Some Principles of Maritime Strategy

Also it must be remembered that nine times out of ten the most effective way of "seeking out the enemy's fleet" (i.e., forcing an action on him) is to seize a position which controls communications vital to his plan of campaign.

This was what happened in 1704. Rooke was unable to seek out the Toulon Fleet, but by seizing Gibraltar he made it come to him (not intentionally, but by the operation of strategical law).

Practically all great naval actions have been brought about in this way, that is, they have been the outcome of an effort to clear essential communications from the enemy's fleet; e.g., Gravelines, La Hogue, Quiberon, Trafalgar, Tsushima.

Similarly the great actions of the old Dutch wars were brought about because our geographical position placed us astride the Dutch trade communications, and they were forced to seek a decision against our fleet.

In applying the maxim of "seeking out the enemy's fleet" it should be borne in mind that if you seek it out with a superior force you will probably find it in a place where you cannot destroy it, except at very heavy cost. It is far better to make it come to you, and this has often been done by merely sitting on the common communications.

Again, if you seek out the enemy's fleet without being certain of getting contact, you may merely assist it in evading you, and enable it to get into a position on your own communications, from which it may be very costly to dislodge it. It was for this reason that the Elizabethan Government kept the fleet in home waters in 1588. Sampson, in the Spanish-American War, was actually permitted to make this mistake. By going to seek out Cervera without being sure of contact, he left him a clear run into Cienfuegos or even Havana, which it was the main function of the fleet to prevent. Captain Mahan has since modified this maxim as follows:—"Seek out the enemy's fleet, if you are sure of getting contact." A truer maxim would seem to be "Seek contact with the enemy's fleet in the most certain and favourable manner that is open to you." To seek out the enemy's fleet is only one way of doing this, and not always the best way. It must be remembered that other conditions being equal, it is an obvious advantage to fight in your own waters rather than in those of the enemy, and more likely to ensure that a defeat of the enemy will be decisive.

RN WAR COLLEGE PORTSMOUTH

JANUARY 1909

1

Clausewitz, On War, p. ix. The references are to Colonel Graham's translation of the third German edition, but his wording is not always followed exactly.

2

Clausewitz, On War, Book viii, chap, ii

3

Ibid, Preparatory Notice, p. vii.

4

Ibid, p. viii

5

Wellington's view of the essential factor was expressed to Rear Admiral Martin, who was sent to Spain by the Admiralty to confer with him in September 1813. "If anyone," he said, "wishes to know the history of this war, I will tell them it is our maritime superiority gives me the power of maintaining my army while the enemy are unable to do so." (Letters of Sir T. Byam Martin) [Navy Records Society], ii, p. 499.

6

Correspondance de Napoléon, xix, 421, 4 September.

7

Development of Strategical Science.

8

The strategical object with which the Baltic fleet was sent was certainly to prevent a counter-stroke—that is, its main function in our war plan was negative. Its positive function was minor and diversionary only. It also had a political object as a demonstration to further our efforts to form a Baltic coalition against Russia, which entirely failed. Public opinion mistaking the whole situation expected direct positive results from this fleet, even the capture of St. Petersburg. Such an operation would have converted the war from a limited one to an unlimited one. It would have meant the "overthrow of the enemy," a task quite beyond the strength of the allies without the assistance of the Baltic Powers, and even so their assistance would not have justified changing the nature of the war, unless both Sweden and Russia had been ready to make unlimited war and nothing was further from their intention.

9

In justice to Wellington, it should be said that his complaints were due to false reports that exaggerated a couple of insignificant captures into a serious interruption.

10

But not without analogous precedent. In the later Middle Ages small craft were assigned the function in battle of trying to wedge up the rudders of great ships or bore holes between wind and water. See Fighting Instructions (Navy Record Society), p. 13.

11

Daveluy, L'Esprit de la Guerre Navale, vol. i, p. 27, note.

12

Mahan, War of 1812, i, 316.

13

The Dutch were believed to have sixteen of the line—one seventy-four, seven sixty-eights, and the rest under sixty guns. In Ross's squadron were one three-decker and two eighties.

14

See post, pp. 222-24.

15

Nelson to Barham, 29 August 1805.

16

Captain Philip Patton to Sir Charles Middleton, 27 June 1794. Barham Papers, ii, 393. Patton had probably wider war experience than any officer then living. He was regarded as possessing a very special knowledge of personnel, and as vice admiral became second sea lord under Barham in 1804.

17

Barham Papers, i, 302.

18

To Evan Nepean, 4 September 1801. Nicolas, Nelson Despatches, iv, 484.

19

For Barham's final views, 1805, see Barham Papers, iii, 90-93.

20

Delarbre, Tourville et la marine de son temps, p. 339.

21

Barham Papers, i, 292.

22

Admiralty Secretary's In-Letters, 537, 8 August 1803.

23

Supra, p. 222.

24

It should be said that Cornwallis did not regard this system as new except for the extension from Finisterre to St. Vincent, which Nelson advised. In acknowledging the order from Ushant he wrote, "The instructions … are nearly the same as have generally been given. I can therefore only guess why a copy of the order was sent to me."—Admiralty, In-Letters, 129, 28 September 1805.

25

The Japanese in the late war attempted to do this work by means of a highly organized Army Disembarkation Staff, but except in perfect conditions of weather and locality it does not seem to have worked well, and in almost all cases the assistance of the navy was called in.

26

Sir Hugh Cloberry Christian was an officer of high distinction with a remarkable record of battle service. He had been serving as Howe's second captain just before his promotion to flag rank in 1795, and died as Commander-in-Chief at the Cape at the early age of fifty-one.

27

On analogous grounds almost every military critic has condemned the policy of this disastrous expedition as involving a dispersal of our slender military force at a time when everything called for its concentration in Europe.