The Rise and Fall of Renaissance France

A governor’s presence at court gave him unique opportunities of patronage which he might use to build up a powerful clientele within his province. This comprised three elements: the regular army (compagnies d’ordonnance), household officers and servants, and local gentlemen. Nearly all the governors were captains of the gendarmerie – the heavily armoured cavalry – and as such controlled recruitment and promotion within its ranks. A governor also had a large private household which provided employment for local noblemen and education for their children. All of this clearly made him potentially dangerous to the crown, for he might use his personal following within his province to undermine royal authority.

The most complex and least efficient part of French government at the end of the Middle Ages was the fiscal administration. This was built essentially around two kinds of revenue: the ‘ordinary’ revenue (finances ordinaires), which the king drew from his demesne, and the ‘extraordinary’ revenue (finances extraordinaires) which he got from taxation. The ‘extraordinary’ revenue owed its name to the fact that originally it had been levied for a special purpose and for a limited time, usually in wartime. By 1500, however, it came from regular taxes levied in peace and war. The ‘ordinary’ revenue consisted not only of fixed and predictable feudal rents, but also of a wide range of variable dues owed to the king as suzerain.

The ‘extraordinary’ revenue comprised three main taxes: the taille, the gabelle and the aides. The taille was the only direct tax. It was levied annually, the amount being decided by the king’s council, and it could be supplemented by a crue or surtax. There were two sorts of taille: the taille réelle was a land tax payable by everyone irrespective of social rank, and the taille personnelle fell mainly on land owned by unprivileged commoners. The former was obviously fairer, but it was found only in a few areas, notably Provence and Languedoc. The nobility and clergy were exempt from the taille, but it does not follow that all the rest of society was liable. Many professional groups (for example, royal officials, military personnel, municipal officials, lawyers, university teachers and students) were exempt, as were a large number of towns, called villes franches, including Paris. Thus if the peasantry was taillable, the same was not true of the bourgeoisie as a whole.

The gabelle was a tax on salt. By the late Middle Ages the salt trade had become so important in France that the crown decided to take a share of the profits by controlling its sale and distribution. But royal control was strongest in the northern and central provinces (pays de grandes gabelles), which had constituted the demesne of King Charles V (1346–80). Here the salt was taken to royal warehouses (greniers à sel), where it was weighed and allowed to dry, usually for two years. It was then weighed again and taxed before the merchant who owned it was allowed to sell it. As a safeguard against illicit trading in salt, the crown introduced the system of sel par impôt, whereby every household had to purchase from a royal warehouse enough salt for its average needs. Outside the pays de grandes gabelles, the salt tax was levied in different ways: in the west of France it was a quarter or a fifth of the sale price, while in the south a tariff was levied as the salt passed through royal warehouses situated along the coast near areas of production.

The aides were duties levied on various commodities sold regularly and in large quantities. The rate of tax was one sou per livre on all merchandise sold wholesale or retail, except wine and other beverages which were taxed both ways. An important aide was the levy on livestock raised in many towns; another was the aide on wine, called vingtième et huitième. But indirect taxation was, like the taille, subject to local variations; several parts of France were exempt from the aides.

The usual method of tax collection in respect of the taille was for the leading men of a parish to elect from among themselves an assessor and a collector. The assessment, once completed, was read out in church by the local priest; a week later the parishioners paid their taxes to the collector as they left church. The assessor and collector were not inclined to be lenient, for they were liable to be imprisoned or to have their property sequestered if the sum collected fell short of the anticipated total. Indirect taxes were usually farmed by the highest bidder at an auction.

The most lucrative tax was the taille, which amounted to 2.4 million livres out of a total revenue of 4.9 million in 1515. It was followed by the aides, which brought in about a third of the taille. As for the gabelle, it was bringing in 284,000 livres (about six per cent of the total revenue).

The fiscal administration in 1500, like the tax system, had not changed since the reign of Charles VII (1422–61). It comprised two administrations corresponding with the two kinds of revenue. The Trésor, which was responsible for the ‘ordinary’ revenue, was under four trésoriers de France who had very wide powers. Each was responsible for one of four areas, called respectively Languedoïl, Languedoc, Normandy and Outre-Seine-et-Yonne. The trésoriers supervised the collection and disbursement of revenues, but did not handle them. This task was left to the receveurs ordinaires, who were each responsible for a subdivision of the bailliage. The receiver-general for all revenues from the demesne was the changeur du Trésor, who was based in Paris, but only a small proportion of the revenues actually reached him, for the crown settled many debts by means of warrants (décharges) assigned on a local treasurer. This avoided the expense and risk of transporting large amounts of cash along dangerous, bandit-infested roads, while passing on the recovery costs to the creditor.

The four généraux des finances, who had charge of the ‘extraordinary’ revenues, had virtually the same powers as the trésoriers de France, each being responsible for an area, called généralité. These were subdivided into élections, of which there were 85 in 1500, but in general there were no élections in areas which had retained their representative estates (pays d’états). The élection owed its name to the élu, an official whose main function was to carry out regular tours of inspection (chevauchées) of his district, checking its ability to pay and the trust-worthiness of his underlings.

The personnel responsible for the administration of the gabelles varied according to the different kinds of salt tax. In the pays de grandes gabelles; each royal warehouse was under a grenetier assisted by a contrôleur, elsewhere the tax was farmed out by commissioners.

On the same level as the changeur du Trésor and performing the same duties, though in respect of the ‘extraordinary’ revenue, were the four receveurs généraux des finances, one for each généralité.

The two fiscal administrations were not entirely separate, for the trésoriers de France and généraux des finances (known collectively as gens des finances) were expected to reside at court whenever they were not carrying out inspections of their respective areas. They formed a financial committee, which met regularly and independently of the king’s council, and were empowered to take certain decisions on their own. They also attended the king’s council whenever important financial matters were discussed. However, their most important duty was to draw up at the start of each year a sort of national budget (état général par estimation), based on accounts sent in by each financial district.

Popular representation

The French monarchy after the Hundred Years War was stronger than it had been earlier, when it had had to share power with the great feudal magnates, yet it was not strong enough to ignore the traditional rights and privileges of its subjects. The king’s army rarely reached 25,000 men in peacetime and twice that number in war. Such a force could not be expected to hold down a population of around 15 million, particularly as the king could not depend on the loyalty of his troops; mercenaries were notoriously unreliable. The royal civil service was also minute by modern standards. In 1505 there were only 12,000 officials, or one for each 1250 inhabitants. Consequently, the monarchy could be effective only by enlisting the co-operation of its subjects. This could be done in various ways: by protecting their privileges, by keeping in close contact with them, by controlling a vast system of patronage and by using representative institutions.

At the national level the only representative institution was the Estates-General, made up of elected representatives of the three estates: clergy, nobility and third estate. But the king was under no statutory obligation to call them and in 1484 during the minority of Charles VIII they met for the last time before 1560. It does not follow that the people ceased to have a voice. At the national level, the king often called meetings of one or two estates to discuss particular questions, although such assemblies seem to have been primarily intended for propaganda purposes. As Russell Major has written, they ‘served more to keep alive the idea that the wise king acted only upon the advice of his leading subjects than they did to develop new deliberative techniques’.

However, many French provinces continued to have representative estates of their own during the long period when the Estates-General were in abeyance. They were known as pays d’états and the principal ones were Normandy, Languedoc, Dauphiné, Burgundy, Provence and Brittany. Most of the estates consisted of prelates, nobles with fiefs and representatives of the chief towns, but there were numerous exceptions. In Languedoc, for instance, only the bishops and 22 noblemen were allowed to represent their respective estates. At the opposite end, there were local assemblies where only villages and small towns were represented. The estates depended for their existence on the king: he called them, fixed the date and place of their meeting, appointed their president and determined their agenda. Royal commissioners put forward demands, negotiated with the delegates and met some of their demands. Usually the estates met once a year, but they could meet more often. The estates did not exist simply to vote taxes demanded by the king. Through the petitions they submitted to him, they could have an influence on his policies. They played a major role in legal, legislative and administrative matters. The codification of customs, for example, was done in assemblies of the estates. They had their own permanent staff supported out of special taxes. The estates apportioned and collected royal taxes within their province; they also voted money to build roads and bridges and to support various activities beneficial to the local economy. They raised troops, repaired fortifications, built hospitals and engaged in poor relief.

TWO The minority of Charles VIII and the Breton marriage(1483–94)

When Louis XI died on 30 August 1483, his son Charles was only thirteen years old – ten months short of the age of majority for a king of France as laid down by an ordinance of 1374. It was consequently necessary to provide a regent for the intervening period. Four people could claim this role: the queen mother, Charlotte of Savoy; the king’s cousin, Louis duc d’Orléans; and the king’s sister and brother-in-law, Anne and Pierre de Beaujeu. Charlotte could point to the precedent set by Blanche de Castille during the minority of Louis IX, but she was a meek woman who had been allowed only a minor political role by the late king. Orléans was old enough to rule (he was twenty-two years old), but lacked the necessary qualities, being flighty, dissolute and a spendthrift. Anne and Pierre de Beaujeu were better qualified. Anne, who was also twenty-two years old, was intelligent and proud, albeit vindictive and grasping. Her husband Pierre was her senior by twenty-one years and had gained administrative experience under Louis XI. The Beaujeus had important advantages over their rivals: they had custody of the young king and enjoyed the support of the royal civil service; but they could not be sure of the military backing of the great nobles.

Not much is known about the first year of Charles VIII’s reign. Historians have generally assumed that the Beaujeus kept a tenuous hold on the government till the duc d’Orléans fled from the court in 1485. This has been questioned by J. Russell Major, who believes that the Beaujeus were ‘supplanted’ by a council made up of great nobles and their protégés. ‘Supplanted’ seems too strong a word. The Beaujeus retained control while having to co-operate with members of the nobility. Their rival, Louis d’Orléans, became president of the king’s council and lieutenant-general of the Ile-de-France. His uncle, Dunois, was appointed governor of Dauphiné, Valentinois and Diois. Within their orbit were Charles comte d’Angoulême, who was next in line to the throne after Louis, and Jean de Foix, vicomte de Narbonne and comte d’Etampes. Jean duc de Bourbon, elder brother of Pierre de Beaujeu, was showered with favours: he became lieutenant-general of the kingdom, constable of France and governor of Languedoc. Among other prominent nobles who flocked to the court of Charles VIII in 1483 in quest of offices, privileges, gifts and pensions were René II, duc de Lorraine, Alain le Grand, sire d’Albret and Philippe of Savoy, comte de Bresse.

The Estates-General of 1484

The decision to call the Estates-General was taken soon after the death of Louis XI, no one knows by whom. Some historians believe that it was taken by Louis d’Orléans at the instigation of Dunois; others ascribe the responsibility to the Beaujeus. Both parties needed popular support. The estates were due to meet at Orléans on 1 January 1484, but they were moved to Tours because of the threat of plague and did not begin till 15 January. The 287 deputies were drawn from all parts of the kingdom. They were elected in the various bailliages and sénéchaussées without, it seems, any undue pressure being exerted on the electors by Orléans or the Beaujeus. ‘When all is said’, writes Major, ‘neither side made a concerted effort to influence all the elections or to bribe all the deputies when once they were chosen.’ Among them was Jean Masselin, who has left us a uniquely detailed, if somewhat one-sided, account of the proceedings; another was Philippe Pot, sénéchal of Burgundy, who made a remarkable speech on 9 February.

The estates opened, as was the custom, with a speech from the Chancellor of France, Guillaume de Rochefort. The French people, he said, had always been devoted to their rulers, unlike the English who had just crowned the murderer of Edward IV’s young sons, Richard III. He tried to calm the deputies’ fears about the age of their own monarch. Such was the trust that the king placed in them that he would ask them to share in the government: they were to inform him of their grievances, report any oppression by public officials, and advise on how peace, justice and good government might be achieved.

After dividing into six sections, the deputies set up a committee to prepare a general cahier for presentation to the king. This was read out on 2 February. It contained a sweeping denunciation of the government of Louis XI and a call for a return to the practices of Charles VII. The clergy wanted the Pragmatic Sanction of Bourges to be enforced. The nobility complained that they were being impoverished by excessive use of the feudal levy (ban et arrière-ban). They wanted to see foreigners excluded from military commands and from offices in the royal household. They also complained of infringements of their hunting rights by royal officials. Poverty loomed large in the third estate’s submission: the current scarcity of money was blamed on wars and the export of bullion to Rome; taxation was described as excessive. The king was urged to remove the need for the taille by revoking all alienations of domain made by his father, reducing the size of the army, stopping or curbing pensions and decreasing the number and pay of royal officials. The longest chapter of the cahier was concerned with justice: it called for the replacement of officials who had been appointed by Louis XI out of favour rather than on merit.

The government of the kingdom was also considered by the estates. The Beaujeus were anxious to prevent Louis d’Orléans becoming regent and their cause was championed by Philippe Pot on 9 February. ‘The throne’, he declared, ‘is an office of dignity, not an hereditary possession, and as such it does not pass to the nearest relatives in the way a patrimony passes to its natural guardians. If, then, the commonwealth is not to be bereft of government, its care must devolve upon the Estates-General of the realm, whose duty is not to administer it themselves, but to entrust its administration to worthy hands.’ A Norman deputy put forward Orléans’s claim: ‘If the king needs a governor and tutor, or, as it is said, a regent, the duke intends no one other than himself to hold that office.’ Having listened to both sides, the deputies decided that ‘the lord and lady of Beaujeu should remain with the king as they have been hitherto’. The king was given neither regent nor tutor, his intellectual maturity being deemed sufficient. In the chancellor’s words: ‘Our king, young as he is, is of an extraordinary wisdom and seriousness.’ On 6 February the estates were given a list of possible members of the king’s council, but they left the choice to the monarch and the princes.

The assembly of 1484 exerted relatively little influence on the future development of France, but the deputies were reasonably satisfied with their achievements. The taille, which had reached 4.5 million livres under Louis XI, was reduced to 1,500,000 livres. The nobility regained hunting rights on their own lands. Only the clergy were disappointed: their efforts to get the Pragmatic Sanction reinstated were successfully opposed by a pro-papal lobby of cardinals and prelates.

The Estates-General came to an end on 7 March. Orléans felt disgruntled that he had not been given the regency. In May he was awarded the lands of Olivier le Daim, Louis XI’s hated barber, but this was not enough to satisfy him. He continued to intrigue with the duke of Brittany, Richard III of England and Maximilian of Habsburg, who ruled Austria and the Netherlands. However, the threat inherent in such a coalition was temporarily averted by the recall of the nobles to attend the coronation of Charles VIII on 30 May. But a new danger arose for the Beaujeus. The young king became infatuated with Orléans’s athletic prowess and may have pleaded to be rid of his sister’s domination. The duke plotted to abduct Charles, but was forestalled by the Beaujeus who fled with the king from Paris to the security of the small fortified town of Montargis. Here various members of the Orléans faction were dismissed from court. The duke, after protesting about this action, retired to his gouvernement of Ile-de-France.

The ‘Mad War’

The princely revolts, which cast a shadow across the early years of Charles VIII’s reign, have sometimes been read as the sequel to the War of the Public Weal of 1465. The two movements, however, were quite different. The rising of 1465 had been aimed at Louis XI’s overthrow and had lasted only a few months. The Mad War (Guerre folle), by contrast, was not directed at Charles VIII but at the Beaujeus; it also developed surreptitiously over a period of two years, erupting in 1487. A major reason for the long gestation was the independence of the duchy of Brittany, which offered a safe haven to malcontents from the French court. The rising was given its pejorative name soon afterwards by the contemporary historian Paolo Emilio, in his De rebus gestis Francorum.

Brittany’s independence of France manifested itself in various ways. Duke Francis II had paid only a simple homage to King Louis XI which entailed none of the obligations customarily incumbent on a vassal to his suzerain; he had not even gone this far in respect of Charles VIII. Brittany seemed bent on becoming a second Burgundy. Yet it was poor, and militarily far inferior to its French neighbour; it could only hope to defend itself by calling in foreign help, especially from England. But paradoxically the duchy’s independence was undermined by its own subjects, for many Breton nobles chose to serve the king of France, attaching themselves to his court. They retained important estates in Brittany and longed to unite the duchy to the kingdom which provided them with offices, honours and wealth. Another Breton weakness was Duke Francis II, a feckless dilettante who became senile about 1484. His only offspring were two daughters, Anne and Isabeau. The affairs of the duchy fell into the hands of Pierre Landais, its treasurer and a much hated parvenu.

In October 1484 the Breton exiles in France came to an agreement at Montargis with the French government. They swore to recognize Charles VIII as their duke’s successor, should the latter die without male issue. The king, for his part, promised to respect Breton privileges and to arrange good marriages for the duke’s two daughters. Francis’s riposte was to take an oath from his subjects acknowledging his daughters as his heirs. On 23 November he also made a treaty with Louis d’Orléans aimed at freeing Charles VIII from Beaujeu tutelage. The duke, at the same time, won the support of a number of French malcontents and courted the Parisians. Early in 1485, Dunois, Orléans’s evil genius, produced a manifesto condemning the government’s financial management. Orléans begged Charles to emancipate himself from the Beaujeus and return to Paris. The king refused, whereupon Orléans left the capital and started raising troops. He appealed to all his friends, including Francis II, for armed assistance, but the first fires of rebellion were soon put out by the Beaujeus. In February, Charles VIII returned to Paris and measures were taken against the rebels: Orléans was deprived of his governorships of Ile-de-France and Champagne, and Dunois of that of Dauphiné. On 23 March the duke made his submission and was readmitted to the council.

Orléans, however, was biding his time. On 30 August he issued a new manifesto critical of the government’s financial policy. In league with him were Beaujeu’s brother Jean, Constable of Bourbon, the comte d’Angoulême, the comte d’Etampes, Cardinal Pierre de Foix, the sire d’Albret and, of course, Dunois. The rebels hoped to have a larger army than the Beaujeus, who had just sent 4000 men to help Henry Tudor gain the English throne; but their hopes were soon dashed. Charles VIII besieged Orléans and Dunois in Beaugency and within a week the revolt was over. By mid-September the duke was again penitent and had to accept royal garrisons in the towns of his apanage. Dunois lost his office of great chamberlain and was banished to Asti for a year. Bourbon and the other rebels also capitulated. The Peace of Bourges (2 November) gave France several months of domestic tranquillity.

In June 1486, Maximilian of Habsburg, who had recently been elected King of the Romans, launched a surprise attack on France’s northern border. It soon ran out of steam because Maximilian was, as usual, unable to pay his troops, but it triggered off another rebellion within France. The pretext was again fiscal: the Beaujeus had imposed a new crue de taille of 300,000 livres in October. In January 1487, Orléans joined Dunois in Brittany, but Charles VIII and Anne de Beaujeu decided to deal with the rebels in Guyenne before attending to Brittany. Their campaign, which lasted a month and a half, comprised a series of successful sieges. The leading rebel in the south-west, Charles d’Angoulême, surrendered on 19 March and was married off to Louise of Savoy. The future King Francis I was their son.