Maxwell: The Final Verdict

It was in its pure form that, on 27 January 1989, Trachtenberg and Smith suggested to McInroy that First Tokyo could generate extra income at no risk by stock lending the shares in its reduced £60 million fund. Overcoming his initial reservations, McInroy agreed to a six-month trial. Unfortunately, however, he failed to ask a number of pertinent questions about the transactions, and most of all he failed to examine the contract between First Tokyo and LBI. He merely demanded that Morgan Stanley, the Trust’s bank which held the share certificates in its safe in London, should accept all the risk. Trachtenberg and Donoughue were told to obtain an undertaking to that effect from Morgan Stanley, whose vice-president Thomas Christofferson duly gave it. Trachtenberg and Donoughue then assured McInroy that the bank had agreed to be the guarantor, though the First Tokyo chairman appears never to have asked for written evidence. ‘That wasn’t my responsibility,’ he later explained.

Inevitably there was confusion about responsibility for the management of First Tokyo’s £60 million – confusion which was very much Robert Maxwell’s intention. First Tokyo had a contract with London & Bishopsgate International Investment Management, who were to manage the fund in accordance with the wishes of First Tokyo’s board of directors. LBIIM was owned by London & Bishopsgate Holdings, which in turn was owned by Headington Hill Investments, Maxwell’s private company ultimately owned by the Liechtenstein foundation. But it was the entirely distinct LBI which was undertaking the stock lending. This confusion was ignored by McInroy, not least because during the first year the profits seemed to exceed expectations.

McInroy’s legal advisers seem also not to have appreciated the deft self-protection of LBIIM’s contract with First Tokyo. While one clause at the top of the agreement permitted stock lending, another, much later clause allowed LBIIM to stock lend ‘in house’ for a ‘fair price’. Astutely, Maxwell and his cohorts had covered themselves in the event of future recriminations.

Unknown to McInroy, soon after the stock lending was approved Maxwell allowed Trachtenberg to use First Tokyo’s shares in an unauthorized manner. First Tokyo’s stock was being lent, not in an orthodox way on the open market, but to Maxwell privately, that is to London & Bishopsgate Holdings. And the collateral for the prime Japanese stock was not cash but MCC shares. To the Maxwells, the beauty of the operation was that First Tokyo’s shares were never sold, so preserving the myth that the fund was inviolate and untouched. The only risk was to First Tokyo’s innocent investors. The evidence suggests that by February 1990 Lord Donoughue ought to have suspected the unannounced use of those shares. In September of that year, Kevin would offer some of those First Tokyo shares to Julie Maitland of Crédit Suisse as collateral for the £50 million private loan.

By November 1990, as Maxwell vainly searched for relief from the recession and from the rising interest rates on his total debt of $3.5 billion, First Tokyo’s £60 million was only a small part of his requirements. For more than a year, he had also been stock lending pension fund shares using the technique proposed by Trachtenberg and Smith. During summer 1989, on the Maxwells’ instructions, Trachtenberg had negotiated the use of pension fund shares to raise cash from John Di Rocco, head of Lehman Brothers’ International securities lending department. To conceal the scheme, the contract signed by Kevin on BIM’s behalf was made complicated. Lehmans would be given shares from BIM’s portfolio, and in exchange would give Treasury bills to Maxwell. Maxwell would immediately sell the bills back to Lehmans, who would pay him in cash. The end result would be that Maxwell had cash and Lehmans had the security of the pension fund shares. In theory, the pension funds would retrieve their shares after buying back the Treasury bills. In the meantime, the impression was preserved that the pension funds still owned the shares unencumbered.

There was one major obstacle to overcome to obtain that cash. On each share certificate, the owner was registered as BIM. To use those pension fund shares, Maxwell needed to invent a cover story to explain his entry into such an unusual transaction.

The reason provided by Trachtenberg to Di Rocco was that BIM needed cash so that it could reinvest the money in shares which would produce higher returns than its existing portfolio, while simultaneously retaining the investment benefit of the shares it pledged. To Maxwell’s delight, Di Rocco accepted the business. Whether the banker realized by specific inquiries that BIM was the manager of pension fund assets would remain uncertain and be subsequently contested. But he and his superiors did realize that the arrangement was ‘purely a funding exercise’, and their suspicions ought to have been aroused because the circumstances were so unusual. It was unusual in two ways: first, the bank was to pay the cash into Maxwell’s private accounts; and second, neither Trachtenberg nor Andrew Smith was a director of BIM. Indeed, Trachtenberg said he represented LBIIM, which was acting as BIM’s agent.

There was one final hurdle. Before the pension fund shares could be used for stock lending, Trachtenberg required Trevor Cook’s consent. At the end of October 1989, after reading LBI’s terms for stock lending, Cook, BIM’s manager, signed an agreement. But that agreement – between BIM and LBI – was different from the contract with Lehmans signed by Kevin on LBI’s behalf, which was not for stock lending but for a loan.

To Cook, everything appeared normal. Working in an open-plan office in Dorrington Street with files marked ‘Stock lending accounts’, he and his deputy Jeff Highfield received monthly accounts from LBI recording the value of the stock lending: Cook in turn would bill LBI for the agreed 1.75 per cent fee. Cook’s willingness to be helpful made the Maxwells’ task much easier. He never asked to see the contracts.

Throughout 1989, with Cook’s agreement, Maxwell had also been personally borrowing increasing amounts of money from BIM, rising from £5 million to £22.5 million. To extinguish the debt, Maxwell ‘sold’ to BIM privately owned shares, but publicly he did not reveal the change of ownership. ‘We’ll always give the pension funds first refusal to earn profits from our share deals,’ Maxwell had told Cook. To the manager, the offer appeared generous. Apparently he remained unsuspicious even when Maxwell’s £22.5 million borrowing during 1989 cost the pension funds £510,000.

Having established Cook’s willingness to accept directives, Maxwell summoned him in January 1990. ‘I have decided it would be in BIM’s interest to buy more MCC shares,’ he said. ‘The price is certain to rise.’ Cook agreed, without questioning Maxwell’s misplaced confidence. BIM would pay £63.2 million for MCC shares owned by Maxwell personally. Cook not only agreed to the ‘offer’ but did not demand that the shares be registered in BIM’s name. Instead, the shares remained registered as Maxwell’s property, and he borrowed another £26 million of the pension funds’ money to finance MCC. Cook would subsequently explain, ‘I didn’t realize the ownership could be abused.’

That March, Maxwell called in Cook twice more. The price of MCC shares was falling despite his prediction two months earlier and he wanted to push it back up. ‘I think it would be beneficial for BIM to buy more MCC shares,’ he said. Two deals were concluded, which were to lose the pension funds £7.4 million. On the 20th, BIM purchased a call option on 10 million MCC shares through Sheinberg at Goldman Sachs. Days before the end of the financial year, BIM paid £20 million for the shares, £2.4 million more than their worth, to boost MCC’s price. On 29 March, BIM sold 7.9 million MCC shares through Goldmans. In the second deal, BIM bought a call option from Goldmans on a further 10 million MCC shares for £18.9 million. One month later, the deal was booked to BIT (Bishopsgate Investment Trust, the nominee company used by Maxwell to retain pension fund shares and cash). The option, exercised on 29 June, cost BIM £5 million.

On 31 March 1990, the end of the financial year, Maxwell’s debt to the pension fund was still £13.5 million, so to remove it from the annual accounts he repaid it. The following day, he withdrew the money again. Thereafter his use of pension fund money rocketed. By 29 June, he had taken £105 million from BIM. To settle that debt, he told Cook that he was ‘selling’ to the pension funds his private stake in Invesco MIM and 5.4 million shares in Scitex, an Israeli high-tech company producing imaging systems for the publishing industry. Maxwell had bought 9.59 million Scitex shares (after rights issue) in December 1988 for $39 million or £24 million. Their value would rise to $220 million. The shares Maxwell offered Cook represented three-quarters of his stake in the company and would be worth £102 million.

Cook accepted this ‘offer’ too. He listed the Scitex and Invesco shares as part of BIM’s management of pension funds and removed Maxwell’s private £105 million debt from the accounts. But he failed to register the shares officially in Israel as owned by the pension fund. This, he explained, was ‘because I had signed a personal agreement with Robert Maxwell that he was holding the shares on BIM’s behalf. Even worse, he did not secure possession of the share certificates.

Maxwell’s complete control over BIM and the pension funds was, to his and Kevin’s increasing irritation, not duplicated at LBI, where a crisis had arisen among the directors. The cause was Mark Tapley, recruited as the new managing director in January 1990. Clean-cut, honest and ambitious to make his fortune in London’s rollicking financial markets, Tapley had been employed in the 1970s at J.P. Morgan and had been lured to LBI from Lehmans by Smith and Lord Donoughue on a generous salary for a three-year contract plus bonuses.

Within days of his arrival, Tapley had become alarmed by LBI’s administrative chaos, for which he blamed Larry Trachtenberg. He was also unhappy with Andrew Smith’s exaggerated claims about past performance and who, moreover, appeared to be trading in shares in what Tapley considered an unacceptable manner. ‘That’s a conflict of interest,’ he cautioned Smith. Soon afterwards, Smith returned to New York to establish LBI Inc. with £10 million capital provided by Maxwell, continuing his collaboration with Trachtenberg and Donoughue, although the latter referred to the American as ‘Adolf Smith’. ‘We must get rid of Trachtenberg,’ Tapley told Donoughue. ‘We must get him out of LBI.’ But Donoughue did not respond. By then, he had become Kevin’s confidant and no week passed without his name featuring in the Maxwell son’s diary.

On 1 April 1990, glancing at LBI’s 1989 accounts, Tapley noticed the high fees LBI was earning from the stock-lending programme. ‘Where are these fees coming from?’ he asked Trachtenberg. The American only replied, ‘It’s all done through Morgan Stanley with their guarantee.’ Tapley’s curiosity was not satisfied. Searching through the records of the stock lending, he came across the name of Thomas Christofferson, of Morgan Stanley. Christofferson was grateful to Kevin for placing LBI’s custodian business with his bank. It was an easy source of income. Until November 1991, Christofferson would, on demand from either Kevin or Trachtenberg, innocently sign letters and release share certificates which diverted the shares belonging to First Tokyo and others.

Although Tapley noticed that Trachtenberg was telephoning Morgan Stanley and ordering them to pledge First Tokyo’s shares to other banks as formal stock lending, reading LBI’s print-outs he was puzzled that they failed to identify the shares loaned. Instead, Trachtenberg’s oral instructions to Morgan Stanley were recorded on the computer only as ‘shares held on order of … bank’. Tapley demanded to know what was the authority for stock lending First Tokyo’s shares. ‘We’re doing it on Maxwell’s orders,’ stated Trachtenberg. He then added disingenuously: ‘We don’t know to whom the stock is being lent.’

Tapley’s initial concern had been that Trachtenberg was carelessly omitting to keep a record of his instructions to Morgan Stanley. By April 1990, he realized it was worse than that. His source was Jonathan Ford, a former Coopers accountant recruited by Maxwell to work in LBI. ‘I’ve been in the investment business for twenty years,’ said Tapley, ‘and I’ve never earned so much from stock lending. How do you do it?’

‘Because it comes from the Mirror Group,’ replied Ford with startling honesty.

Tapley gasped, ‘This is another conflict of interest. It will be forbidden by IMRO.’

Tapley appealed to Kevin. It was an unwelcome approach and Kevin repeatedly cancelled the appointment. When they finally met, Kevin agreed, ‘We must close that stock-lending operation down.’ But he made it clear that Tapley was no longer welcome in his office – he was disrupting the Maxwells’ operation. Of course the stock lending would not stop, but Kevin agreed with his father that it might be dangerous to dismiss the manager in breach of his contract. Better to keep him inside the tent and quiet. For his part, Tapley did not welcome the prospect of litigation with the Maxwells if he himself sought to break his contract, nor would he relish the loss of his high income in the middle of a recession.

Come July 1990, Tapley was still concerned by LBI’s stock lending of First Tokyo shares. ‘Why are you bothered?’ asked Trachtenberg. ‘It’s nothing to do with you!’ By then, Stuart Carson, LBI’s new compliance officer, responsible in the new self-regulatory era for ensuring fulfilment of statutory requirements, had consulted IMRO. The regulatory agency confirmed that IMRO rules did not forbid the conflict of interest prompted by stock lending. ‘It isn’t forbidden,’ reported Carson.

Two palliatives were proposed. Jean-Pierre Anselmini, MCC’s French deputy chairman, was that same July temporarily appointed an LBI director. Tapley’s initial relief disappeared when Anselmini began to postpone important meetings. ‘You’re intransigent,’ he told Tapley in stilted English, ‘making the management more difficult by distressingly insisting upon standards against Smith.’ Tapley’s appeals to Donoughue were also rebuffed. Urging self-restraint, the peer told him, ‘We must try and keep this together. We’re a good team.’ Donoughue was supported by George Willett: ‘Don’t go to IMRO. Stop making distinctions between moral and legal issues.’ Tapley was persuaded to keep quiet by three men whose motives he found unclear. Tapley accorded Donoughue the nickname ‘Manuel’, the character in the television sitcom Fawlty Towers famous for his repeated claim, ‘I know nothing.’

At the end of the day on 3 August 1990, after many cancelled meetings, Tapley was finally admitted once more into Kevin’s office. ‘The stock lending must stop,’ agreed Robert Maxwell. Satisfied that he had got what he wanted, Tapley distributed a memorandum describing a newly reorganized LBI which would exclude Smith and Trachtenberg. Two hours later, Kevin telephoned, his voice betraying deep anger: ‘That memo must be withdrawn. It’s premature.’ During that short interval, Kevin had understood the implications for the empire’s survival of Trachtenberg’s removal.

In the course of successive meetings in late October and November, Tapley was convinced by Kevin and Donoughue that LBI would be reorganized. ‘We’ll get rid of the Max Factor,’ both pledged, referring to the negative influence of Robert Maxwell. Tapley was relieved. But in reality he had been sidelined. The Maxwells’ priority was to silence their critic while they sought cash from any source to sustain their increasing debts. In September Kevin had committed himself to his father’s scheme of arrangement. Searching through BIM’s monthly schedule of shares owned by the pension funds, he had noticed the name Euris, a French investment fund. Euris, he knew, did not issue share certificates. Instead, the only proof of ownership were the records held by the company’s secretary. Transfer of ownership was settled by a simple letter notifying a sale.

On 3 September 1990, Kevin wrote, as a director of BIM, to Euris’s company secretary instructing that 2.2 million shares worth £32 million had been ‘transferred’ from BIM to Pergamon Holdings, a transfer which contravened the trust deed. (The board minutes were signed by Kevin, Ian and Robert Maxwell, with Anselmini as a witness. BIM’s articles required two signatures for a transfer.) On the same day, Kevin pledged the shares to BNP, the French bank, as collateral for a private loan. He then kept silent about the transfer. Trevor Cook, BIM’s manager, was not told, and Euris remained listed on BIM’s schedule as a pension fund share. By any measure, it was unauthorized, but it was a mere curtain-raiser to the increasingly drastic measures undertaken by Kevin to raise cash during October.

His targets were two fund managers of pension fund shares. In October 1990, he asked the managers of Capel Cure Myers and Invesco MIM for the temporary return of shares owned by the pension funds for stock lending. On 8 October, Capel Cure, on Kevin’s instructions, sent shares worth £40 million for stock lending to Lehmans. Capel Cure’s covering letter explicitly informed the bank that the shares were owned by the Mirror Group Pension Scheme. The reason for their action, some suggest, was that an assistant director at Capel Cure appreciated that the pension fund shares were to be used as collateral for a loan rather than for stock lending and sought to protect his position.

The following day, 9 October 1990, Kevin and Cook, acting as BIM directors, instructed Invesco to send its pension fund portfolio worth £30 million to Lehmans. The letter, signed by Kevin on behalf of the Mirror Group Pension Scheme, assured Invesco that the shares would be used for normal stock lending and returned ‘within 30 days’. Lawrence Guest, a Mirror Group director and one of the fund’s trustees, was not told about the ‘stock lending’. He would only discover in November 1991. Initially, there was no reason for the other fund managers to suspect that Kevin’s instruction was not straightforward, but the arrangement did disturb Tim Daily, Invesco’s expert in stock lending. Daily, twenty-seven years old, was an ambitious, working-class trader born in Watford with just six O levels who unashamedly wanted ‘to taste the good things in life’. Hired in April 1990 to expand Invesco’s stock-lending business, he had recently been appointed the chairman of the International Stock Lending Association, the industry’s spokesman in dealing with both the media and the Bank of England. Among his targets for Invesco’s new stock-lending business were the Maxwell pension funds.

The news that Maxwell was intending to use a rival for stock lending was passed to Daily that same day, 9 October, in a panic telephone call from Peter Smith, his subordinate. Daily, in Naples, Florida attending a stock-lending conference, was chastened by the report. ‘It all sounds a little bit fishy,’ Smith told Daily, ‘and not quite as cut and dry as it seems.’ On hearing the news, he added, he had telephoned a friend at Lehmans and had been told that the portfolio was to be used not for stock lending but ‘purely as collateral for a loan’. Smith added that, to his surprise, Trachtenberg had also telephoned asking him not to speak to Lehmans. Daily decided to approach Mark Haas, the bearded and ambitious Lehmans securities executive responsible for negotiating the transaction with Kevin and Trachtenberg, who was also attending the conference in Florida.

Minutes later, Daily found Haas watching a game of pool. ‘Are you taking away our client for stock lending?’

‘No,’ replied Haas. ‘We’re doing a Treasury repo. Not stock lending. Maxwell is having trouble raising cash’ and was using pension fund assets. Haas knew that MCC, under pressure to repay debts, had asked Lehmans for a $15 million loan for one month. His superiors, after reading MCC’s accounts, had vetoed the idea out of fear of Maxwell’s ‘potential for manipulation [of] profits’ and because MCC’s accounts revealed assets of minus $2.2 billion because of the debts. Moreover, at Lehmans, the very nature of the transaction – whereby shares ‘borrowed’ by Kevin were exchanged for the final total of $83.9 million in cash and paid to Maxwell’s private company – enabled the bankers to understand precisely the unusual use that was being made of pension fund assets.

Haas did not reveal those details that day in Florida, but enough had been said to prompt Daily’s comment: ‘I don’t like the sound of it. It’s a bit dodgy.’

‘We haven’t had this conversation,’ replied Haas. ‘I know my half. You know your half. Together we know too much.’ Haas would deny this version of the conversation.

Daily ignored this advice and reported the conversation to Bob Southgate, his superior in London. Southgate’s reaction was, ‘It’s all very sensitive,’ referring not to Maxwell’s financial predicament, but to the fact that Maxwell owned a 20 per cent stake in Invesco MIM and was a friend of the fund’s chairman, Lord Stevens (moreover its president was Lord Rippon, a director of MCC). After a number of huddled conversations, Invesco’s managers agreed to accept Maxwell’s assurances.

In the event, the pension fund shares were exchanged with Lehmans for Treasury bills which were then cashed. The money was paid not to the pension funds but to LBI and then to Headington Hill Investments, Maxwell’s private company. The bankers’ apparent lack of concern that Maxwell might have been using pension fund shares to raise cash was reflected in their confused records. Haas was dealing with LBI, Maxwell’s private investment company, which allegedly was representing BIM, the pension fund managers. Yet in Lehmans’ records the depositor of the shares was recorded as ‘LBIIM’, a different entity, suggesting unusual carelessness by the bank.

Trevor Cook, meanwhile, was not only ignorant of the deal negotiated by Trachtenberg and Kevin with Lehmans, but when on 16 October Daily arrived at a Maxwell office in Shoe Lane to meet him and Trachtenberg, he remained unaware of the Invesco trader’s conversation with Haas. Daily had invited himself to present his expertise in stock lending. Towards the end of the meeting, Trachtenberg explained to Daily that LBI was paying 1.75 per cent for stock-lending fees. Although Daily realized that the figure was higher than normal, he said nothing. Cook also stayed silent: he knew that LBI’s fees might be high but he ‘had no point of reference’. Any doubts were offset by Donoughue’s presence within LBI. ‘I trusted Donoughue and he knew that we were stock lending the pension fund assets. I assumed it was all right,’ recalled Cook.

‘That was a load of rubbish,’ Daily said to his colleagues as they descended in the lift.

‘Don’t say anything here,’ replied one of the other occupants. ‘The lift’s probably bugged.’

Cramped into a small office on their return, Daily told his superiors, ‘It’s all wrong.’ The response was equivocal. To refuse to comply with their client’s request was out of the question, not least because Maxwell was a shareholder and a friend of Lord Stevens. So, on 19 October, after several telephone calls asking, ‘Is it all ready?’, Trachtenberg arrived in Invesco’s entrance hall and personally took the share certificates from Daily, signing a receipt. On one issue Trachtenberg was insistent: the transfer was temporary. The certificates were to be returned in thirty days.

To regularize the arrangement, Kevin and Robert Maxwell signed a contract. Kevin (on behalf of BIM) and his father (on behalf of the Robert Maxwell Group) agreed that RMG could borrow BIM’s stock. Although dated 1 October 1990, it appears to have been formulated at the end of 1990 to cover the Capel Cure and Invesco transactions. It allowed both Kevin and Trachtenberg to reinforce the claim they were making to Cook that pension fund assets were involved in stock lending. But Cook, although he was BIM’s manager, was not suspicious. After he had received a letter from Lehmans stating that the shares and Treasury bills ‘were held for your account’, he assumed that the pension funds were covered by genuine collateral of between 125 and 150 per cent. But he never actually saw any share certificates, nor did he ask to see anything. ‘I just got lists and letters,’ Cook later reflected ruefully, ‘from Trachtenberg on behalf of LBI.’ Everything, he believed, was held by the banks. He did not ask to see the Treasury bills nor did he realize that they had been cashed. ‘I should have checked the share certificates but I didn’t suspect anything. I was fooled.’