Wyandots, Delawares, Shawnees, Miamis, Mingoes, Potawatomi, Ottawas, Connoys, Chippewas and Munsees, at the Maumee Rapids on the twenty-seventh of July, 1793.

The remaining passages between the Commissioners and the Indian allies are briefly told. In vain did the Commissioners urge that settlements and valuable improvements had been made on the faith of past treaties; that it was not only impracticable but wholly impossible to consider the Ohio as the boundary; that the treaty of Fort Harmar had been made in good faith and with the very tribes who professed to own the lands ceded. In vain did they admit the former mistakes of the government in setting up a claim to the whole country south of the Great Lakes. The jealous and apprehensive chieftains, spurred on and encouraged by British promise of support, refused to listen to all appeals, contemptuously rejected all offers of money or compensation, and insisted to the last on the Ohio as the boundary.

That the full responsibility for this action on the part of the tribes must be laid at the door of the British, goes without successful challenge. If at the beginning they had only furnished a little ammunition, as Brant says, they were now fast becoming openly hostile. The French Revolution had opened, and England and France were battling for supremacy. In order to cut off supplies of food from the French people, England had seized all cargoes of corn, flour and meal bound for French ports, and had purchased them for the benefit of his majesty's service. This action had greatly irritated the American merchants and had led to serious remonstrance on the part of the government. England had also asserted the right to board neutral vessels and impress British seamen whenever found. Many an American ship had been hailed on the high seas, and forced to submit to a humiliating search. It was claimed that many American sailors had been seized and forced to enter the British service. Added to all this, the Citizen Genet had, in the early part of the year 1793, arrived in America. As the representative of the French Republic he was armed with numerous blank commissions for privateers, to be delivered "to such French and American owners as should apply for the same." An attack was to be launched on British commerce. Before he arrived at Philadelphia the British minister had laid before the President a list of complaints "founded principally on the proceedings of Mr. Genet, who, at Charleston, undertook to authorize the fitting and arming of vessels, enlisting men, and giving commissions to cruise and commit hostilities on nations with whom the United States were at peace." Washington did everything in his power to preserve neutrality. On the twenty-second of April, 1793, and twenty-three days before Genet arrived at Philadelphia, the President issued a proclamation, declaring that "the duty and interest of the United States required that they should, with sincerity and good faith, adopt and pursue a conduct friendly and impartial toward the belligerent powers." But the vast majority of the people of the United States, including many high in public life, were in open sympathy with the French and utterly detested England. These sentiments were particularly marked in the western countries, for there the people had suffered from all the cruelty and savagery of the Indian warfare, and they fiercely denounced the British agents.

Under all these circumstances the relations between Great Britain and the United States had become tense and strained. The provincial officers at Quebec and the Indian partisans at Detroit quickly echoed the mood of the home government. In the event of a new war, England could again command the savage allies and ravage the frontiers as she had done during the revolution. The Indians would not only prove to be a useful barrier in the event of an American invasion of Canada, but they might help England to regain in part the territory she had lost. "Hence, instead of promoting a pacification, the efforts of the Canadian government were obviously exerted to prevent it." This, no doubt, accounts for what Brant has noted concerning the exchanges with the American commissioners at the mouth of the Detroit river. The western tribes were suddenly given assurance by the British that England would come to their aid, and were told to insist on the Ohio as the limit of concession. This put an effectual stop to all further measures for peace.

Wayne was now free to go forward with his campaign again, but so much time had been consumed by the commissioners, and the militia were so slow in arriving from Kentucky that the army did not take up its march from Hobson's Choice until the seventh of October. The general now had about twenty-six hundred effective men, including officers, thirty-six guides and spies, and about three hundred and sixty mounted volunteers. With these he determined to push forward to a position about six miles in advance of Fort Jefferson, and about eighty miles north of Cincinnati. He would thus excite a fear on the part of the savages for the safety of their women and children, and at the same time protect the frontiers. He expected resistance, for the Indians were "desperate and determined," but he was prepared to meet it. The savages constantly hung on his flanks, making attacks on his convoys of provisions, and picking off the packhorses. On the morning of the seventeenth of October, a force of ninety non-commissioned officers and men under Lowry and Boyd, who were escorting twenty wagons loaded with grain, were suddenly assaulted about seven miles north of Fort St. Clair. Fifteen officers and men were killed, seventy horses killed or carried away, and the wagons left standing in the road. Nothing daunted, Wayne pushed on. On the twenty-third of October, he wrote to the Secretary of War that, "the safety of the western frontiers, the reputation of the Legion, the dignity and interests of the nation, all forbid a retrograde maneuver, or giving up one inch of ground we now possess, until the enemy are compelled to sue for peace."

In the meantime General Charles Scott had arrived from Kentucky with about one thousand mounted infantry and had camped in the vicinity of Fort Jefferson, but the season was so far advanced, that Wayne now determined to send the Kentuckians home, enter into winter quarters, and prepare for an effectual drive in the spring. Unlike his predecessors, Wayne entertained no distrust of the frontiersmen, but determined to utilize them with telling force. The hardy riflemen were quick to respond to a real leader of men. They looked on the wonderful bayonet practice, the expert marksmanship of the Legion, and the astonishing maneuvers of the cavalrymen with great admiration. When they went to their homes for the winter they were filled with a new confidence in the government, and in its ability to protect their firesides. The vigilance, the daring, and the unflinching discipline of the continental general, gave them assurance. Fort Greenville was now erected on a branch of the Big Miami, and here Wayne established his headquarters. In December, eight companies of infantry and a detachment of artillery erected Fort Recovery, on the spot made memorable by St. Clair's defeat.

At the opening of the year 1794, "the relations between Great Britain and the United States had become so strained," says Roosevelt, "that open war was threatened." On the tenth of February, Lord Dorchester addressed a deputation of prominent chiefs of the northwestern tribes as follows: "Children: I was in the expectation of hearing from the people of the United States what was required by them: I hoped that I should be able to bring you all together, and make you friends. Children: I have waited long, and listened with great attention, but I have not heard one word from them. Children: I flattered myself with the hope that the line proposed in the year eighty-three, to separate us from the United States, which was immediately broken by themselves as soon as the peace was signed, would have been mended, or a new one drawn, in an amicable manner. Here, also, I have been disappointed. Children: Since my return, I find that no appearance of a line remains; and from the manner in which the people of the United States rush on, and act and talk, on this side; and from what I learn of their conduct toward the sea, I shall not be surprised, if we are at war with them in the course of the present year; and if so, a line must then be drawn by the warriors." Copies of this speech were circulated everywhere among the tribes. Alexander McKee, Lieutenant-Colonel John Butler, of the British army, and Joseph Brant were active. Large presents were sent up from Quebec, ammunition and arms were distributed, and the Ottawas and Chippewas summoned from the far north. In April, 1794, Lieutenant-Governor Simcoe, of Canada, openly advanced into the American territory, built a fort at the Miami Rapids, and garrisoned it with British redcoats. Massive parapets were constructed on which were mounted heavy artillery. The outer walls were surrounded by a deep fosse and "frasing" which rendered it secure from escalade. The Indians, thus buttressed, as they supposed, by British support, were openly defiant and refused to make peace.

The indignation of the American people may well be imagined. To a long train of secret machinations the British now added open insult. Washington, justly aroused by England's long course of treachery and double-dealing, wrote to Jay concerning Simcoe's action as follows: "Can that government, or will it attempt, after this official act of one of their governors, to hold out ideas of friendly intentions toward the United States, and suffer such conduct to pass with impunity? This may be considered the most open and daring act of the British agents in America, though it is not the most hostile or cruel; for there does not remain a doubt in the mind of any well-informed person in this country, not shut against conviction, that all the difficulties we encounter with the Indians – their hostilities, the murder of helpless women and innocent children along our frontiers – result from the conduct of the agents of Great Britain in this country. In vain is it, then, for its administration in Britain to disavow having given orders which will warrant such conduct, whilst their agents go unpunished; whilst we have a thousand corroborating circumstances, and indeed almost as many evidences, some of which cannot be brought forward, to know that they are seducing from our alliance, and endeavoring to move over the line, tribes that have hitherto been kept in peace and friendship with us at heavy expense, and who have no causes of complaint, except pretended ones of their creating; whilst they keep in a state of irritation the tribes who are hostile to us, and are instigating those who know little of us or we of them, to unite in the war against us; and whilst it is an undeniable fact that they are furnishing the whole with arms, ammunition, clothing, and even provisions to carry on the war; I might go farther, and if they are not much belied, add men also in disguise." The President also called on the British minister, Mr. Hammond, for an explanation. Hammond, while admitting the authenticity of Dorchester's speech and the construction of the British fort on the Maumee, pointed to pretended acts of hostility on the part of the United States. This was the insolent tone assumed toward a government considered to be too weak to defend its lawful rights.

The British were now busy in assembling a savage army to oppose Wayne's advance. Two Potawatomi captured on the fifth of June, said that a message had been sent to their tribe to join in the war against the United States; that the British were at Roche de Bout on the Maumee with about four hundred troops and two pieces of artillery, exclusive of the Detroit militia, and that they "had made a fortification around Colonel McKee's house and store at that place, in which they had deposited all their stores and ammunition, arms, clothing and provisions with which they promised to supply all the hostile Indians in abundance, provided they would join and go with them to war; that about two thousand warriors had been assembled, and that Governor Simcoe had promised that fifteen hundred British troops and militia would join them in the attack on the Americans." They further related that this same Governor Simcoe had sent them four different invitations to join in the war, promising them arms, ammunition, provisions and clothing, and everything that they wanted. "All the speeches," said these Potawatomi, "that we received from him, were as red as blood; all the wampum and feathers were painted red; the war pipes and hatchets were red; and even the tobacco was red." The evidence furnished by two Shawnees, captured on the twenty-second of June, corroborated the Potawatomi. They testified that the British were always setting the Indians on, like dogs after game, pressing them to go to war, and kill the Americans, "but did not help them; that unless the British would turn out and help them, they were determined to make peace; that they would not be any longer amused by promises only." Asked about the number of warriors collected along the Maumee, they put the number of the Shawnees at three hundred eighty, the Delawares at four hundred and eighty, the Miamis at one hundred, and the Wyandots at about one hundred and fifty. The Chippewas, however, would furnish the greatest number of fighting men, and they were on the way to the council. That the question of whether there would be a fight or not depended upon the British; "that the British were at the foot of the rapids, and had fortified at Roche de Bout; that there was a great number of British soldiers at that place; that they told the Indians they were now come to help them to fight; and if the Indians would generally turn out and join them, they would advance and fight the American army; that Blue Jacket had been sent by the British to the Chippewas and northern Indians, a considerable time since, to invite them, and bring them to Roche de Bout, there to join the British and other hostile Indians in order to go to war."

On the last day of June, 1794, the premeditated blow fell on Fort Recovery, the scene of St. Clair's disaster in 1791. The garrison was under the command of Captain Alexander Gibson, of the Fourth Sub-Legion. Under the walls of the fort were a detachment of ninety riflemen and fifty dragoons under the command of Major McMahon, who had escorted a train of packhorses from Fort Greenville on the day before, and who were now about to return. The Indians were, according to some authorities, under the command of the Bear chief, an Ottawa; others assign their leadership to the Little Turtle. That they had planned a coup de main and a sudden re-capture of the position is certain. Their army consisted of about fifteen hundred men; they had advanced in seventeen columns, with a wide and extended front, and their encampments were perfectly square and regular. They were attended by "a captain of the British army, a sergeant, and six matrosses, provided with fixed ammunition, suited to the calibre of two field pieces, which had been taken from General St. Clair, and deposited in a creek near the scene of his defeat in 1791." They expected to find this artillery, which had been hidden by the Indians, and turn it on the fort, but the guns had been recovered by their legitimate owners and were now used for defense. A considerable number of white men accompanied the savages, disguised as Indians and with blackened faces, and three British officers, dressed in scarlet, were posted in the rear and encouraged the Indians in their repeated assaults.

The first attack on Major McMahon was successful. Nineteen officers and privates and two packhorsemen were killed and about thirty men wounded. Packhorses to the number of two hundred were quickly taken. But the Indians now made a fatal mistake. In a spirit of rashness, they rushed on the fort. The determined legionaries, aided by McMahon's men, poured in a murderous fire, and they fell back. Again they attacked, and again were they repulsed. All day long they kept up a constant and vigorous fire but it availed nothing. During the succeeding night, which was dark and foggy, they carried off their dead.

On the next morning the attack was renewed, but great numbers of the savages were now becoming disheartened. The loss inflicted by the American garrison had been severe, and was mourned for months by the Indian tribes. Forty or fifty red men had bit the dust and over a hundred had been wounded. Disgraced and crestfallen the savage horde retired to the Maumee. The first encounter with Wayne's army had proved disastrous.

On the twenty-sixth of July, Wayne was joined by sixteen hundred mounted volunteers from Kentucky under the command of Major-General Charles Scott. Scott was a man of intrepid spirit and his men knew it. Moreover, the Kentuckians now looked forward to certain victory, for they trusted Wayne. On the twenty-eighth of July, the whole army moved forward to the Indian towns on the Maumee. No finer body of men ever went forth into the wilderness to meet a savage foe. Iron drill and constant practice at marksmanship had done their work. Officers and men, regulars and volunteers, were ready for the work at hand. Unlike Harmar and St. Clair, Wayne had in his service some of the most renowned scouts and Indian fighters of the day. Ephraim Kibby, William Wells, Robert McClellan, Henry and Christopher Miller, and a party of Chickasaw and Choctaw warriors, constantly kept him posted concerning the number and whereabouts of the enemy, and the nature of the ground which he was to traverse. "The Indians who watched his march brought word to the British that his army went twice as far in a day as St. Clair's, that he kept his scouts well out and his troops always in open order and ready for battle; that he exercised the greatest precaution to avoid an ambush or surprise, and that every night the camps of the different regiments were surrounded by breastworks of fallen trees so as to render a sudden assault hopeless." "We have beaten the enemy twice," said Little Turtle, "under separate commanders. We cannot expect the same good fortune always to attend us. The Americans are now led by a chief who never sleeps. The night and the day are alike to him; and, during all the time that he has been marching upon our villages, notwithstanding the watchfulness of our young men, we have never been able to surprise him. Think well of it. There is something whispers me, it would be prudent to listen to his offers of peace."

On the eighth of August Wayne reached the junction of the Au Glaize and the Maumee, and began the erection of Fort Defiance. The whole country was filled with the Indian gardens and corn fields which extended up the Maumee to the British fort. On the thirteenth of August, the General dispatched the scout, Christopher Miller, with the last and final overture of peace. In the event of a refusal, there must be a final appeal to arms. "America," said Wayne, "shall no longer be insulted with impunity. To the all-powerful and just God I therefore commit myself and gallant army." Impatient of a reply, Wayne moved forward again on the fifteenth, and met Miller returning. The Indians requested a delay of ten days to debate peace or war. Wayne gave orders to march on. At eight o'clock on the morning of the twentieth of August, 1794, the army advanced in columns and in open order to meet the enemy. The Indian forces consisted of Shawnees, Delawares, Wyandots, Ottawas, Miamis, Potawatomi, Chippewas and Mohawks, numbering from fifteen hundred to two thousand warriors. Added to these were two companies of Canadian militia from Amherstburg and Detroit, commanded by Captain Caldwell. Alexander McKee was present, and Matthew Elliott and Simon Girty, but they kept well in the rear and near the river. The whole mixed force of Indians and Canadians were encamped on the north bank of the Maumee, "at and around a hill called 'Presque Isle,' about two miles south of the site of Maumee City, and four south of the British Fort Miami."