The Rise and Fall of Renaissance France

In 1516, even before Maximilian’s death, the archbishops of Mainz and Trier had invited Francis to stand for election, promising him their votes. They had soon been joined by Joachim of Brandenburg and the Elector-Palatine, so that the king could reasonably expect a majority in his favour in the electoral college. The Empire attracted him not only for its international prestige, but also because he wanted to keep it out of the hands of Maximilian’s grandson Charles, who was already powerful enough. As he explained, ‘The reason which moves me to gain the Empire … is to prevent the said Catholic King from doing so. If he were to succeed, seeing the extent of his kingdoms and lordships, this could do me immeasurable harm; he would always be mistrustful and suspicious, and would doubtless throw me out of Italy.’

The Electors were less interested in Francis’s candidature than in promoting a contest. Under rules laid down in the Golden Bull, an imperial election was supposed to be free of corruption. In practice, however, it resembled an auction. As the Habsburgs marshalled their resources, Francis did likewise. He sent envoys to the Electors with 400,000 écus to distribute as bribes. When Charles Guillart suggested that persuasion might be preferable to bribery, Francis strongly disagreed. He was better placed than his rival to win the election, for he was closer to Germany and allowed his agents a free hand, whereas Charles was far away in Spain and would not allow his agents to concede anything without his prior approval. But Francis was denied the co-operation of the German bankers, who sided with the Habsburgs if only because they controlled the silver mines of central Europe. Consequently, he was denied exchange facilities and obliged to send ready cash to Germany at a time when the roads were infested with brigands.

German public opinion was also strongly anti-French. Habsburg agents used every means, including sermons and illustrated broadsheets, to stir up suspicion and hatred of the French. Germans were led to believe that the bribes Francis was distributing had been forcibly taken from his subjects and that a comparable fate would befall themselves if he were elected. Francis countered this propaganda by claiming that he, rather than Charles, would be the more effective champion of Christendom against the Turkish Infidel.

On 8 June 1519 the Electors gathered at Frankfurt under the shadow of the army of the Swabian League. No Frenchmen, said Henry of Nassau, would enter Germany save on the points of spears and swords. At the eleventh hour Leo X, who had so far supported Francis as the lesser of two evils (he did not wish to see a union of the imperial and Neapolitan crowns), changed his mind. Even Francis gave up hope of winning. On 26 June he withdrew his candidature and, two days later, Charles was chosen unanimously.

Historians have often assumed that the rivalry which developed between Francis and Charles stemmed from the imperial election. Francis was undoubtedly vexed by the result, particularly as he had wasted some 400,000 écus on bribes. But his disappointment was dwarfed by the political implications of the election. Before Charles could be a fully-fledged emperor, he needed to be crowned by the pope in Italy. He was likely to go there in force and would almost certainly threaten Francis’s hold on Milan, particularly as the emperor was the duchy’s suzerain. The pope, too, had reason to fear Habsburg domination of the peninsula. On 22 October he signed a secret treaty with Francis. While the king promised to defend the States of the Church against Charles, Leo undertook to deny Charles the investiture of Naples.

The Field of Cloth of Gold (June 1520)

The imperial election brought France and England closer together. Whereas in the past there had been four major powers in Europe, France, Spain, England and the Empire, now there were only three, Spain and the Empire having become joined in the person of Charles V. As France and the new Habsburg state seemed of roughly equal weight, England’s position was enhanced. Cardinal Wolsey, who directed Henry VIII’s foreign policy, revived the idea, first mooted in 1518, of a meeting between Henry and Francis. On 12 March he laid down the conditions of what has become known as the Field of Cloth of Gold. Charles, whose aunt Catherine of Aragon was Henry’s queen, tried hard to prevent the meeting or to secure its postponement. He visited England on his way from Spain to Germany and held talks with Henry VIII, but no one knows what they decided.

The Anglo-French meeting took place in June at a site between the English town of Guînes and the French town of Ardres. Providing suitable accommodation for the large number of participants was probably the biggest headache for the organizers. Henry erected a large temporary palace outside Guînes castle, while Francis put up a superb tent covered with gold brocade and striped with blue velvet powdered with gold fleur-de-lys. It was the tallest of some 300 or 400 pitched in a meadow outside Ardres.

The Field of Cloth of Gold consisted of two events: the initial meeting of the kings on 7 June and a tournament or feat of arms scheduled to last twelve days. Henry and his court crossed the Channel on 31 May. Soon afterwards, Wolsey with a magnificent escort called on Francis at Ardres and signed a treaty which provided for the marriage between the Dauphin and Mary Tudor. On 7 June, at an agreed signal, the two kings, each accompanied by a large escort, moved towards the Val Doré, where they faced each other on two artificial mounds. After a fanfare, Henry and Francis rode towards the bottom of the valley. They spurred their mounts as if about to engage in combat, but instead embraced each other. After dismounting, they retired to a tent where they were joined by Wolsey and Bonnivet. An hour later they emerged and presented their respective nobles to each other.

The ‘feat of arms’, which began on 11 June, lasted till the 24th. Complicated regulations had been drawn up to prevent accidents. The two kings did not fight each other: they competed each with his own team. The famous story of Henry being worsted by Francis in a wrestling match is probably apocryphal. What is certain is that the king of France soon tired of the rigid etiquette that had been prescribed. On 17 June he paid Henry a surprise visit. Bursting into his chamber, he exclaimed: ‘Brother, here am I your prisoner!’ Not to be outdone, Henry turned up in Francis’s bedroom two days later. This put everyone in a good mood. On 23 June mass was celebrated by Wolsey amidst great pomp on the tournament field. The two royal chapels sang alternate verses of hymns accompanied by an organ, trombones and cornets. Afterwards the pope’s blessing was conferred on both kings. Louise of Savoy announced that her son and Henry intended jointly to build a palace in the Val Doré where they might meet each year, and also a chapel dedicated to Our Lady of Friendship.

Money matters

Francis I incurred heavy expenses from the start of his reign. Having inherited a deficit of 1.4 million livres from Louis XII, he had to pay for that king’s funeral and for his own coronation. The overall cost of the Marignano campaign has been estimated at 7.5 million livres. The Peace of Fribourg cost the French crown one million écus and inaugurated a system of pensions to the Swiss. In 1518, Francis paid 600,000 écus for the return of Tournai. The imperial election campaign may have cost him another 400,000 écus and the Field of Cloth of Gold at least 200,000l. In June 1517 the king’s council decided to levy supplementary taxes worth 1,100,0431. in an attempt to reduce the government’s deficit of 3,996,5061.

Francis did not substantially change either the burden or the structure of taxation during his reign. Royal income from taxes rose by an annual average of 1.44 per cent, which is moderate by comparison with the average of 2.38 per cent per annum under Louis XII and 5.7 per cent per annum under Henry II. The taille rose most in absolute terms: from about 2.4 million livres in 1515 to some 4.6 million in 1544–5 with a fall to 3.6 million in 1547. The rate of the gabelle in north and central France trebled during the reign, but over the whole kingdom its value was only 700,000l. in 1547 as compared with less than 400,000 in the early part of the reign. The aides and other indirect taxes are said to have risen from about 1.2 million to 2.15 million. Domainal revenues did not rise at all. The only tax created by Francis was one on walled towns to pay for infantry.

However, taxation estimates based on the central records are misleading, for a high proportion of the receipts were disbursed at the collection point and never reached the royal treasury. The actual burden of taxation was also heavier than is suggested by the central records, the sums imposed by local collectors being often in excess of the legal limits. The yield was also eroded by the costs of collection.

Although in theory the French church was exempt from direct taxation, the reality was different. In theory the clerical tenth or décime was a voluntary gift to assist the king in an emergency, yet in practice it became virtually a regular tax. Following the Concordat of Bologna, the pope allowed Francis to levy a tenth on the French clergy and he did so again in 1527 and 1533, but papal authorization was not regarded as essential; the initiative was often taken by the king alone. Altogether 57 tenths were levied under Francis and may have yielded a total of 18 million livres.

It was outside his regular income that Francis innovated most. To meet his immediate needs, he borrowed from merchants and bankers, most of them Italians who had settled in Lyon. They lent to the crown sometimes under constraint or in exchange for commercial concessions, but usually as a result of free speculative choice. The king was often prepared to pay high rates of interest. For example, a loan of 100,000 écus raised for the Field of Cloth of Gold carried an annual interest of 16.2 per cent. By 1516 the crown was already heavily in debt to the Lyon bankers.

Francis also borrowed heavily from his own tax officials, who were invariably men of substance. If for some reason the tax yield was lower than expected, a tax official might be asked to advance money from his own pocket. In return, he would be allowed to reimburse himself from the next year’s tax receipts. This was how taxes were ‘anticipated’. On a number of occasions the king helped himself to the inheritance of a wealthy subject. His first victim was the seigneur de Boisy who died in May 1519.

Although many towns were exempt from the taille, they were often asked for forced loans, which could be even more burdensome. In 1515 and 1516, for example, Francis asked for sums ranging from 1500 to 6000 livres each from Toulouse, Lyon, Troyes and Angers. Paris was asked for 20,000l. to help pay for the defence of the kingdom. Sometimes a town was allowed to recoup by levying a local tax or octroi on some commodity such as wine. An expedient much used by Francis was the alienation of crown lands by gift or sale. This was repeatedly opposed by the parlement, which pointed to the adverse effect on the king’s ‘poor subjects’ of any diminution of his ‘ordinary’ revenue, but Francis always managed to get his way.

Two other expedients were the sale of titles of nobility and of royal offices. As far as is known, Francis issued 183 letters of ennoblement during his reign of which 153 were sold. They cost between 100 and 300 écus before 1543 and considerably more afterwards. As for offices, Francis turned their sale into a veritable system. They were sold directly to bourgeois anxious to acquire them as a means of social advancement (for many offices conferred noble status on the holders) or were given away as rewards for services rendered or as repayment of loans, leaving the recipients free to sell them if they wished. Francis also sold résignations and survivances which enabled office-holders to nominate their successors. The price of a councillorship in the Parlement of Paris was fixed by 1522 at 3000 écus; other offices commanded variable amounts. The sale or venality of offices created a dangerous situation in the long term as they tended to be monopolized by a limited number of families.

The trésoriers de France and généraux des finances (known collectively as gens des finances), who administered the crown’s finances between 1515 and 1527, were closely related to each other and shared their interests. Alongside their royal duties they ran very profitable businesses of their own. Consequently, their public and private functions overlapped, offering speculative temptations. An outstanding member of this financial oligarchy was Jacques de Beaune, baron of Semblançay, the son of a rich merchant of Tours, who became the king’s chief financial adviser after serving his mother and, before her, Anne of Brittany. As général of Languedoïl, he played a leading role in funding the Marignano campaign. In January 1518 he was given overall powers of supervision over all the king’s revenues, but it was probably as an agent of credit that he proved most useful to the crown. Important as they were, the gens des finances did not have ultimate control of the crown’s financial policy. This was vested in the king’s council among whose members one, usually the Grand Master, was singled out to oversee financial business. The king himself was by no means uninterested in such business. In April 1519 he spent three days with his gens des finances looking for ways to fund the army.

War with the emperor (1521)

Charles of Habsburg was crowned King of the Romans at Aachen on 23 October 1520. Two days later Pope Leo X allowed him to use the title of ‘Roman emperor elect’. Charles hoped to go to Italy soon for his imperial coronation, but various matters detained him in Germany, among them the Lutheran Reformation. Francis hoped to return to Italy himself, but was prevented by a serious accident. However, he added to Charles’s problems in order to keep him out of Italy. Among visitors to the king’s bedside were Robert de La Marck, seigneur de Sedan, and Henri d’Albret, king of Navarre. Soon afterwards they invaded Luxemburg and Navarre respectively. Francis disclaimed any responsibility for their actions, but Charles was not deceived. He accused the king of waging war covertly and warned him of the risks involved. Soon afterwards an imperial army led by the count of Nassau threw La Marck out of Luxemburg, overran Sedan and threatened France’s northern border. In the south, Marshal Lescun’s army was routed at Ezquiros, and Spanish Navarre, which he had invaded, reverted to Castilian rule.

In Italy, too, Francis ran into serious trouble. On 29 May, Leo X came to terms with Charles V. The latter promised to restore Parma and Piacenza to the Holy See, to assist the pope against the duke of Ferrara and to take the Medici under his protection, while Leo promised to crown Charles emperor in Rome and signified his willingness to invest him with Naples. The treaty, however, was kept secret until Leo was given a pretext to break his alliance with France. In June, Lescun, who had been left in charge of Milan, invaded the States of the Church in pursuit of some rebels. His action gave the pope the pretext he had been waiting for. When an ammunition dump in Milan exploded, killing many French soldiers, Leo acclaimed the event as an act of God and made public his treaty with Charles. Soon afterwards they formed a league for the defence of Italy. Denouncing the pope’s ingratitude on 13 July, Francis banned the export of all ecclesiastical revenues to Rome and imposed heavy fines on Florentine merchants in France. He boasted that before long he would enter Rome and impose laws on the pope.

By the summer of 1521, Francis had cause to rethink his policies. The emperor was threatening his northern border, Navarre was again under Castilian rule, the pope had turned imperialist and the French hold on Milan was precarious. On 9 June the king accepted an offer of mediation from Henry VIII, and in July an international conference met at Calais under Wolsey’s chairmanship. Francis wanted peace, not a truce, but Mercurino di Gattinara, the imperial chancellor, wanted neither. He was anxious to prove that Francis had been the aggressor as the first step towards forming an Anglo-imperial alliance.

On 20 August the emperor invaded northern France. For three weeks Mézières was heavily bombarded, but the garrison, commanded by Bayard, put up a stout resistance. This gave Francis time to gather an army near Reims. He still hoped for peace, but the Calais conference was getting nowhere. Wolsey, who had paid a mysterious visit to the emperor in Bruges, seemed to be playing for time. In late September the title of war suddenly turned in France’s favour. On 26 September, Nassau lifted the siege of Mézières and retreated into Hainault; in Italy, Lautrec relieved Parma; and on 19 October, Bonnivet captured Fuenterrabía on the Franco-Spanish border. These French victories naturally affected the talks in Calais. When Wolsey suggested a truce, Francis was no longer interested. He planned to relieve Tournai which was being besieged by the imperialists, but on 23 October he missed a unique opportunity of defeating the enemy, and on 1 November he began retreating towards Arras. Nine days later he disbanded his army; soon afterwards Tournai capitulated. Francis was hoping for better news from Italy, but on 19 November the league’s army captured Milan. The French were then driven out of other towns in the duchy. The Calais conference, meanwhile, came to an end. On 24 November, in the Treaty of Bruges, Wolsey committed England to enter the war on the emperor’s side in 1522.

The financial crisis of 1521–3

It was only in 1521, after Francis had gone to war with the emperor, that the gap between his income and expenses became almost unbridgeable. For war had become very expensive, especially the hire of Swiss mercenaries. ‘These people’, wrote Anne de Montmorency, ‘ask for so much money and are so unreasonable that it is almost impossible to satisfy them.’ Yet Francis could not dispense with them. Within a few months his indebtedness to moneylenders rose alarmingly. By the spring of 1522 he owed them one million livres. At the beginning of 1521, Semblançay had in his keeping 300,000 écus which the king had received from Charles V as part of the Neapolitan pension and 107,000 livres belonging to Louise of Savoy. When she implored Semblançay to do everything in his power to assist her son, he assumed that she meant him to use her savings as well as the king’s. But this money was very soon swallowed up. On 13 September, Semblançay informed the king that he had only enough money left for one month. As the war dragged on through the winter, Francis created offices, and in February 1522 alienated crown lands worth 200,000 livres. The taille of 1523 was anticipated to the tune of 1,191,1841. The king called on a number of towns to pay for infantry. He also seized church treasures worth 240,000l. The silver grille enclosing the shrine of St Martin at Tours was torn down by royal agents, melted down and turned into coin. At Laon cathedral four statues of apostles in gold were given the same treatment.

On 22 September the government raised a loan of 200,000l. from the Parisian public against the security of the municipal revenues. This marked the beginning of the system of public credit, known as the Rentes sur l’Hôtel de Ville. Each contributor to the loan was assured of a life annuity or rente, carrying a rate of interest of 81/3 per cent which was paid out of the receipts from various local taxes. As the interest was paid by municipal officials of the same social background as the lenders, the system rested on a fair measure of mutual trust, yet Parisians showed little enthusiasm for the scheme.

The battle of La Bicocca (27 April 1522)

The sudden death of Leo X on 1 December 1521 changed the situation in Italy. As the flow of money from papal coffers to Colonna’s army dried up, the French under Marshal Lautrec reorganized themselves. Much, however, hung on the result of the next papal conclave. Francis threatened to sever his allegiance to the Holy See if Cardinal Giulio de’ Medici, leader of the imperial faction in the Sacred College, were elected. In the event, the cardinals chose Adrian of Utrecht, Charles V’s old tutor and regent in Spain. Francis was understandably furious, but Adrian, who took the name of Hadrian VI, approached his new duties in a truly Christian spirit. Denying that he owed his election to Charles, he refused to be drawn into the anti-French league. His main objective was to pacify Christendom as the first step towards arranging a crusade against the Turks, who now threatened Rhodes, the last Christian outpost in the eastern Mediterranean. Francis, however, was more interested in regaining Milan.

In March 1522, Lautrec, whose army had been reinforced by 16,000 Swiss, laid siege to Milan, but, finding the city too strong, he turned his attention to Pavia. Francesco Sforza was thus able to put more troops into Milan, much to the chagrin of Francis who accused his captains in Italy of incompetence. He declared his intention of returning there himself, but was overtaken by events. Emerging from Milan, Colonna threatened Lautrec’s rear, whereupon the marshal lifted the siege of Pavia and marched to Monza. Colonna followed at a safe distance and encamped in the grounds of a villa north-west of Milan, called La Bicocca. He fortified his camp with ditches, ramparts and gun platforms. Lautrec saw the madness of attacking it, but his Swiss troops, who had grown tired of marching and counter-marching to no purpose, threatened to leave unless he engaged the enemy at once. He begged them to think again, but eventually conceded their demand. On 27 April they attacked the imperial camp only to be decimated. Some 3000 were killed, leaving the rest to return to Switzerland utterly humiliated. Lautrec, after a vain attempt to hang on to Lodi, returned angrily to France. His brother Lescun surrendered Cremona soon afterwards. On 30 May, Genoa capitulated. Only the castles of Milan and Cremona remained in French hands. The French débâcle in Italy was soon followed by England’s entry into the war. On 29 May an English herald appeared before Francis in Lyon and declared war in Henry’s name. Hostilities began in July when the earl of Surrey raided Morlaix. In September he led an army out of Calais and tried unsuccessfully to provoke the French into giving battle. Within a month, however, his supplies ran out, forcing him to withdraw to Calais.

While the princes of Christendom were fighting each other, Rhodes fell to the Turks. Hadrian VI urged the princes to sink their differences and join a crusade; but Francis insisted on Milan being restored to him first. The pope, he said, had no canonical right to impose a truce under threat of spiritual sanctions. He reminded Hadrian of the fate that had befallen Pope Boniface VIII in the fourteenth century when he had opposed the French king Philip the Fair. In June he banned the export of money from France to Rome and dismissed the papal nuncio from his court. These measures only served to drive Hadrian into the imperial camp. On 3 August he joined a league for the defence of Italy.

The enquiry commissions of 1523–4 and fiscal reform

By 1523 there was not enough money in the king’s coffers to pay for the war. Francis had to look for new sources of income. He suspected that he was being cheated by his own fiscal officials, and set up a commission to audit their accounts and to punish any malpractices. Not even Semblançay, who had done so much to assist the king out of his difficulties, was spared, yet his only fault had been not to distinguish between the king’s purse and his mother’s. At the end, the commissioners found that he owed Louise 707,267 livres, but that he was owed 1,190,374 livres by the king.