Imperialism and Mr. Gladstone

II

Source.—The Times, March 29, 1878

The uncertainty which has prevailed during the last few days respecting the course which our Government would pursue, in view of the difference respecting the Congress which had arisen between ourselves and Russia, has received a startling and momentous solution. When the House of Lords met yesterday, Lord Derby no longer occupied his seat on the Ministerial Bench, and he at once announced that he had resigned the office of Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs… The explanations given yesterday remove all doubt respecting the relative positions assumed by our Government and Russia in regard to the Congress. Sir Stafford Northcote stated in the House of Commons the import of the communications which have passed between ourselves and Russia… Russia's reply amounted to a clear intimation that she claims to withhold from the cognizance of the Powers any articles of the preliminary Treaty she may choose. Such a reserve as she asserts is tantamount to a definite claim to alter an existing Treaty by force of arms without consulting the other Powers who signed it, and towards whom she is under honourable obligations. There being this imminent danger that the Congress may not meet – it being, as Lord Beaconsfield said, "the belief" of the Government "that the Congress would not meet," it became necessary for the Government to consider what further course they would take… We do not know what course Lord Derby would have advised, and it is possible he would not immediately have taken any fresh steps. But the rest of the Government decided that in the interests of peace, and for the due protection of the rights of the Empire, it was their duty "to advise Her Majesty to avail herself of those powers which she has for calling for the services of her Reserved Forces." As subsequently explained by Mr. Hardy in the House of Commons, this step is one which is rendered necessary by the new organization of the Army… Its result will be to raise our regular forces to their utmost efficiency. In other words, it will place the land forces which actually exist in readiness for prompt action; and it is thus a plain declaration – a declaration rendered emphatic by Lord Derby's resignation – that we are prepared to act promptly if the course on which Russia has entered directly injures our honour or our interests. Such a declaration of our being determined to adhere to the claims we have put forward is perhaps the most momentous step which has yet been taken by this country.

PEACE WITH HONOUR (1878)

Source.—The Times, July 17

The Premier alighted at his official residence in Downing Street, and was met on the threshold by General Ponsonby, bearing a bouquet of rare flowers, sent to him by the gracious forethought of Her Majesty the Queen… The ground was well kept by the police, till the Prime Minister appeared at a window and began to speak. Then a rush swept the police away. Three cheers for Lord Beaconsfield were given. For the second time in the day the Prime Minister was visibly affected. He had to wait long for silence, but when an approach to quiet had been obtained Lord Beaconsfield said: "I can assure you that no recognition of neighbours could be more gratifying to my feelings than these expressions of the sentiments of those among whom I see many of my oldest and most cherished friends. Lord Salisbury and myself have brought you back peace, but a peace, I hope, with honour, which may satisfy our Sovereign, and tend to the welfare of the country."

THE SECRET AGREEMENTS IN BEACONSFIELD'S POCKETS (1878)

Source.—Hansard, Third Series, vol. 242, col. 344 (House of Lords: Debate on the Protocols of Berlin, August, 1878)

The Earl of Rosebery rose to call attention to a memorandum purporting to have been signed by the Marquis of Salisbury and Count Schouvaloff on May 30, 1878, and to ask if it was the intention of the Government to lay it on the table of the House… The course the Government had pursued with respect to their policy was, he would venture to say, one of obscurity enlivened with sarcasm. In the whole history of the negotiations there were five cardinal points – points which became salient to everyone who had studied the history of these transactions. First, there was the San Stefano treaty; the second was the circular of the 1st of April; the third, the alleged secret agreement of May 30th; the fourth, the secret convention of June 4th with Turkey; and the fifth was the treaty signed at Berlin on the 30th of July. As to the secret agreement between Russia and England, it would be well to recall how they came to have any cognizance of it at all. The substance of it appeared in the Globe within, he thought, three or four days after it was signed, and it was on the 14th of June, he thought, that the entire text was given in the columns of the same journal… They had all heard that the agreement was not to be laid on the table, because there were documents in connection with it which it would be necessary to present at the same time; but other Powers would not allow us to produce them. What he gathered from all this was that, if it had not been for the ill-advised conduct of a very subordinate clerk in the Foreign Office, who was entrusted with the copying of the agreement at the rate of 10d. an hour, the English public would not at this moment have the faintest conception of such an agreement, and the keystone of the whole purpose of the Government would be wrapped in obscurity. This was alarming in itself, because, if these subterranean methods were employed as a rule, they would give the public some little dismay in regard to the course of further negotiations… Having signed this agreement, and having signed another secret agreement within two or three days with Turkey, Her Majesty's Plenipotentiaries proceeded, fortified with them, to the Congress. Now came the most extraordinary point in all the history of these negotiations, so far as they knew it. Eight days after the signature, or alleged signature, of this agreement, in which, if the House would remember, we consented to the abandonment of Batoum and other Russian conquests in Armenia, the Foreign Secretary addressed a despatch to our Resident Plenipotentiary in Berlin, in which he urged him to use his exertions to the utmost on behalf of Batoum. The words were so remarkable that he might be pardoned for quoting them to their lordships. On the 8th of June the noble Marquis wrote to Lord Odo Russell: "There is no ground for believing that Russia will willingly give way in respect to Batoum, Kars, or Ardahan; and it is possible that the arguments of England urged in Congress will receive little assistance from other Powers, and will not be able to shake her resolution in this respect." Well, that was not likely under the circumstances. The noble Marquis continued in this letter of June 8th: "You will not on that account abstain from earnestly pressing upon them and upon Russia the justice of abstaining from annexations which are unconnected with the professed object of the war, and profoundly distasteful to the populations concerned, and the expediency, in regard to the future tranquillizing of Asia, of forbearing to shake so perilously the position of the Government of Turkey…" Now, the great point with regard to this was, was Lord Odo Russell, when he received that communication, cognizant of the agreement which had been signed on the 30th of May? Because what they wanted to know was this, was Lord Odo Russell one of a company, or was he a simple actor put up to recite the arguments of Batoum, with a prompter by to keep him to his part?.. Then, on the same day, Mr. Secretary Cross addressed a despatch to the Plenipotentiaries of Her Majesty, urging them to make great exertion on behalf of Greece. He should say that the position of a Plenipotentiary who entered the Congress to struggle on behalf of Batoum, Kars, Ardahan, and Greece must have been a somewhat melancholy one in the retrospect; because, when the questions came up, the Turkish positions were abandoned, and Greece was ignored… He did not pretend that secret understandings were unknown to us, but he believed this was the first time we had called a European Congress with the view of discussing great treaties, and standing forth on behalf of public law, we ourselves having, at the same time, bound ourselves in private to consent to those stipulations which we had denounced, and which we continued to denounce.

GLADSTONE INDIGNANT AGAIN (1878)

Source.—The Times, December 2

Mr. Gladstone (at Greenwich): I want to ask you, and I think after these two years it is about time, who are the true friends of Russia? Is it we, gentlemen, who met two years and a half ago on Blackheath, and said it was most mischievous to leave to any single country the settlement of the Eastern question?.. Who brought Russia back to the Danube? Those very men who are continually denouncing us as the friends of Russia. We had in 1856 by the fortune of war driven Russia back from the Danube; the present Government have brought Russia back to the Danube. They made a secret memorandum with Count Schouvaloff by which they engaged – unless they could convert him by their arguments – to vote in the Congress for bringing Russia back to the Danube… Who gave Russia the fortress of Kars? The present Government. These people say they want to keep down the power of Russia. Want to keep down the power of Russia! Why, they have left it in her power to make herself the liberator of Bulgaria, and secure for herself the influence which always follows upon gratitude.

RUSSIAN INTRIGUE AT CABUL (1878)

Source.—Parliamentary Publications, "Afghanistan," C 2,190 of 1878, p. 228Telegram dated August 2, 1878. From Viceroy, Simla, to Secretary of State, London

Further confirmation received of presence of Russian mission at Cabul headed by General Abramoff, Governor of Samarkand, who is mentioned by name. We desire to point out that present situation requires immediate correction. It will soon be known throughout India that Russian officers and troops have been received with honour, and are staying at Cabul within short distance of our frontier and our largest military garrison, while our officers have been denied admission there. We have further reports of Russian officers having visited and been well received at Maimena. To remain inactive now will, we respectfully submit, be to allow Afghanistan to fall as certainly and as completely under Russian power and influence as the Khanates. We believe we could correct situation if allowed to treat it as question between us and the Ameer, and probably could do so without recourse to force. But we must speak plainly and decidedly, and be sure of your support. We propose, therefore, in the first place, to insist on reception of suitable British mission at Cabul. To this we do not anticipate serious resistance; indeed, we think it probable that Ameer, adhering to his policy of playing Russia and ourselves off against each other, will really welcome such mission, while outwardly only yielding to pressure…

From Secretary of State, August 3, 1878 (Extract)

Assuming the certainty of Russian officers at Cabul, your proposals to insist on reception of British envoy approved. In case of refusal you will telegraph again as to the steps you desire to take for compelling the Ameer to receive your mission.

Telegram from Viceroy, September 21, 1878

Chamberlain1 reports from Peshawur that it is quite evident Ameer is bent on utmost procrastination, and determined on making acceptance of our mission dependent on his pleasure and choice of time… To await at Peshawur Ameer's pleasure would be to abandon whole policy and accept easy repulse at outset… Consequently mission moved this morning to Jamrud; thence Cavagnari advances to Ali Musjid with small escort to demand passage…

Telegram from Viceroy, September 22, 1878

Following telegram received last night from Sir Neville Chamberlain. Message begins: Cavagnari reports that we have received a decisive answer from Faiz Mahomed, after personal interview, that he will not allow mission to proceed. He crowned the heights commanding the way with his levies, and though many times warned by Cavagnari that his reply would be regarded as reply of the Ameer, said he would not let mission pass…

Telegram from Secretary of State, October 30, 1878

Text of letter, as approved, to be sent to the Ameer… In consequence of this hostile action on your part, I have assembled Her Majesty's forces on your frontier, but I desire to give you a last opportunity of averting the calamities of war. For this it is necessary that a full and suitable apology be offered by you in writing, and tendered on British territory by an officer of sufficient rank. Furthermore, as it has been found impossible to maintain satisfactory relations between the two States unless the British Government is adequately represented in Afghanistan, it will be necessary that you should consent to receive a permanent British Mission within your territory… Unless these conditions are accepted, fully and plainly, by you, and your acceptance received by me not later than the 20th November, I shall be compelled to consider your intentions as hostile, and to treat you as a declared enemy of the British Government.

SHERE ALI (1878)

Source.—Parliamentary Publications, "Afghanistan," C 2,190 of 1878, p. 225Extract from a Memorandum by Lord Napier of Magdala

We have unfortunately managed Shere Ali badly. Perhaps it might not have been possible, with our scruples and his want of them, to have managed him advantageously; but it must be admitted that we have not given him the reasons to unite himself with us that he naturally expected. First, we stood aloof in his struggles for life and empire, ready to acknowledge whoever might prove the master of Afghanistan. Then, when Shere Ali had subdued his enemies, he came forward to meet us with an alliance, but we were willing to form only an imperfect alliance with him. He was willing to trust us, provided that we would trust him; but we felt that we could not bind ourselves to unreserved support of a power whose ideas of right and wrong were so different from ours. We therefore proposed to bind him, leaving ourselves (according to his idea) free, and he recoiled from this bargain. His friendly feelings, however, were not entirely alienated by that experience of us; he abstained from any action towards Seistan at our desire, and he believed that the mediation which we pressed upon him would have ended by the restoration of the portion of Seistan that Persia had occupied in his days of trouble. And not only Shere Ali, but the whole Afghan people, believed that we should restore to them what they had lost. When they found that we had allowed Persia to obstruct and ill-treat our arbitrator, and to retain much of her encroachments, they looked upon us as a weak and treacherous people, who, under the guise of friendship, had spoiled them in favour of Persia. This I believe to be the root of Shere Ali's discontent with us.

DEATH OF SHERE ALI (1879)

Source.—Parliamentary Publications, "Afghanistan," C 2,401 of 1879, p. 12Translation of a Letter, dated February 26, 1879, from Sirdar Mahomed Yakub Khan to Major Cavagnari

… I now write a second time in accordance with former friendship to inform you that to-day a letter was received by post from Turkestan announcing that my worthy and exalted father had, upon 29th Safar (21st February, 1879), obeyed the call of the summoner, and, throwing off the dress of existence, hastened to the region of the divine mercy.

THE GANDAMAK TREATY (1879)

Source.—Parliamentary Publications, "Afghanistan," C 2,362 of 1879

Article III. – His Highness the Ameer of Afghanistan and its dependencies agrees to conduct his relations with foreign States in accordance with the advice and wishes of the British Government… The British Government will support the Ameer against any foreign aggression with money, arms, or troops, to be employed in whatsoever manner the British Government may judge best for the purpose.

Article IV. – With a view to the maintenance of the direct and intimate relations now established … it is agreed that a British Resident representative shall reside at Cabul, with a suitable escort, in a place of residence appropriate to his rank and dignity. It is also agreed that the British Government shall have the right to depute British Agents with suitable escorts to the Afghan frontiers, whensoever this may be considered necessary by the British Government in the interests of both States, on the occurrence of any important external fact…

Article IX. – The British Government restores to His Highness the Ameer of Afghanistan and its dependencies the towns of Candahar and Jellalabad, with all the territory now in possession of the British armies, excepting the districts of Kurram, Pishin, and Sibi. His Highness … agrees on his part that the districts of Kurram, Pishin, and Sibi, according to the limits defined in the schedule annexed, shall remain under the protection and administrative control of the British Government: that is to say, the aforesaid districts shall be treated as assigned districts, and shall not be considered as permanently severed from the limits of the Afghan kingdom… The British Government will retain in its own hands the control of the Khyber and Michni Passes, and of all relations with the independent tribes of the territory directly connected with these passes.

Done at Gandamak this 26th day of May, 1879.

THE CABUL MASSACRE (1879)

Source.—Parliamentary Publications, "Afghanistan," C 2,457 of 1880, p. 95Statement of Taimur (Timoss), Sowar B troop, Corps of Guides, on September 15, 1879

I was in the Bala Hissar, Cabul, on the 3rd instant: Major Sir Louis Cavagnari and the other British officers were in the bungalow. At about 8 a.m. the Turkestani ("Ardal") regiment, which was in the Bala Hissar, was paraded to receive its pay. Daud Shah, the Commander-in-Chief, gave them one month's pay. They claimed two, and broke. They were paraded quite close to the Residency, and another regiment was also quartered with them. One of soldiery shouted out, "Let us destroy the Envoy first of all, and after that the Ameer!" They rushed into the courtyard in front of the Residency, and stoned some of the syces who were sitting there. We then opened fire on them, without orders from any European. All the British officers were inside. The Ameer's men then went for their weapons, and returned with them in a quarter of an hour. They then commenced to besiege the Residency, and from commanding positions made the roof of the Residency untenable. We made shelter trenches on it, and fired from the windows. The city people came to help the soldiers about 10 a.m. Major Sir Louis Cavagnari was wounded in the forehead about 1 p.m.; he was in a shelter trench. A man from the roof of a house shot at him, and the bullet striking a brick, it, together with a piece of brick, struck Sir Louis. But he was not killed. Mr. Jenkyns came up and sent for a Munshi to write to the Ameer, but the scribe was unable to write through fear. I then wrote briefly to the Ameer that we were besieged, and he was to help us; and sent it by Gholam Nabbi, a Kabuli, an old Guide Sowar who was in the Residency. No answer came. Gholam Nabbi afterwards told me that the Ameer wrote on the letter, "If God will, I am just making arrangements." Major Cavagnari was helped into the Residency, and tended to by Dr. Kelly. Mr. Jenkyns then ordered me to send a second letter to the Ameer, stating that Major Cavagnari was wounded, and to hasten on assistance. The letter was sent by a Hindu whose name I don't know. He was cut to pieces in front of the Residency. I was at about 3 p.m. sent with a letter by Mr. Hamilton promising six months' pay. By that time they had managed to get on to the roof of the Residency. I went armed into the midst of the crowd, and was immediately stripped of my arms, but my life was saved by an officer. They threw me from the roof of the Residency on to the roof of the neighbouring house. I lost my senses… I know nothing of what happened after this, but I visited the place next morning. I recollect they had begun to set fire to the Residency just as I was leaving… Daybreak I went to the Residency, and saw first the corpse of Lieutenant Hamilton lying over a mountain gun which had been brought up. The troops who were there told me Mr. Hamilton had shot about three men with his pistol, and had cut down two more before he was shot. He was stripped and cut into pieces, but not dishonoured. About 25 feet off was the body of Mr. Jenkyns in a similar state. I did not go into the Residency, but was told Dr. Kelly was lying killed in the Residency. Sir Louis Cavagnari was in the Residency when it fell in flames. He was in the room where the wounded were, and his body had not been discovered when I left the city.

Source.—Parliamentary Publications, "Afghanistan," C 2,457 of 1880, p. 83Extract from Deposition of Ressaldar-Major Nakshband Khan

At about 9 a.m., while the fighting was going on, I myself saw the four European officers charge out at the head of some twenty-five of the garrison; they drove away a party that were holding some broken ground. About a quarter of an hour after this another sally was made by a party with three officers at their head – Cavagnari was not with them this time – with the same result. A third sally was made with two British officers (Jenkyns and Hamilton) leading; a fourth sally was made with a Sikh Jemadar bravely leading. No more sallies were made after this. They all appeared to go to the upper part of the house, and fired from above. At about half-past eleven o'clock part of the building, in which the Embassy was, was noticed to be on fire. I do not know who fired it. I think it probable that the defenders, finding themselves so few, fired part, so as to have a less space to defend. The firing went on continuously all day; perhaps it was hottest from 10 a.m. to 3 p.m., after which it slackened, and the last shots were fired at about 8.30 p.m. or 9 p.m., after which all was quiet, and everyone dispersed. The next morning I heard shots being fired. I asked an old woman, to whose house I had been sent for safety by Sirdar Wali Muhammad Khan, what this was: she sent out her son to find out. He said: "They are shooting the people found still alive in the Residency."

THE MIDLOTHIAN CAMPAIGN (1879)

Source.—The Saturday Review, November 29

The personal enthusiasm with which Mr. Gladstone is regarded by the mass of his followers has been largely stimulated by his appearance in Scotland and by his fervid harangues. The only local topic on which he has cared to dwell is the alleged creation of fagot votes by his opponents. There can be no doubt that the purchase of little freeholds for the sole purpose of obtaining votes is an abuse and a grievance, though it is said that Mr. Gladstone once held a fagot vote. For two or three years of his life Mr. Cobden concentrated all his efforts on a gigantic scheme of fagot votes, by which the manufacturing towns were to obtain control of the counties; but the total failure of the project caused it to be tacitly abandoned. If Mr. Gladstone is after all defeated in Midlothian, the moral effect of a Conservative victory will be greatly impaired by the process of tampering with the representation. To Mr. Gladstone's excited mind an attempt to pack a constituency probably assumes extravagant dimensions. Before he arrived at Edinburgh he began his public protest against fagot votes in Midlothian, as well as against the crimes of a Government which he has persuaded himself to regard as the worst and most dangerous that has held power in England. He has denounced his opponents so loudly and so often that even his overflowing eloquence could include nothing new, but the crowded assemblies which he addressed, though they had read his orations, and perhaps his pamphlets, had not heard him speak. It is not surprising that eager and unanimous multitudes should welcome with admiration and delight the detailed exposition, by the most eloquent of politicians, of the opinions which they had already been taught to hold. Few cold-blooded or dispassionate sceptics would ask themselves whether it was credible that a Ministry and a great and steady majority of the House of Commons should never, even by accident, have deviated into prudence, justice, or patriotic foresight. In private discussion and in Parliamentary debate it is found expedient, according to the old legal phrase, to give colour, or, in other words, to admit that the theory, which is impugned, though unsound, is at least credible or intelligible. Mr. Gladstone follows the bent of his own genius when he encourages the popular tendency to deal with difficult controversies as if they were wholly one-sided.