A Voyage Round the World

But even, independent of an Indian revolt, there were two places only, on all the coast of the South Sea, which could be supposed capable of resisting our squadron; these were the cities of Panama and Callao: as to the first of these, its fortifications were so decayed, and it was so much in want of powder, that the president himself, in an intercepted letter, acknowledged it was incapable of being defended; whence I take it for granted it would have given us but little trouble, especially if we had opened a communication across the isthmus with our fleet on the other side. And with regard to the city and port of Callao, its condition was not much better than that of Panama; since its walls are built upon the plain ground, without either out-work or ditch before them, and consist only of very slender feeble masonry, without any earth behind them; so that a battery of five or six pieces of cannon, raised anywhere within four or five hundred paces of the place, would have had a full view of the whole rampart, and would have opened it in a short time; and the breach hereby formed, as the walls are so extremely thin, could not have been difficult of ascent; for the ruins would have been but little higher than the surface of the ground; and it would have yielded this particular advantage to the assailants, that the bullets, which grazed upon it, would have driven before them such shivers of brick and stone as would have prevented the garrison from forming behind it, supposing that the troops employed in defence of the place should have so far surpassed the usual limits of Creolian bravery as to resolve to stand a general assault. Indeed, such a resolution cannot be imputed to them; for the garrison and people were in general dissatisfied with the viceroy's behaviour, and were never expected to act a vigorous part. On the contrary, the viceroy himself greatly apprehended that the commodore would make him a visit at Lima, the capital of the kingdom of Peru; to prevent which, if possible, he had ordered twelve gallies to be built at Guaiaquil and other places, which were intended to oppose the landing of our boats, and to hinder us from pushing our men on shore. But this was an impracticable project of defence, and proceeded on the supposition that our ships, when we should land our men, would keep at such a distance that these gallies, by drawing little water, would have been out of the reach of our guns; whereas the commodore, before he had made such an attempt, would doubtless have been possessed of several prize ships, which he would not have hesitated to have run on shore for the protection of his boats; and besides, there were many places on that coast, and one particularly in the neighbourhood of Callao, where there was good anchoring, though a great depth of water, within a cable's length of the shore; consequently the cannon of the man-of-war would have swept all the coast to above a mile's distance from the water's edge, and would have effectually prevented any force from assembling to oppose the landing and forming of our men. And this landing-place had the additional advantage that it was but two leagues distant from Lima; so that we might have been at that city within four hours after we should have been first discovered from the shore. The place I have in view is about two leagues south of Callao, and just to the northward of the headland called, in Frezier's draught of that coast, Morro Solar. Here there is seventy or eighty fathom of water within two cables' length of the shore; and here the Spaniards themselves were so apprehensive of our attempting to land, that they had projected to build a fort close to the water; but as there was no money in the royal chests, they could not compleat so considerable a work, and therefore they contented themselves with keeping a guard of a hundred horse there, that they might be sure to receive early notice of our appearance on that coast. Indeed some of them (as we were told), conceiving our management at sea to be as pusillanimous as their own, pretended that this was a road where the commodore would never dare to hazard his ships, for fear that in so great a depth of water their anchors could not hold them.

And let it not be imagined that I am proceeding upon groundless and extravagant presumptions, when I conclude that fifteen hundred or a thousand of our people, well conducted, should have been an over-match for any numbers the Spaniards could muster in South America. Since, not to mention the experience we had of them at Paita and Petaplan, it must be remembered that our commodore was extremely solicitous to have all his men trained to the dexterous use of their fire-arms; whereas the Spaniards, in this part of the world, were wretched provided with arms, and were very awkward in the management of the few they had: and though on their repeated representations the court of Spain had ordered several thousand firelocks to be put on board Pizarro's squadron, yet those, it is evident, could not have been in America time enough to have been employed against us. Hence then by our arms, and our readiness in the use of them (not to insist on the timidity and softness of our enemy), we should in some degree have had the same advantages which the Spaniards themselves had on the first discovery of this country against its naked and unarmed inhabitants.

Now let it in the next place be considered what were the events which we had to fear, or what were the circumstances which could have prevented us from giving law to all the coast of South America, and thereby cutting off from Spain the resources which she drew from those immense provinces. By sea there was no force capable of opposing us; for how soon soever we had sailed, Pizarro's squadron could not have sailed sooner than it did, and therefore could not have avoided the fate it met with. As we should have been masters of the ports of Chili, we could thereby have supplied ourselves with the provisions we wanted in the greatest plenty; and from Baldivia to the equinoctial we ran no risque of losing our men by sickness (that being of all climates the most temperate and healthy), nor of having our ships disabled by bad weather. And had we wanted sailors to assist in the navigating of our squadron whilst a considerable proportion of our men were employed on shore, we could not have failed of getting whatever numbers we pleased in the ports we should have taken, and from the prizes which would have fallen into our hands. For I must observe that the Indians, who are the principal mariners in that part of the world, are extremely docile and dexterous; and though they are not fit to struggle with the inclemencies of a cold climate, yet in temperate seas they are most useful and laborious seamen.

Thus then it appears what important revolutions might have been brought about by our squadron had it departed from England as early as it ought to have done: and from hence it is easy to conclude what immense advantages might have thence accrued to the public. For, as on our success it would have been impossible that the kingdom of Spain should have received any treasure from the provinces bordering on the South Seas, or should even have had any communication with them, it is certain that the whole attention of that monarchy would have been immediately employed in endeavouring to regain these inestimable territories, either by force of arms or compact. By the first of these methods it was scarcely possible they could succeed; for it must have been at least a twelvemonth after our arrival before any ships from Spain could have got into the South Seas, and when they had been there, they would have found themselves without resource, since they would probably have been separated, disabled, and sickly, and would then have had no port remaining in their possession where they could either rendezvous or refit. Whilst we might have been supplied across the isthmus with whatever necessaries, stores, or even men we wanted; and might thereby have supported our squadron in as good a plight as when it first set sail from St. Helens. In short, it required but little prudence so to have conducted this business as to have rendered all the efforts of Spain, seconded by the power of France, ineffectual, and to have maintained our conquest in defiance of them both. Whence they must either have resolved to have left Great Britain mistress of the wealth of South America (the principal support of all their destructive projects), or they must have submitted to her terms, and have been contented to receive these provinces back again, as an equivalent for such restrictions to their future ambition as she in her prudence should have dictated to them. Having thus discussed the prodigious weight which the operations of our squadron might have added to the national influence of this kingdom, I shall here end this second book, referring to the next the passage of the shattered remains of our force across the Pacific Ocean, and all their subsequent transactions till the commodore's arrival in England.

BOOK III

CHAPTER I

THE RUN FROM THE COAST OF MEXICO TO THE LADRONES

OR MARIAN ISLANDS

When, on the 6th of May 1642, we left the coast of America, we stood to the S.W. with a view of meeting the N.E. tradewind, which the accounts of former writers taught us to expect at seventy or eighty leagues from the land. We had besides another reason for standing to the southward, which was the getting into the latitude of 13° or 14° north, that being the parallel where the Pacific Ocean is most usually crossed, and consequently where the navigation is esteemed the safest: this last purpose we had soon answered, being in a day or two sufficiently advanced to the south. But though we were at the same time more distant from the shore than we had presumed was necessary for the falling in with the trade-wind, yet in this particular we were most grievously disappointed, the wind still continuing to the westward, or at best variable. As the getting into the N.E. trade was to us a matter of the last consequence, we stood yet more to the southward, and made many experiments to meet with it; but all our efforts were for a long time unsuccessful; so that it was seven weeks from our leaving the coast before we got into the true trade-wind. This was an interval in which we had at first believed we should well-nigh have reached the eastermost parts of Asia; but we were so baffled with the contrary and variable winds, which for all that time perplexed us, that we were not as yet advanced above a fourth of the way. The delay alone would have been a sufficient mortification; but there were other circumstances attending it which rendered this situation not less terrible, and our apprehensions perhaps still greater, than in any of our past calamities. For our two ships were by this time extremely crazy; and many days had not passed before we discovered a spring in the fore-mast of the Centurion, which rounded about twenty-six inches of its circumference, and which was judged to be at least four inches deep. And no sooner had the carpenters secured this mast with fishing it, than the Gloucester made a signal of distress to inform us that she had a spring in her main-mast, twelve feet below the trussel trees; which appeared so dangerous that she could not carry any sail upon it. Our carpenters on a strict examination of this mast found it excessively rotten and decayed; and it being judged necessary to cut it down as low as it was defective, it was by this means reduced to nothing but a stump, which served only as a step to the top-mast. These accidents augmented our delay, and being added to our other distresses occasioned us great anxiety about our future safety. For though after our departure from Juan Fernandes we had enjoyed a most uninterrupted state of health, till our leaving the coast of Mexico, yet the scurvy now began to make fresh havock amongst our people: and we too well knew the effects of this disease by our former fatal experience to suppose that anything except a speedy passage could secure the greater part of our crew from being destroyed thereby. But as, after being seven weeks at sea, there did not appear any reasons that could persuade us we were nearer the trade-wind than when we set out, there was no ground for us to imagine that our passage would not prove at least three times as long as we at first expected; and consequently we had the melancholy prospect either of dying by the scurvy or of perishing with the ship for want of hands to navigate her. Indeed, several amongst us were willing to believe that in this warm climate, so different from what we felt in passing round Cape Horn, the violence of this disease, and its fatality, might be in some degree mitigated; as it had not been unusual to suppose that its particular virulence during that passage was in a great measure owing to the severity of the weather: but the ravage of the distemper, in our present circumstances, soon convinced us of the falsity of this speculation; as it likewise exploded certain other opinions which usually pass current about the cause and nature of this disease.

For it has been generally presumed that sufficient supplies of water and of fresh provisions are effectual preventives of this malady; but it happened that in the present case we had a considerable stock of fresh provisions on board, being the hogs and fowls which were taken at Paita; we besides almost daily caught great abundance of bonitos, dolphins, and albicores; and the unsettled season, which deprived us of the benefit of the trade-wind, proved extremely rainy; so that we were enabled to fill up our water-casks almost as fast as they were empty; and each man had five pints of water allowed him every day during the passage. But notwithstanding this plenty of water, notwithstanding that the fresh provisions were distributed amongst the sick, and the whole crew often fed upon fish; yet neither were the sick hereby relieved or the progress or malignity of the disease at all abated. Nor was it in these instances only that we found the general maxims upon this head defective: for tho' it has been usually esteemed a necessary piece of management to keep all ships where the crews are large as clean and airy between decks as possible; and it hath been believed by many that this particular alone, if well attended to, would prevent the appearance of the scurvy, or at least mitigate its virulence; yet we observed during the latter part of our run that, though we kept all our ports open and took uncommon pains in cleansing and sweetning the ships, the disease still raged with as much violence as ever; nor did its advancement seem to be thereby sensibly retarded.

However, I would not be understood to assert that fresh provisions, plenty of water, and a constant supply of sweet air between decks are matters of no moment: I am, on the contrary, well satisfied that they are all of them articles of great importance, and are doubtless extremely conducive to the health and vigour of a crew, and may in many cases prevent this fatal malady from taking place. All I have aimed at in what I have advanced is only to evince that, in some instances, both the cure and prevention of this malady is impossible to be effected by any management, or by the application of any remedies which can be made use of at sea. Indeed, I am myself fully persuaded that, when it has got to a certain head, there are no other means in nature for relieving the sick but carrying them on shore, or at least bringing them into the neighbourhood of the land. Perhaps a distinct and adequate knowledge of the source of this disease may never be discovered; but, in general, there is no difficulty in conceiving that, as a continued supply of fresh air is necessary to all animal life, and as this air is so particular a fluid that, without losing its elasticity, or any of its obvious properties, it may be rendered unfit for this purpose by the mixing with it some very subtle and otherwise imperceptible effluvia; it may be easily conceived, I say, that the steams arising from the ocean may have a tendency to render the air they are spread through less properly adapted to the support of the life of terrestrial animals, unless these steams are corrected by effluvia of another kind, which perhaps the land alone can afford.

To what hath been already said in relation to this disease, I shall add that our surgeon (who during our passage round Cape Horn had ascribed the mortality we suffered to the severity of the climate) exerted himself in the present run to the utmost: but he at last declared that all his measures were totally ineffectual, and did not in the least avail his patients. On this it was resolved by the commodore to try the success of two medicines which, just before his departure from England, were the subject of much discourse, I mean the pill and drop of Mr. Ward. For however violent the operations of these medicines are said to have sometimes proved, yet in the present instance, where, without some remedy, destruction seemed inevitable, the experiment at least was thought adviseable: and, therefore, one or both of them at different times were administred to persons in every stage of the distemper. Out of the numbers who took them, one, soon after swallowing the pill, was seized with a violent bleeding at the nose. He was before given over by the surgeon and lay almost at the point of death; but he immediately found himself much better, and continued to recover, tho' slowly, till we arrived on shore, which was near a fortnight after. A few others too were relieved for some days, but the disease returned again with as much virulence as ever. Though neither did these, nor the rest, who received no benefit, appear to be reduced to a worse condition than they would have been if they had taken nothing. The most remarkable property of these medicines, and what was obvious in almost every one that took them, was that they acted in proportion to the vigour of the patient; so that those who were within two or three days of dying were scarcely affected; and as the patient was differently advanced in the disease, the operation was either a gentle perspiration, an easy vomit, or a moderate purge: but if they were taken by one in full strength, they then produced all the forementioned effects with considerable violence, which sometimes continued for six or eight hours together with little intermission. However, let us return to the prosecution of our voyage.

I have already observed that a few days after our running off the coast of Mexico the Gloucester had her main-mast cut down to a stump, and we were obliged to fish our foremast; and that these misfortunes were greatly aggravated by our meeting with contrary and variable winds for near seven weeks. I shall now add that when we reached the trade-wind, and it settled between the north and the east, yet it seldom blew with so much strength that the Centurion might not have carried all her small sails abroad without the least danger; so that, had we been a single ship, we might have run down our longitude apace, and have arrived at the Ladrones soon enough to have recovered great numbers of our men who afterwards perished. But the Gloucester, by the loss of her main-mast, sailed so very heavily that we had seldom any more than our top-sails set, and yet were frequently obliged to lie to for her: and, I conceive, that on the whole we lost little less than a month by our attendance upon her, in consequence of the various mischances she encountered. During all this run it was remarkable that we were rarely many days together without seeing great numbers of birds; which is a proof that there are several islands, or at least rocks, scattered all along, at no very considerable distance from our track: but the frequency of these birds seem to ascertain that there are many more than have been hitherto discovered; for the most part of the birds we observed were such as are known to roost on shore; and the manner of their appearance sufficiently evinced that they came from some distant haunt every morning, and returned thither again in the evening, since we never saw them early or late; and the hour of their arrival and departure gradually varied, which we supposed was occasioned by our running nearer their haunts or getting farther from them.

The trade-wind continued to favour us, without any fluctuation, from the end of June till towards the end of July. But on the 26th of July, being then, as we esteemed, about three hundred leagues from the Ladrones, we met with a westerly wind, which did not come about again to the eastward in four days' time. This was a most dispiriting incident, as it at once damped all our hopes of speedy relief, especially too as it was attended with a vexatious accident to the Gloucester: for in one part of these four days the wind flatted to a calm, and the ships rolled very deep; by which means the Gloucester's forecap splitting, her fore top-mast came by the board, and broke her fore-yard directly in the slings. As she was hereby rendered incapable of making any sail for some time, we were under a necessity, as soon as a gale sprung up, to take her in tow; and near twenty of the healthiest and ablest of our seamen were removed from the duty of our own ship, and were continued eight or ten days together on board the Gloucester to assist in repairing her damages. But these things, mortifying as we thought them, were only the commencement of our disasters; for scarce had our people finished their business in the Gloucester before we met with a most violent storm from the western board, which obliged us to lie to. At the beginning of this storm our ship sprung a leak, and let in so much water that all our people, officers included, were constantly employed about the pumps: and the next day we had the vexation so see the Gloucester with her fore top-mast once more by the board. Nor was that the whole of her calamity, since whilst we were viewing her with great concern for this new distress, we saw her main top-mast, which had hitherto served her as a jury main-mast, share the same fate. This compleated our misfortunes, and rendered them without resource: for we knew the Gloucester's crew were so few and feeble that without our assistance they could not be relieved; whilst at the same time our sick were now so far increased, and those who remained in health so continually fatigued with the additional duty of our pumps, that it was impossible for us to lend them any aid. Indeed we were not as yet fully apprized of the deplorable situation of the Gloucester's crew; for when the storm abated, which during its continuance prevented all communication with them, the Gloucester bore up under our stern, and Captain Mitchel informed the commodore that besides the loss of his masts, which was all that was visible to us, the ship had then no less than seven feet of water in her hold, although his officers and men had been kept constantly at the pumps for the last twenty-four hours.

This new circumstance was indeed a most terrible accumulation to the other extraordinary distresses of the Gloucester, and required if possible the most speedy and vigorous assistance, which Captain Mitchel begged the commodore to afford him. But the debility of our people, and our own immediate preservation, rendered it impracticable for the commodore to comply with his request. All that could be done was to send our boat on board for a more particular account of the ship's condition, as it was soon suspected that the taking her people on board us, and then destroying her, was the only measure that could be prosecuted in the present emergency, both for the security of their lives and of our own.

Our boat soon returned with a representation of the state of the Gloucester, and of her several defects, signed by Captain Mitchel and all his officers; whence it appeared that she had sprung a leak by the stern post being loose, and working with every roll of the ship, and by two beams amidships being broken in the orlope, no part of which, as the carpenters reported, could possibly be repaired at sea; that both officers and men had wrought twenty-four hours at the pump without intermission, and were at length so fatigued that they could continue their labour no longer, but had been forced to desist, with seven feet of water in the hold, which covered all their casks, so that they could neither come at fresh water nor provision: that they had no mast standing, except the foremast, the mizen-mast, and the mizen top-mast, nor had they any spare masts to get up in the room of those they had lost: that the ship was, besides, extremely decayed in every part; for her knees and clamps were all become quite loose, and her upper works in general were so crazy that the quarter-deck was ready to drop down: that her crew was greatly reduced, as there remained alive on board her, officers included, no more than seventy-seven men, eighteen boys, and two prisoners, and that of this whole number only sixteen men and eleven boys were capable of keeping the deck, several of these too being very infirm.