A Voyage Round the World

But the commodore's mortification did not end here. It has been already observed that it was at first intended that Colonel Bland's regiment, and three independent companies of a hundred men each, should embark as land-forces on board the squadron. But this disposition was now changed, and all the land-forces that were to be allowed were five hundred invalids to be collected from the out-pensioners of Chelsea College. As these out-pensioners consist of soldiers who from their age, wounds, or other infirmities, are incapable of service in marching regiments, Mr. Anson was greatly chagrined at having such a decrepid detachment allotted him; for he was fully persuaded that the greatest part of them would perish long before they arrived at the scene of action, since the delays he had already encountered necessarily confined his passage round Cape Horn to the most rigorous season of the year. Sir Charles Wager too joined in opinion with the commodore, that invalids were no ways proper for this service, and sollicited strenuously to have them exchanged: but he was told that persons who were supposed to be better judges of soldiers than he or Mr. Anson, thought them the properest men that could be employed on this occasion. And upon this determination they were ordered on board the squadron on the 5th of August; but instead of five hundred, there came on board no more than two hundred and fifty-nine; for all those who had limbs and strength to walk out of Portsmouth deserted, leaving behind them only such as were literally invalids, most of them being sixty years of age, and some of them upwards of seventy. Indeed it is difficult to conceive a more moving scene than the embarkation of these unhappy veterans: they were themselves extremely averse to the service they were engaged in, and fully apprised of all the disasters they were afterwards exposed to; the apprehensions of which were strongly marked by the concern that appeared in their countenances, which was mixed with no small degree of indignation, to be thus hurried from their repose into a fatiguing employ, to which neither the strength of their bodies, nor the vigour of their minds, were any ways proportioned, and where, without seeing the face of an enemy, or in the least promoting the success of the enterprize, they would, in all probability, uselessly perish by lingering and painful diseases; and this too after they had spent the activity and strength of their youth in their country's service.

I cannot but observe, on this melancholy incident, how extremely unfortunate it was, both to this aged and diseased detachment, and to the expedition they were employed in, that amongst all the out-pensioners of Chelsea Hospital, which were supposed to amount to two thousand men, the most crazy and infirm only should be culled out for so laborious and perilous an undertaking. For it was well known that however unfit invalids in general might be for this service, yet by a prudent choice there might have been found amongst them five hundred men who had some remains of vigour left: and Mr. Anson fully expected that the best of them would have been allotted him; whereas the whole detachment that was sent to him seemed to be made up of the most decrepid and miserable objects that could be collected out of the whole body; and by the desertion above-mentioned, these were a second time cleared of that little health and strength which were to be found amongst them, and he was to take up with such as were much fitter for an infirmary than for any military duty.

And here it is necessary to mention another material particular in the equipment of this squadron. It was proposed to Mr. Anson, after it was resolved that he should be sent to the South Seas, to take with him two persons under the denomination of Agent Victuallers. Those who were mentioned for this employment had formerly been in the Spanish West Indies, in the South Sea Company's service, and it was supposed that by their knowledge and intelligence on that coast they might often procure provisions for him by compact with the inhabitants, when it was not to be got by force of arms: these agent victuallers were, for this purpose, to be allowed to carry to the value of £15,000 in merchandize on board the squadron; for they had represented that it would be much easier for them to procure provisions with goods than with the value of the same goods in money. Whatever colours were given to this scheme, it was difficult to persuade the generality of mankind that it was not principally intended for the enrichment of the agents, by the beneficial commerce they proposed to carry on upon that coast. Mr. Anson from the beginning objected both to the appointment of agent victuallers and the allowing them to carry a cargo on board the squadron: for he conceived that in those few amicable ports where the squadron might touch, he needed not their assistance to contract for any provisions the place afforded; and on the enemy's coast, he did not imagine that they could ever procure him the necessaries he should want, unless (which he was resolved not to comply with) the military operations of his squadron were to be regulated by the ridiculous views of their trading projects. All that he thought the government ought to have done on this occasion was to put on board to the value of £2000 or £3000 only of such goods as the Indians or the Spanish planters in the less cultivated part of the coast might be tempted with; since it was in such places only that he imagined it would be worth while to truck with the enemy for provisions: and in these places it was sufficiently evident a very small cargo would suffice.

But though the commodore objected both to the appointment of these officers and to their project, of the success of which he had no opinion; yet, as they had insinuated that their scheme, besides victualling their squadron, might contribute to settling a trade upon that coast, which might be afterwards carried on without difficulty, and might thereby prove a very considerable national advantage, they were much listened to by some considerable persons: and of the £15,000 which was to be the amount of their cargo, the government agreed to advance them 10,000 upon imprest, and the remaining 5000 they raised on bottomry bonds; and the goods purchased by this sum were all that were taken to sea by the squadron, how much soever the amount of them might be afterwards magnified by common report.

This cargo was at first shipped on board the Wager storeship, and one of the victuallers; no part of it being admitted on board the men-of-war. But when the commodore was at St. Catherine's, he considered that in case the squadron should be separated, it might be pretended that some of the ships were disappointed of provisions for want of a cargo to truck with, and therefore he distributed some of the least bulky commodities on board the men-of-war, leaving the remainder principally on board the Wager, where it was lost; and more of the goods perishing by various accidents to be recited hereafter, and no part of them being disposed of upon the coast, the few that came home to England did not produce, when sold, above a fourth part of the original price. So true was the commodore's judgment of the event of this project, which had been by many considered as infallibly productive of immense gains. But to return to the transactions at Portsmouth.

To supply the place of the two hundred and forty invalids which had deserted, as is mentioned above, there were ordered on board two hundred and ten marines detached from different regiments. These were raw and undisciplined men, for they were just raised, and had scarcely anything more of the soldier than their regimentals, none of them having been so far trained as to be permitted to fire. The last detachment of these marines came on board the 8th of August, and on the 10th the squadron sailed from Spithead to St. Helens, there to wait for a wind to proceed on the expedition.

But the delays we had already suffered had not yet spent all their influence, for we were now advanced into a season of the year when the westerly winds are usually very constant, and very violent; and it was thought proper that we should put to sea in company with the fleet commanded by Admiral Balchen, and the expedition under Lord Cathcart. As we made up in all twenty-one men-of-war, and a hundred and twenty-four sail of merchant-men and transports, we had no hopes of getting out of the Channel with so large a number of ships without the continuance of a fair wind for some considerable time. This was what we had every day less and less reason to expect, as the time of the equinox drew near; so that our golden dreams and our ideal possession of the Peruvian treasures grew each day more faint, and the difficulties and dangers of the passage round Cape Horn in the winter season filled our imaginations in their room. For it was forty days from our arrival at St. Helens, to our final departure from thence: and even then (having orders to proceed without Lord Cathcart) we tided it down the Channel with a contrary wind. But this interval of forty days was not free from the displeasing fatigue of often setting sail, and being as often obliged to return; nor exempt from dangers, greater than have been sometimes undergone in surrounding the globe. For the wind coming fair for the first time, on the 23d of August, we got under sail, and Mr. Balchen shewed himself truly solicitous to have proceeded to sea, but the wind soon returning to its old quarter obliged us to put back to St. Helens, not without considerable hazard, and some damage received by two of the transports, who, in tacking, ran foul of each other. Besides this, we made two or three more attempts to sail, but without any better success. And, on the 6th of September, being returned to an anchor at St. Helens, after one of these fruitless efforts, the wind blew so fresh that the whole fleet struck their yards and topmasts to prevent driving: yet, notwithstanding this precaution, the Centurion drove the next evening, and brought both cables ahead, and we were in no small danger of driving foul of the Prince Frederick, a seventy gun ship, moored at a small distance under our stern; though we happily escaped, by her driving at the same time, and so preserving her distance: but we did not think ourselves secure till we at last let go the sheet-anchor, which fortunately brought us up. However, on the 9th of September, we were in some degree relieved from this lingring vexatious situation, by an order which Mr. Anson received from the Lords Justices, to put to sea the first opportunity with his own squadron only, if Lord Cathcart should not be ready. Being thus freed from the troublesome company of so large a fleet, our commodore resolved to weigh and tide it down the Channel, as soon as the weather should become sufficiently moderate; and this might easily have been done with our own squadron alone full two months sooner, had the orders of the Admiralty, for supplying us with seamen, been punctually complied with, and had we met with none of those other delays mentioned in this narration. It is true, our hopes of a speedy departure were even now somewhat damped by a subsequent order which Mr. Anson received on the 12th of September; for by that he was required to take under his convoy the St. Albans, with the Turky fleet, and to join the Dragon and the Winchester, with the Streights and the American trade, at Torbay or Plymouth, and to proceed with them to sea as far as their way and ours lay together. This incumbrance of a convoy gave us some uneasiness, as we feared it might prove the means of lengthening our passage to the Maderas. However, Mr. Anson, now having the command himself, resolved to adhere to his former determination, and to tide it down the Channel with the first moderate weather; and that the junction of his convoy might occasion as little loss of time as possible, he immediately sent directions to Torbay that the fleets he was there to take under his care might be in a readiness to join him instantly on his approach. And at last, on the 18th of September, he weighed from St. Helens; and though the wind was at first contrary, had the good fortune to get clear of the Channel in four days, as will be more particularly related in the ensuing chapter.

Having thus gone through the respective steps taken in the equipment of this squadron, it is sufficiently obvious how different an aspect this expedition bore at its first appointment in the beginning of January, from what it had in the latter end of September, when it left the Channel; and how much its numbers, its strength, and the probability of its success were diminished by the various incidents which took place in that interval. For instead of having all our old and ordinary seamen exchanged for such as were young and able (which the commodore was at first promised) and having our numbers compleated to their full complement, we were obliged to retain our first crews, which were very indifferent; and a deficiency of three hundred men in our numbers was no otherwise made up to us than by sending us on board a hundred and seventy men, the greatest part composed of such as were discharged from hospitals, or new-raised marines who had never been at sea before. And in the land-forces allotted to us, the change was still more disadvantageous; for there, instead of three independent companies of a hundred men each, and Bland's regiment of foot, which was an old one, we had only four hundred and seventy invalids and marines, one part of them incapable of action by their age and infirmities, and the other part useless by their ignorance of their duty. But the diminishing the strength of the squadron was not the greatest inconveniency which attended these alterations; for the contests, representations, and difficulties which they continually produced (as we have above seen, that in these cases the authority of the Admiralty was not always submitted to) occasioned a delay and waste of time, which in its consequences was the source of all the disasters to which this enterprise was afterwards exposed: for by this means we were obliged to make our passage round Cape Horn in the most tempestuous season of the year; whence proceeded the separation of our squadron, the loss of numbers of our men, and the imminent hazard of our total destruction. By this delay, too, the enemy had been so well informed of our designs, that a person who had been employed in the South Sea Company's service, and arrived from Panama three or four days before we left Portsmouth, was able to relate to Mr. Anson most of the particulars of the destination and strength of our squadron, from what he had learnt amongst the Spaniards before he left them. And this was afterwards confirmed by a more extraordinary circumstance: For we shall find that, when the Spaniards (fully satisfied that our expedition was intended for the South Seas) had fitted out a squadron to oppose us, which had so far got the start of us, as to arrive before us off the island of Madera, the commander of this squadron was so well instructed in the form and make of Mr. Anson's broad pendant, and had imitated it so exactly, that he thereby decoyed the Pearl, one of our squadron, within gun-shot of him, before the captain of the Pearl was able to discover his mistake.

CHAPTER II

THE PASSAGE FROM ST. HELENS TO THE ISLAND OF MADERA; WITH A SHORT ACCOUNT OF THAT ISLAND, AND OF OUR STAY THERE

On the 18th of September 1740, the squadron, as we have observed in the preceding chapter, weighed from St. Helens with a contrary wind, the commodore proposing to tide it down the Channel, as he dreaded less the inconveniences he should thereby have to struggle with, than the risk he should run of ruining the enterprise by an uncertain, and, in all probability, a tedious attendance for a fair wind.

The squadron allotted to this service consisted of five men-of-war, a sloop of war and two victualling ships. They were the Centurion of sixty guns, four hundred men, George Anson, Esq., commander; the Gloucester of fifty guns, three hundred men, Richard Norris, commander; the Severn of fifty guns, three hundred men, the Honourable Edward Legg, commander; the Pearl of forty guns, two hundred and fifty men, Matthew Mitchel, commander; the Wager of twenty-eight guns, one hundred and sixty men, Dandy Kidd, commander; and the Tryal sloop of eight guns, one hundred men, the Honourable John Murray, commander; the two victuallers were pinks, the largest of about four hundred, and the other of about two hundred tons burthen. These were to attend us till the provisions we had taken on board were so far consumed as to make room for the additional quantity they carried with them, which, when we had taken into our ships, they were to be discharged. Besides the complement of men borne by the above-mentioned ships as their crews, there were embarked on board the squadron about four hundred and seventy invalids and marines, under the denomination of land forces (as has been particularly mentioned in the preceding chapter) which were commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Cracherode. With this squadron, together with the St. Albans and the Lark, and the trade under their convoy, Mr. Anson, after weighing from St. Helen's, tided it down the Channel for the first forty-eight hours; and, on the 20th, in the morning, we discovered off the Ram Head the Dragon, Winchester, South Sea Castle, and Rye, with a number of merchantmen under their convoy. These we joined about noon the same day, our commodore having orders to see them (together with the St. Albans and Lark) as far into the sea as their course and ours lay together. When we came in sight of this last mentioned fleet, Mr. Anson first hoisted his broad pennant, and was saluted by all the men-of-war in company.

When we had joined this last convoy, we made up eleven men-of-war, and about one hundred and fifty sail of merchantmen, consisting of the Turky, the Streights, and the American trade. Mr. Anson, the same day, made a signal for all the captains of the men-of-war to come on board him, where he delivered them their fighting and sailing instructions, and then, with a fair wind, we all stood towards the south-west; and the next day at noon, being the 21st, we had run forty leagues from the Ram Head. Being now clear of the land, our commodore, to render our view more extensive, ordered Captain Mitchel, in the Pearl, to make sail two leagues ahead of the fleet every morning, and to repair to his station every evening. Thus we proceeded till the 25th, when the Winchester and the American convoy made the concerted signal for leave to separate, which being answered by the commodore, they left us: as the St. Albans and the Dragon, with the Turkey and Streights convoy, did on the 29th. After which separation, there remained in company only our own squadron and our two victuallers, with which we kept on our course for the island of Madera. But the winds were so contrary that we had the mortification to be forty days in our passage thither from St. Helens, though it is known to be often done in ten or twelve. This delay was a most unpleasing circumstance, productive of much discontent and ill-humour amongst our people, of which those only can have a tolerable idea who have had the experience of a like situation. For besides the peevishness and despondency which foul and contrary winds and a lingering voyage never fail to create on all occasions, we, in particular, had very substantial reasons to be greatly alarmed at this unexpected impediment. Since as we had departed from England much later than we ought to have done, we had placed almost all our hopes of success in the chance of retrieving in some measure at sea the time we had so unhappily wasted at Spithead and St. Helens. However, at last, on Monday, October the 25th, at five in the morning, we, to our great joy, made the land, and in the afternoon came to an anchor in Madera Road, in forty fathom water; the Brazen Head bearing from us E. by S. the Loo N.N.W. and great church N.N.E. We had hardly let go our anchor when an English privateer sloop ran under our stern and saluted the commodore with nine guns, which we returned with five. And, the next day, the consul of the island visiting the commodore, we saluted him with nine guns on his coming on board.

This island of Madera, where we are now arrived, is famous through all our American settlements for its excellent wines, which seem to be designed by Providence for the refreshment of the inhabitants of the torrid zone. It is situated in a fine climate, in the latitude of 32° 27' north; and in the longitude from London (by our different reckonings) of 18-½° to 19-½° west, though laid down in the charts in 17°. It is composed of one continued hill, of a considerable height, extending itself from east to west: the declivity of which, on the south side, is cultivated and interspersed with vineyards: and in the midst of this slope the merchants have fixed their country seats, which help to form a very agreeable prospect. There is but one considerable town in the whole island; it is named Fonchiale, and is seated on the south part of the island, at the bottom of a large bay. Towards the sea, it is defended by a high wall, with a battery of cannon, besides a castle on the Loo, which is a rock standing in the water at a small distance from the shore. Fonchiale is the only place of trade, and indeed the only place where it is possible for a boat to land. And even here the beach is covered with large stones, and a violent surf continually beats upon it; so that the commodore did not care to venture the ships' long-boats to fetch the water off, there was so much danger of their being lost; and therefore ordered the captains of the squadron to employ Portuguese boats on that service.

We continued about a week at this island, watering our ships, and providing the squadron with wine and other refreshments. Here on the 3d of November, Captain Richard Norris signified by a letter to the commodore, his desire to quit his command on board the Gloucester in order to return to England for the recovery of his health. This request the commodore complied with; and thereupon was pleased to appoint Captain Matthew Mitchel to command the Gloucester in his room, and to remove Captain Kidd from the Wager to the Pearl, and Captain Murray from the Tryal sloop to the Wager, giving command of the Tryal to Lieutenant Cheap. These promotions being settled, with other changes in the lieutenancies, the commodore, on the following day, gave to the captains their orders, appointing St. Jago, one of the Cape de Verd Islands, to be the first place of rendezvous in case of separation; and directing them, if they did not meet the Centurion there, to make the best of their way to the island of St. Catherine's, on the coast of Brazil. The water for the squadron being the same day compleated, and each ship supplied with as much wine and other refreshments as they could take in, we weighed anchor in the afternoon, and took our leave of the island of Madera. But before I go on with the narration of our own transactions, I think it necessary to give some account of the proceedings of the enemy, and of the measures they had taken to render all our designs abortive.

When Mr. Anson visited the governor of Madera, he received information from him that for three or four days, in the latter end of October, there had appeared to the westward of that island, seven or eight ships of the line, and a patache, which last was sent every day close in to make the land. The governor assured the commodore, upon his honour, that none upon the island had either given them intelligence, or had in any sort communicated with them, but that he believed them to be either French or Spanish, but was rather inclined to think them Spanish. On this intelligence Mr. Anson sent an officer in a clean sloop, eight leagues to the westward, to reconnoitre them, and, if possible, to discover what they were: but the officer returned without being able to get a sight of them, so that we still remained in uncertainty. However, we could not but conjecture that this fleet was intended to put a stop to our expedition, which, had they cruised to the eastward of the island instead of the westward, they could not but have executed with great facility. For as, in that case, they must have certainly fallen in with us, we should have been obliged to throw overboard vast quantities of provision to clear our ships for an engagement; and this alone, without any regard to the event of the action, would have effectually prevented our progress. This was so obvious a measure that we could not help imagining reasons which might have prevented them from pursuing it. And we therefore supposed that this French or Spanish squadron was sent out, upon advice of our sailing in company with Admiral Balchen and Lord Cathcart's expedition: and thence, from an apprehension of being overmatched, they might not think it adviseable to meet with us till we had parted company, which they might judge would not happen before our arrival at this island. These were our speculations at that time, and from hence we had reason to suppose that we might still fall in with them in our way to the Cape de Verd Islands. We afterwards, in the course of our expedition, were persuaded that this was the Spanish squadron, commanded by Don Joseph Pizarro, which was sent out purposely to traverse the views and enterprizes of our squadron, to which in strength they were greatly superior. As this Spanish armament then was so nearly connected with our expedition, and as the catastrophe it underwent, though not effected by our force, was yet a considerable advantage to this nation, produced in consequence of our equipment, I have, in the following chapter, given a summary account of their proceedings, from their first setting out from Spain in the year 1740, till the Asia, the only ship of the whole squadron which returned to Europe, arrived at the Groyne in the beginning of the year 1746.