Joining a Prestigious Club

In contrast, some studies in CEE countries found that Europeanisation had little to no impact on party systems. Thus, Szczerbiak and Bil established very little evidence of EU impact on the Polish party system due to the domestic factors.21 In a similar vein, Haughton et al. detected limited impact on party organisations and programmes in CEE countries after the accession. In fact, CEE parties used the links with the European level as a “badge of approval” to enhance their significance and standing for the domestic electorate.22 Examining the role of the PES in shaping social democracy in CEE countries, Holmes and Lightfoot established “very little evidence of any impact”.23 The evidence of genuine ideological and behavioural change was absent, whereas the level of internalisation was shallow without any degree of reflection. CEE parties used the PES affiliation as an external validation of their distinction from unreformed post-communist parties and therefore indulged in role-playing.24

In the non-EU member states, cooperation with the Europarties has drawn very little attention and up until now was investigated based on a single case study. The first scholarly study of the Europarties’ influence on non-EU parties was conducted by Timus.25 Focusing on Ukraine, Timus investigated the affiliation of Ukrainian parties with the EPP. The main focus was on the admission process and the ideological match between the Europarty and its Ukrainian sister parties. The main findings revealed strategic incentives for cooperation, emanating from both the Europarty and domestic parties. While in domestic arena, parties used engagement with the Europarties for domestic legitimacy and international recognition, for the Europarties the cooperation represented an opportunity to strengthen their positions in the neighbourhood.26

Only recently has there been an attempt to elaborate a comparative framework to investigate the activity of the Europarties regarding party-building in CEE democracies.27 When examining transnational party activity, it is important to integrate such aspects as the complementary activity of the internationals and party foundations, bilateral links between the EU parties and individual parties within the Europarties, the ongoing process of democratisation and consolidation of party systems, the European integration process, and the EU’s own democratic conditionality.28

Significance of the research

The review of previous studies points out existing research gaps within the Europeanisation studies. Whereas the abovementioned contributions are limited to a single case study, this research, in contrast, is driven by a comparative approach. It pursues the conduction of a systematic analysis of the Europarties’ impact beyond the EU from cross-national, cross-partisan, and cross-dimensional perspectives. Aiming to increase the generalisability of the findings, the research includes Georgia, Moldova, and Ukraine in the analysis to establish any cross-regional patterns and similarities. Secondly, to increase the scope of analysis, the research encompasses all mainstream Europarties and relevant domestic parties. By including both strong and weak Europarties and domestic parties, the research aims at party variation in political weight. On the one hand, this allows an examination of whether there is a difference between stronger and weaker Europarties in establishing cooperation and in their potential to influence non-EU parties. On the other hand, incorporating strong and weak domestic parties allows the analysis of whether there are some commonalities in their incentive structures and whether there is a difference in susceptibility to the Europarties’ impact. Finally, the examination of the Europarties’ impact on three dimensions is inclusive and encompasses party development from its main standpoints: identity and party ideology, organisational structure, and inter-party relationships. This kind of research design allows comparisons of the significance of ideological, organisational, and behavioural changes both within and across parties, and across countries.

Given the extensive fieldwork data, the main contribution of the research is first-hand insights into the motives driving cooperation and into the precise mechanism of the admission of non-EU parties. Having international party assistance as a control variable, the research aims to single out the Europarties’ net impact on non-EU party development. Rooted in domestic politics, the cases reveal publicly inaccessible storylines behind each party’s cooperation and the factors that informally influence it. Extending beyond the party level, the research pursues the analysis of whether the Europarties’ influence contributes to the standardisation, consolidation, and democratisation of party systems in Eastern Europe. Last but not least, considering constant party system instability in East Europe, the research indirectly uncovers the effectiveness and sustainability of the Europarties’ engagement and points out the potential shortcomings and limitations of the Europarties’ activities in the region.

Itinerary of the book

Chapter 2 describes the theoretical and conceptual frameworks of the research. In particular, it starts with the concepts of socialisation and norm diffusion and continues with the introduction of the explanatory model of the Europarties’ impact on party development and its scope conditions that may trigger socialisation. The second half of the chapter engages with the methodology, operationalisation and data gathering.

Chapter 3 explains the historical context and institutional development of both the Europarties and the non-EU parties. The first part of the chapter introduces the historical and institutional development of the Europarties, their functions and organisational structure. The second part focuses on the particularities of party development in post-communist countries. It starts with a discussion of different cleavage structures, public distrust, and high electoral volatility and continues with the excessive personalisation of party politics, and the lack of internal party democracy.

Chapter 4 highlights the selection and application process for the non-EU parties. Based on the EPP example, the chapter sheds some light on the formal steps of application and, more importantly, identifies the informal factors which influence the chances of being accepted into the Europarty. This chapter will help to understand how the Europarties find their potential partners and which criteria they use to identify a proper match.

Chapter 5 examines the motivational structures of both the Europarties and the non-EU parties which trigger cooperation between them. This chapter constitutes a crucial part of the analysis, as it touches upon the core of the puzzling phenomenon of cooperation: why do the Europarties and the non-EU parties cooperate with each other if tangible rewards are absent? It identifies a set of motives for both Europarties and non-EU parties and illustrates it in practice by analysing each case of cooperation in greater detail.

Chapter 6 assesses the ideological match between the Europarties’ and the non-EU parties’ profiles. Firstly, the chapter identifies the Europarties’ fundamental ideological principles. Secondly, using this “ideological checklist”, the ideological congruence between the Europarties and their sister parties is measured on economic, social, and European dimensions. It aims to evaluate to what extent the affiliated non-EU parties fit into their chosen European party families.

Chapter 7 focuses on the organisational approximation between the Europarties and the non-EU parties. It estimates the degree of organisational changes the non-EU mother parties and its youth and women’s branches introduced after cooperation the Europarties. The evaluation of the impact is examined in terms of changes in internal decision-making, transfer of know-how, promotion of youth to the mother party, introduction of gender quotas on the electoral lists, and female political empowerment.

Chapter 8 examines the behavioural changes of the non-EU parties after cooperation, particularly analysing the cases of cooperation between domestic sister parties. It aims to assess to what extent the Europarties’ endorsement of cooperation influenced the non-EU parties’ behaviour and led to coalition-building, government formation, or party mergers.

Chapter 9 summarises the key findings revealed from the analysis of cooperation. Moreover, it draws a systematic comparative analysis from cross- and within-dimensional, cross-partisan, and cross-national perspectives. It analyses which dimension—ideological, organisational or behavioural—proved to be the most susceptible to the Europarties’ norms and values, which parties—strong or weak—proved to be the most successful in implementing changes and which country—Georgia, Moldova or Ukraine—proved to be the most influenced by the cooperation with the Europarties. Subsequently, it discusses the implications on the party system level and reflects on the implications for the Europarties.

1 Romano Prodi, “A Wider Europe—A Proximity Policy as the key to stability,” “Peace, Security and Stability—International Dialogue and the Role of the EU,” Sixth ECSA-World Conference. Jean Monnet Project, Brussels, 5–6 December 2002.

2 Ibid.

3 Geoffrey Pridham, “Patterns of Europeanization and Transnational Party Cooperation: Party Development in Central and Eastern Europe.” Paper for Workshop on European Aspects of Post-Communist Party Development, ECPR Sessions, Mannheim, University of Mannheim (1999); Geoffrey Pridham, “The European Union's Democratic Conditionality and Domestic Politics in Slovakia: The Meciar and Dzurinda Governments Compared,” Europe-Asia Studies 54:2 (2002); Giorgia Delsoldato, “Eastward Enlargement by the European Union and Transnational Parties,” International Political Science Review 23:3 (2002); Paul Lewis, “Changes in the Party Politics of the New EU Member States in Central Europe: Patterns of Europeanization and Democratization,” Journal of Southern Europe and the Balkans Online 10:2 (2008).

4 See, for example, Peter Mair, “The Limited Impact of Europe on National Party Systems,” West European Politics 23:4 (2000): 27–28.

5 Pridham, “Patterns of Europeanization”; Pridham, “The European Union's Democratic Conditionality,”; Delsoldato, “Eastward Enlargement”; Paul Lewis, “Changes in the Party Politics”; Maria Spirova, “Europarties and Party Development in EU-Candidate States: The Case of Bulgaria,” Europe-Asia Studies 60:5 (2008).

6 Pridham, “Patterns of Europeanization.”

7 Dorota Dakowska, “Beyond Conditionality: EU Enlargement, European Party Federations and the Transnational Activity of German Political Foundations,” Perspectives on European Politics and Society 3:2 (2002).

8 See, for example, Peter Burnell, “Democracy Assistance: Origins and Organizations,” in Democracy Assistance: International Cooperation for Democratization, ed. P. Burnell (London: Frank Cass, 2000), 34–66; Peter Burnell, “Promoting Democracy Backwards,” FRIDE Working Paper 28, 2006; Thomas Carothers, Aiding Democracy Abroad: The Learning Curve (Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1996); Thomas Carothers, Confronting the Weakest Link: Aiding Political Parties in New Democracies (Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2006); Thomas Carothers, “Examining Political Party Aid,” in Globalising Democracy, ed. P. Burnell (London: Routledge Publishers, 2006); Thomas Carothers, “Democracy Support and Development Aid: The Elusive Synthesis,” Journal of Democracy 21:4 (2010).

9 Robert Ladrech, “Europeanization and Political Parties: Towards a Framework of Analysis,” Party Politics 8:4 (2002).

10 See, for example, Thomas Poguntke et al., “Europeanisation of National Party Organisations: A Conceptual Analysis,” European Journal of Political Research 46:6 (2007): 20; Paul Pennings, “An Empirical Analysis of the Europeanization of National Party Manifestos, 1960–2003,” European Union Politics 7:2 (2008); Alex Szczerbiak and Paul Taggart (Eds.), Opposing Europe? The Comparative Party Politics of Euroscepticism (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008).

11 Mair, “The Limited Impact,” 27–28.

12 Ibid., 45–46.

13 Pridham, “Patterns of Europeanization and Transnational Party Cooperation,” 7.

14 Pridham, “Patterns of Europeanization and Transnational Party Cooper-ation,” 14.

15 Delsoldato, “Eastward Enlargement,” 277.

16 Ibid., 281.

17 Dakowska, “Beyond Conditionality,” 284.

18 Ibid., 288, 290.

19 Lewis, “Changes in the Party Politics,” 158–159.

20 Spirova, “Europarties and Party,” 802.

21 Alex Szczerbiak and Monika Bil, “When in Doubt, (re-) Turn to Domestic Politics? The (non-) Impact of the EU on Party Politics in Poland,” SEI Working Paper No 103, EPERN Working Paper No 20 (2008): 8.

22 Tim Haughton, “Driver, Conductor or Fellow Passenger? EU Membership and Party Politics in Central and Eastern Europe,” Journal of Communist Studies and Transition Politics 25:4 (2009): 421–423.

23 Michael Holmes and Simon Lightfoot, “Limited Influence? The Role of the Party of European Socialists in Shaping Social Democracy in Central and Eastern Europe,” Government and Opposition 46:1 (2011): 54.

24 Holmes and Lightfoot, “Limited Influence,” 42, 46.

25 Natalia Timus, “Coming Closer to Europe: Transnational Cooperation between EPFs and Post-Soviet Parties,” GARNET Working Paper No 72/09, November 2009; Natalia Timus, “Transnational Party Europeanization: EPP and Ukrainian Parties,” Acta Politica 49:1 (2014).

26 Timus, “Coming Closer”.

27 See, for example, Benjamin von dem Berge and Thomas Poguntke, “The Influence of Europarties on Central and Eastern European Partner Parties: A Theoretical and Analytical Model,” European Political Science Review 5:2 (2013).

28 Geoffrey Pridham, “Comparative Perspectives on Transnational Party-Building in New Democracies: The Case of Central and Eastern Europe,” Acta Politica 49:1 (2014): 32–37.

2. Research Framework

Inspired by the appeal of “going empirical”, this research aims to depart from a traditional “rationalist-constructivist” divide and to move further, by offering a fine-grained explanation of the puzzling phenomena of cooperation between Europarties and non-EU parties. Bridging both approaches, this research is interested in revealing why actors are willing to undergo the costly process of adaptation and how actors internalise new norms. It is interested in portraying the “cogs and wheels” of the causal mechanism of socialisation and in defining the scope conditions stipulating the internalisation.

Combining both rationalist and constructivist logics to party politics, this research focuses on the driving forces behind domestic change as the result of cooperation between Europarties and non-EU parties. Why do political parties decide to comply with norms and implement changes? Is domestic change driven by parties’ noble beliefs or by their pragmatic power tactics? How does norm diffusion occur, and under what conditions does it penetrate the domestic level? These questions can be addressed from both rational and normative perspectives, emphasising a “logic of consequences” and a “logic of appropriateness” in the process of Europeanisation.

2.1 Theoretical Framework:

Socialisation and Norm Diffusion

According to Checkel, socialisation is “the process of inducting new actors into the norms, rules, and way of behaviour of a given community”.1 As members of a certain community, actors share an identity, beliefs, values, and norms, which spread through the socialisation mechanism and thus impose certain expectations on actors’ behavioural patterns. This definition implies an uneven “master-novice” relationship, where newcomers become integrated into an established group and change their behaviour in line with the group’s rules through social interaction.2 As Johnston put it succinctly, “socialization is aimed at creating membership of a society where the intersubjective understandings of the society become taken for granted”.3 As a result, socialisation enables conformity to norms and its internalisation.

Socialisation facilitates norm diffusion. For new norms to be fully institutionalised and internalised, the whole “lifecycle” must take place, which includes three stages: “norm emergence”, “norm cascade” and internalisation.4 The first stage occurs when an established set of norms faces a destabilising shock that undermines the legitimacy of the norms. Confronted with a new si-tuation, the old set of norms fails to offer a satisfying solution to new challenges and problems. This leads to an “ideational vacuum”, in which actors are no longer satisfied with the status quo and start looking for a new set of norms that will solve the uncomfortable situation.5

The second stage begins once the set of norms is selected. At the “norm cascade” stage, the norm entrepreneurs try to convince the actors to comply with their rules and practices through arguing or persuasion. In fact, this stage is characterised by an active phase of socialisation when the norm leaders are trying to induct actors into their system of values. The “norm cascade” occurs under certain circumstances that trigger the norm adoption by actors. The conditions vary depending on the situation but encompass features of institutional design, properties of the actors to be socialised, and properties of the socialising actors.6

Finally, at the last stage, actors internalise new norms and perform them on a habitual basis. New norms are taken for granted and are no longer subjected to a public debate. As a result, norms are viewed as right, appropriate, and intersubjective.

The intricate process of socialisation requires the analysis of the microfoundations which, in turn, predetermines the sustainability of internalisation. The shift from a “logic of consequences” to a “logic of appropriateness” might be triggerred by two microprocesses—persuasion or social influence.7

Persuasion is an idealistic form of internalisation when newcomers ge-nuinely change their beliefs and attitudes, resulting in “deep” socialisation and sustainable change of behaviour. This type of microprocess leads to a genuine attitude change through high intensity cognition, reflection, or argument.8

In contrast to persuasion, social influence triggers “pro-norm behaviour through the distribution of social rewards and punishments”.9 The social-influence method employs a variety of rewards, including psychological well-being, increased status, and a sense of belonging, achieved through confor-mity with role expectations. Punishments, on the other hand, might include shaming, exclusion, demeaning, or cognitive dissonance derived from inconsistent behaviour vis-à-vis the new role and identity.10

Described as “public conformity without private acceptance”, social influence underlines an unfinished process of internalisation, in which the actor does not internalise new rules and norms, but alters its behaviour due to group pressure.11 Of crucial importance in the microprocess of social influence are the maximisation of status, honour, and prestige, and the desire to avoid losing reputation and public image through humiliation and shaming. The desire to maximise reputational attributes converts the status into an instrument. The membership in a high-status group unleashes leverage over the actor’s attitude. Pursuing self-esteem, actors comply with norms, as they want others to think well of them and they want to think well of themselves.12