Mind Presentation in Ian McEwan's Fiction

Critical approaches to McEwan's novels demonstrate the growing importance of character, fictional minds and consciousness throughout his writing career. It is believed that socio-historical (external) circumstances and their pernicious impact on children's and young adults' behaviour are central concerns in his earlier novels. Moreover, the representation of the impact of narrative events and situations on the fictional minds' consciousness appears to be the crucial concern in McEwan's later narratives published after The Child in Time (1987). After a discussion of these issues, the cardinal questions of the present study, the approach it applies in order to examine and explore the mental workings of the chosen fictional minds are given at the end of the following section.

1.1 Reading McEwan as a Cognitive Novelist

McEwan's fiction has evolved thematically and technically during the nearly four decades of his writing career. He »has been considered [a] shocking« writer in his early career and a »serious and contemplative novelist« (Childs, The 2) with respect to his later work. In his later novels, McEwan has paid close attention to the presentation of fictional minds. He uses the omniscient third person narrative mode in AM (1998), AT (2002), Saturday (2005), CB (2007) and Solar (2010) as well as diverse consciousness (re)presentation[7] methods—direct thought, indirect thought and particularly free indirect thought (FIT). These techniques allow him to report focalised characters' inner perceptions in order to involve the reader in the mental functioning of the fictional characters. With their high degrees of fictionality and narrativity,[8] moreover, these narratives are potential to anchor themselves firmly to the readers' real world knowledge, experience and mental models, or to their so-called frames and scripts. Therefore, McEwan can be considered as a cognitive novelist.

McEwan's central narrative themes and techniques, according to Angus R. B. Cochran, should not be analysed apart from

a tradition of twentieth-century European novelists who took it upon themselves to expose the cynicism and corruption of government, patriarchy, class division and nationalism. Furthermore, his influences—Kafka, Woolf, Joyce—proposed that individual psychology was inextricably bound up with such large-scale social forces. (407)

One should also include in this list of influences Henry James as »something of a mentor.« McEwan, however, as Brooker adds, has »imaginatively engaged with the politics of the present« (53, 54) in his works. Exploration of the individual psychology becomes central in McEwan's later fiction in which he primarily »illuminates the cavernous makeup of the mind by using his own instrument, his penetrating prose. The place he discovers there is both dark and elegant« (Cochran 407). Even though this statement by Cochran predates the novels discussed in this study, it fits them as well. They are predominantly concerned with the representation of the fictional characters' mental functioning. Moreover, they explore the destructive impact of fictional minds' intramental thoughts on their inter-personal relationships. Likewise, McEwan, according to Wells,

combines a contemporary sensibility about the power and limitations of narrative with a keen sense of his characters' inner lives and their struggles to deal morally with one another. His work demonstrates an impressive variety of generic styles and a wide historical range while consistently providing his readers with points of identification and reflection about their own lives. (»Ian McEwan« 252)

Through presentation of their mental functioning, McEwan's consciousness narratives present the characters' inner lives showing the nature or mode of their thoughts and the way(s) they deal with the other fictional minds. As Matt Ridley states, »The novelist's privilege, according to Ian McEwan, is to step inside the consciousness of others, and to lead the reader there like psychological Virgil« (vii). Similarly, McEwan in AM, AT and CB steps inside the central characters' consciousnesses and in this way enables the reader to compare and contrast the presented perspectives.

1.2 Mind Representation in Amsterdam, Atonement and

On Chesil Beach and the Aim of this Study

Presentation of the characters' mental functioning is the central narrative concern in McEwan's AM, AT and CB. In the first part of AT Briony, is represented as yearning to impose her mental order on her surroundings. Likewise, McEwan's two other narratives, as Wells states, »have a number of things in common despite their very different subjects and generic styles. Both focus on a small number of characters engaged in tightly formed relationships and lead to intense dramatic action and climactic endings« (Ian McEwan 84). This study maintains that whenever the main characters in the chosen narratives become too much intramental pursuing only their own interests or perspectives, they finally face excruciating pain and failure. Although the fictional minds in AM are situated and constructed socially, the communication among them fails mostly because the intramental side of their mental functioning overcomes the intermental one or the balance between them is disrupted. The reader mainly becomes aware of such situations through both the narrative presentation of the concerned characters' unuttered thoughts and their behaviour. For example, in AM, »As the novel proceeds, the reader enters the minds of the two protagonists and some other characters, too, and follows their moods, uncertainties, and intimations of mortality and immortality« (Malcolm 192). In other words, »In both books, the characters are either unwilling or unable to recognise the needs of others, and remain trapped within modes of self-serving behaviour that ultimately harm them as well« (Wells, Ian McEwan 85). Moreover, the primary focus of these narratives seems to be character presentation. According to Palmer »characters« in these narratives »face sharp and painful dilemmas relating to attempts to exercise control over other minds and the motives in trying to doing so« (Social 64). This characteristic, presentation of characters' or selves' relationships with the others, is in fact in line with McEwan's style too. Pascal Nicklas refers to this case stating that: »At the heart of McEwan's poetology is the desire to look through the eyes of someone else. The confusion of the self and the other [. . .] in general opens up for Ian McEwan the ethical dimension of literature« (9). Further, the main problem in these narratives arises when the rift between the central characters' intermental units and their intramental orientations is left unfilled causing disequilibrium in the narratives. This brings about a situation when the central characters are unable to come to terms with their own problems or, recognizing them, they are unable to cure them through having a real affiliation between their private selves and the social cognitive networks. In other words, they are unable to construct a permanent balance in their intermental units. It is mainly because of such paucity that their relationships are likely affected adversely.

This study explores the mental functioning of the central characters in McEwan's three narratives. As it is shown in the discussion chapters, the main reason for the disruption of fictional intermental units in AM, AT and CB appears to be the central characters' intramental dissents. The possible worlds in these narratives, moreover, anchor themselves strongly to the reader's world knowledge, experiences or models. This happens because the narratives primarily represent the impact of the presented events and situations on the central characters' consciousness throughout their life courses. This characteristic makes the mentioned narratives more narratives or narratives with high degrees of narrativity because they closely portray the characters' consciousness or the quality of what it's like to undergo some experiences. The difficulty of constructing stable intermental relationships or cognitive units between and among these minds, however, appears to be the main reason for the destructive consequences in these narratives. The »reflector-characters«[9] in these narratives, furthermore, appear to prefer their single subjectivity over (re)constructing intermental units. They are depicted as relying mainly on their own (mis)interpretations of the other(s) as well as on their own minds or highly aspectual perceptions. That seems to be the fundamental reason in bringing about the lack of a unified social or intermental unit in these narratives or annihilating any established one(s) within them.

As this study argues, the workings of the fictional minds in AM, AT and CB reveal both intermental/social and intramental/individual aspects. It is, nevertheless, the negative emotional consequences of their subjective first position, or intramental side of their mental functioning, that fundamentally orient their mental states. This also finally brings about the fatal imbalance to their relationships. In AM, this situation ends at Clive's and Vernon's double murder and in CB in Edward's and Florence's separation before consummating their marriage. This study explores the way(s) fictional minds within these narratives operate when they encounter with challenging conflicts as well as the impact of those momentous conflicts on the operation of their consciousness. Following such a process, the study explores how narrative experience takes place too. To do that, the study, in a combining manner in the discussion chapters, uses the terminologies provided by Palmer and Herman about the workings and presentation of fictional minds as well as the impact of the dissenting events and situations on their experiencing consciousness within AM, AT and CB. Accordingly, two subjects are explored in the theoretical part of this study: the relationship between narrative meaning or experience and fictional minds as well as the connection between any narrative reader's cognitive abilities and her/his understanding of the fictional minds. In analysing the three selected narratives, this study focuses on three points. Firstly, it examines the narrativity level of each narrative. Secondly, it explores the way fictional minds in them are presented and the manner of their operation. Finally, the study analyses the impacts of central characters' thoughts and (mental) experiences on their and the other characters' (individual and social) behaviour/actions as well as relationships.

2. Cognitive Narratology and Consciousness (Re)Presentation

Situated at a point where the narrative and cognitive turns meet, cognitive narratology provides a meeting ground for many disciplines, including literature, history, linguistics, pragmatics, philosophy, and psychology. (Jahn, »Cognitive« 67)

Interiority, experientiality, and fictional minds are, after all, a good part of what we read novels for. (Palmer, Fictional 38)

The research at issue suggests not only that narrative is centrally concerned with qualia, a term used by philosophers of mind to refer to the sense of what it's like for someone or something to have a particular experience, but also that narrative bears importantly on debates concerning the nature of consciousness itself. (Herman, Basic 144)

This chapter explores the fundamental questions of CN, the approach to fictional minds according to Palmer's theories as well as the concept of narrative and narrativity from Herman's perspective. These subjects are the basic theoretical issues for the analysis of the central characters' mental functioning in AM, AT and CB. Under the first subframe, Cognitive Narratology and Narrative Experience, the fundamental questions of CN are examined and then, under a sub-subframe, Fictional Minds and Cognitive Reader, the role of narrative reader is examined within that framework. Further, under the second subframe, Palmer's Approach to Fictional Minds' Mental Functioning, the concepts of fictional minds, their workings within the storyworlds, their presentational modes and their construction and understanding by the reader are discussed. Finally, under the third subframe, Narrative and Narrativity, the concept of narrative and its most important element, what it's like or qualia, as well as reader's narrative experience are explored according to Herman's theories.

2.1 Cognitive Narratology and Narrative Experience

As an important branch of postclassical narratology, CN has been developing from the classical narratology since 1980s. Analyses of the fictional characters' cognitive aspects in postclassical narratology, according to Palmer, take place within two conceptual frameworks: possible-worlds theory and cognitive science. While the former one »regards the fictional text as a set of instructions according to which the storyworld is recovered and reassembled,« the latter, »derived from cognitive science, studies how various cognitive frames and scripts which are made up of real-world, stereotypical knowledge are applied to the reading process« (»Thought« 606). Moreover, considered »as a subdomain […and] still an emergent trend within the broader domain of narratology,« CN[10] »at present constitutes more a set of loosely confederated heuristic schemes than a systematic framework for inquiry.« The lack of a »systematic framework,« however, does not mean that the related works in this field are disconnected. According to Herman, the »mind relevant aspects of storytelling practices« is a »trait shared by all this work [cognitive approaches to narrative fiction].« Following that, CN is defined as »the study of mind-relevant aspects of storytelling practices« (Herman, »Cognitive« 30–31). It is so because in CN »representation of minds are [considered] fundamental to stories« (Herman, »Cognition« 257)[11]. In addition, reader experiences storyworld mainly through following the cognitive aspects of narrative.

Narrative, according to Herman, is a »cognitive activity« (Basic 98) since its »meaning potential requires the cognitive activity of readers« (Herman, »Cognitive« 33).[12] Furthermore, mind, as claimed by Herman, is crucial to storyworld since »stories both shape and are shaped by what minds perceive, infer, remember, and feel« (»Cognition« 257). Likewise, representation of the experiencing minds is considered to be one of the key concerns in McEwan's work since, as maintained by Nicklas, »The genome and theories of the mind and brain as well as Darwinian evolutionary models or ecological problems of climate change are the background to much of McEwan's fiction and his many articles« (10). CN is, furthermore, concerned with questions that in general deal with narrative production, the nature of fictional minds' functioning as well as their presentation in narrative and narrative understanding. Moreover, in the opinion of Palmer, »One of the concerns of cognitive narratology is the relationship between consciousness and narrative« (»Attributions« 292) which is central to this study too. The following questions, which, according to Herman, »still suggest themselves to the cognitive narratologists« (»Cognitive« 31), are also the fundamental questions of the present study:

How exactly do stories function as tools for thinking? Is it the case that [. . .] narrative is a mode of representation tailor-made for gauging the felt quality of lived experiences? More radically, do stories afford scaffolding for consciousness itself—in part by emulating through their temporal and perspectival configuration the nature of conscious awareness itself? In other words, are there grounds for making the strong claim that narrative not only represents what it is like for experiencing minds to live through events in storyworlds, but also constitutes a basis for having—for knowing—a mind at all, whether it is one's own or another's?[13] (Herman, »Cognitive« 32)

CN, as Herman understands, intends to evaluate narrative as tools for thinking[14] meaning that any narrative provides some cues that initiate the reader's cognitive activities while experiencing narrative. In addition, it is a medium of experience representation and representation of the impact of represented events and situations on characters' consciousness. CN, moreover, intends to connect the storyworlds to the readers' actual world knowledge and experiences treating fictional minds' operation partially like the mental functioning of the actual minds in many respects. It is concerned with the relationship between narrative or storyworld presentation and the actual lived experiences. It examines the relationship between the nature of fictional minds' functioning, the way they are presented as well as their consciousness and the manner they are actualised or configured in the reader's mind while experiencing narrative[15]. All in all, CN-based analysis presupposes the affinity between the storyworld and the actual one and hence attempts to analyse, in Herman's words, the »mind-relevant aspects of storytelling practices« (»Cognitive« 31) in the former one based on the principles of the latter. That is so, because, as Herman suggests elsewhere, fictional minds' examination »entails giving an account of readers' minds, too—of how readers interpret particular textual details as information about characters' attempts to make sense of the world around them« (»Cognition« 245). Likewise, the central concern in AM, AT and CB seems to be the fictional minds' reactions to the challenging situations and events or their mental functioning in different situations. In other words, they both »replicate consciousness in text« (Ridley vii). In AM, for example, Clive-Vernon relationship is mostly represented through their internal broodings both about each other and about themselves. In the same way, the bedroom scene and the beach scene in CB are represented primarily through Edward's and Florence's internal perspectives focusing on their intramental evaluations of the conflicts. Likewise, in AT the narrative mainly shows how Briony's perspective at some particular moments (for example in the fountain scene) is in conflict with that of the others. As a result of this characteristic, these narratives are rich in terms of tools for thinking, experience, consciousness, mindreading and the other cognitive related issues.[16]

The attention to the importance of mind, experience, consciousness as well as the reader's function in narrative interpretation and finally his/her narrative experience are mainly notable within the postclassical phase of narratology. With an autonomous and self-sufficient understanding of the text, classical narratology was limited to the textual framework. According to Jahn, it attempted to refute as far as possible any extraneous factors ignoring »the forces, and desires of psychological, social, cultural and historic contexts.« Therefore, it rejected the idea that »texts« should be »reconstructed in an ongoing and revisable readerly process« (»Cognitive« 67) as pursued by the postclassical approaches to narrative. Further, the abstract nature of classical models, in terms of story and text, is believed to »ignore(s) experience, ideology, and other so-called subjective and contextual elements as much as possible« (Herman and Vervaeck 104). The early narratologists, or Francophone Structuralists, were influenced by the Russian Formalism through Vladimir Propp's Morphology of the Folktale (1928). After Tzvetan Todorov proposed the term narratology in 1968, they came to be known as structuralist narratologists. They emphasised on narrative form, its intrinsic constituents and common ingredients in order to define a universal pattern or grammar for the understanding of narrative function. The structuralist-inspired narratology, as Gerald Princestates, was »text type rather than context, grammar rather than rhetoric, form rather than force« (A Dictionary 66).

Postclassical narratology, however, has made efforts to extend the focus of analysis in the process of narrative experience beyond the textual frames of narrative though including the contextual elements such as the importance of author, reader, history, class, gender etc. Nevertheless, postclassical narratology, as Herman points out, is not considered as a negation of the classical one but instead it »draws on concepts and methods to which the classical narratology did not have access to« (»Scripts« 1049). Moreover, it:

contains structuralist theory as one of its »moments« but enriches the older approach with research tools taken from other areas of inquiry. Or, to put the same point another way, postclassical narratology expands the scope of narrative analysis and its applicability. The result is not simply new ways of getting at old problems in narrative analysis but a rearticulation of those problems, including the root problem of how to define stories. (»Scripts« 1057)

Therefore, in spite of the fact that »The postclassical approaches partly resist structuralism,« or the so-called classical narratology, »but at the same time rarely if ever make a complete break from it« (Herman and Vervaeck 103). One of the ›research tools‹ that in postclassical narratology has been included in narrative analysis approaches comes from cognitive psychologists. Cognitive approach to narrative, accordingly, argues that narrative readers—who experience narrative using their actual experiences and cognitive abilities—undergo nearly the same experiences as represented in the storyworld or experienced by the fictional characters.

Accordingly, »Cognitive dimensions of stories and storytelling,« according to Herman, »has become an important subdomain within the field of narrative analysis.« It is »concerned both with how people understand narratives and with narrative itself as a mode of understating« (»Narrative: Cognitive« 452). Cognitive approaches to literature, therefore, intend to analyse the (cognitive) techniques readers apply in order to experience narratives. It also explores the ways narrative itself can be taken as a mode of understanding (the minds and experiences) or as a tool for thinking. Hence, the presupposition behind Herman's statement is twofold.[17] Firstly, fictional minds and storyworld as a whole can be treated as well as analysed like actual minds or actual world entities. Secondly, it is implied that from the perspective of cognitive approach to literature, narrative reader or audience is central to the process of decoding narrative information. In the same way, Palmer, as a follower of cognitive theories and approaches, underlines the fundamental role of the reading processes of real readers. He remarks that »the constructions of the minds of fictional characters by narrators and readers are central to our understanding of how novels work, because readers enter storyworlds primarily by attempting to follow the workings of the fictional minds contained in them« (Social 7). However, considering the symbiotic relationship between the diegetic feature (that is narrator) and extradiegetic feature (that is real readers) of the narrative, Herman's and Palmer's stances are unlike those of the classical narratologists. Classical or structuralist narratology inclined to constrain the active role of reader in narrative comprehension by its over emphasis on intradiegetic or textual features.[18]

2.1.1 Fictional Minds and Cognitive Reader

Fictional minds are modelled by the help of readers' cognitive abilities based on the semiotic features provided by the author in the narrative text. Accordingly, CN considers fictional character, not plot or sequence of events, as the central part of narrative through which reader's experience of fictional world is realised. That is so because narrative plot is primarily shaped by what happens to characters within the storyworld or by the events that become their experiences. It follows that, narrative is in fact representation, as well as analysis, of the impact of narrative events and situations on fictional characters. That is so because, as Palmer says, »events in the storyworld are of little importance unless they become the experiences of characters. We follow the plot by following the workings of fictional minds« (»The Lydgate« 156). At the centre of Palmer's research lies the question »how fictional minds work within the context of the storyworlds to which they belong« (»Construction« 29). According to him, fictional minds are the product of both story level and the discourse level of narrative: